Balbin v. Latin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-20332-BLOOM

MANUEL BALBIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SGT. J. LATIN, et al.,

Defendants.

/

SCREENING ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Manuel Balbin’s pro se civil rights

complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. (“Complaint”), ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff alleges violations of his

constitutional rights arising from his confinement while a pre-trial detainee at the Pretrial

Detention Center (“PDC”) in Miami-Dade County. See generally id. For the reasons set out below,

this action shall proceed as to Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims of failure to protect against

Defendants Sergeant J. Latin, Corporal C. McGahee, Lieutenant Wooden, and Corrections Officer

Williams; this action shall be dismissed as to Plaintiff’s individual capacity failure to protect

claims against Defendants Corporal D. Labri, Captain Daniel Junior, Miami-Dade County Mayor

Daniella Levine Cava, and Miami-Dade County Board of Commissioners; this action shall be

dismissed as to the fictitious party Defendants, the unknown PDC Corrections Officers and the

unknown Jackson Memorial Hospital Doctor; and this action shall be dismissed as to Plaintiff’s

official capacity failure to protect claims against all Defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s allegations take place during August 2021 when he was a detainee confined at

PDC. ECF No. [1] at 17-26. On August 5, 2021, Plaintiff was housed in Wing C on the 8th floor

when another detainee “made unwanted sexual advances towards [him].” Id. at 18 (alteration

added). Plaintiff reported the incident and filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”)

complaint. Following the PREA incident, Plaintiff was re-housed alone in a “Safety Cell” in an

adjacent wing, Wing A, on the same floor. Id. He was made to wear a red uniform to indicate that

he should be “locked down 24/7 [and] restricted from having any physical contact with other

detainees.” Id. (alteration added). Plaintiff states that because Wing A was adjacent to Wing C, the

move did not protect him because word of the PREA incident quickly spread to Wing A. Id.

Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting to be moved to a different location but, “due to quarantine

[protocol]” his request was not honored. Id. (alteration added).

On August 16, 2021, during weekly rounds, Corporal C. McGahee and Lieutenant Wooden

entered Plaintiff’s cell (Room 5). Id. Plaintiff told them that he was in fear for his life because

detainees in neighboring cells (Rooms 1, 2, and 3), had heard about the PREA incident and were

threatening to stab and kill him in the “yard or anywhere they could.” Id. at 18-19. McGahee

responded, “I know white boys are soft, you got to be tough though,” and Wooden stated, “[t]he

most that can happen is a fight.” Id. at 19 (alteration added).

On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed an emergency inmate grievance reporting the threat of

serious bodily harm. Id. In the grievance, he wrote that he believed the threats were serious because

one of the other detainees previously stabbed another detainee in the yard. Id. Per PDC procedures,

the emergency grievance was hand-delivered to Sergeant J. Latin. Id. However, no actions were

taken to protect Plaintiff from the specifically identified harm. Id.

The morning of August 20, 2021, Plaintiff made several attempts to alert PDC staff that he

was in imminent danger of being attacked. At 7:30 AM, Plaintiff told Corporal D. Labri that during

recreation time, he must go to the yard alone “because room 1, 2, [and] 3 want to stab [and] kill

me.” Id. at 20 (alterations added). In response, Labri stated, “[w]hatever[.]” Id. (alterations added).

At 8:50 AM, two unknown corrections officers, described only as Black males, came to Plaintiff’s

cell and instructed him that they needed to relocate him temporarily in order to fumigate his cell.

Id. Plaintiff told the corrections officers that he could not leave his cell “because the inmates that

are trying to kill me are in the yard right now[.]” Id. (alteration added). The corrections officers

told him that he would be safe because they would put him in a holding cell while the fumigation

was performed. Id. They said the fumigation would not take long and they would return him to his

cell as soon as it was finished. Id. The corrections officers moved Plaintiff to the holding cell where

he remained for 40 minutes.

He states that after the fumigation was complete, he begged the corrections officers to

return him to his cell but they took no action. Id. Corrections Officer Williams was also present

and witnessed Plaintiff in the holding cell. Plaintiff screamed to Williams that he needed to go

back to his cell. Id. at 21. “I can’t be here when they come back from the yard, they’re trying to

kill me!” Id. Williams ignored Plaintiff’s pleas. Id.

At 9:30 AM, the five detainees Plaintiff had warned about returned from the yard and saw

Plaintiff through the glass of the holding cell. Id. Plaintiff screamed for help but the detainees

opened the holding cell and proceeded to physically and sexually assault Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was

cut with a knife in the eye, arm, and leg. Id. at 21-22. He also sustained bruising to his body and

face. Id. at 22. He was taken to the PDC clinic where he had a seizure due to brain damage from

the assault. Id. at 22. Plaintiff was then transported to Jackson Memorial Hospital (“JMH”) in an

ambulance for treatment. Id. at 22.

Once at JMH, an unknown female doctor at JMH treated Plaintiff. Plaintiff immediately

told the doctor that she needed to call the police because he had been sexually battered and the

attack had been an attempt to murder him. Id. The doctor refused to call the police and told

Plaintiff, “We don’t do that here, what we do here is treat you for your wounds.” Id. Plaintiff

insisted that he needed police officers to document his wounds while they were still fresh because

he feared that PDC corrections officers were trying to cover up the attack. Id. The doctor again

refused and prevented Plaintiff from calling the police during the four-day duration of his hospital

stay. Id. Additionally, the doctor failed to report the sexual battery to JMH’s rape treatment center.

Id.

Plaintiff states that the holding cell where he was attacked had an “unsecure latch” instead

of a lock and key apparatus. Id. at 24. He alleges that all of the holding cells on floors 2 through

10 had these same latches. Id. He states that Captain Daniel Junior regularly made rounds through

PDC and observed the “unsecure [holding cell] latches” but never ordered them to be fixed or

replaced. Id. (alteration added). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Miami-Dade County Mayor

Daniella Levine Cava and the Miami-Dade County Board of Commissioners had knowledge of

the “unsafe and unsecure latches” because they approved of PDC’s building and construction but

failed to fix or replace the latches. Id. at 24.

As a result of the attack, Plaintiff received four face fractures, a fractured jaw, several stab

wounds, and nerve damage in his left eyelid. Id. at 26. He suffers from seizures, memory loss,

headaches, and ongoing severe pain. Id. He also suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and

experiences nightmares, depression, shame, anxiety, and feelings of worthlessness. Id. Plaintiff

seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief to have the PDC holding cell

latches replaced. Id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and is therefore

subject to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d

1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2003). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a case is subject to dismissal if a

court determines the action is: (1) “frivolous or malicious,” (2) “fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted,” or (3) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a

federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d

1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). In order to “avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint

must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x

692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per

curiam). Although a pro se pleading is liberally construed, it must still “suggest that there is some

factual support for a claim.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the allegations in a complaint require

more than mere labels and legal conclusions. See Quality Auto Painting Center of Roselle, Inc. v.

State Farm Indemnity Co., 917 F.3d 1249, 1262 (11th Cir. 2019). However, a district court is not

required to “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Rodriguez v.

Scott, 775 F. App’x 599, 603 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,

760 F.3d 1165, 1169 (11th Cir. 2014).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fictitious Party Pleading

i. Two Unknown Corrections Officers and Unknown Jackson Memorial Hospital

Doctor

“As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.”

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Courts allow

fictitious party pleading only where the plaintiff has “adequately described the person to be sued

so that the person [can] be identified for service.” Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.6 (11th

Cir. 1992). At this juncture, the Plaintiff has not provided sufficient information regarding the

identities of the three unnamed defendants, the unknown PDC Corrections Officers, and the

unknown Jackson Memorial Hospital Doctor, so that they could be identified for service.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims against the unnamed Defendants are dismissed without

prejudice. If the case proceeds to discovery and Plaintiff discovers their identities, he may then

seek leave to file a proper amended complaint.

B. Deliberate Indifference/Failure to Protect – Individual Capacity Claims

Based on the allegations, which must be construed liberally at this preliminary stage,

Plaintiff raises individual capacity failure to protect claims against all named Defendants. See

generally ECF No. [1]. “Claims involving the mistreatment of . . . pretrial detainees in custody are

governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment’s

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners.”

Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “A prison official’s

deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003)). A deliberate indifference claim thus

consists of three elements: “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate

indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th

Cir. 1995). To satisfy the subjective component, a plaintiff must allege facts that would allow a

jury to conclude that the defendant actually knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious

harm. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2015). To satisfy

the objective component, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant disregarded that

known risk by failing to respond to it in an objectively reasonable manner. See id.

As to the first prong, “inmate-on-inmate violence can amount to serious harm.” Scott v.

Miami-Dade Cty., 657 F. App’x 877, 881 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “[A]n excessive risk

of inmate-on-inmate violence at a jail creates a substantial risk of serious harm.” Purcell ex rel

Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration added). Where

a plaintiff has previously been attacked, “[t]he fact of an earlier attack ma[kes] the ongoing threats

credible.” Scott, 657 F. App’x at 881 (alterations added). Here, the Plaintiff states that fifteen days

before the attack he had a separate PREA incident where another detainee made unwanted sexual

advances toward him. ECF No. [1] at 18. The Plaintiff reported the activity and was subsequently

transferred to a different wing of the jail, housed alone in a “safety cell,” made to wear a red

uniform to indicate his status, and restricted from having any physical contact with other detainees.

Id. However, the new “safety cell” was in a wing adjacent to the one he had previously been housed

in, which allowed for “word to spread” regarding the previous PREA incident to detainees in

Plaintiff’s new wing. Id. Five detainees in Plaintiff’s new wing heard about the PREA incident and

began verbal threats to seriously injure or kill Plaintiff” Id. at 19. On these facts, Plaintiff plausibly

alleged a substantial risk of serious harm. The Court will proceed to analyze the remaining

elements of a failure to protect claim as to each individual defendant.

i. Corporal C. McGahee and Lieutenant Wooden

Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim of failure to protect against Defendants McGahee and

Wooden. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McGahee was the corporal in charge of all “Safety Cell”

detainees on the 8th floor. ECF No. [1] at 14. Defendant Wooden was the lieutenant in charge of

all “Safety Cell” inmates and also served as Defendant McGahee’s supervisor. Id. at 15. He

explains that “[a] safety cell detainee is suppose[d] to be safe, because he is isolated from general

population, locked down in a cell alone, . . . [and] dressed in [a] red uniform rather than orange.”

Id. at 14-15 (alterations added). At the time he was attacked, Plaintiff was a “safety cell” detainee

on the 8th floor, he was housed alone, and he wore a red uniform. Id. at 17-18.

On August 16, 2021, Plaintiff states that Defendants McGahee and Wooden entered his

cell during their weekly rounds. Id. at 18. Plaintiff verbally informed both Defendants that he “was

in fear for his life” because five detainees in neighboring cells within his wing found out about the

PREA incident that occurred in the adjacent wing. Id. at 18-19. “[A]s a result, those detainees were

now making serious threats to kill Pla[intiff] by stabbing him, [and] also threatening to rape

Pla[intiff], [and] that they would catch Pla[intiff] in [the] yard or any where they could.” Id. at 19

(alterations added). Defendant McGahee responded by telling Plaintiff, “I know white boys are

soft, you got to be tough though[.]” Id. at 19 (alteration added). Defendant Wooden stated that

“[t]he most that can happen is a fight.” Id. (alteration added).

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants McGahee and Wooden were aware of the

substantial threat of serious harm he faced—namely, that detainees in Plaintiff’s wing had learned

about his PREA incident and were making serious threats to attack him. Additionally, after

Plaintiff informed McGahee and Wooden that he feared an imminent attack from specific inmates,

both defendants made statements acknowledging that the risk was legitimate but failed to respond

in an objectively reasonable manner. As to McGahee and Wooden, Plaintiff’s individual capacity

failure to protect claim shall proceed.

ii. Sergeant J. Latin

Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim of failure to protect against Defendant J. Latin.

Plaintiff alleges that Latin was a sergeant at PDC and served as shift commander. Id. at 14. As part

of that role, whenever a detainee is in imminent danger, Latin was informed, and it was his “job to

protect the detainee by taking any necessary measures[.]” Id. (alteration added). On August 18,

2021, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance stating that four of the other detainees in his wing

were making threats of violence against him. Id. at 19; see ECF No. [1] at 2-4. Specifically, the

other detainees threatened to stab Plaintiff when he was in the yard and he believed these threats

were serious because one of the detainees had previously stabbed an inmate in the yard. Id. The

emergency grievance was “hand-delivered to the shift commander Sergeant J. Latin at PTDC on

[August 18, 2021] at approximately 3:20pm by the floor counselor.” ECF No. [1-1] at 3. Despite

having this information, Latin “did nothing” and two days later, the detainees identified in the

emergency grievance attacked Plaintiff. ECF No. [1] at 19. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that

Latin had subjective awareness of the imminent threats of physical violence made against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s individual capacity failure to protect claim against Latin shall proceed.

iii. Corporal D. Labri

Plaintiff has not stated a plausible failure to protect claim against Defendant D. Labri.

Plaintiff alleges that Labri was a corporal at Turner Guilford Knight Corrctional Center, but on

August 20, 2021, the day Plaintiff was attacked, Labri was working at PDC. Id. at 15. At 7:30 AM,

Plaintiff informed Labri that when he went to the yard he needed to go alone because the detainees

in rooms 1, 2, and 3 of the wing “want to stab [and] kill [him].” Id. at 20 (alterations added). Labri

replied, “[W]hatever.” Id. (alteration added). Although Plaintiff alleges that was subjectively

aware of the threats of physical violence made against Plaintiff, he has not alleged that Labri was

deliberately indifferent to those threats. Plaintiff told Labri that when he went to the yard he needed

to go alone, but Plaintiff does not allege that on the day of the attack he went to the yard alone or

otherwise. To summarize the allegations, Plaintiff made Labri aware of an ongoing threat of

serious harm, a way to prevent said threat, and all facts indicate that Labri adhered to Plaintiff’s

recommendations. On these facts, Plaintiff’s individual capacity failure to protect claim against

Labri shall be dismissed.

iv. Corrections Officer Williams

Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim of failure to protect against Defendant Williams.

Plaintiff alleges that Williams was a corrections officer on the 8th floor of PDC. Id. at 15. Forty

minutes prior to the attack, two unnamed officers placed Plaintiff in a holding cell in order to

fumigate his cell. Id. at 20. While in the holding cell, Plaintiff screamed to Williams, “Yo Will, I

need to go back to my cell, I can’t be here when they come back from yard, they’re trying to kill

me!” Id. at 21. Williams took no action and shortly thereafter, while still in the holding cell,

Plaintiff was attacked by other detainees. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Williams actually

knew that if Plaintiff was left in the holding cell, he faced a substantial risk of serious harm.

Plaintiff’s individual capacity failure to protect claim against Latin shall proceed.

C. Deliberate Indifference/Failure to Protect – Supervisor Liability

It is well settled that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App’x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321,

1328 (11th Cir. 2007)). A supervisor can only be held liable under § 1983 if he “personally

participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is a causal connection between

[his] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” West, 496 F.3d at 1328 (quoting

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted)).

To state a supervisory liability claim, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the personal involvement

of the supervisor in the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, (2) the existence of either

a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, (3)

facts that support an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed

to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged

constitutional deprivation that he then failed to correct. See West, 496 F.3d at 1328-29 (listing

factors in context of summary judgment). However, a supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for

mere negligence in the training or supervision of his employees. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829,

836-37 (11th Cir. 1990). The mere fact a defendant occupies a supervisory position is not enough;

rather Plaintiff must “show that the supervisor either participated directly in the unconstitutional

conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged

constitutional violation.” Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted).

i. Director Daniel Junior

Plaintiff has not stated a plausible failure to protect claim against Defendant Daniel Junior.

Plaintiff alleges that Junior is the director of the Miami-Dade County Corrections and

Rehabilitation. Id. at 16. As director, Junior is tasked with making sure all MDCR facilities,

including PDC, are safe and secure. Id. Unlike the holding cells at other MDCR facilities that are

secured by lock and key, all of the holding cells on floors 2 through 10 of PDC have latches. Id. at

24. Junior is aware of the latches on the holding cells because he regularly makes rounds at PDC

and personally “sees unsecure latches.” Id. However, Junior has never made any efforts to secure

the latches or replace them with a key lock. Id. Plaintiff alleges that “if the holding cells had key

locks, Pla[intiff’s] attackers would of never been able to gain entry into Pla[intiff’s] holding cell.”

Id. (alterations added).

As to Junior, Plaintiff’s allegations of substantial risk of harm are of a different degree.

Plaintiff does not allege that Junior was aware that other detainees threatened to harm Plaintiff.

“In general, a plaintiff must show more than a generalized awareness of risk to make out a

deliberate-indifference claim.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish deliberate indifference based on a generalized

risk, the plaintiff must show that serious inmate-on-inmate violence was the norm or something

close to it.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty.,

50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff faced substantial risk of serious harm when fights

causing injuries requiring medical attention and hospitalization regularly occurred between

inmates).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Junior had personal knowledge that the holding cells at PDC

had latches. As to Junior, Plaintiff’s allegations merely state that he was aware that the latches on

the holding cells posed a generalized risk. These allegations are insufficient to support that Junior

had personal knowledge that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Nor has Plaintiff

alleged the existence of a custom or policy or any facts to support an inference that Junior directed

unlawful actions against Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff characterizes the latches on holding cells as

“unsecure,” his allegations do not give rise to any “widespread history of abuse” caused by the

latches. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s individual capacity failure to protect claim against Junior shall be

dismissed.

ii. Miami-Dade County Mayor Daniella Levine Cava and Miami-Dade County

Board of Commissioners

Plaintiff has not stated a plausible failure to protect claim against Defendants Miami-Dade

County Mayor Daniella Levine Cava and Miami-Dade County Board of Commissioners. Plaintiff

alleges that in 1959, PDC’s construction was completed. Id. As early as 1998, all of the holding

cells on floors 2 through 10 were secured by latches. Id. Plaintiff alleges that because the Mayor

and the Board of Commissioners approved the construction and building plans for PDC, “these

Def[endants] have direct knowledge of the unsafe [and] unsecure latches, [and] they are

responsible for never updating [the latches].” Id. (alterations added).

Plaintiff’s allegations against the Miami-Dade County Defendants are conclusory. The fact

that over 60 years ago, Miami-Dade County entities approved the construction of PDC does not

constitute any significant causal connection between the Defendants and the risk of serious harm

Plaintiff faced from threats of physical violence. Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged any other

basis for supervisor liability. Thus, Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Mayor Daniella

Levine Cava and the Board of Commissioners shall be dismissed.

D. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff alleges official capacity claims against all Defendants. “[O]fficial-capacity suits

generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is

an agent[.] . . .” Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978). “Such

suits against municipal officers are therefore, in actuality, suits directly against the [municipality]

that the officer represents.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing

cases). Therefore, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants are really claims against

Miami-Dade County, and should be treated as such.

Regarding Miami-Dade County, “[a] municipality may be held liable under § 1983 if the

plaintiff shows that a ‘custom’ or ‘policy’ of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the

constitutional deprivation.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94). “A plaintiff . . . has two methods by which to establish a

county’s policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial

custom or practice of the county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the

county.” Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). However, “an

inquiry into a governmental entity’s custom or policy is relevant only when a constitutional

deprivation has occurred.” See Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff has stated a facially plausible failure to protect claims against McGahee,

Wooden, Latin, and Williams. All the same, he has not meaningfully alleged the existence of an

officially promulgated Miami-Dade County policy that was the moving force behind their alleged

failure to protect. Nor has he meaningfully alleged the existence of a custom or practice through

the repeated acts of a final policymaker for Miami-Dade County that was the moving force behind

the alleged failure to protect. Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable Monell claim against

Miami-Dade County.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Plaintiff=s individual capacity failure to protect claims against Sergeant J. Latin,

Case No. 22-cv-20332-BLOOM

Corporal C. McGahee, Lieutenant Wooden, and Corrections Officer Williams

SHALL PROCEED.

2. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief and individual capacity failure to protect

claims against Corporal D. Labri, Captain Daniel Junior, Miami-Dade County

Mayor Daniella Levine Cava, and Miami-Dade County Board of Commissioners

SHALL BE DISMISSED.

3. Plaintiff's official capacity failure to protect claims against all Defendants SHALL

BE DISMISSED.

4. Plaintiffs claims against the fictitious party Defendants, the unknown PDC

Corrections Officers, and the unknown Jackson Memorial Hospital Doctor,

SHALL BE DISMISSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on February 9, 2022.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Manuel Balbin, Pro Se

#B05748

South Florida Reception Center

Inmate Mail/Parcels

14000 NW 41st Street

Doral, FL 33178

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