The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
WENDALL HALL,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:22-cv-530-SPC-KCD
MALINDA MASTERS,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Malinda Masters’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 48), Plaintiff Wendall Hall’s Response (Doc. 52), and the
summary judgment evidence presented by both parties.
Background
Hall is an involuntarily committed resident of the Florida Civil
Commitment Center (FCCC). Masters is the FCCC’s former facility
administrator, a position now held by Jon Carner. In his complaint, Hall
alleges that on August 24, 2022, the water from the sink in his room smelled
and tasted foul, and that when he drank the water it immediately caused
cramps, pain, vomiting, diarrhea, migraine headaches, and severe mental
anguish. Hall asks the Court to award him $5 million in damages, an
injunction ordering Masters to provide him bottled water, and closure of the
FCCC. Masters moves for summary judgment.
The FCCC is on the DeSoto County water system. DeSoto tests the water
at FCCC monthly and in the past has notified the facility administrator if there
were any issues with the results. (Doc. 48-4 at 2). The FCCC also has the
water tested annually by an independent company, Sanders Laboratories.
Sanders found no abnormal issues with the water from 2019-2022—they
collected the water samples for the 2022 test on September 8, 2022. (Id. at 3).
Masters testifies she drank the water at FCCC routinely and it tasted good
and had no odor. (Doc. 48-5 at 3). Carner and another FCCC employee named
Tyre Thomas also testify they drink the water and consider it safe. (Doc. 48-4
at 3-4; Doc. 48-6 at 2).
Hall states in his declaration that Masters, Carner, and Thomas never
drink the water at FCCC. (Doc. 52-1 at 8). He also describes the water from
August 24, 2022, to the present as brown, dirty, unclean, foul in taste and
smell, and contaminated with rust, lead, sulfur, and other harmful substances.
(Id. at 4). Hall does not state how he knows what chemicals are in the water,
except that he can smell sulfur. He claims that when he drank the water on
August 24, 2022, it immediately caused him illness, diarrhea, vomiting,
bloating, cramps, migraine headaches, neurological disease, neuropathological
or neuromuscular disease, severe mental anguish, and depression. (Id. at 3).
Hall attempts to refute Masters’ evidence about the water quality at
FCCC with papers that have no apparent relevance to this case, including a
page from a lab report on the water at DeSoto Correctional Institution and two
pages from a Pace Analytical laboratory report of unknown provenance. (Id.
at 15-16, 18). He also submitted a page from a website called Tapsafe that
states the water in Arcadia, Florida is safe to drink. (Id. at 19-22). Finally,
Hall submits information from various sources about a military airfield that
once sat on or near the current site of the FCCC. (Id. at 23-39). Hall speculates
the military contaminated the groundwater, causing the cancer deaths of 50 or
more FCCC residents. (Id. at 7). Hall does not submit any evidence that
Masters ever provided him groundwater from the area around the FCCC
rather than water from the DeSoto County water system.
Some facts from August 24, 2022, are unrefuted. Several FCCC
residents reported the water appeared darker than normal. (Doc. 48-4 at 3).
Hall submitted a resident communication form claiming the water was
contaminated with sulfur and bacteria. (Doc. 52-1 at 9). The staff distributed
bottled water to the residents. (Doc. 48-4 at 4). A staff member contacted the
county and learned the county added chlorine to the water while changing out
water tanks, but the water was safe to drink. (Id.). FCCC staff posted a memo
from Masters in each dorm explaining that while the water was discolored, it
was safe to drink and would return to normal the next day. (Id. at 4, 9).
Hall claims the water at FCCC has caused him a myriad of health
problems, but there is no evidence he has ever been diagnosed with any
medical issues relating to the water at FCCC. Antoria Blanding, FCCC’s
Health Services Administrator, reviewed Hall’s medical chart and submitted
an affidavit. On July 8, 2022, Hall saw a nurse practitioner and was diagnosed
with constipation and questionable polyps versus internal hemorrhoids and
told to return if his condition worsened. (Doc. 48-7 at 3; Doc. 48-9). Hall saw
a doctor at DeSoto County Hospital on August 19, 2022, and complained of
chronic abdominal pain with diarrhea. (Doc. 48-10). The doctor recommended
a colonoscopy, which was later scheduled. (Doc. 48-10). In a pre-op
appointment on August 26, 2022, Hall reported blood in his stool, abdominal
pain, and a history of colon polyps and gastroesophageal reflux disease. (Doc.
48-11).
On September 8, 2022, Hall saw Nurse Practitioner C. Reilly after
reporting in a sick call that he had diarrhea and cramps from drinking the
water. When Reilly told Hall the water incident was over two weeks earlier
and lasted maybe one or two days, Hall said the water affected him because he
is allergic to Sulfa, an antibiotic. Reilly explained that something in the water
that smells like sulfur is not the same as the medication Sulfa. Reilly
diagnosed unlikely gastroenteritis and gave Hall a cup for a stool sample. (Doc.
48-13). Hall underwent a colonoscopy on September 15, 2022, which revealed
internal hemorrhoids. (Doc. 48-14). Hall saw Nurse Reilly again on October
14, 2022, and complained of cramps and diarrhea—cultures from the stool
sample were negative. (Doc. 48-15).
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The initial
burden falls on the movant, who must identify the portions of the record “which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact
exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). To defeat summary judgment, the non-movant must “go beyond the
pleadings, and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
material facts exists.” Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. See Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759
(11th Cir. 2006). But “[a] court need not permit a case to go to a jury…when
the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-
movant relies, are ‘implausible.’” Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d
739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996). If the moving party demonstrates entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law, the non-moving party must establish each
essential element to that party’s case. Howard v. BP Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520,
524 (1994).
Hall files his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983 claim,
a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured
under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation occurred under
color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Arrington v. Cobb Cty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In addition,
a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal connection between
the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler
Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).
Discussion
Because Hall is a civil detainee, his claims arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. But “the standard for
providing basic human needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same
under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and it makes no
difference whether [the plaintiff] was a…detainee or a convicted prisoner
because the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison
inmates applies equally to cases involving…detainees.” Keith v. DeKalb Cty.,
Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1044 n.35 (11th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
Courts apply a two-part analysis to challenges to conditions of
confinement. A plaintiff must establish an objective component and a
subjective component. “Under the objective component, the detainee must
prove that the conditions are sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth
Amendment: that is, he must show that ‘extreme’ conditions created an
unreasonable risk—one that society chooses not to tolerate—of serious
damages to the detainee’s future health or safety.” Ellis v. Pierce Cty., Ga., 415
F. App’x 215, 217 (11th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Under the subjective
component, the detainee must show deliberate indifference, which has three
components: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard
of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). The defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Saunders v. Sheriff of Brevard Cty., 735 F. App’x 559, 564
(11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Masters challenges Hall’s ability to prove the objective component, the
subjective component, and causation. As for the objective element, the parties
have submitted competing testimony about the appearance, taste, and smell of
the water at FCCC. Carner purported to attach the 2022 report from Sanders
Laboratories, but he attached the invoice instead, which does not include the
results of the testing. The condition of the water at FCCC—and thus the
objective component of Hall’s claim—remains in dispute.
Masters does establish her burden of proof on the subjective element. It
is undisputed that the water at FCCC comes from the DeSoto County water
system, and that the water is tested by the county once a month and Sanders
Laboratories once a year. Hall attempts to contest Masters’ testimony that she
routinely drank the water at FCCC, as well as Carner’s and Thomas’s
testimony that they still regularly drink the water. Hall claims he personally
witnessed that all three never drink the water. (Doc. 52-1 at 8). But it is not
plausible that Hall could observe every drink of water Masters, Carner, and
Thomas drink each day. He can only speculate, and “[c]ontentions based on
‘mere speculation and conjecture’ cannot defeat summary judgment.” Terrell
v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 98 F.4th 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Metro Props., Inc., 806 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Hall fails to contest that Masters received annual laboratory reports on
the water at FCCC and communicated with the county when questions about
water safety arose, and he fails to plausibly challenge Masters’ assertion that
she routinely drank the water. Thus, no reasonable jury could find that
Masters was subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm posed by drinking the
water at FCCC.
Hall also fails to establish causation. His claim that drinking the water
on August 24, 2022, “immediately” caused “ongoing severe diarrhea, ongoing
vomiting, bloating, cramps, migraine headaches, neurological disease,
neuropathological or neuromuscular disease, (nerves and muscle damages and
damage to the nervous system), severe mental anguish and depression” is not
plausible. (Doc. 52-1 at 3). Nor is it supported by any medical evidence. On
the contrary, Hall’s unrefuted medical records show that he suffered from
gastrointestinal issues long before August 24, 2022. And Hall presents no
verifying medical evidence to support his claim that drinking the water at
FCCC caused him harm. No reasonable jury could find that Hall has
established causation here.
Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:
Defendant Malinda Masters’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) is
GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter
judgment in favor of the defendant, terminate any pending motions and
deadlines, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 29, 2024.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record