Offshore Marine Towing, Inc. v. gismondi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-CV-60657-RAR

OFFSHORE MARINE TOWING, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARTURO GISMONDI, in personam, and

“M/V SEA U L8TER,” a 2018 53-foot HCB,

document number 1297047, her engines,

tender, tackle, equipment, furnishings, and

appurtenances, in rem,

Defendants.

__________________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REDUCE SECURITY

Under maritime salvage law, a vessel owner benefitting from a salvor’s rescue must pay a

price for the recovery of his vessel. Here, Plaintiff seeks compensation for towing Defendant’s

vessel in the amount of $220,000.00—or approximately 20% of the value of the salvaged vessel.

See Am. Compl. [ECF No. 3]. The question is whether this salvage reward is appropriate given

the nature of the services rendered.

On March 30, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest

for the Vessel. See Order Directing Clerk to Issue Warrant of Arrest [ECF No. 9]. Thus, on April

9, 2020, Defendant Arturo Gismondi posted $330,000.00 into the Court Registry in order to release

his vessel.1 However, taking issue with the amount of security, Defendant subsequently filed a

Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Show Cause Hearing and Memorandum to Support Vacating

Seizure and/or Reducing Security Posted [ECF No. 25] (“Motion”). The Court has reviewed the

1 Security was set at $330,000.00 because the contract between the parties calls for a bond to be posted at

1.5x the amount of the bill for salvage services. See [ECF No. 3-1].

Motion, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition [ECF No. 33] (“Response”), and the accompanying

exhibits. For the reasons set forth below, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion [ECF No. 25] is GRANTED insofar as

it seeks to reduce the security posted.

BACKGROUND2

On the afternoon of March 19, 2020, Arturo Gismondi, together with his wife and 9 guests,

were aboard the SEA U L8TER—a 2018 53-foot HCB (“Vessel”). See Florida Boating Accident

Investigation Report (“Accident Report”) [ECF No. 33-1]. On or about 6:00 PM, the Vessel ran

aground as Mr. Gismondi attempted to enter the Hillsboro Inlet in Pompano Beach, Florida. Id.

Simultaneously, Captain William Sisler, of Offshore Marine Towing, Inc. (“Offshore”),3 received

a report that a 50-foot vessel was aground on the north jetty of the Hillsboro Inlet. See Declaration

of Captain William Donald Sisler (“Sisler Decl.”) [ECF No. 33-2] ¶ 3. Upon receiving the report,

Captain Sisler checked the tide chart, which indicated high tide would be occurring at

approximately 6:15 PM. Id. ¶ 4. Given the fast-approaching high tide, Captain Sisler quickly

proceeded to the grounding site because he realized prompt action would be necessary to assist the

Vessel before the tide dropped. Id.

Upon arrival, Captain Sisler observed 11 persons aboard the Vessel. Id. ¶ 8. From aboard

his own vessel (a 28-foot aluminum hulled Sea Ark) he confirmed that everyone was wearing a

2 The recitation of the facts herein varies slightly from the factual background set forth in the Court’s Order

Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the Arbitration Agreement and to Stay Case [ECF No. 45]. Said

variations are attributable to the fact that the Court has now had the benefit of reviewing several declarations

and other pieces of evidence provided in connection with the instant Motion.

3 Offshore is a commercial towing and salvage company based out of Pompano Beach, Florida. Am.

Compl. ¶ 2. The company runs a large and sophisticated salvage operation as evidenced by the fact that it

maintains 11 salvage vessels worth in excess of $1,600,000.00. See 2020 Physical Inventory Offshore

Marine Towing, Inc. [ECF No. 33-13].

lifejacket, and no one needed medical attention. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The Vessel was resting on its keel

and small waves (less than 2 feet in height) crashing onto the jetty were causing the Vessel to rock

side to side slightly. See Video Filing [ECF No. 34].4 For the safety of both vessels, Captain Sisler

decided to anchor near a lighthouse about 500 feet away from the Vessel. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. He grabbed

his toolbox containing “hose clamps, rags, epoxy, damage control plus, gaskets, lashing lines and

[a] salvage agreement” and walked across the north jetty to reach the Vessel. Id. ¶ 11.

Once he reached the Vessel, he checked the bilges and confirmed they were dry. Id. ¶ 13.

Captain Sisler then informed Mr. Gismondi and his wife that their Vessel was in a “salvage

situation,” offered his assistance as a representative of Offshore, and presented a one-page (double-

sided) agreement titled “Standard Form Marine Salvage Agreement” (“Salvage Agreement”). Id.

¶¶ 15, 19. Captain Sisler further explained that assistance would not be “an hourly job and that

the fee for salvage would be told to them after the salvage.” Id. ¶ 15. Some back-and-forth

discussion ensued, and although Mrs. Gismondi was reluctant to sign the agreement, Mr. Gismondi

ultimately agreed to the service and signed the Salvage Agreement provided by Captain Sisler. Id.

¶¶ 16-19. Mr. Gismondi handed Captain Sisler two American Express credit cards which Captain

Sisler photographed, as well as a $100 bill which Captain Sisler returned. Id. ¶ 19. Captain Sisler

reiterated that he was providing a salvage service and Mr. Gismondi would be billed later. Id.

Once Mr. Gismondi signed the Salvage Agreement, another Offshore towboat (a 29-foot

Ambar with twin 300 horsepower engines) approached Captain Sisler at the Vessel. Id. ¶ 20. The

Offshore tow boat secured a 100-foot line to the Vessel and after 10-15 minutes managed to safely

pull the Vessel off the north jetty. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23. The Vessel was towed to Wahoo Bay where

4 Video footage provided by Plaintiff corroborates the Court’s description of the grounding scene upon

arrival. See Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing Video Via Conventional Filing as Evidence in Support of Response

to Defendants’ Motion to Vacate (“Video Filing”) [ECF No. 34].

Captain Sisler put on diving gear and inspected it for bottom damage. Id. ¶ 22. According to

Captain Sisler’s observations, “all four skegs on the motors were broken, all four propellers were

damaged, and there was one broken lower unit (gear box).” Id.

Once the Vessel was freed, Offshore requested to maintain possession and haul it out to a

marina in Pompano so it could be more thoroughly inspected by a certified mechanic to check for

hull and engine damage. Id. ¶ 24. Mr. Gismondi refused to let Offshore maintain possession of

his Vessel. Id. Despite Offshore’s request, Mr. Gismondi removed the tow lines and steered the

Vessel back, on its own bottom and power, to his home marina at Royal Palm Yacht Club. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

The arrest of a vessel is “an in rem procedure in admiralty law having an ancient lineage.”

Salazar v. Atlantic Sun, 881 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1989). Where, as here, a vessel is arrested

pursuant to a verified complaint in admiralty, Rule E(4)(f) of the Supplemental Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure for Admiralty and Maritime Claims governs the procedure for release from arrest.

It states, in relevant part, that “[w]henever property is arrested or attached, any person claiming an

interest in it shall be entitled to a prompt hearing at which the plaintiff shall be required to show

why the arrest or attachment should not be vacated . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADM. R. E(4)(f).

The purpose of such a post-arrest hearing is to afford due process to the vessel’s owner.

S & S Diesel Marine Servs., Inc. v. M/V F–TROOP, No. 11-CV-60020, 2011 WL 1899402, at *8

(S.D. Fla. May 18, 2011). To that end, the plaintiff must prove that the arrest or attachment was

supported by “reasonable grounds.” George v. A 2005 Donzi Motor Yacht, Hull Identification

Number DNAFA 008A505, No. 09-CV-81145, 2009 WL 3417707, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2009).

The plaintiff’s burden is not an onerous one. S & S Diesel, 2011 WL 1899402, at *9-10. Indeed,

the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned against district courts conducing a “mini-trial” at this stage of

the case. PDS Gaming Corp. v. M/V Ocean Jewell of St. Petersburg, No. 07-10088, 2007 WL

2988798, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 5, 2007).

Notwithstanding the propriety of arrest, “Supplemental Admiralty Rule E(5)(a) provides

for the release of an arrested vessel on the giving of security, to be approved by the court or clerk.”

S & S Diesel, 2011 WL 1899402, at *11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the Court

“may, on motion and hearing, for good cause shown, reduce the amount of security given[.]” FED.

R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADM. R. E(6). In determining whether and how to reduce security under Rule

E(6), a court should weigh “the reasonableness of plaintiff’s damages claim . . . and other equitable

considerations.” Transportes Navieros Terrestres S.A. de C.V. v. Fairmount Heavy Transp., N.V.,

572 F.3d 96, 108 (2d Cir. 2009).

ANALYSIS

A. Offshore’s Efforts Constitute Salvage

Salvage is a “service which is voluntarily rendered to a vessel needing assistance, and is

designed to relieve her from some distress or danger either present or to be reasonably

apprehended.” McConnochie v. Kerr, 9 F. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1881). To determine whether a

salvage occurred, the court must find three elements: (1) marine peril; (2) voluntary services

rendered; and (3) success in whole or part. The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1880). The Court shall

address each in turn.

1. Marine Peril

The existence of maritime peril is a necessary element for a valid salvage claim. To

determine whether a maritime peril existed, the court examines whether, at the time the assistance

was rendered, the vessel was in a situation that might expose her to loss or destruction. Lewis v.

JPI Corp., No. 07-CV-20103, 2009 WL 3761984, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2009). However, the

danger need not be immediate or actual. See, e.g., Southernmost Marine Services, Inc. v. One (1)

2000 Fifty Four Foot (54”) Sea Ray Named M/V “Potential”, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 (S.D.

Fla. 2003) (“[A] marine peril exists where a vessel is in danger of being partially or totally lost and

where it is not being successfully salved when the plaintiff voluntarily undertakes its salvage

operation.”). All that is necessary is “reasonable apprehension of injury or destruction if the

[salvage] services are not rendered.” Phelan v. Minges, 170 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. Mass. 1959).

Most courts encountering a vessel driven aground on rocks, shoals, or reefs have found that

a hard grounding is per se marine peril. See Cayere v. Malta Mediterranean Shipping Co., No.

12-CV-01122, 2012 WL 3112330, at *2 (D. P.R. Apr. 4, 2012) (and cases cited therein); see also

3A Benedict on Admiralty: The Law of Salvage § 64 (2020) (hereinafter “Benedict.”). In Boat

Raising & Reclamation v. Victory, No. 06-CV-00078, 2007 WL 4462995, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Dec.

14, 2007), a distressed vessel ran aground on a seawall. The owner believed he could float the

vessel when high tide came, but the Court found it could not have been done, since the receding

hurricane surge and the rising tide would have essentially offset and would not have been sufficient

to float the vessel. Id. at *8. Thus, the Court concluded that plaintiff established the existence of

a maritime peril from which the vessel could not have been rescued without the plaintiff’s

assistance. Id.

Here, sufficient evidence supports a finding that the Vessel ran aground near the rock and

coral surrounding the north jetty at the Hillsboro Inlet.5 See Video Filing [ECF No. 34]; Sisler

5 Defendants contend that the Vessel ran aground on sand and not on rock/coral, but other than their own

assertions, Defendants have not provided any evidence to that effect. Mot. at 2-3, 9. At this stage, due to

the lack of evidence supporting Defendants’ position, the Court cannot definitively rule out the possibility

that the Vessel may have been at least partially resting on sand. However, the Court has examined satellite

images of the location of the grounding using the coordinates provided in the Accident Report (26°15’29.1”

N / 80°04’50.8” W). A review of said images places the Vessel’s grounding site within proximity to the

jetty. Additionally, at least one arbitrator deciding a dispute involving a boating accident at the Hillsboro

Inlet has concluded that hard groundings are likely given the submerged reef and coral formations found in

the channel. Coastal Towing & Salvage, Inc. v. M/V OVATION, No. 3801, Soc’y of Mar. Arbitrators, Inc.

(Sept. 12, 2003). Specifically, in Coastal Towing, the arbitrator expressed he could “not believe that the

Decl. ¶ 3; Accident Report [ECF No. 33-1]. Stranded on that rocky surface while vulnerably

resting on its keel, the Vessel was left at the mercy of wind and water which could have pushed it

in such a way as to damage it further. Sisler Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.

Defendants’ claim that the Vessel “would have likely been naturally lifted off . . . by the

rising tide,” Mot. at 2, is not plausible given that the grounding occurred during high tide shortly

before a falling tide, Sisler Decl. ¶ 4. Defendants also contend the Vessel was under no maritime

peril because “there was no breach to the hull, no water ingress, no threat to the environment, [and]

no threat to person or other property . . . .” Mot. at 9. In making this argument, Defendants fail to

recognize that the peril necessary to give rise to a claim for salvage need not be immediate or

absolute. The Plymouth Rock, 9 F. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1881). Indeed, the “apprehension of

danger” test—developed by courts over a century of admiralty jurisprudence—contemplates only

the potential for danger. Here, the Court finds that although the Vessel was not in immediate or

absolute danger, the evidence suggests it was at least in minimal apprehension of danger. Thus,

for purposes of this preliminary matter, the Court finds that the Vessel was in marine peril.6

2. Voluntary Services Rendered

The Court finds the element of voluntariness is satisfied here. Voluntary service is

rendered in the absence of a legal duty or obligation. See The Clarita, 90 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1875).

vessel was soft aground, on only sand, silt or mud” since the sides of the Hillsboro Inlet channel are steep

and cut from coral, and “[t]he damage to the bottom and propellers demonstrate[d] that there was some

hard content to the bottom, either rock, hardpan, or more likely, coral.” Id. Given the Hillsboro Inlet’s

inherent features and the evidence presented by Plaintiff, the Court finds it reasonable to conclude that the

Vessel was likely hard aground.

6 At this stage of the proceedings, the Court only notes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the

Vessel was in marine peril. To support an actual salvage award down the road, Plaintiff will need to prove

conclusively that marine peril existed, and any award they receive will take into account factors not

considered by the Court at this time—including, but not limited to, evidence regarding the tide and the

condition of the grounding site.

“Whatever may be the motive impelling the true volunteer in undertaking the enterprise—whether

for reasons of monetary gain, whether to aid in his own rescue, or even where his services have

been offered through error—it cannot detract from the [voluntary] status which the law accords to

him.” Benedict, § 68. Thus, professional salvors—who perform their services for monetary

gain—may claim salvage awards. The Camanche, 75 U.S. 448 (1869).

In this case, Offshore had no legal duty to salvage the Vessel.7 It is not a governmental

entity and was not under any other legal obligation to act as it did. Because Offshore acted without

a legal duty to salvage the vessel, it acted voluntarily. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 702

F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1983); Unnamed Master & Crew v. Certain Unnamed Vessel, 592 F. Supp.

1191, 1194 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (motive is not a determining factor in assessing voluntariness).

3. Success in Whole or Part

Finally, the salvage operation was a success. Lack of success, no matter how great the

effort, will preclude a salvage award. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 12 (1869); Benedict, § 88. The

rationale justifying this element of a salvage claim is that the purpose of engaging in a salvage

operation is to render a beneficial service to the owner or vessel. Hence, when no benefit is

conferred, the salvor is precluded from obtaining a reward. The Enos Soule, 95 F. 483, 484-85

7 Defendants argue that Offshore could not have been acting voluntarily because it was acting under its

contractual duty pursuant to the Salvage Agreement signed by the parties. Mot. at 5, n.3. Defendants’

argument is without merit because it fails to recognize that “not every salvage contract results in contract

salvage.” Andrew Anderson, SALVAGE & RECREATIONAL VESSELS: MODERN CONCEPTS AND

MISCONCEPTIONS, 6 U.S.F. Mar. L. J. 203, 207 (1993). To be clear, maritime law distinguishes between

pure salvage and contract salvage. In a pure salvage situation, the salvor is a volunteer and the

“compensation is dependent on success.” The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 192 (1989). “The existence of a

salvage contract is typically raised as a defense to a pure salvage claim in order to escape the application of

the more generous pure salvage award rule.” Evanow v. M/V Neptune, 163 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998).

However, where a contract, like the one at issue here, does not contain either an agreement to pay a given

sum or to pay without regard to success, but provides only that the salvor will be entitled to an award in the

event of success on a “no cure-no pay” basis, the services do not become contract salvage but retain their

status as pure salvage services. The Camanche, 75 U.S. 448 (1869).

(S.D.N.Y. 1899). Here, as a voluntary—although professional—salvor, Offshore conducted the

salvage operation and ultimately succeeded in removing the Vessel from peril.

Accordingly, this Court concludes that Offshore’s efforts likely constituted salvage and

thus Defendants’ Motion to Vacate the Arrest warrants denial. Having found that reasonable

grounds exist for issuing the arrest warrant in this case, the Court now turns to Defendants’

alternative request for the Court to reduce the security posted.

B. The Security Must Be Reduced

The value of a salvage award “is largely a matter of fact and discretion, which cannot be

reduced to precise rules, but depends upon a consideration of all the circumstances of each case.”

The Connemara, 108 U.S. 352, 359 (1883). To calculate the value of a successful salvage

operation the court must consider the long-standing six-factor test established by the Supreme

Court in The Blackwall. 77 U.S. at 14. The six factors, in order of their relative importance, are:

(1) The degree of danger from which the property was rescued;

(2) The value of the property saved;

(3) The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the impending peril;

(4) The promptitude, skill and energy displayed in rendering the service and saving the

property;

(5) The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service and the

danger to which such property was exposed; and

(6) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service.

Benedict § 237; Treasure Salvors v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 556 F.

Supp. 1319, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1983). A court must consider all six factors to determine the proper

award, B.V. Wijsmuller, 702 F.2d at 340; however, the degree of danger from which the property

was rescued tends to be the most important factor in determining the amount of the award.8

Benedict § 245; Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549

F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Ocean Servs. Towing & Salvage, Inc. v. Brown, 810 F. Supp. 1258,

1263 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Conolly v. S.S. Karina II, 302 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.N.Y 1969).

1. Degree of Danger from which the Vessel was Rescued

As explained above, the Court has found the Vessel was in “minimal” apprehension of

danger. Although this minimal apprehension is sufficient to meet the element of a marine peril, it

is not enough to warrant a high order salvage award. This salvage operation occurred in broad

daylight, while the seas were relatively calm, the weather clear and sunny, and a few feet from the

beach in water so shallow that Captain Sisler was able to walk across it to reach the Vessel. See

Video Filing [ECF No. 34]; Sisler Decl. ¶ 11.

The Court finds Offshore’s narrative that the “seas were working the boat from side to

side” to be overstated. Resp. at 12. While the Vessel appeared to be slightly rocking as a result

of the surf, video evidence indicates the absence of an immediate or absolute threat of harm, and

“once free [the Vessel] traveled on its own bottom and power to its dock without aid[.]” Mot. at

14. Offshore’s claim that the Vessel would have been severely damaged if it would have remained

at the sight of grounding for another 12 hours, Resp. at 12, is highly speculative and further

presupposes that Mr. Gismondi would have allowed his $1.25m yacht to remain in a grounding

situation for hours.

Ultimately, when comparing the conditions here to other rescues taking place in open

water—namely during stormy conditions where life and limb are at stake—it becomes abundantly

8 Varying degrees of peril to both the vessel and the salvor are almost always present. A situation of little

peril to the grounded vessel or to the towing vessel results in a low order salvage award. See, e.g., Ulster

S.S. Co. v. Cape Fear Towing & Transportation Co., 94 F. 214 (5th Cir. 1899); Beach Salvage Corp. of

Florida v. The Cap’t. Tom, 201 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Fla. 1961).

clear that the circumstances surrounding this salvage operation did not present any true degree of

danger to justify a high order salvage award.

2. Value of the Salvaged Vessel

The Court must also consider the value of the salvaged Vessel. Initially, the Vessel

(including its 4 motors) was estimated to be worth between $1,000,000.00–$1,250,000.00. See

Resp. at 12; see also Declaration of Chloe Collins (“Collins Decl.”) [ECF No. 33-9] ¶¶ 7,13.

Assuming Offshore’s estimates are accurate, the Vessel suffered approximately $50,000.00 in

damages. Id. ¶ 13. Thus, the Court calculates the lowest post casualty value assignable to the

Vessel would be approximately $950,000.00.

3. Risk Incurred by Offshore in Securing the Vessel from Peril

The Court finds the risk incurred by Offshore to be minimal given the many hazards

ordinarily encountered at sea. “It is risks out of the ordinary for men of that calling which are

recognized and liberally rewarded in salvage cases.” Benedict, § 264. Offshore argues that

“Captain Sisler risked personal injury to . . . get onto the [Vessel] two separate times by walking

across the north jetty rocks in the waves” and as a result “[h]e was knocked down or slipped two

times.” Resp. at 11. But the risk taken here was not extraordinary in nature and, in any event, the

potential for injury was augmented by Captain Sisler’s own poor judgment. When Captain Sisler

arrived at the grounding site there was no visibly imminent threat to the Vessel, and he confirmed

(without leaving his boat) that everyone on the Vessel was wearing a life jacket, and no one was

injured. Sisler Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. Captain Sisler could have minimized his risk by waiting for the

second Offshore towboat to arrive before he attempted to reach the Vessel to secure the tow rig.

There was simply no need for him to walk over to the Vessel twice, unless, of course, the primary

motivation for the first walk across the jetty was to make sure a certain Salvage Agreement was

executed.

4. Promptitude, Skill, and Energy Displayed in Rendering the Service and

Saving the Vessel

Offshore promptly arrived on the scene within minutes of receiving report that a 50-foot

vessel had run aground on the north jetty. See Sisler Decl. ¶ 3. Offshore is a professional salvor

with over 30 years of experience and its team of four men in three towboats were properly equipped

to rescue the Vessel. Collins Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8-10. The evidence further demonstrates Offshore—

albeit motivated by pecuniary gain—was exceptionally energetic in pulling the Vessel away from

the jetty towards the Wahoo Bay and securing the safety of the Vessel, all in under 15 minutes.

Sisler Decl. ¶¶ 22-23.

5. Value of the Property Employed by Offshore in Rendering the Service and

the Danger to Which Such Property was Exposed

Offshore deployed a team of men in three vessels with a combined present value of

$475,000. Id. ¶ 7. Offshore’s vessels carried pumps, hoses, dive gear, patching materials, and

other gear if the circumstances warranted it. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10. Although three vessels were deployed,

ultimately only one towboat (a 29-foot Ambar with twin 300 horsepower engines) was needed to

pull the Vessel off the jetty and it was able to do so within a relatively short amount of time. Sisler

Decl. ¶¶ 22-23. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that this was the type of salvage operation

that would have required three towboats to be on scene. The Offshore team was exposed to the

dangers inherent in the professional salvaging business.

6. Labor Expended by Offshore in Rendering the Salvage Service

The time and labor expended here were minimal. The Vessel readily came off ground. No

special equipment was required or used. The ungrounding can be regarded as routine and simple,

especially for a professional salvage team such as Offshore.

In summary, considering all the Blackwall factors together, as this Court must, the Court

finds Offshore’s justifications for claiming the exorbitantly large salvage award of $220,000.00

(20% of the salvage value of the Vessel) simply do not hold water. Because the salvage operation

was a low-level ungrounding effort with little peril, in conjunction with the other factors discussed

above, the Court finds a low order salvage award of 1% of the lowest possible salvage value of the

Vessel ($950,000.00) is appropriate here.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Reduce Security [ECF No. 25] is

GRANTED and the $330,000.00 security is hereby REDUCED and SET at $9,500.00.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 27th day of November, 2020.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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