The Professional Airline Flight Control Association v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 21-60396-CIV-ALTMAN/Hunt

THE PROFESSIONAL AIRLINE

FLIGHT CONTROL ASSSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

SPIRIT AIRLINES INC.,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

ORDER

This is a labor dispute under the Railway Labor Act. For years, Spirit’s flight-dispatch officers

worked out of a single control center in South Florida. Tired of weather disruptions and hurricane

season, Spirit announced plans to open a second control center in Orlando. As a result of this

announcement, Spirit and the dispatch-officers’ union began negotiating—hoping to ameliorate the

impact this new hub might have on Spirit’s employees. When those negotiations failed, the union filed

this lawsuit, in which it asks us to enjoin Spirit from going through with its plan. As we’ll see, however,

the Railway Labor Act channels “minor disputes”—like this one—out of federal court and into

binding arbitration. Because we thus lack subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, we GRANT

Spirit’s motion to dismiss.

THE FACTS

Spirit Airlines is a major U.S. commercial airline based in Miramar, Florida. See Am. Compl.

[ECF No. 10] ¶¶ 2, 4, 6. Spirit employs about 75 flight-dispatch officers. Id. ¶ 6. Flight-dispatch officers

are “highly trained individuals who exercise discretion over major flight decisions.” Id. ¶ 5. Those

decisions include things like flight paths, fuel loads, and crew composition. Id. The officers make these

(complicated) decisions based on several variables—e.g., aircraft specifications, weather conditions,

and airspace restrictions. Id. Once a flight departs, the flight-dispatch officer “share[s] equally” with

the commanding pilot the “responsibility for the safety of each flight.” Id.

Our Plaintiff, the Professional Airline Flight Control Association (“PAFCA”), serves as both

the flight-dispatch officers’ union and their exclusive bargaining representative. Id. ¶ 3. Spirit and

PAFCA entered into a collective bargaining agreement on November 26, 2018. Id. ¶ 7. That agreement

is effective from October 16, 2018, through October 15, 2023. See Collective Bargaining Agreement

[ECF No. 10-1] (the “CBA”) § 21. The CBA automatically renews “for yearly periods thereafter unless

written notice of intended change is served in accordance with Section 6 . . . of the Railway Labor Act

. . . by either party . . . not sooner than one hundred fifty (150) days prior to October 15, 2023.” Id. In

other words, the parties may serve a notice to amend—or otherwise renegotiate—the CBA only after

May 2023. Id.

There are several CBA provisions that will become important to our overall story. For starters,

the CBA contains a broad management-rights clause—which (among many other things) affords Spirit

the discretion to transfer all (or part) of its operations. The clause provides: “Except as restricted by

an express provision of this Agreement, the Company shall retain all rights to manage and operate its

business and workforce, including but not limited to the right . . . to transfer operations or part of

operations.” Id. § 18A. The CBA also says that, “[w]here the Company opts to relocate the dispatch

office to a new domicile more than fifty . . . miles from its current location, the parties will meet to

discuss and agree upon moving expenses for affected employees.” Id. § 6D. The parties agreed that

“[a]ll orders . . . involving transfers [or] relocation . . . shall be in writing” and that Spirit would “provide

an opportunity for [PAFCA] input regarding functionality and ergonomics . . . before the Company

relocates the Dispatch Office.” Id. §§ 20B, 20D.

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For years, Spirit’s flight-dispatch officers worked out of Spirit’s control center in Miramar,

Florida—where Spirit is headquartered. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 6. But the decision to employ only one

control center—in a coastal city in South Florida—came with its own problems. Id. ¶ 9. In particular,

Spirit was forced to evacuate the Miramar control center whenever it was threatened by hurricanes or

other storms. Id. This disrupted Spirit’s operations and required Spirit, anytime there was a storm, to

transfer its operations temporarily from its headquarters. Id. Looking to avoid (or minimize) these

disruptions in the future, Spirit informed PAFCA, in February 2020, that it planned to relocate the

company’s control center to Nashville, Tennessee—away from the coast. Id. After this announcement,

Spirit and PAFCA began bargaining over employee moving expenses, in accordance with Section 6D

of the CBA, id., which (you’ll recall) obliged the parties to “meet to discuss and agree upon moving

expenses for affected employees,” CBA § 6D.

Some months later, Spirit changed course. See Am. Compl. ¶ 12. In September 2020, Spirit

announced that it wouldn’t be relocating its dispatch center to Nashville after all. Id. Instead, it

proposed both to keep the South Florida center and to open a second control center in Orlando. Id.

Following this announcement, the parties restarted their negotiations. Id. ¶ 13. Unfortunately, these

discussions were slightly more complex. Id. ¶ 14. While the original relocation plan had required the

parties to bargain only over moving expenses, Spirit’s proposed dual-control-center setup required the

parties to discuss several other issues—including cross-center seniority rights, cross-center shift

trading, and employee bidding (for work in one center versus the other). Id.

