Blazejowski v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (St. Johns County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TAWNY BLAZEJOWSKI,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:20-cev-1386-HES-JBT

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Tawny Blazejowski, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).! Blazejowski proceeds on an Amended Petition

(Doc. 5). In the Amended Petition, Blazejowski challenges a 2014 state court

(St. Johns County, Florida) judgment of conviction for three counts of threats

or extortion, four counts of aggravated stalking, and one count of false report

of child abuse, abandonment or neglect. See Amended Petition at 1.

Blazejowski raises ten grounds for relief. Id. at 5-55. Respondents submitted a

1 For all pleadings and exhibits filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

Response to the Amended Petition (Response; Doc. 13). They also submitted

exhibits. See Docs. 13-1 through 13-4. Blazejowski filed a brief in reply (Reply;

Doc. 14) with exhibits (Docs. 14-1 through 14-3). This action is ripe for review.

II. Factual and Procedural History

The following facts are taken from Blazejowski’s initial motion for

postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule

3.850 Motion):

September 2012

This case began when [Blazejowski] and her ex-

fiancé, Mr. Joseph Good, ended their relationship on

September 24th, 2012. ([Blazejowski] then

immediately began firing off a series of harassing

emails. The initial blast of emails contained photos of

them together as a couple. The emails were first sent

from her account (fl.law.ratb@gmail.com) to his email

account at home (joe.good1265@comcast.net) and at

work (cjmxg@allstate.com). But then, [Blazejowski]

hijacked Mr. Good’s account with Yahoo

(joe.good1265@yahoo.com), changed the password,

and sent out over a dozen pornographic emails to

company executives at his work.

She also emailed Mr. Good photos that were

secretly taken inside his residence, photos of him

undressed, a photo from Probation Plus, and a photo

of a shovel stuck in the ground. She then returned to

his Yahoo account, forwarded photos of him undressed

to company executives at his work, removed her phone

and email information, and then completed the late

night crusade by sending out arrest photos of his ex-

wife, Ms. Beth Love.

The next morning, Tuesday the 25th of

September, began with a barrage of emails from an

account created in the likeness of his hijacked Yahoo

account. The fake account was created with Mr. Good’s

name and a nearly identical address

(joegood1265@yahoo.com). At first the emails were

passive aggressive and_ sarcastic (“HAVE A

WONDERFUL DAY”). They then quickly turned to

“sex and porn at work.”

By September 28th, [Blazejowski] had

researched and outline[d] a plan for revenge with a

goal of getting Mr. Good fired from his job at All State.

A search of [Blazejowski’s] computer, which was seized

during the search warrant, revealed a guide on “HOW

TO GET SOMEONE FIRED” and how to “GET

REVENGE ON YOUR EX.”

October 2012

[Blazejowski] then began harassing Mr. Good’s

neighbor and co-worker at All State, Mrs. Jennifer

Robor. On Monday the 15th of October, Mrs. Robor

received mail hand addressed to her husband with no

return information. The envelope contained a typed

letter that alleged she was having an affair with Mr.

Good while they were at work. Having never met or

spoken to [Blazejowski], Mrs. Robor still suspected

that the letter came from [Blazejowski]. [Blazejowski]

denied sending the letter when she was questioned by

Deputy Bagby. She also claimed that she didn’t know

Mrs. Robor or where she lived, and “if Joe though[t]

she was harassing him to prove it.”

By Thursday the 18th of October, [Blazejowski]

also began harassing Mr. Good’s supervisor at All

State, Mr. Scott Thomas. She sent him an email at

8:52 am under the disguise that it was from Mr. Good's

ex-wife: “Beth Love” at owjamcab@yahoo.com. The

subject was “JOE GOOD” and it warned:

YOU BETTER PUT A STOP TO JOE GOOD

FUCKING MY WIFE AT WORK!!! IF YOU

DON’T DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT I WILL

COME IN THERE PERSONALLY AND TAKE

CARE OF IT MYSELF! IF MY WIFE DOES

NOT SUE ALLSTATE FOR SEXUAL

HARASSMENT THEN I WILL AND THEN I

WILL DIVORCE HER AND [TAKE]

EVERYTHING FROM HER.

The message appears as though it came from Mr.

Matthew Robor, but evidence reveals that the account

owjamcab@yahoo.com was created early that morning

from an IP address registered to [Blazejowski]

(208.96.177.239 -- from: 10/06/12 to 10/20/12).

[Blazejowski’s] harassment then escalated when

she had Mr. Good falsely arrested for domestic battery

on the night of October 18th. Late that night, with a

bloody shirt and face on, [Blazejowski] drove to the

Sheriffs Office from her house (1307 Fireside Court,

St. Augustine) and reported that Mr. Good hit her in

the face. She painted a story for Deputy Galentine that

she was the victim of a jealous and abusive ex-

boyfriend. She included the claim that he “seems to be

having an affair at work and he blames me for her

spouse finding out when I don’t know her.” Due to the

physical evidence, Mr. Good was arrested at home that

night by Deputy Romer. He later posted bond after

First Appearance at the St. John’s County Jail.

Later that night, Friday the 19th of October at

11:35 pm, [Blazejowski] sent another email to Mr.

Thomas under the disguise of “Beth Love” at

owjamcab@yahoo.com. The email warned “JOE GOOD

ARRESTED” with a booking photo and message:

“NOT AS INNOCENT AS HE WANTS YOU TO

BELIEVE OR AS HE TELLS.”

Five days after the initial arrest, on Wednesday

the 24th of October, [Blazejowski] returned to the

Sheriffs Office and reported that Mr. Good violated

the no contact order in the domestic battery case. She

claimed that he called her at 12:48 pm from a blocked

number and said: “if you don’t drop the charges you

will regret it and your next beating will be worth it.”

[Blazejowski] signed a sworn affidavit and warrant

affidavit, but a second arrest was not made.

On the following day, October the 25th,

[Blazejowski] petitioned for and was granted a

temporary injunction against Mr. Good in St. Johns

County Case No. 2012-1712DR. [Blazejowski] used the

arrest for domestic battery and the alleged violation of

no contact as grounds for the injunction.

November 2012

Within a month after their breakup,

[Blazejowski] had obtained an injunction against Mr.

Good, placed his job in jeopardy, and had him falsely

arrested. She then returned to the Sheriffs Office on

the 1st of November to report that Mr. Good was now

violating the no contact order in both the domestic

battery case and the injunction case. In a sworn

affidavit, she claimed that Mr. Good left two

threatening notes on her cars in the middle of the

night. The first note read:

I CAN’T BELIEVE YOU’RE DOING THIS TO

US. YOU ONLY HAVE A COUPLE MORE

DAYS TO CHANGE YOUR MIND BEFORE I

DO IT FOR YOU WITH MY DICK IN YOUR

MOUTH AND MY HANDS AROUND YOUR

NECK!!! The second note read: “STOP YOUR

MOTHER BEFORE I STOP HER AND YOU

DON'T HAVE ONE!!!

[Blazejowski] further alleged that she looked outside

when her dogs started barking and she saw a Jeep

similar to his leaving the scene. No arrest was made.

On the 26th of November, [Blazejowski] sent an

email to local football coaches and the FHSAA

advising them of Mr. Good’s arrest for domestic

battery. The email was nearly identical to the one that

[Blazejowski] sent to Mr. Thomas in October.

[Blazejowski] then began directing threats to

Mr. Good’s daughter, Ms. Caroline Good. The

Gainesville Police Department reported that they

received a tip from Crime Stoppers on November 28th

that Ms. Good was selling illegal drugs out of her dorm

room on the University of Florida campus. A search

revealed no drugs or contraband. Writings in a

notebook later seized from [Blazejowski] show that she

was likely the source of the tip.

December 2012

Since the reports in St. Johns County were not

resulting in arrests, [Blazejowski] then began making

reports in Duval County. On Friday the 14th of

December, [Blazejowski] went to the Avenues Mall in

Jacksonville and reported to Deputy Bialkoski that

she received a call from a female who said: “Stupid

bitch, Joe still has a handgun, he showed it to me, and

he wants you to know that he plans on using it on you

if you continue to ask for the injunction.” [Blazejowski]

alleged the call could have come from Mr. Good's

friend, Mrs. Chantal Allain. According to the report,

patrol efforts were suspended due to lack of suspect

information.

Early the next morning, Saturday the 15th, Mr.

Good received an email that a subscription for

“Maxim” magazine was ordered for Miss Joe Good at

Blackhawk Drive. The address belonged to Mrs.

Allain. On Monday the 17th of December, a

subscription to “Black Men” and “Penthouse”

magazines were ordered for Miss Joe Good at Bartram

Village Drive. That address belonged to Ms. Love.

After attorneys for Mr. Good filed an alibi

defense in the domestic battery case, the State

Attorney’s Office [fliled an Announcement of No

Information on Tuesday the 18th in St. Johns County

Case No. 2012-02461MM.

Following a contested hearing on Wednesday

the 19th, [Blazejowski] was granted an injunction for

one year against Mr. Good in Case No. 2012-1712DR.

On Thursday the 27th of December, Ms.

Caroline Good reported to the Jacksonville Sheriffs

Office that someone mysteriously placed a container

with drugs and paraphernalia in her vehicle while she

was at the Avenues Mall. Writings in notebooks seized

from [Blazejowski] indicate that she was planning a

very similar set up.

On Monday the 31st of December, [Blazejowski]

returned to Duval County in another attempt to get

Mr. Good arrested for a violation of injunction. This

time she reported that she was at Dicks Sporting

Goods and returned to find a card with a photo from

Mr. Good. Mr. Good was questioned at work and

coworkers confirmed his alibi. Mr. Good reported that

he had resorted to getting a new phone that could

track his movements through GPS. [Blazejowski] was

later advised about making a false report, and in

response she reported that she has gotten nowhere

filing charges with St. Johns County but maybe she

will get somewhere with Duval County.

January 2013

On January the 11th, the Jacksonville Aviation

Authority received a Crime Stoppers tip that Mr. Good

was trafficking illegal drugs from Washington DC to

Florida. The tip included a photo and indicated that he

would have a travel companion. Two days later, as

they returned from their trip, Mr. Good and Ms.

Mariela Murphy were detained in the airport. A

search revealed no illegal drugs. Mr. Good advised

that he received a message from Yahoo while he was

out of town that someone was attempting to recover

his account password and that [Blazejowski] may have

discovered that he was in DC because the two

previously shared an Expedia account. Text messages

on [Blazejowski’s] phone indicate that she had been

following Mr. Good around this time and that she

knew he was at the airport on the 10th with a female

companion.

On Wednesday the 16th of January, the Florida

Division of Insurance Fraud received an anonymous

report that Mr. Good was committing insurance fraud

with his ex-wife, Ms. Love. The “anonymous” report

came from [Blazejowski’s] email at

tlblaze6@hotmail.com.

A week later, on Wednesday the 23rd, Ms. Allain

reported to Deputy Romer that a red rose was sent to

her house with a card that read: “Jt was so good to hear

your voice again. I love you, Joe.” Mr. Good denied

sending the rose and card.

February 2013

[Blazejowski] then began harassing Mr. Good’s

new girlfriend, Ms. Mariela Murphy. On the 27th of

February, [Blazejowski] sent a harassing letter to Ms.

Murphy’s parents in California. The envelope had her

old address and it contained a photo of an undressed

lady with a letter proclaiming “MARIELA VERONICA

KAPLAN MURPHY GOOD A HO!!! Also on the 27th,

[Blazejowski] sent a harassing letter to Ms. Murphy’s

landlords. The handwritten envelope[] to Mr. and Mrs.

Duggan contained a typed letter warning:

The Turnberry neighborhood is _ seriously

concerned about your property at 280 Edge of

Woods Rd. This is a nice community and your

tenant is ruining tt and upsetting many families.

There have been countless complaints about the

late night teen parties thrown by her daughter

while she is out of town. These parties always

involve drugs and alcohol out in the open for

children to see. The most upsetting and what you

should be most concerned about is that she

constantly has her boyfriend Joseph Good who is

acriminal, recently arrested in St. Johns County

spend days at a time at the house. We also believe

that your property is in danger. Prior to living

with Mariela Murphy, Joseph Good dated a

women [sic] who was the victim of his jealous ex-

wife, Beth Ann Love who vandalized her home by

spray painting profanity all over [ ] her house

and then went to Turnberry and did the same to

his house on Paradise Pond Rd. Please verify this

though [sic] the neighborhood security company.

It won't be long before your property is targeted

and you both also become victims.

Writings in a notebook seized from [Blazejowski]

indicate that she authored the letters (“2/27/13 ...

mailed letter to her landlords faked handwriting on

envelope and did not handle anything with hands

uncovered’).

[Blazejowski] then turned to using crime

stoppers as a medium for harassment and threats. On

the 27th of February, she called Crime Stoppers of

Northeast Florida to report that Mr. Good was

sexually molesting certain minor children. The

anonymous report mentioned Mrs. Allain and claimed

that abuse had been ongoing since September 2012.

The report was updated on March 1st to include that

“the suspect got a new phone, so the pictures might be

on the old phone or on his computer.” [Blazejowski]

documented in a red notebook that on “02/27/13:

Reported Joe... by calling crime stoppers.”

March 2013

[Blazejowski] began March with a blitz of more

false reports made anonymously through crime

stoppers. On March Ist, [Blazejowski] made an

anonymous report to First Coast Crime Stoppers that

Mr. Good and Mr. Thomas were storing child

pornography on their work computers and using

women to obtain access to children. The tip also

implicated Ms. Murphy, Mrs. Allain, Mrs. Robor, and

Ms. Good. An investigation by All State and the

Jacksonville Sheriffs Office revealed that the tip was

unfounded.

Also on the lst of March, [Blazejowski] made

widespread accusations to the National Center for

Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) about child

molestation and pornography. She named six children

as victims, and falsely implicated Mr. Good, Mr.

Thomas, Mrs. Robor, H.G. (a minor), Ms. Good, and

Ms. Murphy as suspects. The narrative of the NCMEC

tip is identical to the First Coast Crime Stoppers tip

also sent that day. Records reveal that the NCMEC tip

was made from an IP address (208.96.17795)

registered to [Blazejowski].

On March the 2nd, [Blazejowski] anonymously

made an additional crime stopper report that Mr. Good

was molesting a minor child that was also threatening

suicide. The tip implicated Ms. Murphy.

On March the 4th, Deputy Kelly responded to

the St. Augustine Outlet Mall regarding a threat to

kill [Blazejowski] allegedly made by “Mariela.”

[Blazejowski’s] coworker at the Disney Store, Ms. Rose

Carey, reported that she received a call from “Mariela”

warning that her and Joe were coming down there to

kill [Blazejowski]. Ironically, [Blazejowski] arrived

five minutes later. Per [Blazejowski], the Sheriffs

Office responded to her house earlier that day in

reference to a report made by Ms. Murphy. Both Mr.

Good and Ms. Murphy denied any involvement. No

arrests were made but affidavits were obtained with

Mr. Good’s new number and Ms. Murphy’s number

listed. Writings from the red notebook indicate this

was another fabrication by [Blazejowski].

Now armed with their new contact information,

[Blazejowski] engaged in a campaign of fabricated

violations of injunctions by repeatedly spoofing her cell

phone. On Monday the 11th, [Blazejowski] met with

SJSO Deputy Banks at McDonalds on State Road 16

to report that Ms. Murphy and Mr. Good were

harassing her. [Blazejowski] alleged that she received

four calls from around 8:20 pm. She alleged that on the

third call a woman said “don’t fall asleep tonight” and

on the fourth call a man said “coming for you.”

[Blazejowski] claimed that she recognized Mr. Good’s

voice on the fourth call. She additionally provided an

email from “Mariela Murphy” at

marielaymurphy@gmail.com with the subject “Watch

your back” and message:

Working tonight? LOL You're all so stupid.

ESPECIALLY THE COPS!! They will never

figure out what we did but you will take the fall.

Cops and gates won't protect you. We know where

you are at all times and if we don’t get you at

work Joe knows how to get into your house. Joe

wants me to be Mrs. Good but he says we cant

move on until you arc dead. Therefore, when you

least expect it we will get you and no one will ever

find your body. Kiss your kids goodbye!!!

No arrests were made. Records’ show that

marielaymurphy@gmail.com was_ created that

morning from an IP address (173.8.61.53) registered to

the Bartram Trail Library.

10

Three days later, on the 13th of March,

[Blazejowski] reported to Deputy Kelly that she

received 13 calls from 315-2997 and on the final call at

11:20 pm, Mr. Good left a voicemail stating, “J will call

you later.” Deputy Kelly arrested Mr. Good that night

for a violation of injunction because the number

depicted on ([Blazejowski’s] phone matched the

number on Mr. Good’s affidavit from March the 4th.

By 1:56 am on the morning of the 14th, Mr. Good was

booked into the St. Johns County Jail for a second

time.

Within an hour of second false arrest,

[Blazejowski] registered a group of people for the

Florida Victim Information and Notification Everyday

(VINE) service so that they would be notified of Mr.

Good’s arrest and release. Included on the list was Mr.

Good (via cjmxg@allstate.com), Ms. Good, Ms.

Murphy, Mr. Duggan, Mr. Thomas _ (via

cdc5b@allstate.com), president@allstate.com, and

various St. Johns County school administrators or

coaches. Evidence seized from [Blazejowski] includes

a checklist of the people that were subscribed for the

service.

After Mr. Good posted bond, [Blazejowski] called

the Sheriffs Office on the evening of the 14th of March

to report another violation of injunction. This time

Deputy Wright responded to [Blazejowski’s] house

around 9:34 pm and collected a sworn affidavit from

her stating that:

At approximately 16:26 tonight I received a

phone call from (904) 315-2997. I did not answer

the call but a voice mail was left by a voice I

recognize as my ex-fiancé Joseph Good saying

"You will die for making me go to jail.”

[Blazejowski] added that she received notice from the

jail that Mr. Good had been released prior to the

threatening message. Mr. Good was not arrested due

to an ongoing investigation in this case by the Sheriff's

Office.

[Blazejowski] then went to Duval County the

following day and reported the same alleged violation

11

of injunction. On Friday the 15th, [Blazejowski]

advised Deputy Bennick that she listened to a call at

11:30 am while in Duval County at an appointment.

She elaborated that she received the call on the 14th

at 16:27 hours while she was in Duval County, and

further that it was made by Mr. Good while he was at

work in Duval County. The alleged voicemail stated:

“You will die for making me stay the night in jail.” JSO

did not make an arrest that day.

Phone records reveal that [Blazejowski]

fabricated the alleged violations of injunction by

spoofing her cell phone on the 11th, 18th, and 14th.

Records from Sprint for [Blazejowski] show that: (a)

five calls were received on the 11th from Ms. Murphy’s

phone between 19:58 hours and 20:23 hours; (b) a total

of 18 calls were received on the 13th from Mr. Good’s

phone between 21:40 hours to 23:20 hours, and (c) one

call was received on the 14th from Mr. Good’s phone at

16:26 hours. Records from AT&T however prove that

in fact no calls were made by Ms. Murphy to

[Blazejowski] on the 11th and no calls were made by

Mr. Good to [Blazejowski] on either the 13th or 14th.

On the 17th of March, [Blazejowski] wrote a

letter to SJSO Commander Art May and Sheriff David

Shoar commending Deputy Galentine, Deputy Kelly,

Sergeant Tarbert, and Deputy Wright for their work.

In the letter she portrays herself as “a scared victim.”

On Wednesday the 20th of March, [Blazejowski]

reported another violation of injunction in Duval

County. [Blazejowski] reported to JSO Deputy Snead

that she received to [sic] voicemail messages from Mr.

Good stating that[] “You fucking cunt, I still have a

gun” and “I should have killed you when I had the

chance. Good thing it’s never too late.” [Blazejowski]

alleged that the calls came from his work phone (904-

223-2704) at 11:40 am and 11:43 am while she was in

Duval County. An arrest warrant was then issued at

the request of the State Attorney’s Office in Duval

County. On the following day, while he was at work in

Jacksonville, Mr. Good was falsely arrested for a third

time.

12

Records from Sprint for [Blazejowski] (392-

8423) show that two calls were made from Mr. Good’s

work phone (223-2704) on the 20th at 11:39 am and

11:42 am. Records from All State reflect that no calls

were made but records from AT&T reflect that four

calls were made. Notwithstanding the discrepancy in

the records, the recorded messages were clearly

computer generated and clearly not recognizable as

Mr. Good’s voice. The same messages were also

written in a red notebook used by [Blazejowski] to

organize and plan her attacks. Moreover, the notes

confirm that [Blazejowski] discovered a way to spoof

calls from his work phone “to get Joe fired.”

On Thursday the 28th, [Blazejowski] called in

an anonymous report to the Florida Department of

Children and Families regarding child neglect and

abuse by Mr. Good and his ex-wife, Ms. Love. Caller

ID displayed [Blazejowski’s] phone number (392-

8423). An investigation by DCF proved that the tip

was unfounded. At the direction of Detectives with the

Sheriffs Office, DCF confirmed through a controlled

call that [Blazejowski] made the “anonymous” report.

On the 31st of March, [Blazejowski] registered

Mr. Good for multiple adult dating websites online.

[Blazejowski] also created a fake Facebook account for

Mr. Good. Records from Facebook reveal that

[Blazejowski] used her cell phone (892-8423) to verify

the account and accessed the account from an IP

address (208.96.177.95) registered to her house.

During this time, Mrs. Robor received a message from

the account with a “profile” of Mr. Good that contained

a copy of his All State business card, booking photos

from his false arrests, a phot[o] of him undressed, and

the slogan “you are in good hands when you get fucked

Joe Good.” A search of [Blazejowski’s] computer

exposed how she created the “profile” that she later

posted online and mailed to various persons.

April 2013

On April the 2nd, [Blazejowski] made two more

unjustifiable complaints to Crime Stoppers of

13

Northeast Florida. The first tip (#W326-3262), made

at 12:52 am[] [w]las very similar to the one made a

month earlier in March because it again alleged that a

certain child was threatening suicide because she was

being sexually abused. The tip implicated both Mr.

Good and Ms. Murphy. The second tip (W326-3263),

made at 1:02 am, alleged that Mr. Good and Mrs.

Robor were engaged in pornographic photography of

children. Writings seized from [Blazejowski] reveal

that she made both of these false accusations.

Also on April the 2nd, [Blazejowski] circulated a

vulgar letter to Ms. Murphy, Ms. Allain, and Mr.

Good’s mother. The mailing had the same “profile”

that was sent to Mrs. Robor via Facebook along witha

list of adult websites that it could be found on.

Also on the 2nd, [Blazejowski] sent Ms. Murphy

a peculiar letter warning:

“HI BITCH STOP MESSING W/ Beth She

actually wants to make peace w you! LOL Your

beef is with me Not her Leave her alone OR

DEAL WITH ME. You R SO STUPID! Do U

Really think that he will stay w you? Only For

the sex ... Stay away from my friend. Or else

“Your Friend” NOT!’

Two days later, on the 4th of April, [Blazejowski]

continued the harassment with a malicious letter to

Ms. Murphy’s ex-husband at his work. The letter was

filled with accusations of incest, child abuse, child

pornography, and child suicide. Later that evening,

[Blazejowski] registered Mrs. Robor for multiple adult

websites and adult store catalogs.

The terror caused by [Blazejowski] escalated on

Friday the 5th of April when she sent a second round

of threatening letters. The Defendant sent a letter to

both of Ms. Murphy’s parents in California with a

photo of a decomposing corpse and threat that:

“THIS IS WHAT [REDACTED] WILL LOOK

LIKE THE NEXT TIME MARIELA SEE’S HER

IF SHE SEE’S OR EVENT TALKS TO JOE

GOOD ONE MORE TIME!”

14

[Blazejowski] additionally sent a frightening letter to

Ms. Murphy’s landlord, Mr. Duggan, with the threat

that:

IF MARIELA MURPHY IS NOT OUT OF'

YOUR RENTAL PROPERTY WITHIN 80 DAYS

280 EDGE OF WOODS RD AND 229

PINEHURST POINT ST. AUGUSTINE, FL

382092 WILL BOTH BURN TO THE

GROUND!!!

[Blazejowski] also sent a letter to the corporate office

of All State warning that:

“SOME PEOPLE JUST SHOULDN'T LEAVE

THEIR EMAIL UP ON THEIR SCREEN AND

WALK AWAY FROM THEIR DESK. MAYBE

NOW YOU WILL SEE WHAT MANY HAVE

BEEN TRYING TO TELL YOU FOR SO LONG

ABOUT JENNY ROBOR AND JOE GOOD!!!

That day also included a fax sent by [Blazejowski] at

Office Depot to All State under the disguise that it was

“from Mariela Murphy to Jenny Robor.” Attached to

the fax was a string of fake emails that appear as if

they were secretly sent between Mr. Good and Mrs.

Robor.

Twelve days later, on the 17th of April,

[Blazejowski] was apprehended by the St. Johns

County Sheriffs Office as they executed a search

warrant at her home. Deputies seized an

overwhelming amount of evidence detailing

[Blazejowski’s] course of conduct in this case.

In [Blazejowski’s] house, Deputies located a red

college ruled “1 subject” notebook and a yellow “memo

book.” Among other things, the red notebook contained

a chronology of the fraudulent reports that she made

and the threatening letters that she sent from

February to April. The yellow memo book included

notes that prove [Blazejowski] created the death

threat letter that was sent to Ms. Murphy’s parents a

few days earlier (“send letter to Mariela’s step mother”

and “get picture of decomposed corpse’).

In [Blazejowski’s] car, Deputies discovered the

original fax she sent to All State two days earlier from

15

Office Depot. They also found a multicolored notebook

which verified that [Blazejowski] was trying to

engineer an aggravated stalking case against Mr.

Good (“space actions a month apart to show a pattern

of aggravated stalking’). The multicolored notebook

further verified that [Blazejowski] was attempting to

create “provable violations” that would get Mr. Good

arrested and fired from his job (“after all this make

sure to get a Duval judge change 1 yr. injunction to

permanent’).

In the end, [Blazejowski’s] actions caused Mr.

Good to be falsely arrested three times and then

wrongfully terminated from his job at All State after

more than 20 years there.

See Doc. 13-1 at 108-238.

On August 15, 2013, the State of Florida (State) charged Blazejowski by

amended information with three counts of threats or extortion (counts 1-3),

four counts of aggravated stalking (counts 4-7), and one count of false report of

child abuse, abandonment or neglect (count 8). See Doc. 13-1 at 6-7. On August

14, 2014, Blazejowski entered an open plea of no-contest to all eight counts.

See id. at 9-15. On October 10, 2014, the trial court sentenced Blazejowski to

nine years imprisonment followed by two years of community control and then

four years of probation on counts 1 through 3; five years imprisonment on count

4; and five years of probation on each of the remaining counts (counts 5-8). Id.

at 50-58. The trial court also entered an Order of Community

Control/Probation the same day, which set forth all of the conditions of

16

Blazejowski’s community control and probation. Id. at 58-66. Blazejowski did

not pursue a direct appeal.

On February 18, 2016, Blazejowski filed a motion for postconviction

relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Id.

at 106-33. In the Rule 3.850 Motion, Blazejowski argued her trial counsel was

ineffective when he advised her to forego the State’s alleged plea offer of two

to three years imprisonment and instead enter an open no-contest plea. Id.

After holding an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief on

July 21, 2017. Id. at 183-92. The Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA) per

curiam affirmed the denial of relief on June 26, 2018, and issued the mandate

on July 20, 2018. Id. at 4838, 435.

In May 2018, while serving her prison sentence, Blazejowski was

charged with violating a special condition of the community control/probation

order that prohibited her from contacting the victims. Id. at 60-61, 475-77.

After conducting a violation of probation (VOP) hearing, the trial court revoked

Blazejowski’s community control/probation on counts 1 through 3 and

resentenced her to “serve fifteen (15) years in prison, concurrent on those

counts,” with the probationary sentences on counts 5 through 8 to “remain

unchanged.” Id. at 606-08, 611. Blazejowski appealed, see Doc. 13-2 at 164-211,

and on February 4, 2020, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed Blazejowski’s

17

judgment and sentence upon violation of probation, id. at 252. The Fifth DCA

issued the mandate on April 27, 2020. Id. at 285.

Blazejowski subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition seeking

to disqualify the state court judge who presided over the VOP proceeding. See

Doc. 18-2 at 294-306. The Fifth DCA denied the petition on May 19, 2020. Id.

at 315.

On July 8, 2020, Blazejowski filed a successive Rule 3.850 motion

(Successive Rule 3.850 Motion) in which she raised three claims: (1) newly

discovered evidence; (2) sentence manipulation; and (8) use of false testimony

by the State. See Doc. 13-3 at 257-304. The postconviction court denied relief

on May 25, 2021. See Doc. 13-4 at 499-521. The Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed

the denial of relief on September 21, 2021, id. at 523, and issued the mandate

on October 15, 2021, id. at 525.

While her Successive Rule 3.850 Motion was pending, Blazejowski filed

a petition for writ of certiorari, which she later amended. See Doc. 13-2 at 329-

61. On December 17, 2020, the Fifth DCA dismissed the amended petition after

Blazejowski failed to comply with the court’s order directing her to submit an

appendix in accordance with the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 9.220. Id. at 3638, 365.

Blazejowski filed the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December

2, 2020. See Doc. 1.

18

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus.

Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases

on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

19

pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). As Blazejowski’s convictions and sentence became final

after the effective date of AEDPA, this habeas action is subject to the one-year

limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Respondents argue that this action is untimely as to the five grounds

raised in the Amended Petition that challenge the original 2014 judgment and

sentence. See Response at 10-11. As to those five grounds, Respondents

contend the one-year limitations period began to run from the date the original

2014 judgment and sentence became final. Id. Blazejowski disagrees, arguing

that all grounds raised in the Amended Petition are timely because she filed

this action within one year of the date her 2018 judgment after revocation of

probation became final. See Reply at 5.

“AEDPA’s statute of limitations runs from the date the judgment

pursuant to which the petitioner is in custody becomes final, which is the date

both the conviction and sentence the petitioner is serving become final.”

Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he

judgment that forms the basis of the habeas petition is the one that places the

petitioner in custody.” Id. at 1292; Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849

F.3d 1321, 1825 (11th Cir. 2017) (‘The judgment that matters for purposes of

section 2244 is the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s confinement.”)

20

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the Court looks to the

judgment that places Blazejowski in custody. Here, that judgment is the 2018

violation of probation judgment. Though that judgment stems from the 2014

original judgment and sentence, the sentence that authorizes Blazejowski’s

current detention is the sentence imposed in 2018 for violation of probation.

See Ferreira, 494 F.3d at 1292 (stating that “the judgment to which AEDPA

refers is the underlying conviction and most recent sentence that authorizes

the petitioner’s current detention”); see also Reilly v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

No. 21-13668, 2023 WL 7179321, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023) (The “judgment

[for § 2244 purposes] is the 2015 violation of probation judgment. Though that

2015 judgment stems in part from the 2009 judgment, the sentence that

authorized [the petitioner’s] current detention is the sentence imposed in 2015

for his violation of probation.”); Hernandez v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:12-cv-

377-BJD-PDB, 2015 WL 224654, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2015) (finding the

petitioner’s “conviction and sentence became final [for AEDPA purposes] after

revocation of the probation and the imposition of the new judgment and

sentence”).2 Accordingly, the August 21, 2018 order of revocation and

2 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

ou

imposition of a new judgment and sentence constitutes the “judgment” that

determines the timeliness of Blazejowski’s claims under § 2244(d)(1)(A).3

Respondents concede that “the entire § 2254 petition is timely” if the one-year

limitations period began to run when Blazejowski’s August 21, 2018 judgment

and sentence from the violation of probation became final. See Response at 11.

The Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the 2018 judgment on February 4,

2020, and issued the mandate on April 27, 2020. See Doc. 13-2 at 257, 285.

Because Florida law does not permit the Florida Supreme Court to review an

affirmance without an opinion, see Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure

9.030(a)(2), Blazejowski’s judgment and sentence became final when the time

for filing a petition for certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court

expired. See Chamblee v. Florida, 905 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 2018). The

time for Blazejowski to file a petition for writ of certiorari expired on Monday,

May 4, 2020 (ninety days after February 4, 2020). See Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 468 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (affording the 90-day grace

period to a Florida petitioner whose conviction was affirmed by a court of

appeal in an unelaborated per curiam decision). Accordingly, Blazejowski had

until May 4, 2021, to file a federal habeas petition. Because she filed this

3 Blazejowski does not allege, nor does it appear from the pleadings or the

record, that the statutory triggers set forth in §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) apply in this case.

22

habeas action on December 2, 2020,4 the Court concludes that her Amended

Petition is timely filed.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to

establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to

grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a

hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834

F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474.

The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the

Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Blazejowski’s] claim|[s]

without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

4 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).

23

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t

of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023). “The purpose of AEDPA is to

ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error

correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As such,

federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “greatly circumscribed’

and ‘highly deferential.” Id. Gnternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hill

v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y.

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.8d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need

not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court’s

decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the merits is

unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has

instructed:

24

[T]he federal court should “look through” the

unexplained decision to the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It

should then presume that the unexplained decision

adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be

rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most lkely

relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision, such

as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher

court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars

relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98.

The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to

§ 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As

explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 120S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000),

§ 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a

“contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application”

clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only

‘if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

25

law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 4138, 120 8. Ct. at 1523

(plurality opinion). The “unreasonable application”

clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies

the correct governing legal principle from [the

Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous § factual

determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal

courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of

the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §

2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),

which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the

state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing

evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.

Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield v.

Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 185 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192

L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise

relationship” may be, “a _ state-court factual

determination is not unreasonable merely because the

federal habeas court would have reached a different

conclusion in the first instance.” Titlow, 571 U.S. at --

-, 1348. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290,

301, 1380 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 13823, 1837 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential

review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made’).

26

Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for

prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,

134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2018). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a

state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in

existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could disagree.” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richter,

562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one to meet.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s claims were

adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a §

2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court

remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly

present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court,

either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,

351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state

prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established

appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

ai

In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state

prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the

““opnportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 1380 L.Ed.2d

865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404

U.S. 270, 275, 92S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To

provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,”

the prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each

appropriate state court (including a state supreme

court with powers of discretionary review), thereby

alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.

Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O'Sullivan

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144

L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies

results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas

review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of

procedural default as follows:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality

of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided

by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments

are accorded the finality and respect necessary to

preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our

system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine

of procedural default, under which a federal court will

not review the merits of claims, including

constitutional claims, that a state court declined to

hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state

28

procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[®] supra, at 747—

748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes, [®] supra, at 84-85, 97 S.

Ct. 2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural

rule to deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal

review of the claims if, among other requisites, the

state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate

to support the judgment and the rule is firmly

established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,

Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 1381S. Ct. 1120, 1127-—

1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558

U.S. --, --, 180 S. Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417

(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted

claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A

prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted

claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice

from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S.,

at 750, 1118S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may

be excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has

been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a

state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from

the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d

1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish cause,

the procedural default “must result from some

objective factor external to the defense that prevented

[him] from raising the claim and which cannot be

fairly attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v.

Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992)

(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[7]

Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show

5 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).

6 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

7 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).

29

that “the errors at trial actually and substantially

disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied

fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier,

477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).

In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may

receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the

petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the

continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would

result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,

there remains yet another avenue for him to receive

consideration on the merits of his procedurally

defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence

of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This

exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,

and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal

innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171

(11th Cir. 2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’

of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.

2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “[t]o be

credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not

30

presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,

allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 5138

U.S. at 324.

VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Ground One

As Ground One, Blazejowski argues the State manufactured evidence

against her in order to prevent her from testifying in an unrelated murder that

she alleges was committed by a St. Johns County Sheriffs Office deputy. See

Amended Petition at 6-17. Initially, the Court finds that Blazejowski fails to

present an identifiable constitutional claim in Ground One for which federal

habeas relief would lie. Instead, Blazejowski appears to raise only issues of

state law which are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (stating that “federal habeas corpus relief

does not lie for errors of state law”).

Even assuming Blazejowski presents a federal constitutional challenge

in Ground One, the claim is procedurally barred because she did not fairly

present the federal nature of her claim to the state court. The record reflects

that Blazejowski raised this claim as a newly discovered evidence claim in her

Successive Rule 3.850 Motion. See Doc. 13-3 at 257-64. Her argument,

however, consisted solely of a factual narrative regarding the murder and the

31

alleged manufacturing of evidence against her. Id. Blazejowski did not present

any federal constitutional grounds in support of her claim. Therefore, to the

extent Blazejowski now raises a federal claim, the Court finds she failed to

alert the state court to the federal nature of her claim, and in failing to do so,

deprived the state court of a meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; see Kelley v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1345

(11th Cir. 2004) (a petitioner cannot “scatter some makeshift needles in the

haystack of the state court record. The ground relied upon must be presented

face-up and squarely; the federal question must be plainly defined. Oblique

references which hint that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork will not

turn the trick.”).

Further, Blazejowski is also procedurally barred from seeking federal

habeas relief on this claim because the postconviction court relied on an

independent and adequate state procedural ground when it found the claim

untimely under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b). See Doc. 13-4 at

509-13. The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part test to determine

when a state court’s procedural ruling relies on an independent and adequate

state ground. Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). “First, (1)

the last state court rendering judgment must clearly and expressly state it is

relying on a state procedural rule to resolve the federal claim... . Second, the

state court’s decision on the procedural issue must rest entirely on state law

32

grounds and not be intertwined with an interpretation of federal law. ... Third,

the state procedural rule must be adequate.” Id. (citations omitted and

emphasis added).

As applied here, the postconviction court’s untimeliness finding was

based on the procedural requirements of Rule 3.850, which is an independent

and adequate state procedural ground. See LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

421 F.3d 1237, 1260 n.25 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he procedural requirements of

Florida’s Rule 3.850 constitute independent and adequate grounds under the

applicable law.”); Kimbrough v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 809 F. App’x 684,

692-93 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding the denial of a claim as untimely under Rule

3.850(b) “rested on an independent and adequate state procedural ground”).

Second, the postconviction court’s untimeliness determination rested solely on

state procedural grounds without citing to or otherwise referencing federal

law. Thus, the postconviction court’s “ruling was not intertwined with federal

law.” Kimbrough, 809 F. App’x at 692.

Third, the procedural rule was adequate to support the postconviction

court’s untimeliness finding. See id. That is, the postconviction court properly

applied a regularly followed procedural default principle to find the claim

untimely. A Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief must be filed within

two years of the criminal judgment “unless the motion alleges that the facts on

which the claims for relief are predicated could not have been discovered

33

earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” See Kimbrough, 809 F. App’x at 692

(citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1)). Here, the postconviction court determined

that Blazejowski’s allegations regarding the manufacturing of evidence were

not newly discovered as the record showed she was aware of them as early as

March 2014 -- approximately five months before she entered her no-contest

plea. See Doc. 13-4 at 513. The postconviction court explained:

Defendant alleges that “all details were intentionally

and knowingly kept form [sic] the defense team until

2019.” However, in the March 21, 2014 Affidavit

attached to Defendant’s motion as part of Exhibit 6,

she alleged that “the entire St. Johns County judicial

system knew that Srgt. David Tarbert was not only

involved but responsible for the crimes that

[Defendant] was being accused of.” In the affidavit,

Defendant maintained that during the execution of the

search warrant at her home, the officers informed her

they “found evidence of [Sgt.] Tarbert’s involvement.”

Defendant alleges that the St. Johns County Sheriff's

Office and State Attorney’s Office withheld this

evidence in their discovery disclosures. Additionally,

in her 2016 Florida Bar Complaint, which is also part

of Exhibit 6 to her motion, Defendant alleged that

Assistant State Attorney France and Sgt. Tarbert

manufactured the instant case against her.

Accordingly, the “evidence” is not newly discovered,

and Defendant’s present claim is untimely as the

record reflects she was aware of the aforementioned

information in March 2014. Finally, the Court

observes that Defendant’s present allegations indicate

she was aware of Sgt. Tarbert and Assistant State

Attorney France’s scheme to frame her prior to

entering her plea. However, during the plea colloquy,

the Court asked Defendant whether “anybody coached

you or told you to testify falsely because of any promise

or understanding which has not been told to me,” to

34

which Defendant responded in the negative. For these

reasons, the Court finds the instant claim of newly

discovered evidence fails.

See Doc. 13-4 at 512-13 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the claim is

procedurally barred as the postconviction court’s decision rested on an

independent and adequate state law ground.

Blazejowski has not shown either cause excusing the default or actual

prejudice resulting from the bar. Moreover, she has failed to identify any fact

warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception. Accordingly, relief on the claim in Ground One is due to be denied.

B. Ground Two

As Ground Two, Blazejowski asserts the State violated her constitutional

rights to equal protection and due process when it charged her with aggravated

stalking and extortion. See Amended Petition at 17-18. Blazejowski raised a

substantially similar claim in her amended petition for writ of certiorari, which

the Fifth DCA dismissed on procedural grounds due to her failure to file an

appendix as ordered. See Doc. 13-2 at 348, 357-58, 365. She also raised the

claim in her Successive Rule 3.850 Motion as a claim of “sentence

manipulation.” See Doc. 18-3 at 268-69. The postconviction court found the

claim untimely and successive. See Doc. 13-4 at 520. The Fifth DCA affirmed

without a written opinion. Id. at 523.

35

Respondents contend, and the Court agrees, that the claim in Ground

Two is procedurally defaulted. See Doc. 13 at 15. Blazejowski has not shown

either cause excusing the default or actual prejudice resulting from the bar.

Moreover, she has failed to identify any fact warranting the application of the

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. Accordingly, the claim in Ground

Two is due to be denied.

C. Ground Three

As Ground Three, Blazejowski asserts Detective Andrews of the St.

Johns County Sheriffs Office violated the Fourth Amendment by intentionally

including false statements in the search warrant affidavit. See Amended

Petition at 20-37. She further asserts Detective Andrews’ conduct resulted in

violations of Brady v. Maryland, 372 U.S 83 (19638), and Giglio v. United States,

405 U.S. 150 (1972). See Amended Petition at 20, 36-37.

To the extent Blazejowski asserts a Fourth Amendment claim or Brady

and Giglio violations, the Court finds her claims are unexhausted because she

failed to raise them in her direct appeal or in her postconviction filings.’ Since

future attempts to exhaust these claims would be futile, the claims are

8 The Court notes that Blazejowski’s factual allegations in Ground Three were

taken almost verbatim from her “sentence manipulation” claim in her Successive

Rule 3.850 Motion. See Doc. 13-3 at 269-79. She did not, however, assert any of the

federal claims she now raises in Ground Three of the Amended Petition. Even if she

had done so, the postconviction court denied the sentence manipulation claim as

untimely and successive. Thus, the claim would have been procedurally defaulted for

the reasons set forth in Grounds One and Two.

36

procedurally defaulted. Blazejowski has alleged neither cause and prejudice

nor a miscarriage of justice to overcome her failure to exhaust. Thus, she is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims raised in Ground Three.

D. Ground Four

Next, Blazejowski asserts her due process rights were violated because

she was not provided written notice of the conditions of her probation. See

Amended Petition at 40-45. She raised this claim in her amended petition for

writ of certiorari, which the Fifth DCA dismissed on procedural grounds. See

Doc. 13-2 at 332, 347-48. She also raised this claim in a Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.800 motion. At the time she commenced this federal

habeas action, the Rule 3.800 motion was still pending. See Doc. 13-4 at 527-

32. The postconviction court has since denied the motion, stating in relevant

part:

[A]lthough Defendant’s motion contains multiple

citations to cases indicating a court must orally

pronounce special conditions of probation, this Court

observes that all special conditions, including special

condition 11 which prohibited contact with the victims

in the present case, were orally pronounced at

sentencing.

See State v. Blazejowski, No. 2013-CF-645 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. May 12, 2023).

37

The Fifth DCA per curiam subsequently affirmed the denial of relief.® Id.

Assuming the claim was properly exhausted, the Court addresses the

claim in accordance with the deferential standard for federal court review of

state court adjudications. Upon thorough review of the record, the Court finds

that the state court’s adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the state

court’s adjudication based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given

the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Blazejowski is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

Nevertheless, even if the state court’s adjudication of the claim is not

entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. The record wholly refutes

Blazejowski’s assertion that she did not have written notice of the conditions

of her probation. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court orally advised

Blazejowski of the special conditions of her community control and probation,

9 The Fifth DCA also included language in its order cautioning Blazejowski:

This Court previously affirmed [Blazejowski’s] direct

appeal and thereafter, dismissed several petitions and

appeals filed in this Court stemming from St. Johns County

Circuit Court Case No. 2013-CF-645. Because it appears

that [Blazejowski’s] filings are abusive, repetitive,

malicious, or frivolous, [Blazejowski] is cautioned that any

further pro se filings in this Court asserting claims

stemming from St. Johns County Circuit Court Case No.

2013-CF-645, may result in sanctions such as a bar on pro

se filing in this Court. See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47

(Fla. 1999).

See State v. Blazejowski, No. 2013-CF-645 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Dec. 14, 2028).

38

including in pertinent part, the requirement that she was to have no contact

with the victims “during the entire time of [her] imprisonment and probation.”

Doc. 13-3 at 216. The trial court also entered an Order of Community

Control/Probation the same day that set forth all conditions. See Doc. 18-1 at

58-66. Thus, Blazejowski is not entitled to relief on the claim in Ground Four.

EK. Ground Five

As stated earlier, Blazejowski’s community control/probation order

included, in relevant part, a special condition prohibiting Blazejowski from

contacting any of the victims. See Doc. 13-1 at 60. In 2018, the trial court

revoked the community control/probation order after finding Blazejowski

violated the no-contact provision by sending a subpoena and interrogatories to

one of the victims, Jennifer Robor. Id. at 606-08. As Ground Five of the

Amended Petition, Blazejowski asserts her contact with Robor was a legitimate

exercise of her constitutionally protected right of access to the courts because

she sent the documents to Robor for discovery purposes in connection with a

motion to vacate an injunction.!°9 See Amended Petition at 46-47. She contends

the trial court failed to warn her during her plea hearing and sentencing that

10 The injunction at issue was obtained by another victim, Joseph Good, after

the events underlying this case occurred. See Doc. 13-2 at 151-52 (citing Good v.

Blazejowski, No. DR-13-0715 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2014)); see also

https://apps.stjohnsclerk.com/Benchmark/Home.aspx/Search (last visited March 22,

2024). According to Blazejowski, she sought to vacate the injunction so that she could

qualify for work release from prison.

39

it was “stripping her of her constitutional rights” to access the courts, represent

herself, and confront her accusers. Id. at 46.

To the extent Blazejowski asserts she was denied the right to represent

herself or to confront her accusers, the Court finds her claims are unexhausted

because she failed to raise them in the state court. Since future attempts to

exhaust these claims would be futile, the claims are procedurally defaulted.

Blazejowski has alleged neither cause and prejudice nor a miscarriage of

justice to overcome her failure to exhaust.

Insofar as Blazejowski asserts she was denied her constitutional right of

access to the courts, the record reflects that she raised a substantially similar

claim in her direct appeal of the 2018 judgment and sentence. See Doc. 13-2 at

194. The State filed an answer brief, id. at 214-36, and Blazejowski filed a reply

brief, id. at 239-50. On February 4, 2020, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed

the 2018 judgment and sentence without a written opinion. Id. at 252. To the

extent the appellate court decided the claim on the merits, the Court will

address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for federal court

review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record and the

applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s adjudication of the

claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not involve an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in lght of the evidence

40

presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Blazejowski is not entitled to

relief on the basis of this claim.

Nevertheless, even if the state appellate court’s adjudication of the

access to courts claim is not entitled to deference, the claim is without merit.

Nothing in the record suggests that the state court ever imposed any

restrictions on Blazejowski’s right of access to the state courts. In fact, the

record reflects that Blazejowski has pursued legal relief on numerous occasions

subsequent to the entry of the community control/probation order. Insofar as

Blazejowski argues the no-contact provision hindered her efforts to vacate the

injunction, the record fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that the

documents she sent to Robor were improper because (1) Robor was not a party

in the injunction case and (2) the interrogatories were unrelated to the grounds

Blazejowski articulated in the motion to vacate. See Doc. 13-2 at 91-93; Doc.

13-1 at 570-572. Thus, even if the no-contact provision of the community

control/probation order was not in place, Blazejowski still would not have been

entitled to the discovery she sought from Robor. Accordingly, Blazejowski is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims raised in Ground Five.

F. Ground Six

As Ground Six, Blazejowski asserts the State violated her due process

rights and retaliated against her when it charged her with violating the

conditions of her probation. See Amended Petition at 48-49. Blazejowski raised

Al

a substantially similar claim in her amended petition for writ of certiorari. See

Doc. 13-2 at 347-49, 356. The Fifth DCA dismissed the petition on procedural

grounds due to her failure to file an appendix as ordered. Id. at 365.

Respondents contend, and the Court agrees, that the claim in Ground

Six is procedurally defaulted. Because Blazejowski has not demonstrated cause

and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to excuse the default, the claim in

Ground Six is due to be denied.

G. Ground Seven

As Ground Seven, Blazejowski argues the State violated her

constitutional rights by “manipulating the circumstances” and “forcing [her] to

violate conditions of probation.” See Amended Petition at 50. As support for

her argument, Blazejowski presents an alternate version of facts regarding the

circumstances that led her to contact Robor. Id. at 50-51.

As in Ground One, the Court initially determines that Blazejowski fails

to present an identifiable federal constitutional claim in Ground Seven for

which federal habeas relief would lie. Her general assertion that her

“constitutional rights” were violated is insufficient. To the extent Blazejowski

challenges the state courts grounds for revoking the community

control/probation order, she is raising issues of state law that are not

cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (stating

that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law’); see

42

Billups v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2009 WL 890273, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2009)

(“{S]tate prisoners’ claims of error involving .. . probation, and revocation of

probation or parole are matters governed by state law that are not cognizable

in federal habeas corpus proceedings.”) (quoting Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324,

331 (8th Cir. 1986); Scott v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2010 WL 4258952, at *10

(M.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2010) (“Whether the state judge’s revocation findings meet

state law requirements does not present a cognizable basis for federal habeas

corpus relief.”).

Even assuming the claim is properly before this Court, the claim lacks

merit. Under Florida law, a community control/probation order may be revoked

if a defendant violates a condition while incarcerated prior to the

commencement of probation. See Stafford v. State, 455 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla.

1984) (holding that the state court has the inherent power “to revoke an order

of probation, the term of which has not yet commenced, should the court

determine that the defendant probationer has been guilty of misconduct

occurring subsequent to the entry of the order of probation”) (quoting Martin

v. State, 243 So. 2d 189, 190-91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)); Cason v. State, 604 So.

2d 928, 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“Where, as here, the defendant is given a split

sentence of prison time followed by a probationary period and the defendant

allegedly violates a condition of probation during the prison portion of the

sentence before the probation begins, the trial court may revoke the

43

defendant’s probation based on such violation.”); Kirkland v. State, 315 So. 3d

788 (Fla. lst DCA 2021) (affirming the revocation of an order of probation

where defendant violated the no-contact provision by contacting the victim

while he was still serving his prison sentence prior to the commencement of

the term of probation). Here, the state court had the inherent power to revoke

Blazejowski’s probation based on her violation of the no-contact provision even

though she was still serving the prison portion of her sentence. Accordingly,

Blazejowski is not entitled to relief on the claim in Ground Seven.

H. Ground Eight

As Ground Eight, Blazejowski argues she was exercising her

constitutionally protected rights to “filfe] a motion, access[] the court, ask[] the

court for redress, represent[] herself and tak[e] part in discovery” when she

contacted Robor. See Amended Petition at 52. She asserts this legitimate

exercise of her constitutional rights did not constitute harassment. Id. This is

essentially the same argument Blazejowski raised in Ground Five of the

Amended Petition. Thus, for the same reasons discussed in Ground Five,

Blazejowski is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim raised in

Ground Eight.

I. Ground Nine

As Ground Nine, Blazejowski argues the State failed to prove in 2014

that she met all of the elements required to convict her of aggravated stalking,

44

extortion, and making false reports. See Amended Petition at 53. In turn, she

contends she could not have committed a probation violation because she was

serving an illegal sentence. Id. Blazejowski raised a substantially similar claim

in her amended petition for writ of certiorari. See Doc. 13-2 at 332, 358-60. The

Fifth DCA dismissed the petition on procedural grounds. Id. at 365.

Respondents contend, and the Court agrees, that the claim in Ground

Nine is procedurally defaulted. See Doc. 13 at 30. Because Blazejowski has not

demonstrated cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to excuse the

default, the claim in Ground Nine is due to be denied.

Nevertheless, even if the claim was properly before the Court, the claim

is without merit. Blazejowski entered an open plea of no contest to the charges.

Nothing in the record suggests her plea was involuntary. During the plea

colloquy, Blazejowski specifically acknowledged that she was waiving her

constitutional rights by entering the plea and giving up her right to appeal all

matters except that of an illegal sentence or a challenge to the circumstances

of the plea. Doc. 13-1 at 18. She also stated that no one had forced, threatened,

or pressured her to plead guilty. Id. at 19. The State proffered an exhaustive

factual basis for the plea and defense counsel stipulated there was sufficient

evidence to sustain the plea. Id. at 20-36. The trial court found there was a

sufficient factual basis prior to accepting the plea. Id. at 36. Thus, on this

record, Blazejowski is not entitled to relief on the claim in Ground Nine.

45

J. Ground Ten

As Ground Ten, Blazejowski contends the circuit court judge who

presided over the VOP proceeding was prejudiced and biased against her. See

Amended Petition at 54-55. She argues the judge’s remarks during the VOP

hearing violated her constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. Id.

Blazejowski raised a substantially similar claim in her petition for writ of

prohibition, which the Fifth DCA denied. See Doc. 13-2 at 297-305, 315.

The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential

standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough

review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Nor was the state court’s adjudication based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the

state court proceedings. Thus, Blazejowski is not entitled to relief on the basis

of this claim.

Nevertheless, even if the state court’s adjudication of the claim is not

entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. The Due Process Clause

guaranteed Blazejowski “a fair trial in a fair tribunal, before a judge with no

actual bias against [her] or interest in the outcome of [her] particular case.”

Norris v. United States, 709 F. App’x 952, 957 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bracy

v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997)). To obtain postconviction relief,

46

Blazejowski was required to “prove that under a realistic appraisal of

psychological tendencies and human weakness, the judge posed a risk of actual

bias or prejudgment such that it created an intolerable threat to the guarantee

of due process.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Blazejowski has not met this standard of proof. She fails to demonstrate that

the judge’s remarks during the VOP hearing created “an intolerable threat to

the guarantee of due process.” Id. Accordingly, she is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on the claim in Ground Ten.

VII. Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

If Blazejowski seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability, the

undersigned opines that a certificate of appealability is not warranted. The

Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Blazejowski “must demonstrate

that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,

282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the

issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot

v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

47

Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on

the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.

See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has rejected a

claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that “jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial

of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Upon

consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of

appealability.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The Amended Petition (Doc. 5) is DENIED, and this action is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

ys The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the Amended

Petition and dismissing this case with prejudice.

a. If Blazejowski appeals the denial of the Amended Petition, the

Court denies a certificate of appealability. Because the Court has determined

that a certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate

from the pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper

48

that may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the

motion.

A, The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate

any pending motions.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this Zs A day of

March, 2024.

H E. SINGER

United St istrict Judge

Jax-10 3/26

C Tawny Blazejowski, #156630

Counsel of Record

49