Lay v. Military Sealift Command

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-22548-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

LUIS LAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND,

et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED

IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis,

ECF No. [3] (the “Motion”), filed in conjunction with the Complaint, ECF No. [1] (the

“Complaint”). Plaintiff Luis Lay (“Plaintiff” or “Lay”) has not paid the required filing fee and,

thus, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are applicable. The Court has carefully

reviewed the Complaint, the Motion, the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in the

premises. For the reasons that follow, the Complaint is dismissed, and the Motion is denied as

moot.

Fundamental to our conception and system of justice is that the courthouse doors will not

be closed to persons based on their inability to pay a filing fee. Congress has provided that a court

“may authorize the commencement . . . or prosecution of any suit, action or proceeding . . . or

appeal therein, without the prepayment of fees . . . therefore, by a person who submits an affidavit

that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such

fees . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1

(11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting statute to apply to all persons seeking to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”)). Permission to proceed in forma pauperis is committed to the sound discretion of the

court. Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Thomas v. Chattahoochee

Judicial Circuit, 574 F. App’x 916, 916 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A district court has wide discretion in

ruling on an application for leave to proceed IFP.”). However, “proceeding in forma pauperis is a

privilege, not a right.” Camp, 798 F.2d at 437.

In addition to the required showing that the litigant, because of poverty, is unable to pay

for the court fees and costs, Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307, upon a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis the Court is required to examine whether “the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court

determines that the complaint satisfies any of the three enumerated circumstances under Section

1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss the complaint.

A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need

detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s

pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Importantly, “[p]ro se

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and [are] liberally

construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). “But the leniency

accorded pro se litigants does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Matthews, Wilson & Matthews, Inc.

v. Capital City Bank, 614 F. App’x 969, 969 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty.

of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)). Even under the relaxed pleading standard

afforded to pro se litigants, see Abele v. Tolbert, 130 F. App’x 342, 343 (11th Cir. 2005), the

Complaint fails here.

First, there is no adequate basis alleged upon which the Court may properly exercise

jurisdiction in this case. 1 A “district court may act sua sponte to address the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction at any time.” Herskowitz v. Reid, 187 F. App’x 911, 912-13 (11th Cir. 2006) (footnote

call numbers and citations omitted). This is because federal courts are “‘empowered to hear only

those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the

Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by

Congress.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 409 (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th

Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, “once a federal court determines that it is without subject matter

1 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution

and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this

limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”

Id. (citing Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) and McNutt v. Gen. Motors

Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-183 (1936)). “Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated

to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). “The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a

claim involves the court’s competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise

conferred upon the court by the parties. Otherwise, a party could work a wrongful extension of federal

jurisdiction and give courts power the Congress denied them.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line

R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000-01 (11th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted).

jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.” Id. at 410. Here, Lay asserts that the basis for the

Court’s jurisdiction is “Myself still on control; monitory [sic]; robery [sic]; torture; by more of one

agency’s federal and state on one big setup creating by them against myself.” Id. at 3. This

statement, however, does not sufficiently establish that jurisdiction exists in this case. It is

axiomatic that the Court cannot consider Plaintiff’s claims without proper jurisdiction. See Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 84 (U.S. 1998) (“In a long and venerable

line of cases, this Court has held that, without proper jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all, but

can only note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit.”) (citations omitted).

Second, the Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim. The Court cannot

discern any actual claims asserted by Lay. Although Lay names the Military Sealift Command,

U.S. Department of Defense, Miami Police Department, and Miami and Hialeah Section 8

Department as defendants, there are no allegations with respect to any of the defendants in the

Complaint. Lay simply alleges in his Statement of Claim that

On board of ship flag as U.S. Navy was torurate [sic] with illegal injection that final

destroy my never [sic] system erraise [sic] memorys [sic] and add to my body some

tracking devices that kill vision; alteray [sic] moscule [sic]; etc. from 1990 up to

today’s day all full seve [sic] and nation [sic] way inside my body.

ECF No. [1] at 4. In addition, Lay attaches several pages of allegations regarding his military

service, see ECF No. [1-1] at 14-16, in which it appears that Lay is seeking payment of salary he

claims to be owed. He also attaches several documents to the Complaint, including correspondence

from the U.S. Department of Labor, a partial printout of a docket sheet for a case before Judge

Cooke, a boarding pass, a letter to the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,

a receipt from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, his voter registration, and

correspondence from the Social Security Administration. See ECF No. [1-1]. However, there is no

explanation of how these documents relate to the Complaint. Even though the Court liberally

Case No. 22-cv-22548-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

construes pro se pleadings, the Court is not free to construct causes of action. Here, the Court is

unable to ascertain any claims for relief from the Complaint.

Therefore, as the Court is unable to ascertain any plausible claim for relief—and it does

not have the authority to consider claims without jurisdiction—the instant action must be

dismissed.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Complaint, ECF No. [1], is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Plaintiffs Motion, ECF No. [3], is DENIED AS MOOT.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on August 11, 2022.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Luis Lay, pro se

2520 SW 22nd Street

Suite #2-197

Miami, FL 33145-3438