Lenoir v. Love

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

REX D. LENOIR,

Plaintiff,

Vv. Case No. 3:23-cv-1476-HES-JBT

PHILIP V. LOVE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff Rex D. Lenoir, a detainee at the Duval County Jail, initiated

this action on November 18, 20238, by filing a pro se Complaint for Violation of

Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Lenoir names as

Defendants: (1) Philip V. Love; (2) Sheriff Mike Williams; (8) Nicholas A.

Theilacker; (4) Joshua A. Rodriguez; and (5) Otto H. Bottin. Complaint at 2—4.

His allegations appear to arise from a June 14, 2021 arrest, during which he

asserts Defendants used suggestive identification procedures, illegally

searched him, and used excessive force. See id. at 5-6.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.! See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (llth Cir, 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)@) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1849 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

1 Lenoir has neither paid the filing fee nor filed an application to proceed as a

pauper. As such, for purposes of the Court’s required screening, the Court will assume

he intends to proceed as a pauper.

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.8d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.8d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.8d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (lth Cir. 2011) @er curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1988 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and □

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (ith Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

‘contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

"28 gunvive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

644, 570 (2007),

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary|,]”

the complaint should “give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 656 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to

include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 872 F.8d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”’which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Lenoir’s pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,

while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “this leniency does not

give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

y. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),

overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.8d at 709).

Here, Lenoir’s Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim. As to

Defendants Love, Theilacker, and Bottin, his claims are conclusory in nature

and devoid of facts that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference

that they violated his rights. For instance, Lenoir alleges that Theilacker

“surpass[ed] the mandates of Florida’s stop and frisk law by placing his hands

inside of [Lenoir’s] pockets during a ‘pat down’ for weapons,” Complaint at 5,

but he fails to describe the context of the search. As such, Lenoir does not

plausibly establish that the search was unreasonable and amounted to a

constitutional violation. See United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 997 □□□□□

Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“When an officer reasonably believes that a suspect

threatens his safety or the safety of others, he may search the suspect and seize

concealed objects that he reasonably believes may be weapons or other

instruments of assault.”). As to Love and Bottin, he merely asserts that Love

“swlore] falsely to violations of Fla. Stat. Law” and employed a “suggestive”

identification procedure, Complaint at 5, while Bottin “smash[ed] [Lenoir’s]

nose into a Jacksonville Sheriffs Office patrol car,” id, at 6. Lenoir again

provides minimal facts to support his allegations. Without more, his

allegations are conclusory in nature and fail to state a claim for relief.

Lenoir sues the remaining Defendants—Rodriguez and former Sheriff

Williams—in their official capacities only. The purpose of suing a government

official in his or her individual capacity is to impose personal liability for

actions taken under color of state law. See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v.

Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.8d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Kentucky v, Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). Suing a government

official in an official capacity, on the other hand, is an alternative way to assert

a claim against the entity he or she represents, which in this case would be the

Sheriff, or more appropriately, the County. Id. Since Lenoir sues Sheriff

Willams in his official capacity, the official-capacity suit against Rodriguez is

duplicative and should be dismissed, See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d

764, 776 (ith Cir. 1991) (affirming directed verdict in favor of officers in their

official capacities where the municipality was also a named defendant to avoid

redundancy and confusing the jury); see also C.P. by and through Perez v.

Collier Cnty,, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1091 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (dismissing similar

claims).3 The Court will consider Sheriff Williams’ official capacity liability in

the context of those cases discussing county and municipal liability under

§ 1988.

3 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union

Corp., 371 F.3d 1805, 1810 (11th Cir, 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court

would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision

would have significant persuasive effects.”).

To the extent that Lenoir seeks to hold Duval County through former

Sheriff Williams vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of the employees

responsible for Lenoir’s alleged injuries, Lenoir has failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has soundly

rejected the theory of respondeat superior as a basis for liability in § 1983

actions. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead,

a county or municipality may be liable in a § 1983 action “only where the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Cook ex rel.

Estate of Tessier, 402 F.3d at 11165 (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must

establish that an official policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving

force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at

693-94. “A policy is a decision that is officially adopted by the municipality, or

created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on

behalf of the municipality.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488,

489 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The policy requirement is designed to

“distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the

municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to

action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Grech v. Clayton

Cnty., 335 F.8d 1326, 1329 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quotation omitted),

Indeed, municipal liability arises under § 1983 only where “‘a deliberate choice

to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives’ by city

policymakers.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting

Pembaur v, Cincinnati, 475 U.S, 469, 483-84 (1986)). A municipality will

rarely have an officially-adopted policy that permits a particular constitutional

violation, therefore, in order to state a cause of action for damages under

§ 1983, most plaintiffs must demonstrate that the municipality has a custom

or practice of permitting the violation. See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330; McDowell

v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1288, 1289 (ith Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit has

defined “custom” as “a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes

on the force of law” or a “persistent and wide-spread practice.” Sewell, 117 F.3d

at 489,

In some circumstances, “the failure to provide proper training may fairly

be said to represent a policy for which the city may be held liable if it actually

causes injury.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Failure to train can lead to

municipal liability “only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees

in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its

inhabitants [such that the failure to train] can be properly thought of as a city

‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 388-89 (alteration

added). Thus, in order to assert such a claim, a plaintiff must “present some

evidence that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a

particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any

action.” Gold v, City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1850 (11th Cir. 1998), The

Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that “without notice of a need to train or

supervise in a particular area, a municipality is not liable as a matter of law

for any failure to train or supervise.” Id. at 1851. Indeed, “the need for such

training must be plainly obvious to [County] decisionmakers,” such as where

there is “evidence of a history of widespread prior abuse.” Wright v. Sheppard,

919 F.2d 665, 674 (11th Cir. 1990) (alteration added); see also Rocker v. City

of Ocala, 355 F. App’x 312, 314 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), Here, Lenoir

alleges that Sheriff Williams was “complicit in all violations committed by his

officers . . . [because he] was responsible for the training and conduct of his

subordinates.” Complaint at 5. His allegations are conclusory at best. He

neither pleads facts suggesting that the alleged constitutional violations

resulted from a failure to train, nor that Sheriff Williams would know of a need

to train or supervise, Therefore, this case will be dismissed without prejudice

to Lenoir’s right to refile his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with factual

10

allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief against a proper defendant if

he elects to do so.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2, The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case

without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this □□□ day of |

April, 2024.

LL. Lb

Jrfited Statés District Judge

Jax-9 3/28

Rex D, Lenoir, #2021012338

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