Beyel Brothers, Inc. v. Unknown Potential Claimant(s)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

BEYEL BROTHERS, INC.,

Petitioner,

v. Case No: 6:23-cv-2315-PGB-LHP

UNKNOWN POTENTIAL

CLAIMANT(S) and DEXTER

DOUGLAS,

Claimants.

/

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court upon Claimant Dexter Douglas’s

(“Douglas”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (Doc. 16

(the “Motion”)). Petitioner Beyel Brothers, Inc. (“Petitioner”) responded in

opposition. (Doc. 18). Upon consideration, the Motion is due to be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This maritime action stems from an alleged incident involving Douglas and

Petitioner’s vessel—the Megan Beyel, a 1979 108.50’ towing vessel bearing official

number 608097 (the “Vessel”). (Docs. 1, 3).

The subject incident took place on December 22, 2021. (Doc. 1). While

performing repair work aboard the Vessel, Douglas allegedly “grabb[ed] the end of

a wet extension cord that was powering a pump in the Vessel’s rudder room.” (Doc.

16, p. 2; Doc. 18, p. 3).1

Ultimately, on December 1, 2023, Petitioner filed the instant action for

exoneration from or limitation of liability arising out of injuries Douglas sustained

from the subject incident. (Doc. 1 (the “Complaint”)). Douglas moved to dismiss

the Complaint for being untimely pursuant to governing authority (Doc. 16), and

Petitioner responded in opposition (Doc. 18).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly highlighted that “it is extremely difficult

to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Garcia v. Copenhaver,

Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 1997); see, e.g.,

Simanonok v. Simanonok, 787 F.2d 1517, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986). Rule 12(b)(1)

attacks on subject matter jurisdiction may be facial or factual. Carmichael v.

Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). For facial

attacks, courts look to the face of the complaint, taking all allegations as true, and

determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged standing. Stalley, 524 F.3d

1 Shortly after the subject incident, on March 4, 2022, Douglas’s attorney sent a letter to

Petitioner informing Petitioner of his representation of Plaintiff (the “Letter”). (Doc. 16, p. 2;

Doc. 18, p. 3). The Letter notified Petitioner of Douglas’s “Jones Act claim for injuries that he

sustained” while performing work on the vessel and requested evidence preservation. (Doc.

16, p. 2; Doc. 18, p. 3). Over a year later, on June 28, 2023, Douglas served Petitioner with a

Florida state court lawsuit asserting claims for Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness.

(Doc. 16, p. 3; Doc. 18, p. 3).

Considering the basis of Petitioner’s argument for dismissal is improper, the aforementioned

information that speaks to Petitioner’s “notice” of Douglas’s potential claim is irrelevant. See

infra Part III. Moreover, the Court notes that such information is not contained in the instant

Complaint.

at 1232. Factual attacks, in contrast, allow a court “to consider extrinsic evidence

such as deposition testimony and affidavits.” Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1279. Factual

attacks place the burden on the plaintiff to show that jurisdiction exists. OSI, Inc.

v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2002). Factual attacks “challeng[e]

the accuracy of the allegations, not their sufficiency.” Norkunas v. Seahorse NB,

LLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2010), aff’d, 444 F. App’x 412 (11th Cir.

2011). Here, Douglas attempts to bring a factual attack on subject matter

jurisdiction. (See Doc. 16).

III. DISCUSSION

Douglas moves to dismiss Petitioner’s admiralty action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. 16).

Specifically, Douglas contends that the Complaint is time-barred under the

Limitation of Liability Act and Supplemental Rule F(1) of the Supplemental Rules

for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (“Supplemental

Rule F(1)”), depriving the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. (Id.). Ultimately,

the Court finds Douglas does not present a proper basis for the Court to dismiss

this action under Rule 12(b)(1).

The procedures for commencing an exoneration from or limitation of

liability action are governed by the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501,

et seq.,2 and Supplemental Admiralty Rule F. Pursuant to the Limitation of

2 The Court notes that code sections of the Limitation Act were renumbered, most recently, in

2022. Pertinent to the instant Motion, 46 U.S.C. § 30511—formerly 46 App. U.S.C. § 185—was

renumbered as 46 U.S.C. § 30529. However, the relevant language has remained the same.

Liability Act, shipowners can limit liability for certain claims involving their vessel

to the value of the vessel plus its then-pending freight. See 46 U.S.C. § 30529;

Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. Carroll, 918 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2019).

However, § 30529(a) of the Limitation of Liability Act provides that a vessel owner

“may [only] bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for limitation

of liability . . . within 6 months after a claimant gives the owner written notice of a

claim.” § 30529(a) (emphasis added). Similarly, Supplemental Rule F(1) also

imposes a six-month deadline for filing suit: “Not later than six months after

receipt of a claim in writing, any vessel owner may file a complaint in the

appropriate district court . . . for limitation of liability.”

In the instant Motion, Douglas’s sole argument is that the Complaint should

be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because it was not filed within the time

frame provided by § 30529 and Supplemental Rule F(1). (See generally Doc. 16).

Accordingly, Douglas contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

(Id.). However, the Court finds such an argument misguided and unpersuasive.

Simply put, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that “[t]he six-month filing

deadline specified by 46 U.S.C. § 30511(a) is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing

rule, and a shipowner’s failure to meet it does not deprive the district court of

subject matter jurisdiction but rather provides a basis on which to dismiss the

owner’s limitation action on the merits.”3 Orion, 918 F.3d at 1338 (emphasis

3 See supra note 2.

added);4 e.g., In re Bertsch, 540 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1191 (S.D. Fla. 2021). Here,

Douglas’s entire argument for dismissal is premised on the erroneous position that

the six-month timeframe imposed by the Limitation of Liability Act and

Supplemental Rule F is jurisdictional. (Doc. 16, p. 6 (“[T]he motion at bar simply

raises a jurisdictional issue . . . .”)). Moreover, Douglas explicitly states that the

Motion “does not seek to address the underlying merits of the instant action.” (Id.).

Consequently, Douglas does not raise a proper basis for the Court to dismiss

this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Definitive Marine Survs. Inc.

v. Tran, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (“Because the 6-month

deadline is non[-]jurisdictional, granting [claimant’s] Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the boat owners’ asserted untimely filing

of the action, and in doing so necessarily considering the many letters, the affidavit,

and other documents they present, is unwarranted.”); Matter of La Dolce Vita

LLC, No. 3:22CV6289/TKW/ZCB, 2022 WL 17266563, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 14,

2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17404304 (N.D. Fla. Dec.

2, 2022) (highlighting that the claimant’s motion to dismiss, a factual attack under

Rule 12(b)(1), provided “no basis” to dismiss the case because it relied on the non-

jurisdictional six-month deadline).

4 Douglas’s argument is misguided as he largely relies on In re Waterfront License Corp., 231

F.R.D. 693, 697 (S.D. Fla. 2005)—case law that was abrogated by the Eleventh Circuit’s

decision in Orion.

In sum, dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction—

considering the arguments raised—would directly conflict with Eleventh Circuit

precedent. As such, the instant Motion must be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion (Doc. 16) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on April 3, 2024.

ree

PAUL G.

UNITED STATES*DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties