The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 20-CV-23856-COOKE
CAROL KELLY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARNIVAL CORPORATION,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S DAUBERT MOTION IN LIMINE
TO STRIKE REPORT AND OPINIONS OF RANDALL JAQUES
THIS CAUSE came before the court on Defendant, Carnival Corporation’s
(“Defendant” or “Carnival”), Daubert Motion in Limine to Strike Report and Opinions of
Randall Jaques [ECF No. 22] (the “Motion”). This matter was referred to the undersigned
pursuant to an Order of Referral for all non-dispositive pretrial matters by the Honorable
Marcia G. Cooke [ECF No. 6].
THIS COURT has reviewed the Motion, the Response [ECF No. 31], and the Reply
thereto [ECF No. 36], as well as the documents submitted in support of the parties’ filings,
including the Expert Report [ECF No. 22-2] and curriculum vitae [ECF No. 31-1] of Randall
Jaques, the pertinent portions of the record, and all relevant authorities.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is a maritime negligence action in which Plaintiff, Carol Kelly (“Plaintiff” or “Ms.
Kelly”), seeks damages for injuries allegedly sustained while a passenger aboard Carnival’s
cruise ship, the Carnival Glory [ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 7-9]. Ms. Kelly alleges she severely injured
herself by stepping on a rogue screw on her stateroom floor. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.
In the Complaint, filed September 9, 2020 [ECF No. 1], Plaintiff asserts three causes
of action, all sounding in negligence, against Defendant: (1) negligent failure to warn; (2)
negligent failure to maintain; and (3) general negligence. Id. Generally, Plaintiff alleges
Defendant was negligent in failing to maintain Plaintiff’s stateroom in a safe manner by
preventing the screw at issue from falling and remaining on the carpet of the stateroom, failing
to discover the screw was there through proper inspection and maintenance, and, to the extent
Defendant knew of the risk of such a danger, failing to warn Plaintiff of the risk. Defendant
filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses on October 12, 2021 [ECF No. 5].
On November 19, 2021, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.
18]. Shortly thereafter, on December 3, 2021, Defendant filed the Motion now before the
Court [ECF No. 22] seeking to strike the report and opinions of Plaintiff’s cruise ship safety
expert, Randall Jaques, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In support of her Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed December 15, 2021 [ECF No. 25], Plaintiff submitted Mr. Jaques’s
Expert Report [ECF No. 25-11]. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is now ripe,
and this case is set for trial during the trial period beginning April 25, 2022. See ECF No. 7.
II. THE EXPERT AND REPORT AT ISSUE
According to Mr. Jaques’s Report, Plaintiff retained Mr. Jaques as a Cruise Ship Safety
Expert “to perform a cruise ship accident analysis and assess events leading up to [Plaintiff’s]
injuries.” [ECF No. 22-2 at 1]. Mr. Jaques’s Report further explains that Plaintiff asked him
to assess the causes of the incident and to assess and evaluate the safety of the
subject area of the vessel, the vessel’s relevant equipment and facilities, the
relevant industry standards including applicable safety standards, the policies and
procedures of Carnival Cruise Lines, including the SMS ships management
system as required by the SOLAS Safety of Life At Sea and the IMO International
Maritime Organization, the vessel’s crew, and ultimately determine what were the
causes which contributed to a metal screw becoming lodged in [Plaintiff’s] right
foot...
ECF No. 22-2 at 1-2.
Mr. Jaques indicates he has 16 years’ work experience in security and safety positions
for various cruise lines, including Defendant. [ECF No. 13-1 at 3]. His responsibilities
working for the cruise lines included, inter alia, investigating accidents and incidents occurring
on cruise ships and identifying the causes of such accidents. [ECF No. 22-2 at 2]. Mr. Jaques
estimates he has investigated over 2,000 accidents and injuries on both land and sea, ranging
from slip and falls and water slide injuries to fire burns and food allergies. Id. at 4.
To prepare for his analysis of Plaintiff’s incident, Mr. Jaques reviewed the “applicable
codes, standards, and laws available at the time of the subject incident,” Carnival’s business
records, and Carnival’s responses to Ms. Kelly’s discovery requests. Id. at 6. He also inspected
the infamous screw at issue, viewed photographs of the subject stateroom, watched a
YouTube video of an allegedly similar stateroom to that in which Plaintiff was injured, and
interviewed Plaintiff and her son, Robert Kelly. Id.
Notably, Mr. Jaques did not inspect the stateroom where the alleged incident occurred
because he determined that, given the passage of time between the date of the incident and
his retention, such an inspection would not be beneficial to his analysis. Id. at 7. And Mr.
Jaques did not conduct any tests or analyses involving the screw and the furnishings and
equipment on Defendant’s ship, nor did he provide further insight into the methodology of
his accident reconstruction and analysis. Mr. Jaques also did not cite to or provide specific
cruise industry standards in his report, despite having purportedly reviewed them prior to his
analysis and making general reference to some unspecified and uncited industry manuals and
standards. Indeed, Mr. Jaques provided nothing to support or demonstrate the bases for his
opinions other than his own personal experience and the statements of the Plaintiff and her
son.
Mr. Jaques provides three opinions, all of which Defendant seeks to strike: (1) the
screw came from Ms. Kelly’s stateroom and Carnival is at fault for not ensuring the room’s
fixtures were in good condition, (2) failure to maintain the mechanical components in Ms.
Kelly’s stateroom was a careless and negligent act by Carnival’s staff, and (3) Carnival was
negligent for allowing the inspection of cabin compliance to break down. Id. at 10-15.
III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Analyzing The Admissibility Of Expert Testimony
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Pursuant
to Rule 702, an expert witness may testify in the form of an opinion if: “(a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
The Court serves as a gatekeeper to the admission of scientific and technical expert evidence.
Quiet Technology DC-8 v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993)). The Court’s role is
especially significant given that an expert’s opinion can be both powerful and quite
misleading. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, the party
offering the expert testimony bears the burden of laying the proper foundation, and that party
must demonstrate admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rink v. Cheminova,
400 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2005).
In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court engages in a three-part
inquiry to consider whether:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends
to address; (2) the methodology used by the expert in reaching his conclusions
is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert;
and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue through the application of scientific, technical or
specialized expertise.
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Daubert,
509 U.S. at 589). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refers to each of these
requirements as the “qualifications,” “reliability,” and “helpfulness” prongs. United States v.
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). While some overlap exists among these
requirements, the Court must analyze each one individually. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260.
Qualifications: An expert may be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education. Easterwood v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-CV-22932, 2020 WL 6880369, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 23, 2020). An expert is not necessarily unqualified simply because his experience
does not precisely match the matter at hand. Id. So long as the expert is minimally qualified,
objections to the level of the expert's expertise go to credibility and weight of the expert’s
testimony, not its admissibility. Id.
Reliability: In determining the reliability of an expert’s methodology, the Court
considers: (1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of
the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the
scientific community. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. This same criteria applies to both scientific
opinions and experience-based testimony. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261-62. (citing Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). Even so, the Court is allowed significant flexibility
to consider other factors relevant to reliability. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
Helpfulness: Expert testimony is only admissible if it concerns matters that are beyond
the understanding of the average lay person and offers something more than what lawyers
can argue in closing arguments. Webb v. Carnival Corp., 321 F.R.D. 420, 425 (S.D. Fla. 2017)
(quoting Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262–63). While an expert may testify as to his opinions on an
ultimate issue of fact, “he may not testify as to his opinions regarding ultimate legal
conclusions.” Umana–Fowler v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., c, 1122 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (quoting United
States v. Delatorre, 308 Fed.Appx. 380, 383 (11th Cir. 2009). “[M]erely telling the jury what
result to reach is unhelpful and inappropriate.” Umana–Fowler, 49 F.Supp.3d at 1122 (citing
Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990).
B. Proving A Maritime Negligence Claim
“A negligence claim requires proof that ‘(1) the defendant had a duty to protect the
plaintiff from a particular injury; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach actually
and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.’”
Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 13-cv-21413, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170890, 2013 WL
6271522, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2013) (quoting Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1336 (11th Cir. 2012)). Under maritime law, “a shipowner owes to all persons properly aboard
the ship ‘the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case.’” Id.
(quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959)). “When a
passenger claims that [he or] she was injured by a dangerous condition on the ship, this
standard of care normally ‘requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier
have had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition.’” Id. (quoting Keefe v.
Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989)). In cases where the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant itself created the dangerous condition, he or she “must prove that
[that the defendant] ‘created the allegedly dangerous condition sufficient to constitute a
breach of its duty of reasonable care.’” Id. (quoting Long v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 982 F. Supp.
2d 1313, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2013)).
IV. DISCUSSION
With the foregoing in mind, the undersigned turns to the admissibility of Mr. Jaques’s
opinions offered in this case.
Mr. Jaques’s Report is replete with opinions, e.g.:
• Ms. Carol Kelly did not sustain this impaled screw injury prior to boarding
the vessel;
• The screw came from the interior of the stateroom;
• The screw that became embedded in Ms. Kelly’s foot, more likely than not,
came from an air vent, bathroom fixture, balcony/balcony door fixture(s),
door dampener, cabinet hinge or other one of the many items in the cabin
requiring screws of the same size and type within Ms.Kelly’s stateroom;
• Carnival is at fault for not ensuring the stateroom fixtures (such as an air vent
or door hinge) were functional, in good maintenance, and not
missing screws;
• Failure to maintain the mechanical components, including, screws in the
Plaintiff’s stateroom was a careless and negligent act on the part of
Housekeeping and the Hotel engineer aboard the vessel;
• Carnival is at fault for not completing a proper stateroom inspection prior to
the Kelly family occupying the stateroom;
• These failures were the cause of a loose screw falling into the carpet of Ms.
Kelly’s stateroom and a direct cause of Ms. Kelly’s injuries;
• The loose screw would not have been on Ms. Kelly’s stateroom floor had
Carnival’s crew complied with its own policies and procedures;
• Carnival was negligent for allowing for the inspection of cabin compliance to
break down.
ECF No. 22-2 at 10-15. For purposes of Defendant’s Motion, the Report can be broken
down into three opinions, summarized as follows: (1) the screw that injured Ms. Kelly came
from her stateroom and Carnival is at fault for not ensuring the room’s fixtures were in good
condition, (2) failure to maintain the mechanical components in Ms. Kelly stateroom was a
careless and negligent act by Carnival’s staff, and (3) Carnival was negligent for allowing the
inspection of cabin compliance to break down. [ECF No. 22-2 at 10-15].
Carnival seeks to exclude Mr. Jaques’s opinions on the grounds he is not qualified to
render them, the opinions are unsupported by a reliable methodology, and they are unhelpful
to the trier of fact. [ECF No. 22 at 5].
A. Qualification
The first inquiry when determining the admissibility of expert testimony is whether
the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he or she intends to address
at trial. City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 563. “Determining whether a witness is qualified to
testify as an expert ‘requires the trial court to examine the credentials of the proposed expert
in light of the subject matter of the proposed testimony.’” Ciena Inv., Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins.
Co., 280 F.R.D. 653, 660 (S.D. Fla.2012) (quoting Jack v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d
1308, 1314–16 (N.D. Ga.2002)).
In his expert report, Mr. Jaques lists his qualifications at length as follows:
…As a cruise line safety officer and chief of security aboard multiple cruise
ships, and lately as a private marine and cruise ship security and safety consultant
I have been investigating and testifying in maritime accidents and wrongful death
all over the world.
I served as a police officer & Homicide Detective with the City of Reno &
Coral Gables Police, Washoe County School Police Departments. During that
employment I functioned in part as a marine patrol officer and was required to
obtain various training and certifications from the U.S. Coast Guard. I am a
qualified seamen and small boat captain since 1984.
In 1990, I was activated by the Army Reserves to serve in the Gulf War
(Office of the Inspector General). Following my return from the Gulf War, I
became employed by CARNIVAL CORPORATION as a Chief Security Officer,
and served as such on a number of vessels until approximately December, 2007
with three different cruise lines. In 2006 I obtained my certificate as Safety Officer
with Holland American Line. I was responsible for identifying hazards on board
cruise ships and I was responsible for investigating accidents and incidents
occurring aboard cruise ships and identifying the causes of such accidents and
incidents, conducting root cause analysis, and making recommendations for
corrective actions.
I was responsible for supervising tender operations in ports. “Tenders” are
small commercial motor vessels which are used to transport passengers between
ship and shore in ports which have no docks for cruise ships. Such small passenger
vessel operations are inherently dangerous and require the establishment, exercise
and strict enforcement of standard safety precautions to avoid mishaps and injury.
Such small commercial passenger vessels require a crew trained and skilled in
passenger management and safety. I was also a trained-On Scene Commander for
emergency situations such as fire and evacuation, and a lifeboat commander.
In 2001, I was hired by Norwegian Cruise Line to work full-time as a
security chief aboard various NCL vessels, where I was responsible for identifying
hazards on board those cruise ships and was also responsible for investigating
accidents and incidents and identifying the causes of such accidents and incidents,
conducting root cause analysis, and making recommendations for corrective
actions. I continued in this role with Norwegian Cruise Line until 2003, when I
deployed to Afghanistan in connection with my reserve duties. After this tour, I
served briefly as a security officer aboard a Disney Cruise Line vessel in the latter
part of 2004, also charged with identifying shipboard hazards and investigating
accidents and incidents and identifying causes and making recommendations for
corrective action. Following that, I went on to work for Holland American Line.
Between March 2005 and July 2006, I worked as a security manager and
safety officer, aboard vessels of Holland America Line (a subsidiary of
CARNIVAL). The scope of my duties as a security manager and safety officer
with Holland America Line were similar to when I was employed by Carnival,
NCL, Disney, and previously with Holland America. As security officer I
inspected the ships to identify hazards aboard those ships and investigated every
accident or injury producing incident that occurred on the vessel, on the pier, and
during shore excursions to ultimately determine the cause(s) of each accident or
incident and to make recommendations for corrective actions. These accidents
and incidents numbered approximately 15 to 25 per voyage. My estimated total
accidents and injuries investigated surpass 2,000 cases, both at sea and on land.
Accidents ranged from slip and falls, trip and falls, stairwells, falls from heights,
head injuries, limb amputations, death at sea, man over board, criminal assaults,
sexual assaults, tenders, gangways, ramps, engine room falls, burns, fires, food
allergies, bike accidents, bus accidents, drowning, slide injuries, & scooter
accidents, propeller accidents, and emergency medical evacuations at sea. During
the emergency medical evacuations, it was my job as on scene commander to
work directly with the Staff Captain, Doctor, nurses, safety officer and Master of
the vessel to establish a logistical plan for the evacuation. Typically, I would meet
with the staff captain and Doctor to determine how the debarkation will happen
and where it will take place. I investigated hundreds of passenger and crew
accidents at sea and in port. A number of these accidents involved Death At Sea
Or On Shore Excursions.
In 2008 I registered Randall W. Jaques LLC in the State of Florida, I have
owned and operated my own marine/maritime security and safety consultancy
since then. I have performed hundreds of investigations and evaluations of marine
casualties, most often involving cruise ships. In my own marine/maritime security
and safety consultancy, I conduct these investigations and evaluations of marine
casualties utilizing the same methodology, described herein, as when I was
employed by the cruise lines as a safety officer and security officer. I have been
asked to perform such services for the cruise industry and for representatives of
persons injured during cruises for both the Defense and Plaintiff firms. As the
ombudsman for the United States Coast Guard, Sector Miami 2006-2018. I also
had 4 CG Cutters that I represent for the command. I am extremely well versed
in the emergency operations, and capabilities of the USCG during a air/sea
emergency situation or Code Oscar MOB Man Overboard. As a professional
maritime consultant, I have conducted hundreds of site and vessel inspections
worldwide which include the scenes of accidents and incident and also have
included the inspection of medical facilities where emergency treatment was
conducted. My site, vessel, and medical facility inspections were conducted to
perform accident reconstructions, identify hazards, determine accident or incident
causes, review policies and procedures in light of SOLAS, and evaluate the safety,
security, premises safety, and evaluation of professional services offered. In order
to evaluate medical facility inspections aboard vessels, I would interview the
facility administrator and ask questions pertaining to what care or trauma
treatment can be offered.
Recently I have upgraded my STCW certification in Crowd Management
and continue my education with the Maritime Professional Training Center in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida. In May of 2015, Chief Judge Kevin Michael Moore
approved and acknowledged that Randall W. Jaques is to be recognized as a
maritime safety expert and crowd and crisis control management expert in the
Southern District Court of Florida.
ECF No. 22-2 at 2-4].
Defendant argues that Mr. Jaques is not qualified to render the opinions in his Report
because he has not shown how his work experience would qualify him to render any of the
offered opinions. [ECF No. 22 at 5].
The qualification inquiry “is not stringent, and so long as the expert is minimally
qualified, objections to the level of the expert's expertise [go] to credibility and weight, not
admissibility.” Ciena Invs., 280 F.R.D. at 661 (citing Vision I Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Aspen
Specialty Ins. Co., 674 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1325 (S.D.Fla.2009). Here, Mr. Jaques has shown that
he does have substantial experience in the cruise ship industry and in conducting inspections
and investigations of injuries occurring on cruise ships. The undersigned will assume, without
deciding, that Mr. Jaques’s background and experience qualify him as a Cruise Ship Safety
Expert in this case.
B. Reliability
Defendant next argues that Mr. Jaques’s opinions must be excluded because they are
not reliable on the grounds Mr. Jaques fails to demonstrate that he used a reliable
methodology in reaching his conclusions. [ECF No. 22 at 6]. More specifically, Defendant
argues Mr. Jaques’s opinions “lack[] a scientific basis and [are] not rooted in scientific
analysis” and instead are “the product of Mr. Jaques’s own sheer speculation.” [ECF No.22
at 7 (citing Quevedo v. Iberia, Lineas aereas De Espana, S.A. Operadora Unipersonal, No. 17-21168-
CI, 2018 WL 4932097, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2018))]. Defendant also argues that to the
extent Mr. Jaques relies on his own experience in support of his opinions, he has not shown
how his work experience applies to the analyses or conclusions he reaches here. Id. at 6-9.
Plaintiff responds that Mr. Jaques’s conclusions are based upon a scientific method
and that Defendant can replicate the methodology. [ECF No.31 at pp. 3, 6]. She further
argues, “The complex process of investigating a scene of an incident is not something a lay
person commonly does. As such, Jaques extensive scientific analysis and ultimate opinion
regarding the time when Ms. Kelly stepped on the screw is important to assist the jury in
understanding the complexities of accident/incident investigation.” Id. at 4. Finally, Plaintiff
asserts that Mr. Jaques was not deposed and that had Defendant deposed him, “[t]hey would
know that his methodology is sound and capable of being replicated.” Id.
Reliability is different than believability or persuasiveness, which remains an issue for
the trier of fact. Rink, 400 F.3d at 1293 n. 7. To evaluate the reliability of an expert opinion,
courts consider, to the extent practicable: (1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been
tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known
or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique and (4) whether the technique is
generally accepted in the scientific community. These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive;
not all of them will apply in every case, and in some cases other factors will be equally
important in evaluating the reliability of proffered expert opinion. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261-
62.
Mr. Jaques explained the methodology used in his report in a paragraph titled
“OVERALL METHODOLOGY.” [ECF No. 22-2 at 6]. In this section, Mr. Jaques explains:
My analysis started with a comprehensive review of applicable codes, standards,
and laws available at the time of the subject incident. Further, I reviewed all
available documents and evidence provided to me (Carnival Cruise Line’s
business records, inspection of the subject screw, photographs of the subject
stateroom, case pleadings, generic Youtube video of a similar balcony cabin, and
discovery including Defendant's responses to Interrogatories and Requests for
Production) and I conducted detailed interviews of the Plaintiff and her son,
Robert Kelly. Robert Kelly was onboard the subject cruise and had personal
knowledge of the facts relevant to my analysis. With all of the evidence I reviewed,
I performed an accident reconstruction and analysis from a cruise ship safety
expert perspective utilizing a comprehensive methodology of analysis, as I have
done thousands of times in the past in my former roles as Safety Officer and
Security Officer aboard cruise ships and thereafter as a cruise ship safety and
security consultant.
ECF No. 22-2 at pp. 6-7. He also includes a list of “References” identifying ten things,
presumably publications he reviewed, but most are not fully cited, nor are they attached to
the Report, and he does not indicate how he used the referenced items to support his opinions.
See id. at pp. 5-6.
Other than the vague reference to the ten listed “References,” Mr. Jaques does not
articulate any code, standard, or law in his report. The only authority mentioned is an uncited
reference to a “Cruise Industry sustainability report” in support of his statement that cruise
ship operators have an obligation to identify and correct hazards before an injury occurs, id.
at 7, and a link to marineengineeringonline.com to bolster his statement that “screws are known
to fail at sea due to the vibrations on the ship and the salt water corrosion.” Id. at 13-14.
Meanwhile, as noted above, Mr. Jaques did not inspect the ship nor Plaintiff’s actual
stateroom or perform any testing on its flooring. He did not consult any books, articles,
studies, or reports specific to the design or structure of the ship or the room, nor did he indicate
having done any such independent research in order to form his opinions. See id. at 6-7.
Rather, Mr. Jaques's opinions in this case appear to be premised almost entirely upon his
experience and his observations or inferences derived from watching a YouTube video of what
he believes to be a similar stateroom, Plaintiff’s photographs of her stateroom, and his
interviews with the Plaintiff and her son, see, id. at 6, with no clear explanation of any
connection between his experiences and his ultimate opinions. See Farley v. Oceania Cruises,
Inc., 2015 WL 1131015, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2015) (holding that Mr. Jacques’s
methodology failed because he did not inspect the vessel where the accident took place,
interview any crew member, or provide a detailed explanation of how his experience supports
his opinions or what materials he consulted to reach his conclusions) (citing Umana-Fowler,
2014 WL 4832297, at *2).
In addition, as Defendant points out and several other courts in this District have
observed, Mr. Jaques is “no stranger to Daubert challenges to his flawed methodology and
unhelpful opinions.” Easterwood, 2020 WL 6880369 at *9. Based on a review of Mr. Jaques’s
Report and the parties’ memoranda and supporting materials in this case, this Court agrees
with Defendant and with the several other district courts to have found that Mr. Jaques's
opinions suffer from serious and fatal methodological flaws. As Magistrate Judge Torres
explained in Webb:
Mr. Jaques’ methodology suffers from many of the same deficiencies identified in
Farley. His expert report simply lists a number of conclusory statements without
any foundation. He does not demonstrate whether he performed any analysis nor
does he indicate whether his opinions were subject to any verification or peer
review, or how his experience specifically informed his opinions. Neither his
report nor his testimony references a single study, article, or authority to support
his opinions. See [Johnson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103454, 2007 WL 9624459, at
*7] (finding that “Plaintiff's assertions fall far short of demonstrating how Jaques’
experience leads to his conclusions and opinions, why his experience is a sufficient
basis for his opinions, and how his experience is reliably applied to the facts of
Plaintiff's case.”) (citations omitted).
The advisory committee notes for Rule 702 further illustrate how Mr.
Jaques’ reliance on his experience, and the various items mentioned in Plaintiff's
response, fail to satisfy the reliability prong of Daubert:
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness
must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that
experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is
reliably applied to the facts. The trial court’s gatekeeping function requires
more than simply ‘taking the expert's word for it.’
Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170890, 2013 WL 6271522,
at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee notes
(2000 amends.) (emphasis added)). Most of Mr. Jaques’ opinions and testimony
are not “tethered to any supporting materials or sources” as there are no studies,
peer-reviewed materials, treatises, sources, data nor anything else underlying his
views. Farley, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30576, 2015 WL 1131015, at *7. Instead,
his opinions are conclusory statements regarding Defendant’s fault that [are] not
tied to any methodology. Moreover, Mr. Jaques does not explain why the items
he relied upon—in addition to his experience— provide a sufficient basis for his
opinion, especially in light of the fact that they merely lead to legal conclusions.
Webb, 321 F.R.D. at 429-30 (citing Farley, 2015 WL 1131015, at *1).
In the instant case, Mr. Jaques’s stated methodology presents the same issues described
by Judge Torres in Webb and by the other courts cited therein. Accordingly, consistent with
the reasoning in Webb and numerous other cases in this District, this Court also concludes
that Mr. Jaques’s opinions do not satisfy the reliability requirement of Daubert because they
lack any proper methodological foundation.
C. Helpfulness
Defendant next argues that even if Mr. Jaques satisfied the reliability prong, his
opinions must nevertheless be stricken because “they are not beyond the understanding of an
average layperson and do nothing to help the jury.” [ECF No. 22 at pp. 9, 13, 18].
“[E]xpert testimony is admissible if it concerns matters that are beyond the
understanding of the average lay person” and offers something “more than what lawyers for
the parties can argue in closing arguments.” Webb, 321 F.R.D. at 425 (quoting Frazier, 387
F.3d at 1262-63). Furthermore, while “[a]n expert may testify as to his opinions on an ultimate
issue of fact . . . he ‘may not testify as to his opinion regarding ultimate legal conclusions.’”
Umana-Fowler, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 1122 (quoting United States v. Delatorre, 308 Fed. Appx. 380,
383 (11th Cir. 2009)). “[M]erely telling the jury what result to reach is unhelpful and
inappropriate.” Id. (citing Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir.
1990)).
Initially, the undersigned notes that many of Mr. Jaques’s opinions assigning fault to
Carnival, indicating that it was on notice of any dangerous condition, and imputing
negligence to the cruise line and its staff opine on ultimate legal conclusions at issue in this
case and, therefore, impermissibly invade the province of the jury. As such, his opinions
assigning fault must be stricken. See Maxwell, No. 19-CV-23054, 2021 WL 1049513, at *5
(holding that Mr. Jaques’ opinions assigning fault to Defendants and indicating that
Defendants had notice of a dangerous condition must be stricken); Farley, 2015 WL 1131015,
at *9 (same).
The undersigned agrees with Defendant that what remains of Mr. Jacques’s opinions
after striking all impermissible legal conclusions is not beyond the understanding of a lay
person and, therefore, must also be excluded. Mr. Jaques’s remaining opinions boil down to
his conclusion that the screw Plaintiff stepped on must have been on the floor of her
stateroom. This opinion derives from his interviews of Plaintiff and her son and his review of
a maintenance log for the stateroom that showed various repairs made in the weeks prior to
the incident. [ECF No. 22-2 at 10]. “[T]he evidence upon which [Mr.] Jaques relied in
forming his opinions and conclusions is well within the understanding of the average
layperson.” Easterwood, 2020 WL 6880369, at *10 (quoting Johnson v. Carnival Corp., No. 07-
20147-CIV, 2007 WL 9624459, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2007)).
Having determined that Mr. Jaques’s methodologies are not reliable and that his
opinions and testimony are inadmissible and will not assist the trier of fact, this Court finds
that Mr. Jaques must be stricken as an expert for the reasons stated above.
Vv. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Daubert Motion in Limine to Strike
Report and Opinions of Randall Jaques [ECF No. 22] is GRANTED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 23" day of March,
2022.
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MELISSADAMIAN—
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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