Taylor v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Pamela Taylor, Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

Civil Action No. 20-22161-Civ-Scola

)

Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., )

Defendant. )

Order Striking Complaint

This matter is before the Court on an independent review of the record.

This maritime tort action arises from injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiff

Pamela Taylor when she tripped and fell while a passenger aboard a ship

operated by Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (“RCC”). (Compl., ECF No.

1.) In her complaint, Taylor asserts one count labeled “Negligence” against RCC,

but she alleges at least nine ways in which RCC breached its duty of care or was

otherwise negligent. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-27.) These “breaches” raise numerous distinct

theories of liability, including for negligently creating or allowing a dangerous

condition, negligent failure to warn, negligent failure to maintain the subject

area, and negligent failure to follow certain policies. (Id.)

“Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have little tolerance for shotgun

pleadings.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir.

2018). They violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b), “waste

scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak

havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the

courts.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted). When presented with a shotgun

pleading, a district court “should strike the pleading and instruct counsel to

replead the case—if counsel could in good faith make the representations

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348,

1357-58 (11th Cir. 2018) (“This is so even when the other party does not move

to strike the pleading”). One type of shotgun pleading is where a complaint fails

to “separate[] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.”

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23, n.13 (11th

Cir. 2015). The complaint here is this type of shotgun pleading.

Taylor’s “negligence” count attempts to cram multiple, distinct theories of

liability into one claim. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 25-27.) At the same time, many of the

purported breached duties are redundant. For example, the Court can discern

no meaningful distinction between RCC’s purported negligence for failure to

provide “a reasonable and safe means to [exit] the vessel” and its purported

negligence for “[f]ailing to provide a safe and level walking area on the gangway

when exiting the vessel.” (See id. at ¶ 25.e., ¶ 25.g.)

To the extent each theory is a separate cause of action, each must be

asserted independently and with supporting factual allegations.1 See Garcia v.

Carnival Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1337, n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Moore, J.)

(dismissing maritime negligence claim that “epitomizes a form of ‘shotgun’

pleading,” where the plaintiff alleged that Defendant owed a duty of “reasonable

care under the circumstances,” and then “proceed[ed] to allege at least twenty-

one ways in which Defendant breached this duty”); Brown v. Carnival Corp., 202

F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (Ungaro, J.) (“Simply alleging that

Carnival owed Plaintiff a duty of ‘reasonable care’ in a conclusory fashion, while

also pleading [“forty-one”] alleged breaches that purport to impose a heightened

duty upon Carnival, is not sufficient to state a valid negligence claim under

maritime law,” and holding that “the burden will remain on Plaintiff to review

her Complaint and ensure that each factual allegation is supported by law and

plausible facts, and is alleged in good faith.”); Gayou v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,

No. 11-23359-Civ, 2012 WL 2049431, at *5-*6, n.2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012)

(Scola, J.) (ordering plaintiff to amend complaint to “separately allege an

independent count” for various theories of liability that were lumped into a single

maritime negligence claim); Flaherty v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 15-

22295, 2015 WL 8227674, *3 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2015) (Lenard, J.) (same);

Doe v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 2016 WL 6330587, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016)

(Ungaro, J.) (holding that Plaintiff’s “boilerplate allegations” of breach of duty

failed to state a claim for negligent hiring and retention, training and supervision

under maritime law, and ordering Plaintiff to “allege each of these three claims

in separate Counts” in an amended complaint (emphasis in original)); Ciethami

v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1349-50 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

(Williams, J.) (holding that maritime negligence claim failed Rule 8(a), where the

Plaintiff’s “shotgun-style recitation[]” of “34 breaches of duty,” “without any

factual context,” makes “any meaningful assessment of her claims difficult”);

Gharfeh v. Carnival Corp., No. 17-20499, 2018 WL 501270, at *3, *6-*7 (S.D. Fla.

Jan. 22, 2018) (Goodman, Mag. J.) (dismissing maritime negligence count that

“improperly commingles claims” as an “impermissible shotgun pleading”);

Gharfeh v. Carnival Corp., 309 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1333, n.7 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

(Goodman, Mag. J.) (dismissing negligence claim where Plaintiff “has done little

more than assert fact-free, wholly conclusory, boilerplate allegations” and

1 For example, the facts supporting Taylor’s claim that RCC failed to warn the Plaintiff will likely

be distinct from the facts supporting Taylor’s claim that RCC failed to maintain the area in a

reasonably safe condition.

requiring in any amended pleading that the plaintiff “allege facts, not merely

labels and boilerplate conclusions”); Ward v. Carnival Cruises, No. 17-24628,

2019 WL 342027, at **2-3,n.1,n.2(S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2019) (Scola, J.) (collecting

cases). Further, Taylor must eliminate any redundant allegations.

Accordingly, the Court strikes the complaint, (ECF No. 1), as a shotgun

pleading. Taylor may file an amended complaint by June 23, 2020, provided it

complies with this order, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 10(b), and the

Igbal/Twombly standard.

Taylor is forewarned that failure to comply with this order may result in

the dismissal of this case with prejudice or other appropriate sanctions. See

Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1358-59 (instructing that “if the plaintiff fails to comply

with the court’s order—by filing repleader with the same deficiency—the court

should strike his pleading or, depending on the circumstances, dismiss his case

and consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.” (quotations omitted)).

Done and ordered in Miami, Florida on June 16, 2020.

fot N. LS Jr.

United States District Judge