United States v. Brown

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 03-4404

MICHAEL SHAYNE BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-02-219)

Submitted: November 5, 2003

Decided: November 24, 2003

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Gretchen M. Lynch,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.

Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, James Ashford Metcalfe,

Assistant United States Attorney, Kedron Bullock, Third Year Law

Student, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

2 UNITED STATES v. BROWN

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Michael Shayne Brown appeals his conviction pursuant to his con-

ditional guilty plea for being a felon in possession of ammunition and

a firearm. Brown reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion

to suppress in his plea agreement. Because we find the district court

properly denied Brown’s motion to suppress evidence seized during

an administrative inventory search, we affirm.

This Court reviews de novo the denial of a motion to suppress evi-

dence. United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 671 (4th Cir. 2003).

However, the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear

error. Id. The Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable

to the government. Id.

A warrantless search or seizure is prohibited by the Fourth Amend-

ment unless it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.

See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 n.4 (1990). "An inven-

tory search is a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of

the Fourth Amendment . . . designed to effect three purposes: protec-

tion of the owner’s property, protection of the police against claims

of lost or stolen property, and protection of the police from potential

danger." United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d 769, 772-73 (10th

Cir. 1997); see Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). The

Fourth Amendment is offended when, considering the totality of the

circumstances, an inventory search is unreasonable. See South Dakota

v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976).

If an inventory search is conducted according to standard depart-

mental policies and not as a ruse for an impermissible search, the

search does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and evidence seized

during the search is admissible at trial. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S.

1, 3-5 (1990); United States v. Brown, 787 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir.

UNITED STATES v. BROWN 3

1986). There is no requirement that the standardized procedures be

incorporated into a written policy. See United States v. Ford, 986 F.2d

57, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). "Reasonable police regulations relating to

inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth

Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be

able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different proce-

dure." Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374.

The district court found that even though a better practice might

have been to record all items removed from a vehicle on the inventory

list, the omission of evidentiary items from the inventory list did not

give rise to an inference of bad faith on the part of the police. We con-

clude that the district court did not clearly err when it found the

inventory search was done in good faith. Accordingly, under the total-

ity of the circumstances, the administrative inventory search was not

unreasonable. For this reason, we affirm Brown’s conviction. We dis-

pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED