The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs,
v. 2:23-cv-54-SPC-NPM
SANDRA HOWEN and
MARLENE TWENTIER,
Defendants.
MARLENE TWENTIER,
Cross-claimant,
v.
SANDRA HOWEN and
LISA HOWEN
Crossclaim Defendants.
ORDER
In this interpleader action regarding distribution of life-insurance benefits,
Marlene Twentier served written discovery on the Howens, but they failed to timely
respond. After multiple futile conferral efforts, Twentier filed a motion to compel.
(Doc. 44). The Howens made no effort to oppose the motion, and the court granted
it. Quite naturally, the court also found Twentier entitled to an expense-of-motion
award. (Doc. 45). Twentier subsequently filed a declaration seeking $1,200 in fees
for three hours devoted to preparing and filing the motion and its supporting exhibits.
(Doc. 48). The Howens never disputed the reasonableness of Twentier’s fee request.
When awarding fees under Rule 37, “there must be a causal connection
between the discovery violation and the reasonable expenses incurred.” Flexsteel
Pipeline Techs., Inc. v. Chen, No. 5:16-cv-239-TKW-GRJ, 2020 WL 13189031, *1
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2020) (internal citation omitted). And in calculating such an
award, federal courts use the lodestar method. Smith v. Atlanta Postal Credit Union,
350 F. App’x 347, 349–50 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Flexsteel, 2020 WL 13189031,
at *1 (collecting cases). “Under the lodestar method, courts determine attorney’s fees
based on the product of the reasonable hours spent on the case and a reasonable
hourly rate.” In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1076 (11th Cir. 2019).
First, the reasonable hourly rate. A “reasonable hourly rate” is “the prevailing
market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman v. Hous. Auth.
of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The “relevant legal
community” is “‘the place where the case is filed.’” ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168
F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999). “The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden
of establishing that the requested hourly rate is in line with prevailing market rates.”
Maner v. Linkan LLC, 602 F. App’x 489, 493 (11th Cir. 2015). “Satisfactory
evidence at a minimum is more than the affidavit of the attorney performing the
work” and usually includes “direct evidence of charges by lawyers under similar
circumstances or . . . opinion evidence.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. But at the end
of the day, the court itself is an expert in determining a reasonable hourly rate. See
id. at 1303.
Twentier seeks a $400 hourly rate for attorney Steven A. Ramunni. But
without any detail or explanation for such a rate in his declaration, the court is not
persuaded that a $400 hourly rate is justified for a routine motion to compel that
could have easily been prepared by a first-year associate. Roskovensky v. Sanibel
Captiva Island Vacation Rentals, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-602-JLB-NPM, 2024 WL
474123, *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2024); see also Tri-City R.R. Co., LLC v. Preferred
Freezer Servs. of Richland, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00045-SAB, 2020 WL 3620225, *2
(E.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 2020) (finding it clear that defendant’s fee was not reasonable
given the routine nature of the motion to compel). The motion to compel contained
no novel legal theories or difficult factual issues. Instead, it presented a
quintessentially straightforward issue: a party that simply failed to respond to
discovery requests. That said, the Howens never objected to the rate, so the court
finds a $300 rate is reasonable.
Next is the reasonableness of the hours expended. Again, the appropriateness
of the hours is the applicant’s burden to establish. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. In
doing so, the fee applicant “must exclude from their fee applications ‘excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours,’ which are hours ‘that would be
unreasonable to bill to a client and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the
skill, reputation or experience of counsel.’” Am. C.L. Union of Georgia v. Barnes,
168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434
(1983) and Norman, 836 F.3d at 1301)). “When a district court finds the number of
hours claimed is unreasonably high, the court has two choices: it may conduct an
hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board
cut.” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008).
The three hours requested for the motion to compel are not reasonable.
Twentier seeks 0.8 hours for drafting the original motion to compel, which the court
denied without prejudice for failure to comply with Local Rule 3.01(g). (Docs. 42,
43). Twentier then billed another 0.6 for drafting an amended motion to compel, but
it is largely the same motion, adding only a few additional lines regarding Twentier’s
conferral efforts. (Doc. 44). Had Twentier properly conferred the first time around,
the amended motion would have been unnecessary. So 0.3 hours for the amended
motion seems more appropriate. Twentier also seeks 0.6 hours for reviewing the
Howens’ discovery responses for compliance. But this entry makes little sense given
the premise of the motion to compel was a complete lack of responses from the
Howens. So it is unclear what responses Twentier had to review. The court also
declines to award 0.3 hours for review of two court orders.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds 1.9 hours at a $300 per hour rate is
reasonable and awards Twentier $570 for her expenses, including fees, related to the
motion. This is appropriate given the routine nature of the motion while also
accounting for the Howens’ unresponsiveness. By April 16, 2024, the Howens must
jointly tender payment to Twentier and file a notice of compliance.
ORDERED on April 2, 2024.
Hhfes x Ae -
NICHOLAS P. ZE
United States Magistrate Judge
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