Christie v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD.

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

William Christie, Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

Civil Action No. 20-22439-Civ-Scola

)

Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. and )

others, Defendants. )

Order On Motions to Dismiss

Now before the Court are Defendants Jefferson Insurance Company and

AGA Service Company’s (the “Insurance Defendants”) motion to dismiss the

Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 17) as well as Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises

Ltd.’s motion to dismiss count VI of the Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 22). For

reasons stated below, the Court denies the Insurance Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Counts VII, VIII, IX and X of the complaint (ECF No. 17) and grants

Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss Count VI of the complaint (ECF No. 22).

The Plaintiff is directed to file his amended complaint in a manner consistent

with this order by November 3, 2020.

I. Background1

The Plaintiff William Christie was a passenger on Royal Caribbean’s

Symphony of the Seas. (ECF No. 1 at ¶8.) In connection with his trip on Royal

Caribbean’s vessel, Mr. Christie purchased travel insurance from Defendant

Jefferson Insurance Company, a travel insurance policy underwriter. (ECF No. 1

at ¶3.) That policy was serviced by Defendant AGA Service Company. (ECF No.

1 at ¶3.) In connection with this policy, Mr. Christie alleges the Insurance

Defendants were obligated to provide for “the coordination and supervision of

emergency medical care for the Plaintiff during the subject cruise.” (ECF No. 1

at ¶3.)

While aboard Royal Caribbean’s vessel, on July 1, 2019, Mr. Christie

began experiencing severe back pain and visited the ship’s medical facility, where

he was treated by Pranjal Pathak, one of the ship’s doctors. (ECF No. 1 at ¶16.)

Mr. Christie claims his back pain was so severe he was unable to lay on the

examination table and was “unable to walk.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶16.) As a result of

1 The Court accepts the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true for the purposes of

evaluating the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of

Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997).

this, Mr. Pathak gave Mr. Christie certain treatments and suggested he follow-

up with his personal doctor when he was back home in Florida after the cruise.

(ECF No. 1 at ¶18.)

The next day, July 2, 2019, Mr. Christie’s condition had not improved. Still

unable to walk, and now unable to have a bowel movement, Mr. Christie returned

to the ship’s medical facility where a Nurse, Iuliana Bratu, gave Mr. Christie a

glycerin suppository for his wife to administer to him. (ECF No. 1 at ¶20.) Mr.

Christie alleges that no medical record was created for this event and he received

no follow-up from the ship’s medical staff. (ECF No. 1 at ¶20.)

On July 3, 2019, Mr. Christie was still unable to walk and had to return

to the ship’s medical facility by wheelchair. Mr. Christie alleges that up through

this point the ship’s doctors, including Dr. Randall Ortel, assumed Mr. Christie

was suffering from sciatica and after realizing this was not the case, referred Mr.

Christie to a hospital in Puerto Rico for a lumbar spine MRI and treatment. (ECF

No. 1 at ¶21.) The hospital where Mr. Christie was referred by Royal Caribbean

did not have an available MRI scanner. (ECF No. 1 at ¶21.) Mr. Christie alleges

that at this point, he contacted AGA and Jefferson to assist in coordinating his

emergency medical care. (ECF No. 1 at ¶21.) After attempting to get an MRI at

the hospital he was referred to, Mr. Christie was told there were no scanners

available that day and that they would need to come back tomorrow. (ECF No. 1

at ¶25.) While waiting for his MRI scan, Mr. Christie and his wife attempted to

arrange through AGA to have Mr. Christie airlifted to a medical facility in Florida,

however, AGA would not agree to do so until Mr. Christie received an MRI. (ECF

No. 1 at ¶23-25.)

Eventually, the Christie’s chartered their own air ambulance for

$10,000.00 and had Mr. Christie airlifted from Puerto Rico to a hospital in

Tampa, Florida. (ECF No. 1 at ¶27.) After being admitted, Mr. Christie was

diagnosed with cauda equina syndrome and underwent an emergency spinal

decompression surgery. (ECF No. 1 at ¶28.) Mr. Christie alleges that the delay in

his obtaining surgery resulted in permanent injury, including paralysis. (ECF

No. 1 at ¶28-32.)

The Insurance Defendants have moved to dismiss counts VII, VIII, IX and

X of the Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 17) and Royal Caribbean has moved to

dismiss Count VI of the Complaint on the grounds that it is a facially deficient

pleading.

II. Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all the

complaint’s allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a pleading need only contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2). The Plaintiff must nevertheless articulate “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” will not survive dismissal. Id. In applying the Supreme Court’s directives

in Twombly and Iqbal, the Eleventh Circuit has provided the following guidance

to the district courts:

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should 1) eliminate any

allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and

2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief. Further, courts may infer from the factual

allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanation[s],

which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the

plaintiff would ask the court to infer.

Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 F. App’x 136, 138 (11th

Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

III. Legal Standards

A. Shotgun Pleadings

“Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.”

Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2018). They

violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b), “waste scarce judicial

resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate

court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” Id. (quotations

and alterations omitted). When presented with a shotgun pleading, a district

court “should strike the pleading and instruct counsel to replead the case—if

counsel could in good faith make the representations required by Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b).” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2018)

(“This is so even when the other party does not move to strike the pleading”). One

type of shotgun pleading is where a complaint fails to “separate[] into a different

count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty.

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23, n.13 (11th Cir. 2015).

B. Scope of Tort Claim in a Contract Case

The economic loss rule is “a judicially created doctrine that sets forth the

circumstances under which a tort action is prohibited if the only damages

suffered are economic losses.” Koski v. Carrier Corp., 347 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 97

(S.D. Fla. 2017) (Scola, J.) (quoting Tiara Condo Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan

Cos., Inc., 110 So. 3d 399, 401 (Fla. 2013)). The rule is the “fundamental

boundary between contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy

interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care

and thereby encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others.” Id.

The rule prohibits parties in contractual privity from suing in tort for purely

economic losses. Id.; see also Tiara Condo Ass’n, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos.,

Inc., 714 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2013).

In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that “the application of the

economic loss rule [wa]s limited to products liability cases” but in a concurrence

to that opinion, Justice Pariente wrote “the majority’s conclusion . . . does not

undermine Florida’s contract law or provide for an expansion in viable tort claims

. . . [f]or example, in order to bring a valid tort claim, a party still must

demonstrate that all of the required elements for the cause of action are satisfied,

including that the tort is independent of any breach of contract claim.” USI

Insurance Services LLC v. Simokonis, No. 15-cv-24337-Moreno/O’Sullivan, 2016

WL 11547701, at *6 (S.D. Fla. April 15, 2016) (internal citations omitted). The

rule detailed in Justice Pariente’s concurrence is known as the “independent tort

rule.” That rule prevents a party from seeking recovery in tort for what is actually

a breach of contract claim. Ca. Inst. of Arts and Tech. v. Campus Mgmt. Corp.,

No. 18-24701-Civ-Smith, 2020 WL 1692079, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2020)

(Smith, J.). Since the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling, district courts in the

Eleventh Circuit have split on whether the “independent tort rule remains intact

following the Tiara decision.” Id. at *6-8 (collecting cases). While some courts

have held the independent tort rule is still applicable despite the majority’s

opinion in Tiara, others have found Justice Pariente’s concurrence to be mere

dicta.

This Court has recently held in two opinions that the independent tort rule

survived the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Tiara. Accordingly, a Plaintiff

must plead an independent tort, separate and apart from their contract-based

claims, in order to have a viable tort claim relating to activities governed by a

contract. For instance, in Capten Trading Ltd. v. Banco Santander International,

the Court dismissed negligence claims, among other reasons, because the

Plaintiff “failed to establish a recognized duty existing outside the parties’

contractual relationship” and noted that “fundamental contract principles . . .

bar a tort claim where a defendant has not committed a breach of duty

independent of his breach of contract.” Capten Trading Ltd. v. Banco Santander

Int’l, No. 17-20264-Civ-Scola, 2018 WL 1558272, at *5 (S.D. Fla. March 29,

2018) (Scola, J.). Similarly, in Perez v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., the Court again applied

the independent tort rule, noting the rule had recently been reaffirmed by

Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals. Perez v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 19-

22761-Civ-Scola, 2019 WL 5457746, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2019). Consistent

with the prior practice of the Court, for a plaintiff to state a viable tort claim

where that claim is derived from a contractual relationship, the Plaintiff must

allege all required elements for its cause of action and state a “recognized duty

existing outside of” that contractual relationship. Capten, 2018 WL 1558272, at

*5.

C. Undertaker’s Doctrine

Florida courts have articulated a doctrine, known as the undertaker’s

doctrine, which states generally that “whenever one undertakes to provide a

service to others, whether one does so gratuitously or by contract, the individual

who undertakes to provide the service thereby assumes a duty to act carefully

and to not put others at undue risk of harm.” Weinberg v. Advanced Data

Processing, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (Bloom, J.)

(emphasis added) (citing Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1185

(Fla. 2003)). Indeed, this doctrine is recognized as an “entrenched aspect of

Florida tort law.” Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1051 (Fla. 2009).

Section 342A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the

appropriate standard for assessing liability where a Plaintiff alleges a cause of

action pursuant to the undertaker’s doctrine. The Restatement provides:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services

to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a

third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for

physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to

protect his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm,

or

(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third

person, or

(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person

upon the undertaking.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342A. The undertaker’s doctrine has been

applied by Courts where duties under a contract were allegedly negligently

performed. See Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 348 F. Supp. 627, 628-29 (M.D.

Fla. 1972) (recognizing applicability of undertaker’s doctrine where store

contracted with insurer for insurer to make periodic inspections of its premises

to detect any hazardous conditions). The undertaker’s doctrine creates a duty

over and above a party’s duty under a contract and therefore can provide the

basis for an independent tort sufficient to satisfy the independent tort rule.

IV. Analysis

A. Counts VII and VIII, Breach of contract against the Insurance

Defendants

The Insurance Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss Counts VII

and VIII of the Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that they impermissibly seek

damages for items “not contemplated under the travel insurance policy.” (ECF

No. 17 at 7.) Specifically, the Insurance Defendants claim that the travel

insurance policy at issue provided “specific amounts and types of coverage”

including “emergency transportation coverage and emergency medical and

dental coverage” with a “maximum benefit of $500,000 and $25,000,

respectively. (ECF No. 17 at 7.) The Insurance Defendants assert that the policy

does “not contemplate coverage for lost income and earning capacity, pain,

suffering, disability, physical impairment, mental anguish, and all the other tort

compensatory damages that Plaintiff seeks.” (ECF No. 17 at 7.) In response, the

Plaintiff argues that he may plead damages related to personal injury resulting

from negligent performance of a contract. (ECF No. 18 at 10.)

In Florida, the injured party in a breach of contract action may recover

damages that will put the party in the same position they would have been in

had the other party not breached the contract. Capital Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Earth

Tech, Inc., 25 So. 3d 593, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Recoverable damages are

inclusive of “all damages that are causally related to the breach so long as the

damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time the parties entered into the

contract.” Id. Damages are “foreseeable if they are the ‘proximate and usual

consequence’ of the breaching party’s act.” Id. Accordingly, it is not necessary

that the parties “contemplated the exact injury which occurred as long as the

actual consequences could have been reasonably expected to flow from the

breach.” Id.

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that the Parties’ contract required the Insurance

Defendants to assist in “coordinating and supervising emergency medical care,

if needed, during the [Plaintiff’s] cruise vacation.” (ECF No. 18 at 2.) The Plaintiff

claims that the Insurance Defendants breached their contractual duties by

failing to coordinate emergency medical services after the Plaintiff began

experiencing severe back pain which ultimately caused him to suffer permanent

disabilities, including paralysis. (ECF No. 17 at 2.) While the Insurance

Defendants claim that the tort-style damages sought by the Plaintiff were not

contemplated by the Parties it is not necessary that the parties contemplated

such damages when entering into their contract. Rather, under Florida law, the

Plaintiff need only plead that his injury was a foreseeable consequence of the

Insurance Defendants’ breach. Making all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the

Court finds that the Plaintiff has adequately plead that his injuries were a

foreseeable consequence of the Insurance Defendants’ alleged failure to perform

under the contract. Specifically, the Court finds that it is foreseeable that failure

to adequately coordinate emergency medical services could result in significant

personal injury which would result in the tort-style damages the Plaintiff seeks.

Indeed, the Insurance Defendants fail to advance any argument contesting the

foreseeability of the Plaintiff’s damages.

In light of the above, the Court denies the Insurance Defendants’ request

that the Court dismiss Counts VII and VIII of the Plaintiff’s complaint.

B. Counts IX and X, Negligent failure of the Insurance Defendants

to coordinate medical care

Next, the Insurance Defendants request the Court dismiss Count IX and

X of the Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the Plaintiff fails to allege an

independent tort beyond the breach of the insurance contract at issue. (ECF No.

17 at 4.) In response, the Plaintiff argues that his tort claims are proper on three

grounds: 1) a plaintiff may pursue a tort claim based on negligent performance

of a contract where such negligence results in personal injury; and 2) the

Insurance Defendants breached their duty to the Plaintiff under the undertaker’s

doctrine; and 3) the Insurance Defendants’ actions created a foreseeable zone of

risk giving rise to a duty owed by the Insurance Defendants to the Plaintiff. (ECF

No. 18 at 3-5.) As stated above, this Court adheres to the independent tort rule

and accordingly, for the Plaintiff’s tort claims against the Insurance Defendants

to survive the Insurance Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff must have

plead a tort claim independent of the alleged breach of contract.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has met its burden. The Plaintiff has

adequately plead that the Insurance Defendants owed a duty to the Plaintiff

under the undertaker’s doctrine and there for has plead an independent tort in

satisfaction of the independent tort rule. The undertaker’s doctrine requires that

when the Insurance Defendants agreed to undertake the coordination of

emergency medical care on Plaintiff’s behalf, by way of contract between the

parties, the Insurance Defendants had a duty to do so in a manner that did not

put the Plaintiff at undue risk of harm. See Weinberg, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1365.

By allegedly negligently performing its duties to coordinate emergency medical

services under the contract, the Insurance Defendants breached their duty to

the Plaintiff and that breach arguably caused the Plaintiff’s permanent injuries.

See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (“It is

axiomatic that to establish negligence, the passenger must allege 1) duty; 2)

breach of that duty; 3) causation; and 4) harm.”). The Court therefore finds that

the Plaintiff has adequately plead a tort independent of the breach of contract

has been alleged by the Plaintiff. While the Insurance Defendants argue that the

Counts VII, VIII, IX and X are impermissibly duplicative, the Court notes that

negligent performance of a contract can give rise to a claim sounding in tort as

well as one for breach of contract. Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Indus. Plants

Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1977).

The Court therefore denies the Insurance Defendant’s request that the

Court dismiss counts IX and X of the complaint. As the Court has found an

independent tort was plead under the undertaker’s doctrine, the Court need not

reach the additional grounds raised by the Plaintiff in support of his tort claims

against the Insurance Defendants.

C. Count VI, Negligent hiring, selection, retention, monitoring,

and training of the onboard medical staff and medical facility

by the Defendant Royal Caribbean

In its motion to dismiss, Royal Caribbean asks the Court to dismiss Count

VI of the Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that it is a facially defective

pleading. (ECF No. 22 at 2-3.) In response, the Plaintiff argues that it has alleged

sufficient facts in support of Count VI, which seeks relief for “negligent hiring,

selection, retention, monitoring, and training of the onboard medical staff and

medical facility.” (ECF No. 1 at 36.) Specifically, the Plaintiff notes they alleged

that: Royal Caribbean “knew or should have known that the medical education

of the staff . . . did not meet any reasonable standards” (ECF No. 1 at ¶101); a

reasonable investigation of the ship doctors’ prior training and experience would

have revealed the doctors were unfit to work on the vessel (ECF No. 1 at ¶102);

doctors Ortel and Pathak were “not capable, due to their insufficient education,

training, and experience, to request, advocate for, and arrange a prompt

emergency medical evacuation from the vessel for Plaintiff” (ECF No. 23 at 4; see

also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶103-04); Royal Caribbean failed to “sufficiently verify,

investigate, background check, and screen the shipboard physicians prior to

hiring them” (ECF No. 23 at 4; see also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶106-07) (emphasis in

original); Royal Caribbean failed to provide adequate training to its medical staff

regarding “situations where passengers should be transported off of its ships”

(ECF No. 1 at ¶108); and Royal Caribbean had a duty to monitor the activities

and abilities of its shipboard medical staff after they were hired and trained and

therefore fit to be retained. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5; see also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶108-12.)

The Court agrees with the Defendant Royal Caribbean that the Plaintiff’s

pleading is deficient. To support its various claims under Count VI the Plaintiff

must adequately plead facts supporting each of those claims. Gharfeh v. Carnival

Corp., 309 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1332-33 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (Goodman, Mag. J.).

Where the Plaintiff’s pleadings, as here, are “fact-free, wholly conclusory,

boilerplate allegations” that the cruise line knew or should have known about

alleged deficiencies in the training and performance of its onboard medical staff,

the Plaintiff has not done enough to plead facts making its claims plausible

rather than merely possible. Doe v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 16-cv-23733-UU,

2016 WL 6330587, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016) (Ungaro, J.); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8. As the Plaintiff’s pleading could be interchangeably alleged against any

cruise line defendant and its medical staff, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has

failed to adequately allege viable causes of action under Count VI.

Moreover, the Court finds that Count VI is an impermissible shotgun

pleading. Count VI attempts to cram multiple, distinct theories of liability into

one claim. To the extent each theory is a separate cause of action, each must be

asserted independently and with supporting factual allegations. See Garcia v.

Carnival Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1337, n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Moore, J.)

(dismissing maritime negligence claim that “epitomizes a form of ‘shotgun’

pleading,” where the plaintiff alleged that Defendant owed a duty of “reasonable

care under the circumstances,” and then “proceed[ed] to allege at least twenty-

one ways in which Defendant breached this duty”); Brown v. Carnival Corp., 202

F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (Ungaro, J.) (“Simply alleging that

Carnival owed Plaintiff a duty of ‘reasonable care’ in a conclusory fashion, while

also pleading [“forty-one”] alleged breaches that purport to impose a heightened

duty upon Carnival, is not sufficient to state a valid negligence claim under

maritime law,” and holding that “the burden will remain on Plaintiff to review

her Complaint and ensure that each factual allegation is supported by law and

plausible facts, and is alleged in good faith.”); Gayou v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,

No. 11-23359-Civ, 2012 WL 2049431, at *5-*6, n.2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012)

(Scola, J.) (ordering plaintiff to amend complaint to “separately allege an

independent count” for various theories of liability that were lumped into a single

maritime negligence claim); Flaherty v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 15-

22295, 2015 WL 8227674, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2015) (Lenard, J.) (same);

Doe, 2016 WL 6330587, at *3 (holding that Plaintiff’s “boilerplate allegations” of

breach of duty failed to state a claim for negligent hiring and retention, training

and supervision under maritime law, and ordering Plaintiff to “allege each of

these three claims in separate Counts” in an amended complaint (emphasis in

original)); Ciethami v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1349-50

(S.D. Fla. 2016) (Williams, J.) (holding that maritime negligence claim failed Rule

8(a), where the Plaintiff’s “shotgun-style recitation[]” of “34 breaches of duty,”

“without any factual context,” makes “any meaningful assessment of her claims

difficult”); Gharfeh v. Carnival Corp., No. 17-20499, 2018 WL 501270, at *3, *6-

*7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2018) (Goodman, Mag. J.) (dismissing maritime negligence

count that “improperly commingles claims” as an “impermissible shotgun

pleading”); Gharfeh, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 1333, n.7 (dismissing negligence claim

where Plaintiff “has done little more than assert fact-free, wholly conclusory,

boilerplate allegations” and requiring in any amended pleading that the plaintiff

“allege facts, not merely labels and boilerplate conclusions”); Ward v. Carnival

Cruises, No. 17-24628, 2019 WL 342027, at *2-*3, n.1, n.2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28,

2019) (Scola, J.) (collecting cases). Further, the Plaintiff must eliminate any

redundant allegations.

Given that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege facts sufficiently

supporting its claims in Count VI and in further consideration of the fact that

Count VI is an impermissible shotgun pleading, the Court grants Royal

Caribbean’s motion to dismiss Count VI of the Plaintiff’s complaint.

V. Conclusion

The Court denies the Insurance Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its

entirety. (ECF No. 17.) The Court grants Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss

(ECF No. 22) and orders the Plaintiff to replead Count VI of the complaint by

November 3, 2020. Alternatively, if the Plaintiff wishes to abandon its claims in

Count VI, the Plaintiff should advise the Court that it wishes to proceed under

the current complaint, with Count VI dismissed.

The Court also notes that the Plaintiff requested “the opportunity to

conduct discovery before amending his complaint so that he may plead his

claims for negligent hiring, selection, retention, monitoring and training with the

benefit of [Royal Caribbean’s] employment files for the medical staff at issue.”

(ECF No. 23 at 6.) The Court denies this request. The Plaintiff is “seeking to

change the logical sequence of litigation” and “seeks discovery to learn whether

it may be able to assert a valid claim.” Sovereign Bonds Exch. v. Fed. Republic of

Ger., No. 10-219440-Civ., 2011 WL 13100214, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2011)

(Altonaga, J.) (internal quotations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly

instructed that facial challenges to a claim, such as a motion to dismiss, must

be resolved before discovery begins. Id. (discussing Chudasama v. Mazda Motor

Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997)). Parties may not file insufficient

complaints with the hopes of receiving discovery to make them sufficient. Id. at

*2.

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida on October 20, 2020.

dobert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge