Opinion

Beamon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Duval County)

Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed: Mar 27, 2024
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 20.0%

“The choice not to call either of them as witnesses was not patently unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen it, and was the epitome of a strategic decision.”

How later courts described this case

“The choice not to call either of them as witnesses was not patently unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen it, and was the epitome of a strategic decision.”
stating that a petitioner’s “unsupported allegations” that are “conclusory in nature and lacking factual substantiation” cannot sustain an ineffective assistance claim
“In a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, mere speculation that missing witnesses would have been helpful is insufficient to meet the petitioner’s burden of proof.” (citing Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1187)
stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

FLOYD BEAMON,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-1118-MMH-PDB

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Floyd Beamon, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).1 In the Petition, Beamon challenges a 2009

state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for second-degree

murder with a firearm. He raises eight grounds for relief. See Petition at 12-

25. Respondents submitted a Response to the Petition (Response; Doc. 8).

They also submitted exhibits. See Docs. 8-1 through 8-2. Beamon declined to

file a brief in reply. See Doc. 12. This action is ripe for review.

1 For all pleadings and exhibits filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

II. Relevant Procedural History

On August 28, 2007, the State of Florida (State) charged Beamon by

information with the second-degree murder of his brother, Swindell Beamon,

with a firearm. See Doc. 8-1 at 42. At the conclusion of a trial, a jury found

Beamon guilty of the charged offense. Id. at 218-19. On December 18, 2009,

the trial court sentenced Beamon to a term of life imprisonment, with a

minimum mandatory term of twenty-five years. Id. at 223-28.

Beamon pursued a direct appeal raising five arguments: (1) the trial

court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence that he

allegedly “swerved his car towards [the victim] shortly before killing him”;2

(2) the trial court failed to conduct a proper Richardson3 inquiry upon

learning of a discovery violation; (3) the trial court erred in denying his

motion for a mistrial based on the discovery violation; (4) the trial court erred

in overruling his objection to impermissible hearsay testimony that the State

elicited during Officer Mark Muchowicz’s trial testimony; and (5) the

prosecutor’s remarks during opening and closing arguments constituted

fundamental error. Id. at 724-78. The First District Court of Appeal (First

DCA) per curiam affirmed Beamon’s conviction and sentence on May 12,

2011, id. at 859, and issued the mandate on May 31, 2011, id. at 862.

2 See Doc. 8-1 at 743.

3 Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).

On July 6, 2011, Beamon filed a pro se motion to mitigate sentence

under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. See Doc. 8-2 at 176-77.

Beamon filed a second Rule 3.800 motion on July 27, 2011. Id. at 179. The

trial court denied both motions. Id. at 179-80.

On April 4, 2012, Beamon filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief

under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). See Doc.

8-1 at 867-87. On September 28, 2017, the postconviction court granted

Beamon leave to amend his postconviction motion after finding all ten claims

for relief in the Rule 3.850 Motion were “insufficiently pled and . . . therefore

legally insufficient.” Id. at 892-900. On November 30, 2017, Beamon filed an

amended Rule 3.850 Motion in which he argued his trial counsel was

ineffective when she failed to: (1) investigate and raise a claim of self-defense;

(2) subpoena witnesses on Beamon’s behalf; (3) object to Rashawn Roberts’

trial testimony; (4) object to Frederick Holsey’s trial testimony; (5) object to

Katie Whitehurst’s testimony; (6) object to Officer Muchowicz’s testimony; (7)

prepare Beamon for trial; (8) file a motion to suppress all of the witnesses’

testimony; (9) impeach witnesses Roberts and Holsey; and (10) investigate

the victim’s background. Id. at 902-25. On January 9, 2018, the

postconviction court denied relief. Id. at 950-65. The First DCA per curiam

affirmed the denial of relief on May 8, 2019, and issued the mandate on

September 27, 2019. See Doc. 8-2 at 131, 144.

On February 21, 2020, Beamon filed a Rule 3.800 motion to correct

illegal sentence. See Doc. 8-2 at 191-208. Beamon filed another Rule 3.850

motion on April 24, 2020, which the postconviction court denied as untimely,

impermissibly successive, and frivolous on June 23, 2020. Id. at 210. Beamon

filed the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on September 28, 2020. See

Doc. 1.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to

establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to

grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a

hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834

F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at

474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before

the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Beamon’s] claim[s]

without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala.

Dep’t of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023). “‘The purpose of AEDPA

is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of

error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As

such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly

circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential.’” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state

court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state

court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the

state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s

adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United

States Supreme Court has instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the

unexplained decision to the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It

should then presume that the unexplained decision

adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be

rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely

relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision,

such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the

higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d)

bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or

(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope

of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As

explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d

389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct

clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable

application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows

for relief only “if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id.

at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The

“unreasonable application” clause allows for relief

only “if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous factual

determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal

courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of

the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §

2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),

which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the

state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing

evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.

Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield

v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192

L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise

relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual

determination is not unreasonable merely because

the federal habeas court would have reached a

different conclusion in the first instance.’” Titlow, 571

U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d

738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential

review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).

Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for

prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,

134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a

state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in

existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one

to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s

claims were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be

evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a §

2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court

remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly

present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest

court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim,

“state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

845 (1999).

In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a

state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies,

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the

“‘“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d

865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438

(1971)). To provide the State with the necessary

“opportunity,” the prisoner must “fairly present” his

claim in each appropriate state court (including a

state supreme court with powers of discretionary

review), thereby alerting that court to the federal

nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115

S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845,

119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies

results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas

review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of

procedural default as follows:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality

of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are

guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court

judgments are accorded the finality and respect

necessary to preserve the integrity of legal

proceedings within our system of federalism. These

rules include the doctrine of procedural default,

under which a federal court will not review the

merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that

a state court declined to hear because the prisoner

failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g.,

Coleman,[4] supra, at 747-748, 111 S. Ct. 2546;

Sykes,[5] supra, at 84-85, 97 S. Ct. 2497. A state

court’s invocation of a procedural rule to deny a

prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the

claims if, among other requisites, the state

procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to

support the judgment and the rule is firmly

established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,

Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120,

1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler,

558 U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617-18, 175 L.Ed.2d 417

(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted

claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A

prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted

claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice

from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501

U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults

may be excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim

has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim

if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice

from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall,

4 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).

5 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish

cause,

the procedural default “must result from some

objective factor external to the defense that

prevented [him] from raising the claim and which

cannot be fairly attributable to his own conduct.”

McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir.

1992) (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct.

2639).[6] Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner]

must show that “the errors at trial actually and

substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he

was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261

(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).

In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may

receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the

petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the

continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would

result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,

there remains yet another avenue for him to receive

consideration on the merits of his procedurally

defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence

of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This

exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,

and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal

6 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).

innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171

(11th Cir. 2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’

of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally,

“‘[t]o be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable

evidence not presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559

(1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in

most cases, allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily

rejected. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per

curiam) (first citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); and then

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.

Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective

assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that

counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”

of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104

S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.

2052.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct.

2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.” Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s

errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at

687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of

any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test

before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part

Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a

court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet

the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d

1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which

we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697.

A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great

deference.

“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation

is a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,

131 S. Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state

court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable

under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The

standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are

both highly deferential, and when the two apply in

tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (citations and

quotation marks omitted). “The question is not

whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination under the Strickland standard was

incorrect but whether that determination was

unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S. Ct.

1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (quotation marks

omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,”

then a federal court may not disturb a state-court

decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,

131 S. Ct. at 788.

Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “[i]n addition to the

deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds

another layer of deference — this one to a state court’s decision — when we

are considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s

decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As

such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).

VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Ground One

As Ground One, Beamon argues the trial court erred in denying his

motion in limine to exclude any evidence “that [he] tried to hit [the victim]

with his car shortly before th[e] killing.” See Doc. 8-1 at 85, 173; Petition at

12. Beamon asserts the improper admission of this evidence violated his

Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Petition at 12. Beamon also contends his

counsel “prejudiced him” by not filing a motion to exclude Williams Rule

evidence.7 Id. In the Response, Respondents treat the latter argument as an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Response at 7-10, 31-36.

Insofar as Beamon argues the trial court erred in denying his motion in

limine, the record reflects that Beamon raised a substantially similar claim

on direct appeal. See Doc. 8-1 at 743-53. The State filed an answer brief, id.

at 800-05; Beamon filed a brief in reply, id. at 844-48; and the First DCA per

curiam affirmed Beamon’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion,

id. at 859. Initially, the Court determines that Beamon did not fairly present

the federal nature of this claim to the state court. In his briefing on direct

appeal, Beamon relied solely on Florida law to argue the trial court

erroneously denied the motion in limine. See Doc. 8-1 at 743-53. Beamon did

7 Under the Williams Rule, evidence of collateral crimes is admissible “[i]f

found to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad character or

propensity.” Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla. 1959).

not present any federal constitutional grounds in support of his claim.

Therefore, Beamon failed to alert the state court to the federal nature of his

claim, and in failing to do so, deprived the state court of a meaningful

opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. Since future

attempts to exhaust the claim would be futile, it is procedurally defaulted.

Beamon has not shown either cause excusing the default or actual prejudice

resulting from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to identify any fact

warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception. As such, Beamon’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his

motion in limine is due to be denied.

Nevertheless, even if Beamon fairly presented a federal claim on direct

appeal, he is not entitled to relief. In its appellate brief, the State addressed

the claim on the merits, Doc. 8-1 at 800-05; therefore, the appellate court may

have affirmed Beamon’s conviction based on the State’s argument. If the

appellate court addressed the merits of the claim, the state court’s

adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA. After a review of the

record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,

did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore, Beamon is

not entitled to relief on the basis of his claim that the trial court erred in

denying his motion in limine.

Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is not

entitled to deference, the claim lacks merit. The Eleventh Circuit has

explained:

“As a general rule, a federal court in a habeas corpus case will

not review the trial court’s actions concerning the admissibility of

evidence.” Osborne v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1237, 1238 (11th Cir.

1983). “However, where a state court’s ruling is claimed to have

deprived a defendant of his right to due process, a federal court

should then inquire only to determine whether the error was of

such magnitude as to deny fundamental fairness to the criminal

trial.” Id. (citations omitted).

Tidwell v. Butler, 415 F. App’x 979, 980 (11th Cir. 2011).8 Beamon’s

conclusory argument in Ground One is insufficient to establish that the trial

court erred in admitting the evidence at issue in the motion in limine, which

was Holsey’s testimony that he saw Beamon swerve his car towards the

victim as he drove up to the house and parked right before the shooting

occurred. See Doc. 8-1 at 427-28, 437. Significantly, Holsey testified that it

never appeared to him that Beamon “was trying to hit [the victim] with his

car.” Id. at 437, 440. Even assuming Holsey’s testimony was improperly

8 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on

a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir.

2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions

are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive

authority.”).

admitted, Beamon has not shown that the error was of such magnitude that

it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The evidence of guilt was

overwhelming. During the trial, Beamon’s mother testified that he told her

he was going to “stop all these M.F.’s” when he entered the house; when she

saw him moments later with the gun and asked him what he was going to do,

he replied, “I will kill the M.F.” See id. at 445-46. Beamon then left the house

and shot the victim in the front yard in the presence of their mother and two

other eyewitnesses, Roberts and Holsey. Id. at 404-06, 430-31, 448-49.

Roberts testified that after the shooting, he observed Beamon pulling on the

victim’s clothes as the victim gasped for air, and he also heard Beamon tell

the victim that he should have died. Id. at 407. Holsey observed Beamon

visibly upset and crying after the shooting, and he testified that Beamon told

him “I done messed up.” Id. at 433, 439. And Officer Muchowicz testified that

he saw Beamon trying to flee the scene when police and emergency

responders arrived. Id. at 455-57. In light of the overwhelming evidence of his

guilt, Beamon has not demonstrated that the admission of Holsey’s testimony

regarding the swerving incident deprived Beamon of due process or resulted

in a fundamentally unfair trial. Thus, Beamon is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on his claim that his motion in limine was erroneously denied.

To the extent Beamon raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to exclude Williams Rule evidence,

Beamon failed to properly exhaust this claim, and the claim is procedurally

defaulted. See Response at 9-10. According to Respondents, Beamon did not

present this claim on direct appeal or in his amended Rule 3.850 Motion, and

he cannot now present it in a Rule 3.850 motion because it would be

untimely. Id. Beamon has not shown either cause excusing the default or

actual prejudice resulting from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to identify

any fact warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception. Therefore, to the extent Beamon asserts an ineffectiveness claim in

Ground One, it is due to be denied. Even if the Court were to assume that

Beamon exhausted this claim, his ineffectiveness claim would not be

meritorious. He has shown neither deficient performance nor resulting

prejudice. Accordingly, Beamon is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

claims raised in Ground One.

B. Grounds Two and Three

As Ground Two, Beamon argues that the trial court failed to conduct a

proper Richardson9 inquiry upon learning of a discovery violation. See

Petition at 15. Relatedly, in Ground Three, Beamon contends the trial court

erroneously denied his motion for mistrial based on the discovery violation.

Id. at 17. In the Petition, Beamon failed to identify the specific trial

9 “A Richardson hearing is a proceeding under Florida law by which a

criminal defendant can challenge a discovery violation.” Taylor v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 64 F.4th 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023).

testimony at issue in Grounds Two and Three, but the record reflects that he

is referring to Officer Muchowicz’s testimony regarding a statement Beamon

made after he stopped Beamon’s vehicle from leaving the scene:

Q: Was [Beamon] acting a little suspicious to you as

well?

A: He was . . . I’m not sure it was the first time or the

second time when I told him that he was – I think it

was the second time. When I actually drew my

weapon and pointed at him and told him forcefully to

put the keys on the roof he articulated his

frustrations saying you’re going to have the whole

street blocked and I can’t get out and go anywhere or

something to that effect and I said you’re not going

anywhere right now.

Q: Okay. Eventually he puts the keys on the roof?

A: He puts the keys on the roof and when he did step

out of the car like I told him to –

Defense counsel: Objection, Your Honor. I apologize.

May we approach?

The Court: You may.

(Sidebar discussion with reporter present.)

Defense counsel: Your Honor, clearly a statement

that was just elicited from this officer about a

statement by Mr. Beamon is a defendant’s statement

that was never disclosed. It was never brought out

during deposition. It was never indicated in any

report and it was never disclosed by the state as a

statement ever made by Mr. Beamon. Clearly a

discovery violation.

State: Judge, if I could respond. This is the first time

I have ever heard of that. I was expecting him to be,

yeah, he was acting a little suspicious and didn’t put

the keys on the top of the roof immediately. I have

pretrialed him. I never heard him say that before. It’s

the first time I ever heard about it.

Doc. 8-1 at 460-62 (emphasis added). The record reflects that the trial court

granted defense counsel’s request to excuse the jury so that counsel could

question Officer Muchowicz further regarding the statement and whether

there were any additional statements that had not been disclosed. Id. at 462-

464. The trial court subsequently denied defense counsel’s motion for a

mistrial based on the statement, id. at 465, but issued a curative instruction

striking the statement, id. at 466-67.

Initially, the Court finds that Beamon did not fairly present the federal

nature of his claims in Grounds Two and Three to the state court. Beamon

raised substantially similar claims on direct appeal. See Doc. 8-1 at 754-66.

The State filed an answer brief addressing both claims, id. at 805-14; Beamon

filed a brief in reply, id. at 848-53; and the First DCA per curiam affirmed

Beamon’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion, id. at 859. The

record demonstrates that in his briefing on direct appeal, Beamon relied

solely on Florida law to argue both claims. Id. at 754-66, 848-53. Although he

contends in Grounds Two and Three of his federal Petition that his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, see Petition at 15, 17, he did

not identify any federal constitutional provisions or otherwise cite to any

federal authority in briefing these claims on direct appeal. Therefore,

Beamon failed to alert the state court to the federal nature of the claims, and

in failing to do so, deprived the state court of a meaningful opportunity to

review the claims. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. Since future attempts to

exhaust the claims would be futile, the claims are procedurally defaulted.

Beamon has alleged neither cause and prejudice nor a miscarriage of justice

to overcome his failure to exhaust. As such, relief on the claims in Grounds

Two and Three is due to be denied.

Nevertheless, even if Beamon had fairly presented the federal nature of

these claims in his direct appeal, he is still not entitled to relief. In its

appellate brief, the State addressed the claims on the merits, Doc. 8-1 at 805-

14; therefore, the appellate court may have affirmed Beamon’s conviction

based on the State’s argument. If the appellate court addressed the merits of

the claims, the state court’s adjudication is entitled to deference under

AEDPA. After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court

concludes that the state court’s adjudication of these claims was not contrary

to clearly established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceedings. Therefore, Beamon is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

basis of these claims.

Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of these claims was

not entitled to deference, the claims lack merit. The record refutes Beamon’s

contention that there was a discovery violation. Although neither the

attorneys nor Officer Muchowicz recalled this at the time of trial, Officer

Muchowicz had in fact previously testified regarding the statement at issue

during a pretrial hearing on Beamon’s motion to suppress. See Doc. 8-1 at

273 (officer’s testimony that Beamon “was very agitated, irritated, saying I’m

just trying to leave, man, I’m just trying to drive around you.”). Moreover, the

record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the statement at issue was

cumulative of Officer Muchowicz’s earlier trial testimony that he observed

Beamon attempting to drive around the blockade and leave the scene after

the shooting. See id. at 465. Finally, even though the trial court found no

basis for granting a mistrial, it nevertheless granted defense counsel’s

request to strike the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it. Id. at

465-67; see Brown v. Jones, 255 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating

that “jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions”). Thus, given the

record in this action, Beamon has failed to show that he is entitled to federal

habeas relief. Accordingly, relief on the claims raised in Grounds Two10 and

Three is due to be denied.

C. Ground Four

As Ground Four, Beamon argues that his Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated when the trial court erroneously overruled his hearsay

objection to “Officer Muchowicz[] testifying as to what he was told by Officer

Deal.” See Petition at 20. Beamon raised a substantially similar claim on

direct appeal, see Doc. 8-1 at 766-69; the State filed an answer brief, id. at

814-19; Beamon filed a reply brief, id. at 853-56; and the First DCA per

curiam affirmed Beamon’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion,

id. at 859.

As in Grounds One through Three, the Court determines that Beamon

also did not fairly present the federal nature of his claim in Ground Four to

10 The Court notes that Respondents also briefed an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim in response to Ground Two because Beamon argued as “supporting

facts” in Ground Two that his counsel “prejudiced him by failing to conduct a full

‘Richardson inquiry hearing[.]’” See Response at 13-14 (citing Petition at 15). From

the threadbare allegations in the Petition, it is not readily apparent that Beamon

intended to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Ground Two. To the

extent Beamon may have raised such a claim, the Court concludes that

Respondents are correct in their contention that the claim is unexhausted because

Beamon failed to raise it on direct appeal or in his amended Rule 3.850 Motion. See

id. Since future attempts to exhaust the claim would be futile, it is procedurally

defaulted. Beamon has not shown either cause excusing the default or actual

prejudice resulting from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to identify any fact

warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.

Therefore, to the extent Beamon asserts an ineffectiveness claim in Ground Two, it

is due to be denied.

the state court. The record demonstrates that in his briefing on direct appeal,

Beamon relied on Florida law in arguing that the trial court erroneously

overruled the hearsay objection. Id. at 766-69, 853-56. Further, Beamon

applied Florida law in his harmless error analysis of the claim. Id. Beamon

did not present any argument under the Fourteenth Amendment in support

of the claim in his direct appeal. Therefore, Beamon failed to alert the state

court to the federal nature of his claim, and in failing to do so, deprived the

state court of a meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin, 541

U.S. at 29. Since any future attempt to exhaust the claim would be futile, it is

procedurally defaulted. Beamon has not shown either cause excusing the

default or actual prejudice resulting from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to

identify any fact warranting the application of the fundamental miscarriage

of justice exception. As such, relief on the claim in Ground Four is due to be

denied.

Nevertheless, even if Beamon fairly presented a federal claim on direct

appeal, he is still not entitled to relief. In its appellate brief, the State

addressed the claim in Ground Four on the merits, Doc. 8-1 at 814-19;

therefore, the appellate court may have affirmed Beamon’s conviction based

on the State’s argument. If the appellate court addressed the merits of the

claim, the state court’s adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA.

After a review of the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that

the state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly

established federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

Therefore, Beamon is not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.

Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is not

entitled to deference, Beamon still would not be entitled to federal habeas

relief. As stated earlier, “[a]s a general rule, a federal court in a habeas

corpus case will not review the trial court’s actions concerning the

admissibility of evidence.” Osborne v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1237, 1238 (11th

Cir. 1983). “However, where a state court’s ruling is claimed to have deprived

a defendant of his right to due process, a federal court should then inquire

only to determine whether the error was of such magnitude as to deny

fundamental fairness to the criminal trial.” Id. (citations omitted). Here,

although Beamon failed to identify the alleged hearsay testimony in his

Petition, he identified the following testimony in his initial brief on direct

appeal:

After Officer Muchowicz testified that he moved

[Beamon] from [Beamon’s] vehicle to the back of his

own [police] vehicle, the prosecutor asked [Officer

Muchowicz] “–and at some point did Officer Deal

come up and explain to you that – not to release him

because they want to do some more –” At this point

defense counsel objected on the basis of hearsay and

the trial court overruled the objection. [Officer

Muchowicz] then testified that when he was putting

the handcuffs on [Beamon,] Officer Deal came

running up and “said emphatically don’t let him go,

don’t let him go.”

Doc. 8-1 at 766-67 (emphasis added); see also Doc. 8-1 at 467. Beamon fails to

show that this was improperly admitted hearsay testimony. But even if the

testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, Beamon has not even suggested

how its admission rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Thus, Beamon is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim raised in Ground Four.

D. Ground Five

As Ground Five, Beamon contends his counsel failed to object to the

prosecutor’s improper remarks during opening and closing arguments. See

Petition at 21. He asserts that the prosecutor’s comments “individually

and/or cumulatively” constituted fundamental error. Id. Beamon raised a

substantially similar claim on direct appeal, see Doc. 8-1 at 769-77; the State

filed an answer brief, id. at 820-35;11 and the First DCA per curiam affirmed

without a written opinion, id. at 859.

Upon review of the record, the Court again determines that Beamon

did not fairly present the federal nature of this claim to the state court. The

record demonstrates that in his initial brief on direct appeal, Beamon argued

11 Although Beamon filed a reply brief, he did not address this claim. See Doc.

8-1 at 856.

that the prosecutor’s remarks constituted fundamental error based upon

Florida law. Doc. 8-1 at 769-77. “[T]he fundamental error question is an issue

of state law, and state law is what the state courts say it is.” Pinkney v. Sec’y,

Dept. of Corr., 876 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017). Beamon did not present

any federal constitutional grounds in support of this claim in his direct

appeal. Therefore, to the extent Beamon now raises a federal claim, the Court

finds he failed to fairly present the claim to the state court, which deprived

the state court of a meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin,

541 U.S. at 29. Since future attempts to exhaust the claim would be futile,

the claim is procedurally defaulted. Beamon has alleged neither cause and

prejudice nor a miscarriage of justice to overcome his failure to exhaust. As

such, the claim is procedurally barred.

Nevertheless, even if Beamon fairly presented a federal claim on direct

appeal, he is not entitled to relief. In its appellate brief, the State addressed

this claim on the merits, Doc. 8-1 at 820-35; therefore, the appellate court

may have affirmed Beamon’s conviction based on the State’s argument. If the

appellate court addressed the merits of the claim, the state court’s

adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA. After a review of the

record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,

did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore, Beamon is

not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.

Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is not

entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. Attorneys are permitted

wide latitude in their opening and closing arguments, and the record reflects

that the trial judge instructed the jury that the attorneys’ arguments were

not evidence. See Doc. 8-1 at 382, 537; see Brown, 255 F.3d at 1280 (stating

that “jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions”). After reviewing

the record, viewing the prosecutor’s remarks in the context of the trial as a

whole, and assessing their “probable impact” on the jury, see United States v.

Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 849 (11th Cir. 2011), the Court is not convinced that the

remarks at issue likely resulted in a due process violation.12 As such, Beamon

is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claim raised in Ground Five.

E. Ground Six

As Ground Six, Beamon argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

when she advised him that his proposed witnesses would not help his defense

and were “not relevant to [his] case.” See Petition at 24. Beamon raised a

12 The reversal of a conviction is warranted only when improper comments by

a prosecutor have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)

(citation omitted); Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir.

2012) (citation omitted).

substantially similar claim in grounds one and two of his amended Rule 3.850

Motion. See Doc. 8-1 at 905-12. The postconviction court denied relief, stating

in pertinent part:

Neither the evidence presented at trial, nor the

evidence Defendant alleges should have been

presented, would have provided a legal basis for a

self-defense claim. Counsel deposed the State’s

witnesses as well as the witnesses Defendant

requested that she call. Counsel, however, did not

believe there was any evidence supporting a claim of

self-defense. Defendant’s witnesses would have

testified as to threats or acts of violence done by the

victim toward Defendant and his mother, but counsel

did not believe such evidence would be either

relevant or admissible absent evidence that the

victim had done some specific act warranting the use

of deadly force by Defendant immediately prior to the

shooting. Counsel was correct:

It has been recognized that when the

defense of self-defense is raised, evidence of the

victim’s reputation may be admissible to show

his propensity for violence and the likelihood

that the victim was the aggressor, while

evidence of prior specific acts of violence may be

admissible to show the reasonableness of the

defendant’s apprehension at the time of the

slaying. But a prerequisite to the introduction

of such evidence is the laying of a “proper

predicate . . . by the showing of some overt act

by the deceased at or about the time of the

slaying that reasonably indicated a need for

action by the defendant in self-defense.”

Quintana v. State, 452 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA

1984) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); accord Savage v. State, 99 So. 3d 1001, 1003

(Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Defendant argued with the

victim in their driveway, walked inside, picked up a

handgun, walked back outside, and shot the victim

multiple times. Nothing in the record established a

legal justification for these actions. Quintana, 452 So.

2d at 100.

Further, counsel’s strategic decision not to call

a witness after investigating the witness’s testimony

is “generally not subject to postconviction attack

under Strickland.” Mendoza v. State, 81 So. 3d 579,

580-81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). After reviewing the

witnesses’ potential testimony, counsel reasonably

determined that their testimony would not help the

defense. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to

relief on Ground One.

. . .

In Ground Two, Defendant alleges counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate and call multiple

witnesses. Specifically, Defendant complains that

counsel was deficient for not presenting the

testimony of witnesses who would have testified as to

the victim’s behavior when he was either high or

drunk. Defendant claims prejudice because there is a

reasonable probability the result of his trial would

have been different had the jury heard this

testimony.

A defendant must specifically allege the

following when claiming counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate a witness: (1) the witness’s

identity; (2) the substance of the witness’s expected

testimony; (3) how the omission of the witness’s

testimony prejudiced the defendant; and (4) that the

witness was available to testify at trial. E.g. Brown v.

State, 962 So. 2d 355, 355-56 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)

(citing Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla.

2004)).

In ruling on Ground One, this Court found that

counsel investigated these witnesses and correctly

determined that they would have provided no

relevant, admissible testimony. Accordingly,

Defendant is not entitled to relief on Ground Two.

Mendoza, 81 So. 3d at 581 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690).

Id. at 952-53 (record citations omitted). The First DCA affirmed the denial of

relief without a written opinion. See Doc. 8-2 at 131.

To the extent that the First DCA decided this claim on the merits, the

Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for

federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record

and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,

did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Beamon is not

entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.

Nevertheless, even if the state appellate court’s adjudication of this

claim is not entitled to deference, the claim is too speculative to warrant

federal habeas relief. In the Petition, Beamon neither identifies the proposed

witnesses nor sets forth the substance of the expected testimony that he

contends would have aided his defense. See Shaw v. United States, 729 F.

App’x 757, 759 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has]

stated that complaints about uncalled witnesses are not favored, because the

presentation of testimony involves trial strategy and ‘allegations of what a

witness would have testified are largely speculative.’” (quoting Buckelew v.

United States, 575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1978))); Streeter v. United States,

335 F. App’x 859, 864 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In a habeas petition alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel, mere speculation that missing witnesses

would have been helpful is insufficient to meet the petitioner’s burden of

proof.” (citing Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1187)). Further, although Beamon

maintains that his proposed defense witnesses would have testified

favorably, he provides no evidence to support his belief. See United States v.

Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Evidence about the testimony of a

putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony

by the witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the

testimony would have been favorable; self-serving speculation will not

sustain an ineffective assistance claim.”).

Ultimately, “[w]hich witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is

the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever,

second guess.” Knight v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 936 F.3d 1322, 1340 (11th Cir.

2019) (quoting Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995)).

Counsel’s strategic decisions “are entitled to a ‘strong presumption’ of

reasonableness.” Dunn v. Reeves, 141 S.Ct. 2405, 2410 (2021) (quoting

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104). Here, the record reflects that after the State rested,

the trial court had a lengthy exchange with Beamon and his counsel

regarding two individuals Beamon wanted to call as defense witnesses. See

Doc. 8-1 at 487-93. Beamon told the court that he expected both individuals

to testify regarding past violence and threats by the victim towards Beamon

and their mother. Id. at 488. But counsel explained that even if the

individuals testified as Beamon expected, their testimony would not be

admissible or relevant to his defense:

[T]here is no evidence here that would justify a self-

defense claim. The witnesses that he has referred to

have evidence of prior disputes between the victim

and [Defendant], between victim and his mother.

Nothing relevant to an actual self-defense claim on

the day of the shooting. Therefore, their testimony

would not be relevant in this trial and that’s what . . .

I have explained to him. . . . Even if I called these

witnesses I believe the [S]tate would initially object

and their testimony would probably have been

proffered and Your Honor would not allow it because

it’s not relevant to the claim at issue here.

Id. at 489. On this record, it was a reasonable trial strategy for counsel to

choose not to call the two witnesses. Beamon has failed to show that no

competent attorney would have taken the action that his counsel chose. See

Goff v. United States, 693 F. App’x 854, 855 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The choice not

to call either of them as witnesses was not patently unreasonable that no

competent lawyer would have chosen it, and was the epitome of a strategic

decision.”). Moreover, Beamon has failed to make any showing to suggest a

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if his

proposed witnesses had been called to testify. As such, Beamon has failed to

demonstrate deficient performance or resulting prejudice. Therefore, the

claim in Ground Six is due to be denied.

F. Ground Seven

As Ground Seven, Beamon argues his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the trial testimony of State witness Katie Whitehurst, the

mother of both the victim and Beamon. See Petition at 24. Beamon raised a

substantially similar claim in ground five of his amended Rule 3.850 Motion.

See Doc. 8-1 at 915-16. The postconviction court denied relief on the claim,

stating in pertinent part:

In Ground Five, Defendant alleges counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of

Katie Whitehurst. Specifically, Defendant alleges

counsel was deficient for not objecting when

Whitehurst became emotional and confused during

her testimony. Defendant does not allege how

counsel’s failure to object prejudiced him, so his claim

is insufficient as pled. Smith, 998 So. 2d at 694

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

This Court has broad discretion to manage the

courtroom in the event that a witness becomes

emotional while testifying. Thomas v. State, 748 So.

2d 970, 980-81 (Fla. 1999) (citations omitted). When

Whitehurst struggled during her testimony, this

Court stopped the proceedings, had the jury removed

from the courtroom, and did not resume the trial

until Whitehurst regained her composure. These

actions sufficiently calmed the situation.

Defendant also alleges counsel should have

objected to Whitehurst’s testimony based upon her

confusion. However, even had counsel somehow

impeached Whitehurst or emphasized her confusion

on the witness stand, both Roberts and Holsey

corroborated the substantive portions of her

testimony, and Officer Muchowicz testified that

Defendant attempted to flee the scene of the shooting

by driving over his neighbor’s lawns after emergency

vehicles blocked the road. In light of the

overwhelming evidence of guilt presented by the

State, any tangential issues regarding Whitehurst’s

composure or confusion did not affect the ultimate

outcome of Defendant’s trial. Hernandez v. State, 180

So. 3d 978, 989-90 (Fla. 2015); see also Mack v. State,

21 So. 3d 105, 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Accordingly,

Defendant is not entitled to relief on Ground Five.

Id. at 957-58 (record citations omitted). The First DCA affirmed the denial of