Cedant v. United States

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Cajule Cedant, Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

Civil Action No. 19-24877-Civ-Scola

)

United States of America, )

Defendant. )

Order On Motions for Summary Judgment

This matter is before the Court upon the parties’ cross motions for

summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the

Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 37) and denies the Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No.

40.)

1. Background

The instant dispute arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, et seq. On December 10, 2017, the Plaintiff claims

to have been involved in a traffic accident with United States Postal Service

(“USPS”) employee Elijah Miller in North Miami, Florida when Mr. Miller

allegedly ran a stop sign while in his USPS Long-Life Vehicle (“LLV”) and

collided with the Plaintiff’s vehicle, resulting in the Plaintiff’s vehicle rolling

over. (ECF No. 39, 43, at ¶¶ 1-2, 6-15.)

The Court briefly recounts the procedural history of this matter, which

plays an important role in the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.

On May 26, 2020, the Court issued its scheduling order, which required the

parties to exchange expert witness disclosures by December 29, 2020. (ECF

No. 15.) Fact discovery closed on that same date. (Id.) In its scheduling order,

the Court stated “[w]hen a treating physician testifies regarding opinions

formed and based upon observations made during the course of treatment, the

treating physician need not produce a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report” but when such a

physician is “offering opinions beyond those arising from treatment” a Rule

26(a)(2)(B) report is required. (Id.)

On January 5, 2021, after the deadline for expert witness disclosures

had passed, the Plaintiff moved the Court to extend all pre-trial deadlines,

including trial date. (ECF No. 30.) In his motion, the Plaintiff stated he

specifically needed to extend “the deadline to exchange expert witness

summaries/reports as the prior deadline fell during the holidays.” (Id.) The

Defendant timely disclosed its reports. (Id.) The Court denied the Plaintiff’s

motion because the Plaintiff failed to explain why it could not abide by future

deadlines in the case and explained an order from the Court is not necessary

when an extension does not interfere with future Court-imposed deadlines.

(ECF No. 31.) On January 8, 2021, the Plaintiff moved the Court to reconsider

its motion, now explaining that the Plaintiff needed an extension due to the

approaching dispositive motion deadline of January 12, 2021. (ECF No. 32.)

The Court granted the Plaintiff limited relief and extended the dispositive

motion deadline by 10 days, but stated “all other deadlines shall remain the

same.” (ECF No. 33.)

2. Legal Standard

A. Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “summary judgment is

appropriate where there ‘is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and the

moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Alabama v. North

Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2308 (2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “The

moving party bears the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to

materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be

decided at trial . . . [o]nly when that burden has been met does the burden shift

to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of

fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d

604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Rule 56(c) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond

the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the non-moving party “may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1984) (stating “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts”).

The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, and summary judgment is inappropriate where a genuine

issue of material fact remains. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-

59 (1970). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if, under the applicable substantive

law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co.,

357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2004). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the

record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party.” Id. at 1260. A court may not weigh conflicting evidence to

resolve disputed factual issues; if a genuine dispute is found, summary

judgment must be denied. Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1140

(11th Cir. 2007).

3. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

The Court turns first to the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on

liability only. (ECF No. 40.) When a plaintiff brings a cause of action for

negligence under the FTCA, the Court applies the law of the state where the

alleged tort occurred. Stone v. United States, 373 F.3d 1129, 1130 (11th Cir.

2004). To prevail on a negligence claim under Florida law, a plaintiff must

adequately allege: 1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; 2) that the

defendant breached that duty; 3) that the breach caused the plaintiff’s injury;

and 4) actual harm. Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2007); see

also Canteen v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-132, 2014 WL 12573516, at *2 (N.D.

Fla. Oct. 8, 2014). Because the Plaintiff failed to timely exchange its expert

disclosures with the Plaintiff, the Defendant states that the Plaintiff cannot

prove causation or actual harm because, under Florida law, lay testimony is

legally insufficient to support a finding of causation where, as here, the medical

condition is not readily observable. (ECF No. 37, at 13.) Even if the Plaintiff’s

expert reports had been timely submitted, the Defendant states that summary

judgment is inappropriate as the Plaintiff has failed to show the “absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact regarding the person or persons

responsible for the collision.” (ECF No. 45, at 4.) Confusingly, in response to

the Defendant’s arguments, the Plaintiff states, without citation to any legal

authority, that to prevail on summary judgment with regards to liability only,

the Plaintiff need only prove the existence of a duty and that the duty was

breached, but not causation or actual harm. (ECF No. 49, at 2.)

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately prove causation

and actual harm as he failed to address these prongs in his briefing. Indeed,

the Plaintiff stated, “[a]s mentioned above, the Plaintiff’s motion was for partial

summary judgment as to liability. Accordingly, . . . the Plaintiff need only

establish” duty and breach. (ECF No. 49, at 2) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff

seems to misunderstand that it is his burden to prove each and every element

of his negligence claim in order to prove the Defendant’s liability for negligence.

See Canteen, 2014 WL 12573516, at *2 (stating standard for proving negligence

under Florida law requires proof of all four elements in context of motion for

partial summary judgment as to liability only). As the Plaintiff failed to

adequately address each element of negligence, the Court finds summary

judgment in favor of the Plaintiff at this stage is improper.

B. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

In support of its own motion for summary judgment, the Defendant

argues that, without being able to rely on its untimely expert reports to prove

causation or actual harm, the Plaintiff is unable to prevail on its negligence

claim. (ECF No. 37, at 1.) While the Court finds the government’s arguments

persuasive, particularly in light of the Plaintiff’s actions in this case, the Court

notes that, in the Eleventh Circuit, there is a strong preference for courts to

resolve legal actions on their merits, rather than on procedural technicalities.

Elof Hansson Paper & Board, Inc. v. Caldera, No. 11-20495-Civ, 2013 WL

12093241, at *10 n.12 (S.D Fla. 2013) (Williams, J.) (discussing Wahl v. McIver,

773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985)). With this principle in mind, the Court

also finds that summary judgment in favor of the Defendant at this stage is

equally improper.

4. Conclusion

While extensions of time are frequently sought from the Court, they are

not granted as a matter of right. This is particularly so where a party is seeking

an extension of time after the relevant deadline has passed. In such

circumstances, consistent with Federal Rule 16(b)(4), modification of a

scheduling order is precluded unless the schedule cannot be met despite the

diligence of the party seeking the extension. Donaldson v. Carnival Corp., No.

20-23258-Civ, 2021 WL 65445, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2021) (Scola, J.). Here,

the Plaintiff moved to extend the expert disclosure deadline together with all

remaining deadlines in the matter and trial date after the deadline for expert

disclosures had passed, explaining only that “the prior deadline” which had at

that point been in place for seven months, “fell during the holidays.” (ECF No.

30.) Critically, “diligence is the key to satisfying the good cause requirement.”

Donaldson, 2021 WL 65445, at *1. The Plaintiff’s motion was perfunctory,

failed to show that the Plaintiff acted with diligence, and failed to demonstrate

good cause for the requested modifications to the scheduling order. On that

basis, and because the Plaintiff failed to explain how any other deadlines in

this matter were impacted based on the Plaintiff’s failure to timely disclose its

expert disclosures, the Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion.

Thereafter, the Plaintiff moved the Court to reconsider his motion. (ECF

No. 32.) This time, the Plaintiff explained that he sought to extend the trial date

in this matter because the Court’s order requiring discovery and scheduling

conference requires the dispositive motion deadline “be set no later than four

months before the commencement of the proposed trial period.” (ECF No. 5, at

2.) The Plaintiff reiterated that he had missed the expert disclosure deadline

because it “fell during the holidays.” (ECF No. 32, at 1.) The Plaintiff explained

because of the Court’s order regarding the deadline around dispositive motions,

he sought reconsideration of his motion for extension of all deadlines “in an

abundance of caution,” seeking as an alternative for the Court to extend the

dispositive motion deadline. (Jd. at 2.) The Court granted the Plaintiff a ten-day

extension for the filing of dispositive motions, but otherwise kept all remaining

deadlines the same.

It was the Plaintiffs responsibility to demonstrate to the Court ina

sufficiently detailed manner why the extension of deadlines in this matter was

necessary. The Plaintiff failed to satisfy that burden. At no point did the

Plaintiff explain to the Court the potentially dispositive nature of its expert

reports and the substantial prejudice that could be suffered by the Plaintiff if

the expert disclosure deadline were not modified. As a result, the parties and

the Court have expended substantial resources unnecessarily. The Plaintiff is

reminded that, under Federal Rule 16(f), the Court may issue sanctions for

non-compliance with the Court’s scheduling order. The Defendant may also

move the Court to impose similar sanctions.

In light of the above, and in consideration of the Court’s strong

preference to resolve disputes on their merits, the Court orders the parties to

meet and confer and suggest necessary alterations to the Court’s scheduling

order and trial date by March 23, 2021. The Plaintiff shall be responsible for

informing the Court of the parties’ agreement. Failure to timely do so will result

in the dismissal of this action without prejudice. The Court denies both parties

motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 37, 40.) The Court notes the

Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the Plaintiff's untimely expert

reports. (ECF No. 50.) By March 23, 2021, the Defendant shall advise the

Court if its motion is now moot in whole or in part in light of the Court’s order.

Done and ordered in Miami, Florida on March 16, 2021.

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge