Young v. State of Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-CV-61074-RAR

RUFUS YOUNG,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

__________________________________/

ORDER DENYING HABEAS CORPUS PETITION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging Petitioner’s convictions and sentences imposed by the

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Broward County in Case No. 05-000739CF10A. See

Petition [ECF No. 1] (“Pet.”). Respondent filed a Response to the Petition, see Response to Order

to Show Cause (“Response”) [ECF No. 15], and Petitioner filed a Reply, [ECF No. 20]. Having

carefully reviewed the record and governing law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

DENIES the Petition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Petitioner, along with a codefendant, was indicted on five counts in state court: one

count of felony murder in the first degree, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1)(a)2. (Count 1), and

four counts of attempted armed robbery in violation of Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(a) (Counts 2–5).

Indictment [ECF No. 16-1] at 7–9. After a jury trial, the Petitioner was adjudicated guilty on all

five counts of the Indictment and was sentenced to life imprisonment on Count 1 and four

concurrent fifteen (15) year sentences on the remaining counts. See Judgment and Sentencing

Orders [ECF No. 16-1] at 11–28.

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentences to the Florida Fourth District Court of

Appeal (“Fourth DCA”). Petitioner raised five claims on direct appeal: (1) the trial court erred

when it admitted Petitioner’s “involuntary confession,” Direct Appeal Initial Brief [ECF No. 16-

1] at 51; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to find that the State committed a discovery violation

after “the prosecutor falsely represented to the court . . . [that Petitioner] identified himself to [his

mother] as the person in a composite sketch related to the crime,” id.; (3) trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel “when he failed to object when the State repeatedly insinuated to

the jury [that Petitioner] had confessed involvement in the crime to his mother,” id.; (4) “the trial

court committed reversible error when it repeatedly barred Appellant from recross-examination to

explore [new] material that was central to the issues in his trial,” id. at 52; and (5) the “cumulative

effect” of the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments “reached down into the validity of

the trial and caused a verdict not based on evidence,” id. The appellate court affirmed the trial

court in an unwritten opinion dated April 27, 2011. See Young v. State, 59 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2011). The Fourth DCA issued its mandate thereafter on May 27, 2011. Direct Appeal

Mandate [ECF No. 16-1] at 160.

After Petitioner’s direct appeal concluded, Petitioner attempted to file a “Motion for

Postconviction Relief” pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See First Motion

for Postconviction Relief [ECF No. 16] at 162–80. The first page of the Postconviction Motion

indicated that it was provided to prison officials for mailing on January 23, 2012,1 and received by

1 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered

to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009). “Absent

evidence to the contrary, [courts] assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date

that he signed it.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014).

the state court on January 30, 2012. Id. at 162. On May 16, 2013, Petitioner filed a “new” Motion

for Postconviction Relief. See Second Motion for Postconviction Relief [ECF No. 16-1] at 189–

205. Petitioner also contemporaneously filed a “Motion to Accept Motion for Postconviction

Relief as Timely Filed Nunc Pro Tunc to Original Date of Mailing and Leave to Amend Motion

for Postconviction Relief.” See Motion to Accept Postconviction Motion as Timely (“Timeliness

Motion”) [ECF No. 16-1] at 208–12. Petitioner’s central argument in the Timeliness Motion was

that he properly filed his original January 23, 2012 Motion but “was informed by the Clerk’s office

that there was no record of having received the motion.” Id. at 209. In an abundance of caution,

and with the express purpose of preserving the timeliness of a future federal habeas petition,

Petitioner requested the state court to consider his most recent postconviction motion as timely

filed as of January 23, 2012—and not May 16, 2013. Id. at 210–11. Based on the state court

record provided by the Respondent, the Court cannot ascertain whether the state court ever

explicitly ruled on the Timeliness Motion.2

After the state court subsequently ordered Petitioner to amend his postconviction motion,

see Order Striking Motion for Postconviction Relief [ECF No. 16-1] at 244, Petitioner filed an

Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief on November 15, 2013, see Amended Postconviction

Motion [ECF No. 16-1] at 252–80. Petitioner’s Amended Postconviction Motion contained three

grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to sufficiently argue during a pre-

trial motion to suppress that incriminating statements made by Young were not only the product

of coercive police conduct, but were obtained after his initial detention became an unlawful arrest

2 On July 26, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the Fourth DCA requesting that

the Fourth DCA order the state circuit court to “issue a ruling . . . [on his] motion to accept a timely filed

nunc pro tunc to the original filing date[.]” Petition for Writ of Mandamus [ECF No. 16-3] at 89. The

Fourth DCA ultimately dismissed the petition, concluding that the motion itself was moot “as the [trial]

court granted leave to amend and ruled on the merits of the amended motion.” Order Dismissing Petition

[ECF No. 16-3] at 107.

without probable cause, and for failing to call available witnesses that would have provided crucial

testimony regarding Young’s apprehension by police,” id. at 256; (2) trial counsel was ineffective

“for failing to object” to the prosecutor’s “insinuation” during closing arguments that Petitioner

had confessed to his mother, id. at 266; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to advise

Young that the independent act doctrine was a viable and valid defense under the facts and

circumstances of his case,” id. at 271.

On August 22, 2019,3 the State filed a Response to Petitioner’s Amended Postconviction

Motion. See State’s Response [ECF No. 16-2] at 2–8. The State argued that the state court should

summarily deny all three grounds of Petitioner’s Amended Postconviction Motion. Id. at 8. That

same day, the state court denied the Amended Postconviction Motion “for the reasons contained

in the State’s response[.]” Order Denying Amended Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 16-3] at 81.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his Amended Postconviction Motion to the Fourth DCA. See

Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 16-3] at 83–84. On February 20, 2020, the Fourth DCA again affirmed

the state trial court in an unwritten opinion. See Young v. State, 291 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA

2020). The Fourth DCA’s mandate issued on March 20, 2020, see Postconviction Mandate [ECF

No. 16-3] at 140, and the instant Petition was filed with the Court on June 1, 2020, see Pet. The

Petition raises the three following claims:

1. Ground One: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by “misadvising Petitioner that

there was an arrest warrant; failing to file a motion to suppress incriminating statements

made by Petitioner after an illegal arrest; and for failing to call available witnesses that

would have provided crucial testimony regarding the illegal arrest and resulting

interrogations.” Pet. at 6.

2. Ground Two: Trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to advise Petitioner that the

independent act doctrine was a viable and valid defense under the facts and circumstances

of his case[.]” Id. at 12.

3 There is no explanation in either the state court docket or Respondent’s appendix as to why there was a

delay of nearly six years before the State filed a Response to the Amended Postconviction Motion. See

generally State Court Docket [ECF No. 16-1] at 2–5.

3. Ground Three: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s

insinuation, without an evidentiary basis, that Petitioner “confessed to his mother[.]” Id.

at 20.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

“As amended by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)],

28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a

writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181

(2011). Some of the more restrictive limits are found in § 2254(d). Under that provision, a federal

court may grant habeas relief from a state court judgment only if the state court’s decision on the

merits was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, § 2254(d) constructs a “highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings” because, after all, this standard “demands that state-court decisions be given

the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ federal law if the ‘state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.’” Consalvo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 664 F.3d 842, 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000)) (brackets omitted). A state court’s decision

qualifies as an “an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413) (cleaned up).

“‘If this standard [seems] difficult to meet’—and it is—‘that is because it was meant to be.’” Burt

v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)).

By its own plain terms, § 2254(d)’s deferential standard applies only when a claim “was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen, 563

U.S. at 181 (“If an application includes a claim that has been adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings, § 2254(d), an additional restriction applies.”); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472

(2009) (“Because the Tennessee courts did not reach the merits of Cone’s Brady claim, federal

habeas review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies under AEDPA.”). The

summary denial of a claim with no articulated reasons presumptively serves as an adjudication on

the merits subjecting the claim to § 2254(d)’s additional restrictions. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100

(“This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons

before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’”). This is because

federal courts ordinarily presume that § 2254(d)’s deferential standard applies when a

constitutional claim has been presented to a state court and denied in that forum. See, e.g., id. at

99 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief,

it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any

indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”).

At the same time, “federal court[s] should ‘look through’ [an] unexplained decision to the

last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” if one exists. See Wilson v.

Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (emphasis added). From there, federal courts “presume that

the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. “[T]he State may rebut [that]

presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were

briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.” Id.

In addition to the standard of review imposed by AEDPA, the petitioner must also show

that any constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict to

be entitled to habeas relief. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). The Supreme Court

has explained that, while the passage of AEDPA “announced certain new conditions to [habeas]

relief,” it did not supersede or replace the harmless error standard announced in Brecht. Brown v.

Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2022). In other words, a habeas petitioner must also satisfy

Brecht, even if AEDPA applies. See id. (“[A] federal court must deny relief to a state habeas

petitioner who fails to satisfy either [Brecht] or AEDPA. But to grant relief, a court must find that

the petition has cleared both tests.”) (emphasis in original); see also Mansfield v. Sec’y, Dep’t of

Corr., 679 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[A] habeas petition cannot be successful unless it

satisfies both [AEDPA] and Brecht.”).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to “the Assistance of Counsel

for his defen[s]e.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a habeas litigant must demonstrate “that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and

‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced

his defense.” Raleigh v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.3d 938, 957 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88).

Regarding the deficiency prong, “a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel

would have taken the action that his counsel did take” during the proceedings. Chandler v. United

States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). If “some reasonable lawyer at the trial

could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial[,]” counsel did not perform

deficiently. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting White v. Singletary,

972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992)).

As for the second prong, “a defendant is prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance

if ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

A. Timeliness

Generally, “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” has a one-year

period to file a habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The timeliness of the Petition

was once in doubt, as Respondent originally contested whether Petitioner’s first state

postconviction motion was properly filed on January 23, 2012. See Order to Show Cause [ECF

No. 14] at 1–2. Respondent now concedes that Petitioner’s postconviction motion began to toll

the limitations period on January 23, 2012, “meaning that only 189 days of untolled time passed

between Petitioner’s conviction becoming final and the filing of the instant Petition.” Id. at 2; see

also Response at 7 (“Thus, the Petition would be timely.”). Since Respondent has waived any

objection to the timeliness of the Petition, the Court will accept that waiver and consider the

Petition timely. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 n.11 (2006) (“[S]hould a state

intelligently choose to waive a statute of limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty

to disregard that choice.”).

B. Exhaustion

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c), habeas petitioners must exhaust their claims before

presenting them in a federal habeas petition. See Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1096 (11th

Cir. 2022) (“Plainly, the purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to afford the state court ‘the

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’”) (quoting

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)). This requirement is met if a petitioner “fairly

present[ed] every issue raised in [their] federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on direct

appeal or on collateral review.” See Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned

up). “If a petitioner fails to ‘properly’ present [their] claim to the state court—by exhausting [their]

claims and complying with the applicable state procedure—prior to bringing [their] federal habeas

claim, then [§ 2254] typically bars [courts] from reviewing the claim.” Id. In other words, where

a petitioner has not “properly presented his claims to the state courts,” the petitioner will have

“procedurally defaulted his claims” in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999). “In Florida, exhaustion usually requires not only the filing of a [Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.850] motion, but an appeal from its denial.” Nieves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 770

F. App’x 520, 521 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Leonard v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir.

1979)).

Similar to the limitations defense, a respondent also has the option to waive an exhaustion

defense. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (“A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion

requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel,

expressly waives the requirement.”). Here, Respondent concedes that both Grounds Two and

Three have been “arguably exhausted,” so the Court will therefore review those two claims on the

merits without further comment. See Vazquez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.3d 964, 966

(11th Cir. 2016) (“States can waive procedural bar defenses in federal habeas proceedings,

including exhaustion.”) (cleaned up). However, Respondent also argues that Ground One is

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because the state court “decided [the claim] on

independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Response at 9. Upon review, the Court

concludes that Ground One can be denied on the merits, so it is in the interest of judicial economy

to simply “skip over” a discussion of Ground One’s alleged procedural deficiencies. See Loggins

v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (“When relief is due to be denied even if claims

are not procedurally barred, [the court] can skip over the procedural bar issues.”).

ANALYSIS

Turning to the substance of Petitioner’s three claims, the Court must first distinguish its

standards of review. Since Grounds Two and Three were exhausted and adjudicated on the merits

in state court, this Court must apply the deferential standard of § 2254(d). As previously discussed,

the Court must review the reasonableness of the factual findings and legal conclusions made by

“the highest state court decision reaching the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claim[.]” Newland v.

Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1199 (11th Cir. 2008). In this case, the Fourth DCA was the highest court to

adjudicate Grounds Two and Three. See Young v. State, 291 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

Since the Fourth DCA merely affirmed the lower court in an unwritten opinion, the Court must

“‘look-through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide

a relevant rationale.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Unfortunately, the lower state postconviction

court did not provide its own independent reasoning and instead adopted the reasoning of the

State’s Response to Petitioner’s Amended Postconviction Motion. See Order Denying Amended

Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 16-3] at 81 (“[T]he Defendant’s Motion for Post-Conviction

Relief is hereby DENIED, for the reasons contained in the State’s response[.]”). In this

circumstance, the Court shall review the reasonableness of the State’s Response as it is the

presumptive reasoning of both the Fourth DCA and the state postconviction court. See Benjamin

v. Jones, No. 17-cv-60855, 2018 WL 7288078, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2018) (“[T]he State’s

response is presumptively the reasoning of the [Fourth DCA]. This is because the [Fourth DCA]

did not provide a written opinion, and, after looking through to the lower court, the trial court

seems to have incorporated the State’s rationale.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL

180214 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2019).

Conversely, the Court must take a different approach with Ground One and review it de

novo. While it is an exceedingly rare circumstance for a federal court to circumvent § 2254(d)’s

standard of review, there are some limited exceptions. The statute itself permits de novo review

when “a claim is properly presented to the state court, but the state court does not adjudicate it on

the merits,” Mason, 605 F.3d at 1119, or when a federal court determines that the state court’s

decision involved an unreasonable application of the facts or law, see Adkins v. Warden, Holman

CF, 710 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2013); see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). However, the

Supreme Court has also recognized an additional exception: “Courts can, however, deny writs of

habeas corpus under § 2254 by engaging in de novo review when it is unclear whether AEDPA

deference applies, [and] the habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus . . . on

de novo review.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010) (emphasis added). In other

words, the Supreme Court has recognized an “‘Occam’s razor’ approach” whereby the district

court can dispense with a complicated review of a claim’s procedural bar issues and instead review

it de novo, but only when the “claim would fail on the merits in any event.” Dallas v. Warden,

964 F.3d 1285, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020).4 In sum, the Court will first conduct a de novo review of

Ground One and then proceed to analyze Grounds Two and Three under AEDPA’s standard of

review.

A. Ground One

Ground One of the Petition advances three subclaims, all of which are related to a central

conceit: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress incriminating statements Petitioner

made by arguing that they were taken in the wake of an illegal arrest. First, Petitioner contends

that counsel “misadvised” Petitioner that he had been arrested with a valid arrest warrant—even

though that was not true. See Pet. at 7. Second, Petitioner argues that his confession was the result

of an illegal, warrantless arrest in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dunaway v. New

York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) and that counsel unreasonably failed to file a motion to suppress on that

basis. See id. at 9 (“Counsel should have argued about facts in a motion to suppress [that

Petitioner’s] statements [were] made after an illegal arrest.”). Third, Petitioner claims that counsel

was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses during his suppression hearing who could have

purportedly testified about the illegality of Petitioner’s arrest. See id. at 11 (“The failure to call

these witnesses prejudiced the outcome of [the] trial because had the witnesses testified at the

suppression hearing based on illegal arrest, Petitioner would not have been convicted.”). The

Respondent argues that defense counsel did file a motion to suppress which “addressed the subject

of the illegal arrest” and that Petitioner failed to show he was prejudiced by any conceivable error.

Response at 18–19.

4 One more thing. Although the Court does not need to apply § 2254(d)’s standard when conducting a de

novo review, Petitioner must still show that any alleged error had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence” on the verdict since the Brecht harmless error standard always applies on collateral review. See

Mansfield, 679 F.3d at 1307 (“[A] habeas petition cannot be successful unless it satisfies both [AEDPA]

and Brecht.”).

If a defendant makes an inculpatory statement incident to an illegal arrest “the prosecution

must show not only that the statements meet the Fifth Amendment voluntariness standard, but also

that the causal connection between the statements and the illegal arrest is broken sufficiently to

purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest[.]” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 204 (1979).

In Florida, a person cannot be arrested unless law enforcement has “probable cause that a crime

has been or is being committed.” Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1180 (Fla. 2006). So long as

law enforcement has probable cause, an arrest can be made without an arrest warrant provided the

arrest takes place in a public location. See State v. Ramos, 378 So. 2d 1294, 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA

1979) (“Unlike the search of private premises, however, there is no constitutional requirement that

a police officer obtain a search or arrest warrant before he may seize and search a person.”). While

a defendant can still make voluntary statements after an illegal arrest, the court must first ensure

itself that the “taint” of the illegal arrest has dissipated by reviewing: (1) “the temporal proximity

of the arrest and the confession,” (2) “the presence of intervening circumstances,” and (3) “the

purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct[.]” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04

(1975); accord State v. Eubanks, 588 So. 2d 322, 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Respondent’s first argument as conclusively refuted

by the state court record. Although Respondent avers that “counsel filed a motion to suppress that,

while mainly arguing coercion, also addressed the subject of the illegal arrest[,]” the record does

not support that argument. Response at 18. As Respondent concedes, defense counsel’s primary

argument was that “statements allegedly made by the Defendant should be excluded from evidence

as inadmissible because they are the direct product of an interrogation conducted by the police

while suspect was psychologically induced by police and/or in custody without having been

adequately advised of his [rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)].” Motion

to Suppress [ECF No. 16-2] at 11. The state trial court explicitly denied the motion to suppress

on the basis that Petitioner did voluntarily waive his Miranda rights—there was no discussion

about the legality of Petitioner’s arrest. See Order Denying Motion to Suppress [ECF No. 16-2]

at 22 (“Defendant’s [Miranda] waiver was voluntary with a full awareness of the nature of the

rights being abandoned and the consequences of their abandonment.”). Although trial counsel

alluded to an argument that “there [was] absolutely no physical evidence whatsoever that was

gathered by law enforcement which links or tends to implicate the Defendant in the attempted

robbery/shooting,” the Court believes that this perfunctory reference was not sufficient to allege a

constitutional violation pursuant to Brown or Dunaway. Arguments in Support of Motion to

Suppress [ECF No. 16-2] at 14.

Nevertheless, the Court essentially agrees with Respondent’s contention that a motion to

suppress based on Dunaway would have been unsuccessful. Restated, the Court finds that

counsel’s performance (or lack thereof) in these matters had no “reasonable probability” of

affecting the outcome of Petitioner’s case. See Strickland, 496 U.S. at 694. As to the first

subclaim, the presence of an arrest warrant was irrelevant and any “misadvice” about the existence

of a warrant had no bearing on outcome of the case. Detective Berrena testified during the

suppression hearing that Petitioner was picked up “off the street” and not from his home or another

private location. Suppression Hr’g Tr. [ECF No. 17-2] at 8. Therefore, the lack of an arrest

warrant, by itself, would not have made any arrest illegal. See Ramos, 378 So. 2d at 1297.

The second subclaim fails because Dunaway would not have been a valid basis to suppress

Petitioner’s statement. The Court will assume, without deciding, that Petitioner was under arrest

from the moment Detective Berrena made contact with Petitioner.5 The key issue, therefore, is

5 Despite this assumption, there is ample evidence suggesting that Petitioner was not under arrest and that

he voluntarily chose to cooperate with law enforcement. See, e.g., Suppression Hr’g Tr. [ECF No. 17-2] at

whether law enforcement had “probable cause” at the time of Petitioner’s arrest which would allow

“a reasonable person to believe that an offense [had] been committed and that the defendant

committed it[;]” if not, then the arrest would have been illegal. Walker v. State, 741 So. 2d 1144,

1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Prior to the “arrest,” Detective Berrena had been informed by “two

eyewitnesses that stated they could identify the shooter and the non-shooter[,]” and that Benjamin

Sanders—Petitioner’s codefendant—“was positively identified as the shooter.” Suppression Hr’g

Tr. [ECF No. 17-2] at 8. Detective Berrena also received tips via the “Crime Stoppers” tip-line

that Mr. Sanders and Petitioner were the two individuals involved in the shooting. See id. (“We

received numerous Crime Stopper tips, and we placed the individuals given to us in Crime Stoppers

in photo lineups. . . . And we also received through Crime Stoppers [Benjamin Sanders’s] name

as well as Rufus Young’s name.”). Detective Berrena also clarified that although “different

people” had reported that Petitioner was involved via Crime Stoppers, he knew the identity of at

least one of the tipsters. See id. at 21 (“Q: Well, are you telling us you do know the name? A: I

know one name, yes. Q: Who gave you Rufus Young? Who gave you the name Rufus Young?

A: Yes.”). Detective Berrena admitted that, at the time of the arrest, “[t]here was no physical

evidence . . . that linked Mr. Young to that shooting[.]” Id. at 23.

Based on Detective Berrena’s testimony during the suppression hearing, the Court

concludes that he possessed the following information prior to Petitioner’s arrest: (1) there were

two suspects involved in the armed robbery/shooting; (2) multiple, anonymous tipsters identified

Benjamin Sanders and Rufus Young as the two perpetrators; (3) one of the anonymous tipsters

26 (“[Detective Berrena]: I talked to [Petitioner], requested that he come to the office so we could talk. He

was very agreeable, he was polite, yes.”); cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557–58 (1980)

(finding no unlawful arrest or seizure where a suspect “was simply asked if she would accompany the

officers” and no “threats [or] any show of force” occurred). However, the Court will give Petitioner the

benefit of the doubt here since his claim fails in any event.

who claimed that Petitioner was involved was identified by Detective Berrena; and (4) Benjamin

Sanders was positively identified as the shooter—partially vindicating the tipsters who had said

that both Sanders and Petitioner were involved. All of this was sufficient to establish probable

cause. It’s true that an anonymous tip, by itself, cannot establish probable cause, but the Supreme

Court has clearly held that a tip with sufficient corroboration can meet that standard. See Illinois

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 242 (1983) (“[I]n making a warrantless arrest an officer may rely upon

information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the

informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s

knowledge.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Detective Berrena was able to sufficiently corroborate these numerous anonymous tips in

two ways. First, Detective Berrena knew the identity of at least one of the tipsters—this meant

that the tipster qualified as a “citizen-informant” whose “information is at the high end of the tip-

reliability scale.” State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Second, and more

importantly, law enforcement was able to corroborate “significant aspects of the informant’s

prediction.” Lee v. State, 868 So. 2d 577, 580–81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Recall that the tipster

identified both Benjamin Sanders and Petitioner as the two persons involved in the shooting; thus,

once part of the tip was confirmed to be true, it was reasonable for law enforcement to believe that

the identification of Petitioner was also reliable. See also, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 245–46 (holding

that an anonymous letter provided probable cause to arrest the defendant since the letter accurately

detailed the defendant’s travel plans); Watkins v. Session, No. 19-60810-CIV, 2021 WL 663762,

at *9 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2021) (“An anonymous caller reported that someone was urinating in

the park. . . . [T]he Officers arguably corroborated the anonymous caller’s account of a man

urinating in a park by finding Watkins alone in the park beside a cardboard box that appeared to

be covered in urine.”); Luke v. Gulley, No. 19-CV-122, 2022 WL 300968, at *7–8 (M.D. Ga. Jan.

19, 2022) (“The tip also identified other suspects present at the shooting, the presence of whom

was corroborated by the confidential informant and the arrest of others identified by the

confidential informant. . . . A reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the

same knowledge as Defendant reasonably could have believed there was probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff.”). Because Detective Berrena had probable cause to arrest Petitioner, it would have been

futile for defense counsel to argue that Dunaway applied.

Finally, Petitioner has failed to allege that he was prejudiced by the failure to call additional

witnesses during the suppression hearing. As the Court just explained, law enforcement had

probable cause to arrest Petitioner; therefore, it would have been pointless for any witness to testify

about the circumstances or legality of Petitioner’s arrest. See Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583

(Fla. 2004) (holding that, to prove prejudice, a defendant must show “how defense counsel’s

failure to call, interview, or present the witnesses who would have so testified prejudiced the

case”). To conclude, law enforcement had probable cause to arrest Petitioner for his involvement

in an attempted robbery/shooting. For that reason, defense counsel could not have been ineffective

for failing to file a motion to suppress based on the premise that Petitioner’s inculpatory statements

were the fruit of an illegal arrest. See Freeman v. Att’y Gen., 536 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“A lawyer cannot be deficient for failing to raise a meritless claim.”). Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Ground One.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner argues in Ground Two of the Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to advise Petitioner about the applicability of the “independent act doctrine.” Pet. at 12. According

to Petitioner, he was willing to plead guilty to the robbery counts because he and the codefendant

collectively planned to rob individuals by “merely displaying a BB gun,” but he wanted to rely

upon an independent act defense to contest the murder charge since “he had no knowledge that

any of the victims would be approached using a real gun.” Id. at 12–13. Trial counsel purportedly

told Petitioner that the “independent act theory does not exist” and instead relied upon an alibi

defense at trial. Id. at 13. Petitioner now posits that the result of his trial would have been different

if defense counsel had used and relied upon the independent act doctrine. Id. at 14.

Respondent has presented three arguments in opposition: (1) defense counsel did attempt

to instruct the jury on the independent act doctrine as an alternative basis to acquit Petitioner but

“the trial court refused to give it;” (2) counsel’s decision to rely on an alibi defense was a

reasonable strategic decision because, unlike the independent act doctrine, Petitioner would not

have to admit that he was guilty of the robbery counts; and (3) the independent act doctrine was

inconsistent with his own trial testimony. Response at 23–25.

The “independent act doctrine” is a defense under Florida law that is available to a

defendant who “previously participated in a common plan” with another codefendant. Ray v. State,

755 So. 2d 604, 609 (Fla. 2000). The defendant is allowed to argue that he or she is not responsible

for actions “which exceed[ed] the scope of the original plan” agreed upon by the other

codefendants. Id.; see, e.g., McGee v. State, 792 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Where

there is evidence from which a jury could determine that the acts of the co-felon resulting in the

murder were independent of the underlying felony, a defendant is entitled to an independent act

instruction.”). Of course, the independent act doctrine is a unique defense since it ultimately

requires the defendant to, at least partially, admit guilt. See, e.g., Jardin v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,

543 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (applying the independent act doctrine to burglary,

robbery, and murder charges where “the underlying felony was the purchase of drugs, to which

Jardin readily concedes—insists on—his guilt”). Notably, the independent act doctrine does not

apply when “the defendant was a willing participant in the underlying felony and the murder

resulted from forces which they set in motion.” Ray, 755 So. 2d at 609; see also Washington v.

State, 873 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“For a felony murder conviction, the

defendant’s presence during the killing is unnecessary; the critical fact is his or her participation

in the underlying felony.”).

Ultimately, the Court finds that the state court reasonably applied Strickland in denying

Ground Two since counsel did not perform deficiently. The independent act doctrine would have

required Petitioner to admit that he was guilty of the four attempted armed robbery offenses

charged in the Indictment—which could have subjected Petitioner to a maximum sentence of sixty

(60) years in prison. See Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(a) (“If in the course of committing the robbery the

offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first

degree[.]”); Fla. Stat. § 777.04(4)(c) (“If the offense attempted . . . is a life felony or a felony of

the first degree, the offense of criminal attempt . . . is a felony of the second degree punishable [by

a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years].”).6

A successful alibi defense, on the other hand, would have exonerated Petitioner of every

charge against him in the Indictment. Suffice to say, it was eminently reasonable for defense

counsel to choose a defense which applied universally instead of a more limited defense which

would have required Petitioner to admit a significant amount of culpability. See Johnson v.

6 Petitioner could make the argument that he did not possess “a firearm or deadly weapon” because he now

claims that he used a BB gun during the robberies, meaning that his overall sentence could be lower. Pet.

at 12. But this argument would be unpersuasive for two reasons. First, Petitioner now admits that his

codefendant possessed a firearm during the attempted robberies—i.e., Petitioner concedes that a firearm

was used during the attempted robbery. Id. at 12–13. Second, Florida courts also have recognized that a

BB gun can be considered a “deadly weapon.” See Dale v. State, 703 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 1997)

(“Florida’s district courts have overwhelmingly concluded that a BB or pellet gun can be a deadly

weapon[.]”).

Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1177, 1180–81 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that defense counsel made a

reasonable strategic decision to advance a defense that the petitioner “was not present at the crime

scene” rather than a defense “based upon [the petitioner’s] lack of intent to kill and his non-

participation in the murder”). Although the alibi defense was (obviously) unsuccessful at trial,

counsel’s decision was still a reasonable strategy since there was evidence at trial supporting

Petitioner’s alibi. See id. at 1180 (“Given the evidence available at the time and Johnson’s own

admissions, the strategy actually chosen by trial counsel—a ‘Johnson was not there’ defense—was

reasonable. Although the evidence tying Johnson to the scene of the crime was persuasive, it still

was circumstantial and not wholly iron-clad.”).

In addition, it was also reasonable for the state court to conclude that counsel would have

found an independent act defense to be futile. For one thing, Petitioner’s sworn testimony at trial

completely contradicted an independent act defense since he claimed that he was with a girl and

not with the codefendant at the time of the robbery. See Trial Tr. [ECF No. 17-1] at 1409–15.

Naturally, counsel could not have presented a defense that contradicted the sworn testimony of

their own client. See Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that

defense counsel properly rejected a self-defense argument since it “was inconsistent with

Petitioner’s own description of the killing.”).7 Even more important, however, is that the state

7 In his Reply, Petitioner appears to backpedal from his own trial testimony by claiming that, had defense

counsel informed him about the independent act doctrine, he “could have opted to not testify and let the

evidence speak for itself[.]” Reply at 7. While it is certainly conceivable that Petitioner might not have

testified if counsel pursued an independent act defense, he cannot now disclaim his sworn trial testimony

to the contrary in such an obviously self-serving manner. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74

(1977) (“[T]he representations of the defendant . . . constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent

collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”); Robinson

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-cv-1013, 2022 WL 1155296, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2022)

(“Petitioner faces the formidable barrier of his sworn testimony . . . . [H]is attempt to go behind his

previously sworn testimony is not well received.”). As Respondent astutely summarized, “[e]ither

Petitioner is now asserting he committed perjury during trial, or he is arguing that he should have been

permitted to commit perjury to advance a theory he asserted was a lie during his trial testimony[.]”

postconviction court—in adopting the State’s Response—concluded that the independent act

doctrine did not apply. See State’s Response [ECF No. 16-2] at 7 (“Since there was no basis to

have an independent act instruction granted, relief must be summarily denied.”). Although this

Court has the power to review a state court’s interpretation and application of federal law, it cannot

second-guess a state court’s application of state law. See McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530,

535 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A state’s interpretation of its own laws or rules provides no basis for federal

habeas corpus relief, since no question of a constitutional nature is involved.”). The state court

concluded that the independent act doctrine did not apply under state law, and this Court cannot

second-guess that dispositive legal conclusion.8 Thus, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Court

DENIES Ground 2.

C. Ground Three

Petitioner’s final ground for relief is that counsel performed ineffectively by failing to

object to the prosecutor’s insinuation that Petitioner confessed to his mother—even though there

was no evidence to support the prosecutor’s claim. See Pet. at 16–18. Petitioner argues that the

prosecutor’s statement was prejudicial, as it allowed the jury to infer that he confessed to both law

enforcement and his mother. See id. at 19 (“A prosecutor may not insinuate an incriminating

Response at 25. In short, the Court cannot ignore Petitioner’s own sworn testimony at trial in order to

support the viability of his habeas claim.

8 The Court would note, for the sake of completeness, that its review of Florida law supports the state

court’s conclusion that the independent act doctrine does not apply. Specifically, Florida’s district courts

of appeal have uniformly held that the death of a victim is a reasonably foreseeable circumstance of

willingly participating in armed robberies with a firearm or deadly weapon. See, e.g., Washington, 873 So.

2d at 1270 (“A shooting that occurs during an armed robbery does not exceed the scope of the armed

robbery so that an independent act instruction is required.”); Roberts v. State, 4 So. 3d 1261, 1264 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2009) (“[A]n independent act instruction is inappropriate when the unrebutted evidence shows the

defendant knowingly participated in the underlying criminal enterprise when the murder occurred or knew

that firearms or deadly weapons would be used.”); see also supra note 6 (citing state law for the proposition

that a BB gun can be a “deadly weapon” under Florida law). The Court emphasizes, however, that its own

survey of state court precedent does not supersede the state court’s dispositive conclusions of state law.

admission into cross-examination without a good faith basis the fact insinuated is true.”).

Respondent, in turn, adopts the state court’s reasoning that there was evidence Petitioner told his

mother that he “manned up,” and the prosecutor reasonably inferred this statement was akin to a

confession. See Response at 29 (“The statements at issue in closing were based on testimony

admitted at trial, consequently, the comments were permissible.”); State’s Response [ECF No. 16-

2] at 6 (“The comments of the prosecutor noted were fair comment on the fact that the defendant

admitted to confessing to his mother about committing the crime[.]”).

Both federal and Florida law provide a prosecutor with considerable leeway when he or

she presents a closing argument to the jury. See Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1506 (11th Cir.

1985) (“[A] prosecutor may argue both facts in evidence and reasonable inferences from those

facts.”); Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982) (“Wide latitude is permitted in arguing to

a jury. Logical inferences may be drawn, and counsel is allowed to advance all legitimate

arguments.”) (cleaned up). A prosecutor’s arguments do not require a mistrial unless the

comments made are so egregious that they “deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial,

materially contribute to the conviction, be so harmful or fundamentally tainted as to require a new

trial, or be so inflammatory that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict

than it would have otherwise.” Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 589 (Fla. 2008) (cleaned up). An

example of an improper argument is when the prosecutor “insinuate[s] impeaching facts that were

not supported by any evidence and that were not corroborated by actual impeachment.” Braddy

v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 853 (Fla. 2012); see also, e.g., Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219, 1233 (Fla.

2015) (“Therefore, the prosecutor’s insinuations arguably left the jury with the damaging

impression that Evans stalked Beth and was so obsessed with her that he hired a private investigator

to acquire information about her new boyfriend. This line of questioning, which was not supported

by any evidence, was improper.”), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. State, 252 So. 3d

1114, 1115 (Fla. 2018).

As the Court sees it, the gravamen of Ground Three is whether there was sufficient

evidence adduced at trial to allow the prosecutor to make the following argument:

On the backside of the tape with the mother and detective when he

confessed—I am not saying he went into detail—he told his mother,

“I manned-up.” He confirmed it. It is only later on he says it to the

mother.

Trial Tr. [ECF No. 17-1] at 1517–18. While both parties agree that the prosecutor is referring to

a video-taped statement made by Petitioner, Petitioner and Respondent, predictably, have

completely divergent viewpoints on what Petitioner said in the statement. Petitioner claims that

he “did not confess in that recording. . . . What the tape recorded statement actually reveals [is

that] Petitioner told his mother that [Detective] Berrena said, ‘Ben [Sanders] told me you did it.

He manned up.’” Pet. at 19. Petitioner also denied making that statement during the trial itself.

Id. at 18 (“Q: Did you tell your mother, when you saw it, ‘Mom, that’s me?’ Isn’t that what the

detective is asking you about? A: No. I don’t remember ever hearing something like that.”)

(quoting Trial Tr. [ECF No. 17-1] at 1433–34). Respondent argues that Detective Berrena

specifically testified that “Petitioner told his mother that the co-defendant had manned up, so he

did, as well, or something similar to that.” Response at 27.

In denying Ground Three, the state postconviction court found that Detective Berrena

testified that Petitioner made statements to his mother “about ‘manning up’ to the crime” and that

Petitioner himself “confessed to his mother that he was involved in the shooting.” State’s

Response [ECF No. 16-2] at 6. Therefore, Ground Three requires this Court to review the

reasonableness of the state postconviction court’s “determination of facts” rather than its

application of the law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Under AEDPA, the Court must assume that the

state court’s determination of a factual issue is correct; Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also

Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 28 F.4th 1089, 1147–48 (11th Cir. 2022) (“A state court’s findings

on subsidiary factual questions are entitled to § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness. This is

true even when the factual findings are merely implicit.”) (cleaned up).

Upon review of the state court record, the Court concludes the state court reasonably found

that there was sufficient testimony at trial to allow the prosecutor to infer that Petitioner confessed

to his mother. When discussing Petitioner’s video-taped statement, Detective Berrena conceded

that he could not recall exactly what Petitioner told his mother, but he did specifically remember

that “he told her he ‘manned-up.’” Trial Tr. [ECF No. 17-1] at 1200–01. Petitioner himself also

agreed that he told his mother that he was “involved” in the attempted robbery. See id. at 1428

(“Q: Did you ever confess and tell your mother you were involved in this shooting, this attempted

robbery? A: I confessed to her what I did.”). Based on these two statements, the jury could easily

infer that Petitioner told his mother: (1) that he “manned-up,” and (2) that he was “involved” in

the attempted robbery. Under Florida’s permissive closing argument standard, it was perfectly

reasonable for the prosecutor to infer or insinuate that Petitioner’s use of the phrase “manned-up”

was part of his confession that he was “involved” in the attempted robbery. See Miller v. State,

926 So. 2d 1243, 1254–55 (Fla. 2006) (“[A]n attorney is allowed to argue reasonable inferences

from the evidence and to argue credibility of witnesses or any other relevant issue so long as the

argument is based on the evidence.”).

While Petitioner correctly argues that there was other evidence at trial contradicting the

prosecutor’s interpretation, see Pet. at 19, it is the province of the jury to believe or disbelieve

testimony as well as accept or reject closing arguments based on their views of the evidence, see

United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The sole purpose of closing

argument is to assist the jury in analyzing the evidence. . . . [A]ny prejudice was cured by the

court’s instructions to the jury that it should rely on its own recollection rather than the

recollections of the attorneys.”). Because the state court reasonably concluded that there was

factual evidence to support the prosecutor’s closing argument, its conclusion that any objection to

the propriety of the prosecutor’s closing argument would have been meritless is also reasonable.

See Jardin, 543 F. Supp. 3d at 1276 (“Because an objection would not have succeeded, the state

court did not unreasonably apply Strickland.”). Ground Three is therefore DENIED.

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

No evidentiary hearing is warranted in this matter. See Shriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,

474 (2007) (“[I]f the [state court] record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise

precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”).

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

After careful consideration of the record in this case, the Court declines to issue a certificate

of appealability (“COA”). A habeas petitioner has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district

court’s final order denying his habeas petition. Rather, to pursue an appeal, a petitioner must

obtain a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).

Issuance of a COA is appropriate only if a litigant makes “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To do so, litigants must show that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable

or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). And “[w]here a district court has

disposed of claims . . . on procedural grounds, a COA will be granted only if the court concludes

that ‘jurists of reason’ would find it debatable both ‘whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right’ and ‘whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’”

Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Franklin v. Hightower, 215 F.3d

1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Here, reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the Court’s denial of Grounds

One, Two, or Three. Accordingly, a COA must be denied on all claims.

CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed the record and governing law, it 1s hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition [ECF No. 1] is DENIED. Any request

for a certificate of appealability is DENIED, and an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. All deadlines

are TERMINATED, and any pending motions are DENIED as moot. Accordingly, this case is

CLOSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 20th day of July, 2022.

A. RUIZ I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: Rufus Young

DC #L71816

Martin Correctional Institution

Inmate Mail/Parcels

1150 SW Allapattah Road

Indiantown, FL 34956

PRO SE

Deborah Koenig

Office of the Attorney General

1515 N Flagler Drive

Suite 900

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Email: deborah.koenig@myfloridalegal.com

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