“[A] court should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings. Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] court should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings. Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”
- “To bring a case [under federal question jurisdiction], a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 1:20-cv-21869-GAYLES
GARY DOEHLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES J. CLINTON, III,
LUIS COSTA, MARIA COSTA,
HSBC BANK USA, N.A.,
as Assignee of AMERICA’S MORTGAGE
OUTSOURCE PROGRAM, N.A., and
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendants,
_______________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Court pursuant to Defendant James J. Clinton, III’s
(“Clinton”) Motion to Refer Matter to Bankruptcy Court. [ECF No. 4]. The Court has reviewed
the record and is otherwise fully advised. On May 29, 2020, the Court held a telephonic status
conference on the issue of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case as the related
bankruptcy matter is closed. For the following reasons, the Court finds that it does not.
Defendant Clinton invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction in his Notice of
Removal removing this action from the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for
Miami-Dade County, Florida. Specifically, Clinton asserts that federal question jurisdiction is
proper because the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff Gary Doehla filed in state court “arises
under, and is governed by, the laws of the United States Bankruptcy Code[.]” [ECF No. 1].
Notably, Clinton does not allege that removal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452, which allows
for removal of civil proceedings relating to bankruptcy cases. The parties agree that there is no
diversity jurisdiction.
Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006) (citation omitted). Thus, a federal court may raise jurisdictional issues
on its own initiative at any stage of litigation. Id. at 506; see also Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A] court should inquire into whether it has subject
matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings. Indeed, it is well settled that a
federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be
lacking.”) (citations omitted).
The statute governing removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, permits a defendant to remove a case
brought in state court to federal court if the federal court has federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The removing party bears the
burden of proving that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002). A district court is required to “‘strictly
construe the right to remove’ and apply a general ‘presumption against the exercise of federal
jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of
remand.’” Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Russell Corp.
v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001)).
“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded
complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112–13 (1936)). The
Court looks at the plaintiff’s complaint at the time of removal to determine jurisdiction. See Ehlen
Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, 660 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). Federal question jurisdiction
may attach to a state-law claim if “the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution
of a substantial question of federal law[.]” Hill v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1314
(11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A defendant cannot base federal question jurisdiction on a
defense asserted in the answer or raised in the petition for removal. Gully, 299 U.S. at 113.
Clinton, as the removing party, fails to establish that federal question jurisdiction exists in
this case. The operative Amended Complaint that Plaintiff filed in state court is a one-count action
brought under state law to extend his Florida judgment and judgment lien against Clinton. [ECF
No. 1-1]. Federal courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a state-law claim if it
“necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum
may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities[.]” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,
Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)). But Clinton fails to meet his burden to
demonstrate that those circumstances are present here.
While the Amended Complaint mentions Clinton’s bankruptcy matter, it is not an essential
element of Plaintiff’s cause of action such that federal question jurisdiction exists. See Gully, 299
U.S. at 112 (“To bring a case [under federal question jurisdiction], a right or immunity created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the
plaintiff’s cause of action.”). That Clinton’s bankruptcy proceedings ended in 2014 further
supports this conclusion. See Wesley Apartment Homes, Inc. v. Andrews, No. 1:10-CV-3005, 2010
WL 5690356, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2010), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Wesley
Apartment Homes v. Andrews, No. 1:10-CV-3005-TWT, 2011 WL 345828 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1,
2011) (finding that removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1452 was “not warranted” when the related
“bankruptcy petition ha[d] already been dismissed and [wa]s no longer pending’). Based on the
foregoing, and having considered Clinton’s argument at the status conference, the Court finds that
it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. This case shall be REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida;
2. The Clerk of this Court is directed to forward a certified copy of this Order to the
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade
County, Florida; and
3. The case is CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, this 31st day of May, 2020.
Df
DLA
UNITED STATES DIS T JUDGE