After some turbulent turns, the negotiations stalled. Id. ¶ 17. In late January 2021—four or so

months after the parties started their negotiations on the dual-control centers—Spirit told PAFCA

that it was done talking. Id. A week later, Spirit published a press release in an airline periodical, publicly

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announcing its intention to open a second control center. Id. ¶ 18. In that publication, Spirit said that

it would either transfer some employees from the Miramar location or hire new employees to work in

Orlando. Id.

Frustrated, PAFCA sued Spirit in federal court, asserting three counts under the Railway Labor

Act (the “RLA”): Count I alleges that Spirit violated 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh; Count II avers that

Spirit violated 45 U.S.C. § 152 First; and Count III claims that Spirit violated 45 U.S.C. § 153. See

generally Am. Compl. As redress, PAFCA asks us to enjoin Spirit from opening a second control center.

Id. Spirit, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), contending that we lack subject-matter

jurisdiction over PAFCA’s claims because PAFCA’s grievances constitute “minor disputes” under the

RLA.1 This Order follows.

THE LAW

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Since the courts of the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is

a presumption against its existence.” United States v. Rojas, 429 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005) (cleaned

up); see also Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 255 (1884) (Harlan, J.) (“[T]he courts of the Union, being

courts of limited jurisdiction, the presumption, in every stage of the cause, is that [they are] without

their jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears from the record.”). “A defendant can move to dismiss a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by either facial or factual attack.”

Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). In our case,

1 The Motion is fully briefed. See MTD [ECF No. 12]; MTD Response [ECF No. 21]; MTD Reply

[ECF No. 27].

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Spirit has launched both a facial and a factual attack. Because we think that jurisdiction is plainly absent

on the face of the complaint, we stop there—addressing only the facial challenge.2

In a facial attack, “the plaintiff is left with safeguards similar to those retained when a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is raised.” McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-

Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). That means we look to the

complaint “and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.

(cleaned up). In doing so, “the allegations in [the] complaint are [generally] taken as true for the

purposes of the motion.” Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1232–33 (cleaned up). At the same time, “[o]ur duty to

accept the facts in the complaint as true does not require us to ignore specific factual details of the

pleading in favor of general or conclusory allegations.” Flylux, LLC v. Aerovias de Mex., S.A. de C.V.,

618 F. App’x 574, 577 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1205–06

(11th Cir. 2007)). “Indeed, when the exhibits contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the

pleading, the exhibits govern.” Id. (quoting Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1205–06).3

2 It’s sufficient for us to find that PAFCA’s claim fails on the facial challenge. See, e.g., McElmurray v.

Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The district court has

the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of three separate bases: (1) the

complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3)

the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.”

(emphasis added & cleaned up)); Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 237 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he

jurisdictional basis must survive both facial and factual attacks before the district court can address

the merits of the claim.”). We’d note, though, that we’ve reviewed the parties’ evidence and that we’d

reach the same result on Spirit’s factual challenge.

3 PAFCA argues that a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) should be granted “only if it appears certain

that the Plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to

relief.” MTD Response at 2 (citing Strawser v. Strange, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1279 (S.D. Ala. 2015)).

This standard, of course, harkens back to the old days of Conley v. Gibson, under which “a complaint

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (2007). We very much doubt that this test applies today. For one thing, the Supreme

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ANALYSIS

A. This Case Presents a Minor Dispute

“Concerned that labor disputes would lead to strikes bringing railroads to a halt, Congress

enacted the [RLA] in 1926 to promote peaceful and efficient resolution of those disputes.” Union Pac.

R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 72 (2009). The RLA “was extended in 1936 to cover

the airline industry.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994). The RLA “groups

disputes into two categories, major and minor.” Empresa Ecuatoriana De Aviacion, S.A. v. Dist. Lodge No.

100, 690 F.2d 838, 842 (11th Cir. 1982). As we’ll see, “[w]hether the court has jurisdiction to resolve

the underlying contractual dispute depends on whether it is ‘major’ or ‘minor.’” Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs

v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 879 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2017).

So, to start, major disputes concern “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. §

151a. In other words, they are “disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to . . .

change the terms of one.” Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). “In the event of a

major dispute, the RLA requires the parties to undergo a lengthy process of bargaining and mediation.”

Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302 (1989) (“Conrail”). This process begins

Court has abandoned Conley on 12(b)(6) motions for failure to state a claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face”). Unsurprisingly, the Alabama case PAFCA cites relied on a pre-Twombly decision. See

Strawser, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1280 (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).

The Eleventh Circuit has also told us that, under 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff is left with safeguards similar

to those retained when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . is raised.” McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251

(cleaned up). Viewed in this context, PAFCA’s argument seems illogical. Why would a plaintiff be

required to do more to state a claim than he would have to do to invoke our constitutionally limited

subject-matter jurisdiction? Cf. Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 924–25 (11th Cir.

2020) (“[I]t’s long been known that even at the pleading stage, the litigant must clearly and specifically

set forth facts to satisfy the requirements of Article III.” (cleaned up)). But, even if PAFCA is right

about the “no set of facts” standard, PAFCA’s claim to jurisdiction is not just implausible; it’s also

impossible in light of the CBA’s plain language.

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when either side serves (on the other) a Section 6 “notice of an intended change.” 45 U.S.C. § 156. At

that point, “[u]ntil they have exhausted [the RLA’s] procedures, the parties are obligated to maintain

the status quo, and the employer may not implement the contested change in rates of pay, rules, or

working conditions.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302–03. “The district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction

to enjoin a violation of the status quo pending completion of the required procedures[.]” Id.

By contrast, minor disputes—instead of flowing from the creation or amendment of an

agreement—are “disputes growing . . . out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates

of pay, rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. § 151a (emphasis added); see also Burley, 325 U.S. at

723 (explaining that a minor dispute “relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular

provision”). A minor dispute is “subject to a less onerous process of arbitration.” Hawaiian Airlines,

512 U.S. at 265. So, “[i]n the airline industry,” for instance, “a minor dispute is resolved by an

adjustment board established by the airline and the unions.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 304 n.4. In a minor

dispute, the parties aren’t required to maintain the status quo: “[E]ach is free to act under its

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement until the arbitrator rules otherwise.” Air Line

Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 869 F.2d 1518, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In general, “[e]xclusive

jurisdiction over minor disputes rests with the system adjustment board.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air

Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 238 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001).

In short, whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction over this case hinges (for the most part)

on whether our dispute is major or minor. See, e.g., Conrail, 491 U.S. at 304 (noting that “any adjustment

board under the RLA” has “exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.

Amerijet Int’l, Inc., 604 F. App’x 841, 848 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A]s a jurisdictional matter, the RLA

prohibits federal courts from reaching the merits of minor disputes.”); Stewart v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 503

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F. App’x 814, 817 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Under the RLA, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction

over [minor] disputes[.]”); Pyles v. United Air Lines, Inc., 79 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Congress

intended that these ‘minor disputes’ be resolved through the grievance procedures of the RLA rather

than in federal court.”); Empresa, 690 F.2d at 844 (“A minor dispute must be submitted to compulsory

arbitration by an adjustment board, which has exclusive jurisdiction to decide minor disputes.”).

But how do we find the hazy border between major and minor disputes? As a “shorthand

method,” the Supreme Court has told us (as we’ve hinted) that “major disputes seek to create

contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added). The

Court has also clarified that “the formal demarcation between major and minor disputes does not turn

on a case-by-case determination of the importance of the issue presented or the likelihood that it

would prompt the exercise of economic self-help.” Id. at 305. Instead, the canonical test is this:

Where an employer asserts a contractual right to take the contested action, the ensuing

dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties’ collective-

bargaining agreement. Where, in contrast, the employer’s claims are frivolous or

obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major.

Id. at 307. In drawing this line, “the threshold to bind the parties to the exclusive arbitral jurisdiction

accompanying a minor dispute is a low one.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 327 F.3d

1309, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has said that, where any

“reasonable doubt exists as to whether the dispute is major or minor, we will deem it to be minor.”

Id. (cleaned up). Placing a thumb on the scale in this way makes sense: “Since the machinery for

resolving major disputes is conciliatory rather than binding, a major dispute can escalate into a strike,

which in the transportation industries—producers of a nonstorable service—can be a calamity. So it

is no surprise that, when in doubt, the courts construe disputes as minor.” Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 768 F.2d 914, 920 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.).

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Spirit easily meets Conrail’s “arguably justified” standard. Indeed, the CBA has a sweeping

management-rights clause that expressly says: “Except as restricted by an express provision” in the

CBA, Spirit “retain[s] all rights to manage and operate its business and workforce.” CBA § 18A. It

seems fair to conclude that Spirit’s right to “manage and operate its business and workforce” includes

both the right to expand its facilities and the right to determine where its employees should work. And,

fortunately, we don’t need to guess at this inference because, in setting out a non-exhaustive roster of

“retained” rights, the CBA explicitly lists—in no uncertain terms—Spirit’s right to “transfer operations

or part of operations.” Id. (emphasis added). This provision is, standing alone, probably enough for Spirit

to satisfy Conrail’s relatively low bar. See Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307 (emphasizing the “relatively light

burden which the [airline] must bear in establishing exclusive arbitral jurisdiction under the RLA”

(cleaned up)).

But there’s (much) more. Other provisions of the CBA likewise appear to recognize Spirit’s

right to transfer its operations. So, for example, one section (on moving expenses) provides that,

“[w]here the Company opts to relocate the dispatch office to a new domicile . . . , the parties will meet

to discuss and agree upon moving expenses for affected employees.” CBA § 6D (emphases added). The

use of the word “opts” in this context supports Spirit’s position that the CBA makes it Spirit’s

decision—and Spirit’s decision alone—to relocate its operations. And, while the provision talks of

relocating the dispatch office, nothing in the CBA generally (or this provision specifically) suggests that

Spirit cannot relocate only part of its operations, as it has proposed to do here. Indeed, the provision’s

requirement that the parties discuss moving expenses only for “affected employees” arguably implies

that the CBA allows Spirit to relocate some (read: affected), but not all (unaffected), of its operations and

employees. The CBA also says that “orders” involving “transfers” or “relocation” must be in

9

writing—suggesting (it would seem) that Spirit has the authority to order its employees to relocate. Id.

§ 20D.

But here’s the thing: PAFCA may well be right that none of these provisions—individually or

together—permit Spirit to unilaterally open a second control center. PAFCA’s problem, however, is

that it’s simply not our role to “consider the merits of the underlying dispute”—to determine, in other

words, whether the CBA does (or does not) allow Spirit to transfer part of its operations to Orlando.

Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, United Transp. Union, W. Md. Ry. Co. v. CSX R.R. Corp., 893 F.2d 584, 592 (3d

Cir. 1990) (cleaned up). It’s enough for our purposes that Spirit’s decision is “arguably justified” by the

text of the CBA. In other words, it’s sufficient for Spirit to show (as it has) that this case stems from

a dispute—not over the creation of a new agreement or even over an amendment to the old one (indeed,

the CBA cannot be amended until May 2023)—but over the enforcement of an agreement that’s

already been signed. Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307; see also Stewart, 503 F. App’x at 820 (“[I]f a reasonable

doubt exists as to whether the dispute is major or minor, we will deem it to be minor.”); Maine Cent.

R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 787 F.2d 780, 782 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that “it is not for [the court]

to weigh, and decide who has the better of the argument,” and adding that, “[i]f the court did this, it

[would] overstep[] its bounds and usurp[] the arbitrator’s function”).

In similar circumstances, federal courts across the country have agreed that an airline’s attempt

to relocate its operations constitutes a minor dispute. Take the Second Circuit’s decision in Association

of Flight Attendants v. United Airlines, Inc., 976 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1992), for example. In that case, United

Airlines decided to open and staff a new domicile in Paris for 195 flight attendants. Id. at 103. The

fight-attendants’ union sued under the RLA, challenging United’s decision. Id. at 104. Reversing the

district court, the Second Circuit concluded that the case presented a minor dispute. Id. In doing so,

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the Second Circuit explained that United had only the “relatively light burden” to show that its “action

[was] arguably justified by the terms of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 105. And

the court found that the agreement “arguably entitled [United] to establish new domiciles in foreign

countries” because “the agreement [was] at best ambiguous.” Id. In fact, there was “no provision” at

all “limiting the establishment of new domiciles.” Id. Our case, of course, is even stronger—because

our CBA has much more than mere silence: It’s replete, as we’ve seen, with express textual support for

Spirit’s position. As in United Airlines, then, this dispute belongs in arbitration.

And, for this proposition, authority abounds. See, e.g., Div. No. 1, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v.

Consol. Rail Corp., 844 F.2d 1218, 1219, 1224 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the railway’s “unilateral

decision” to change the location “where the road engineers must report for work each day” was

“arguably justified” and thus presented a “minor dispute”); Hilbert v. Pa. R.R. Co., 290 F.2d 881, 882

(7th Cir. 1961) (holding that “a reassignment of engineers from defendant’s terminal at Terre Haute,

Indiana, to defendant’s terminal at Indianapolis, Indiana,” involved “a conflict over the interpretation

or application of the provisions of the existing contract” and thus presented a “minor dispute”);

Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen, Lodge No. 514, 248 F.2d 34, 36, 42–43

(4th Cir. 1957) (concluding that a railway’s decision to “establish[] a new point at which five of the

carrier’s thirty-four train crews would be required to report for duty . . . arose out of a difference of

opinion as to the interpretation or application of the existing agreements” and thus presented a “minor

dispute”).

Against all this, PAFCA advances three arguments—all unconvincing.

First, PAFCA tries to analogize our case to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Detroit & Toledo

Shore Line Railroad Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969), and Order of Railroad Telegraphers

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v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 362 U.S. 330, 331 (1960). But those cases are completely irrelevant

here. While both discuss what should happen in the event of a major dispute, neither helps us answer

the threshold question we face today: What constitutes a major dispute in the first instance?

Let’s start with Shore Line. A railway advised its workers’ union that it intended to establish a

new outpost, requiring “many employees to report for work at Trenton rather than Lang Yard where

they had been reporting.” Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 144. In response, the union (unlike our case) “fil[ed]

a notice under § 6 of the Railway Labor Act proposing an amendment to the collective bargaining

agreement to cover the changed working conditions of the employees who would work out of

Trenton.” Id. at 144 (emphasis added). No one disputed that this notice triggered the RLA’s “major

dispute” provisions, covering “those disputes involving the formation of collective agreements and

efforts to change them.” Id. at 148. The only issue before the Court appears in the first sentence of its

opinion: “This case raises a question concerning the extent to which the [RLA] imposes an obligation

upon the parties to a railroad labor dispute to maintain the status quo while the purposely long and

drawn out procedures of the Act are exhausted.” Id. at 143. In other words, the question in Shore Line

was whether a carrier must “preserve the status quo in only those working conditions covered in the

parties’ existing collective agreement” or whether (instead) the “status quo extends to those actual,

objective working conditions” that prevailed before the dispute. Id. at 153–54. In answering this

question (about the scope of the status-quo requirement), the Court opted for the latter view, holding

that it was “incumbent upon the railroad by virtue of § 6 to refrain from” changing actual working

conditions—in that case, the outpost location—“regardless of the fact that the railroad was not

precluded from making these assignments under the existing agreement.” Id.

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In our case, though, we don’t get to the big question the Court addressed in Shore Line—the

scope of any status-quo injunction—because (contra Shore Line) we have no Section 6 proposal to

amend the CBA. Since our case presents only a minor dispute, Shore Line does not govern our outcome.

As it turns out, federal courts have universally rebuffed parties’ efforts to contort Shore Line’s

reasoning in the way PAFCA does here. In the Sixth Circuit’s words: “[The Union’s] reliance on [Shore

Line] is misplaced because the issue of characterizing a labor dispute as major or minor was not before

the Court. The decision dealt instead with the RLA’s status quo requirement as applied to what all

agreed was a major dispute.” United Transp. Union v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 142 F.3d 438, 438 (6th Cir.

1998) (cleaned up); see also Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. Mesa Air Grp., Inc., 567 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir.

2009) (“Before a federal court can even reach the analysis in Shore Line—that is, before a court can

decide whether something is an established practice protected by the status quo—it must find that the

disagreement in the case is a major dispute.”); Bhd. Ry. Carmen of U.S. & Can., Div. of Transp. Commc’ns

Union v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 944 F.2d 1422, 1427 n.5 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Shore Line is not applicable to the

facts of this case, however, as . . . the possibility of a minor dispute was not addressed.”).

In invoking Telegraphers, PAFCA again misses the point. See MTD Response at 7–13. In

Telegraphers, the railroad proposed to “abolish[]” certain stations, which would “necessarily result in

loss of jobs for some of the station agents and telegraphers.” Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 332. As in Shore

Line, the union “notified the railroad under § 6 of the [RLA] that it wanted to negotiate with the

railroad to amend the current bargaining agreement.” Id. In particular, the union sought to add the

following rule to the agreement: “No position in existence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished or

discontinued except by agreement between the carrier and the organization.” Id. The Court concluded

that it was “impossible to classify [this] as a minor dispute”—in part because (unlike our case) “[p]lainly

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the controversy [in the case] relate[d] to an effort on the part of the union to change the ‘terms’ of an

existing collective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 336, 341 (emphasis added).4

The crux of the case, though, was actually—at least in our view—a different issue: the

railroad’s position that the union’s Section 6 written proposal to freeze all terminations “did not

constitute a labor dispute under the Railway Labor Act” and “did not raise a bargainable issue.” Id. at

332 (cleaned up). In other words, although both major and minor disputes concern changes in “rates

of pay, rules, or working conditions,” see 45 U.S.C. § 151a, the railroad was suggesting that the decision

to close facilities and implement layoffs was not any of these things—and so, was not “bargainable”

under the RLA, Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 334. The Court rejected this position—rejected, in other

words, the railway’s view that “the union’s effort to negotiate about the job security of its members

represents an attempt to usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of business judgment

with respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of its operations.” Id. at 336 (cleaned up).

The railroad’s decision, in short, was not a unique management prerogative that fell beyond the RLA’s

detailed system of alternative dispute resolution. Cf. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n,

908 F.2d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A matter of prerogative is one the carrier is not required to bargain

over[.]” (citing Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 337–40)).

4 The analysis in Telegraphers wasn’t entirely clear. At one point, it suggested that “it is impossible to

classify as a minor dispute this dispute relating to a major change, affecting jobs, in an existing

collective bargaining agreement, rather than to mere infractions or interpretations of the provisions

of that agreement.” Telegraphers, 362 U.S. at 341. In saying so, it appeared to suggest that the major-

minor distinction hinged on the magnitude of the action—viz., its practical consequences. But the

Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this view, saying: “[T]he formal demarcation between major and

minor disputes does not turn on a case-by-case determination of the importance of the issue presented

or the likelihood that it would prompt the exercise of economic self-help.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 305

(emphasis added).

14

Like Shore Line, Telegraphers has very little to do with our case. Why? Because, while the union

in Telegraphers sought to “change” its collective bargaining agreement, neither party has proposed any

such amendment here. Indeed, as we’ve said, no such amendment would even be permissible under

the CBA until May 2023. See CBA § 21. Instead, under Conrail, Spirit has proffered an “arguably

justified” reading of its existing CBA—and so, the parties’ disagreement is a minor dispute. Nor does

Telegraphers’ discussion of the management-prerogatives doctrine alter our result. Spirit, after all, has

never contended that its decision to open a new control center is somehow immune from the strictures

of the RLA—whether because of management prerogatives or anything else. To the contrary, Spirit’s

position in this case has always been that the parties’ dispute should be submitted to arbitration in

accordance with the RLA. So, whether its decision to open dual control centers is a matter of managerial

prerogative (or not) is kind of beside the point. See Rutland Ry. Corp. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 307

F.2d 21, 36 (2d Cir. 1962) (“We do not say that the issue in the present case is not a bargainable one.

We have no doubt that the [union], upon the expiration of the existing agreements, may require the

railroad to bargain[.]”).

Second, PAFCA contends that “[t]he Management Rights provision contained in Section 18 of

the Agreement does not arguably justify Defendant’s unilateral action in this case.” MTD Response

at 13. For this view, PAFCA focuses on two words in Section 18A of the CBA—“[e]xcept” and

“retain.” Here’s the provision in full: “Except as restricted by an express provision of this Agreement,

the Company shall retain all rights to manage and operate its business and workforce, including but

not limited to the right . . . to transfer operations or part of operations.” CBA § 18A (emphasis added).

Neither word helps PAFCA’s case.

15

Starting with the “except” clause, PAFCA argues that Section 16 of the CBA—which creates

a hurricane response team—curtails Spirit’s right to transfer part of its operations to Orlando. See

MTD Response at 15 (“To the extent that the parties have already expressly provided for hurricane

response working conditions in the Agreement, Section 18, on its face, does not apply to permit

Defendant to change those working conditions.”). We disagree. While Section 16 kicks into gear

whenever Spirit feels it’s “warranted” to “operat[e] the [control center] temporarily from an alternate

location,” CBA § 16, that section never sets out any permanent solution for solving weather disruptions.

In fact, the section says nothing at all about a permanent relocation. Nor does the CBA ever hold up

Section 16 as the exclusive method for keeping operations up and running in the event of a storm. In

short, nothing in Section 16 expressly bars Spirit’s proposal.

As for its “retain” argument, PAFCA claims that Shore Line and Telegraphers stand for the

proposition that “no inherent management prerogative exists to change work assignments.” MTD

Response at 14. If this is true (PAFCA insists), then Spirit could have “retain[ed]” no such prerogative

under Section 18A. Id. Here, PAFCA just misconstrues these decisions. In Shore Line, remember, the

Supreme Court simply held that, in a major dispute, a carrier had a duty to maintain the status quo—

and, it added, the status quo included those actual, objective practices that fall beyond the terms of the

collective bargaining agreement. Telegraphers, on the other hand, did suggest that a railroad had no

“managerial prerogative” that would place its decision to cut operations beyond the reach of RLA’s

alternative-dispute-resolution process. But that’s not to say that a carrier—like Spirit—retains no right

to relocate its operations; it’s just to say that, when there’s a major dispute, its decision to relocate must be

stalled (and bargained over) as part of the status quo.

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In other words, PAFCA conflates two distinct concepts. The first is the concept of

management prerogatives—such as selling or closing a business. These are the kinds of core

entrepreneurial decisions an employer is never required to bargain over. See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R.

Co. v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) (“[T]he decision of a railroad employer to go out

of business and consequently to reduce to zero the number of available jobs is not a change in the

conditions of employment forbidden by the status quo provision of § 156.”). As Judge Posner

explained:

A union cannot freeze the status quo by demanding negotiations over something that

the carrier is entitled to do unilaterally either because the collective bargaining

agreement authorizes the carrier to do it or because it is within the carrier’s

“management prerogatives,” the class of decisions that are not decisions about rates

of pay, rules, or working conditions and so are outside the scope of the status quo

provision altogether.

Chicago & Nw. Transp., 908 F.2d at 151.

The second concept has to do with retained rights, which remain within management’s

discretion unless the collective bargaining agreement restricts them. Courts have widely held that,

because a collective bargaining agreement “cannot expressly regulate every conceivable employment

matter,” those agreements “need not include provisions permitting management action on every

conceivable employment matter; rather, on issues not discussed in the Agreement, management

retains discretion.” Airline Pros. Ass’n, Teamster Loc. Union 1224 v. ABX Air, Inc., 400 F.3d 411, 415–16

(6th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). In the Supreme Court’s words:

Collective bargaining agreements regulate or restrict the exercise of management

functions; they do not oust management from the performance of them. Management

hires and fires, pays and promotes, supervises and plans. All these are part of its

function, and absent a collective bargaining agreement, it may be exercised freely

except as limited by public law and by the willingness of employees to work under the

particular, unilaterally imposed conditions.

17

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960). All of this is to say that,

since the CBA doesn’t appear to prohibit Spirit from transferring part of its operations—and, in fact,

because it arguably authorizes as much—Spirit “retain[ed]” its discretion to relocate part of its

operations to Orlando.

One more thing on this argument. We generally “interpret collective-bargaining agreements .

. . according to ordinary principles of contract law[.]” M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S.

427, 435 (2015). This means that, “[w]here the words of a contract in writing are clear and

unambiguous, its meaning is to be ascertained in accordance with its plainly expressed intent.” Id.

(quoting 11 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:6 (4th ed. 2012)); see also Savage Servs. Corp. v.

United States, 25 F.4th 925, 941 (11th Cir. 2022) (“The words of a governing text are of paramount

concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.” (quoting A. SCALIA & B.

GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 56 (2012)). And “retain” means to

“to keep in custody or under control” or “[t]o continue to have or possess.” Retain, OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/164150?rskey=leRmYi&result=2#eid (last visited

Mar. 25, 2022). To continue to control or possess something presupposes that the subject already had

the thing. The word’s ordinary meaning, then, suggests what the caselaw has already told us—that

Spirit had the right “to transfer operations or part of operations” and that it “continue[s] to have” that

right. The plain text of the CBA, in short, supports Spirit here.

Third, PAFCA contends that the CBA’s moving-expenses provision undermines Spirit’s

position. That provision reads: “Where the Company opts to relocate the dispatch office to a new

domicile more than fifty (50) AAA miles away from its current location, the parties will meet to discuss

and agree upon moving expenses for affected employees.” CBA § 6D. PAFCA argues that Spirit is

18

not “relocating” the dispatch office because that office is staying right where it is. That’s certainly one

way to read this provision. Indeed, it may even be the most plausible reading. Still, we can’t say that

Spirit’s reading—that it is relocating because it’s moving a part of its dispatch office to Orlando—is

“frivolous or obviously insubstantial.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307. And, for all the reasons we’ve thus far

highlighted, Spirit’s construction gains steam when we consider it—as we must—in light of the

agreement as a whole. See Caron v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[O]ur

duty is to interpret the contract as a whole, not each term in a vacuum.”). PAFCA’s argument only

highlights, in other words, that this case presents a minor dispute—a reasonable disagreement over

the interpretation of the CBA—that must be resolved by the adjustment board, not a federal judge.

* * *

Because the case presents only a minor dispute, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate it.5

5 This suffices to dismiss Counts I and II of PAFCA’s complaint. In Count I, PAFCA seeks

injunctive relief under 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh, which says:

No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working

conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the

manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this title.

The RLA’s text—in governing only “changes” to “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions”—is

explicitly limited to major disputes. Because this is a minor dispute, we have no subject-matter

jurisdiction. Empresa, 690 F.2d at 844 (“A minor dispute must be submitted to compulsory arbitration

by an adjustment board, which has exclusive jurisdiction to decide minor disputes.”).

In Count II, PAFCA seeks injunctive relief under 45 U.S.C. § 152 First of the RLA, which

provides:

It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every

reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and

working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of

such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to

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B. The Narrow Minor-Dispute Exception Does Not Apply

In general, as we’ve said, “[t]here is no statutory requirement that while a minor dispute is

being arbitrated the status quo must be maintained; the carrier may act unilaterally until told to do

otherwise by the adjustment board’s decision.” Empresa, 690 F.2d at 844. In fact, we (for the most

part) “lack subject matter jurisdiction over [minor] disputes.” Stewart, 503 F. App’x at 817. The

Supreme Court has suggested, though, that federal courts do have “the power to impose conditions

requiring maintenance of the status quo” in a minor dispute when doing so “would operate to preserve

[the adjustment board’s] jurisdiction by preventing injury so irreparable that a decision of the Board

in the union’s favor would be but an empty victory.” Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas

R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960). In the Fifth Circuit’s words:

[T]he proper grounds for granting an injunction against action that is the subject

matter of a minor dispute under the RLA are extremely narrow. Such injunctions may

issue only where necessary to preserve the jurisdiction of the grievance procedure, or

where a disruption of the status quo would result in irreparable injury of such

magnitude that it would render any subsequent decision meaningless.

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. 19 v. Sw. Airlines Co., 875 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1989) (cleaned up). For

three reasons, this “extremely narrow” exception doesn’t apply here.

the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the

employees thereof.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over minor disputes

brought under § 152 First. See Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 143 F. App’x 155, 160

(11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a district court may not “assert jurisdiction to hear and decide claims

under § 2 First” if those claims “give rise to a minor dispute”); see also Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n v.

Nat’l Ry. Lab. Conf., 525 F. Supp. 3d 107, 120 (D.D.C. 2021) (holding that, because the dispute was

minor, “any remaining claim under Section 2, First also cannot survive”); Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps.

v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 358 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that, because the dispute was minor,

“the district court was divested of jurisdiction over [the union’s] claim for a declaration that [the

railway] violated Section 2 First of the RLA”).

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First, PAFCA never argues that it has met this exception. So, it’s forfeited any such argument.

See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that the “failure

to raise an issue in an initial brief . . . should be treated as a forfeiture of the issue, and therefore the

issue may be raised by the court sua sponte [only] in extraordinary circumstances”); Access Now, Inc. v.

Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“In the first place, the law is by now well settled

in this Circuit that a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed

abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.”).

Second, PAFCA cannot show that an injunction is necessary to preserve the adjustment board’s

jurisdiction because (for whatever reason) it hasn’t invoked the board’s jurisdiction in the first place.

Since “[t]he purpose of issuing an injunction in a minor dispute is to preserve the jurisdiction of the

Adjustment Board[,] [i]f a minor dispute is not pending before the Adjustment Board, the District

Court has no power to grant injunctive relief.” Westchester Lodge 2186, Bhd. of Ry. & S. S. Clerks v. Ry.

Exp. Agency, Inc., 329 F.2d 748, 753 (2d Cir. 1964). In our case, PAFCA has failed to allege that it

submitted this dispute to arbitration. In fact, its position is that this case is a major dispute not subject

to arbitration. As a result, we have no power to grant the injunctive relief PAFCA seeks. See, e.g.,

Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 927, 927 (1957) (vacating an injunction in a minor

dispute “because the dispute [was] not pending before the . . . Adjustment Board”); Ry. Lab. Execs.’

Ass’n v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 759 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[T]he court has no

power to grant injunctive relief in a minor dispute unless the dispute is actually pending before an

adjustment board.”).

Third, even if none of this were true, PAFCA’s request for injunctive relief would still fail

because PAFCA hasn’t adequately alleged that a disruption to the status quo would render arbitration

21

meaningless. PAFCA avers only that “PAFCA and its members will be irreparably harmed if

Defendant modifies unilaterally the terms and conditions of employment of the members.” Am.

Compl. ¶ 39. But it never explains why it would suffer irreparable harm or even what that irreparable

harm might be. And, when it comes to this “extremely narrow” form of relief, it’s not enough for

PAFCA to simply parrot the legal standard. See, e.g., Lawrence v. United States, 597 F. App’x 599, 602

(11th Cir. 2015) (“When reviewing a ruling on a facial jurisdictional attack, as in this case, we accept

the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. However, we are not required to accept

mere conclusory allegations as true[.]” (cleaned up)).

* * *

For all these reasons, we have no power to issue an injunction in this minor dispute.6

CONCLUSION

After careful review, we hereby ORDER AND ADJUDGE as follows:

1. Spirit’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 12] is GRANTED.

2. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.7

3. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case.

6 With this, we do away with Count III of PAFCA’s complaint—which seeks injunctive relief under

45 U.S.C. § 153. “[Section] 3 First of the RLA . . . provides for compulsory arbitration of minor

disputes before the . . . Adjustment Board.” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481

U.S. 429, 449 (1987). We lack subject-matter jurisdiction over minor disputes under § 153. See, e.g.,

Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 855 F.2d 1277, 1286 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[W]e conclude

that the district court correctly determined that because the present controversy is a minor dispute

under the RLA, it is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [adjustment board], and must be

resolved under the Act’s § 3 RLA procedures.”).

7 Although Spirit asked us to dismiss this case “with prejudice,” see MSJ at 1, 10, 20, “[a] dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice,”

Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1232. As a result, we dismiss a minor dispute under the RLA (over which we have

no subject-matter jurisdiction) without prejudice, so that PAFCA may assert its claims in the proper

forum.

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4. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot, all other deadlines are

TERMINATED, and any remaining hearings are CANCELED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 25th day of March 2022.

ROY K. ALTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

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