“[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
RANDY A. MARQUARDT,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:22-cv-527-SPC-NPM
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Randy A. Marquardt’s Petition Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). Marquardt challenges a
state murder conviction and resulting sentence of life imprisonment.
Background
The State of Florida charged Marquardt with the second-degree murder
of Charles Gales, plus first-degree burglary, false imprisonment, and
possession of marijuana. Public defenders Philadelphia Beard and Hanna
Renna represented Marquardt at trial. The state established the following
facts through eye- and ear-witness testimony, physical evidence, and
Marquardt’s statements to police. In the morning of September 30, 2013,
Marquardt went to Gales’ house with a gun he borrowed from a friend and shot
Gales six times, killing him. He then went to a house where his ex-wife,
Deborah DeSilva, was working as a babysitter and forced her to accompany
him. They left together in DeSilva’s car with Marquardt driving. DeSilva
texted the child’s parents to let them know she was leaving the house, and she
convinced Marquardt to get rid of his bloody shirt and gun.
Marquardt and DeSilva returned to the house to pick up Marquardt’s
van. They saw a police car, and DeSilva convinced Marquardt to wait at a
nearby McDonalds. DeSilva told police where to find Marquardt, and they
arrested him. Police interviewed Marquardt twice. Marquardt initially denied
seeing Gales that day, but he eventually admitted to killing him. The State
played recordings of the interviews for the jury. The jury found Marquardt
guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Marquardt’s direct appeal and collateral attacks on the conviction were
unsuccessful, and he timely filed the habeas petition currently before this
Court.
Applicable Habeas Law
A. AEPDA
The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state
prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Relief may only
be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court if the
adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet.
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). A state court’s violation of state
law is not enough to show that a petitioner is in custody in violation of the
“Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);
Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010).
“Clearly established federal law” consists of the governing legal
principles set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court when
the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Casey v. Musladin,
549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).
Habeas relief is appropriate only if the state court decision was “contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of,” that federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A
decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court either:
(1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme
Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when
faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144,
1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme
Court precedent if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal
principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner’s case in an objectively
unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v.
Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or “if the state court either
unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a
new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that
principle to a new context where it should apply.” Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406).
When reviewing a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court must
remember that any “determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct[,]” and the petitioner bears “the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (“[A] state-court
factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas
court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”). “A
state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the
state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). “[T]his
standard is difficult to meet because it was meant to be.” Sexton v.
Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 2558 (2018).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part
test for determining whether a convicted person may have relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must establish:
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id.
When considering the first prong, “courts must ‘indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.’” Sealey v. Warden, 954 F.3d 1338, 1354 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). And “[a] state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long
as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Franks v. GDCP Warden, 975 F.3d 1165, 1176 (11th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101). Thus, a habeas petitioner must “show that
no reasonable jurist could find that his counsel’s performance fell within the
wide range of reasonable professional conduct.” Id. This is a “doubly
deferential” standard of review that gives both the state court and the
petitioner’s attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13 (citing
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)).
The second prong requires the petitioner to “show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Sealey, 954 F.3d at 1355 (quoting
Strickand, 466 U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The critical question
on federal habeas review is not whether this Court can see a substantial
likelihood of a different result had defense counsel taken a different approach.
Mays v. Hines, 141 S. Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021). All that matters is whether the
state court, “notwithstanding its substantial ‘latitude to reasonably determine
that a defendant has not [shown prejudice],’ still managed to blunder so badly
that every fairminded jurist would disagree.” Id. (quoting Knowles v.
Mirazayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)).
“An ineffective-assistance claim can be decided on either the deficiency
or prejudice prong.” Sealey, 954 F.3d at 1355. And “[w]hile the Strickland
standard is itself hard to meet, ‘establishing that a state court’s application of
Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.’” Id.
(quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105).
Analysis
Marquardt states one ground for federal habeas relief, which Respondent
concedes was exhausted in state court. Marquardt argues his attorneys’
assistance was ineffective because they did not move to suppress the
statements he made to police. Marquardt claims he had taken Percocet,
Xanax, and marijuana just before his arrest, which made his statements
involuntary. To support his claim, Marquardt points to excerpts of his
interview transcript, in which he asked police if he could smoke marijuana and
stated he wanted to die.
After describing the Strickland standard, the state postconviction court
rejected Marquardt’s claim:
10. In Ground 1, Defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a motion to suppress Defendant’s confession to police
because he was under the influence of marijuana and prescription
medication, and he suffers from a mental illness. Defendant
contends that the answers provided to detectives during the
interrogation were made by a mentally instable individual who
was intoxicated or high on a controlled substance, and they were
not Defendant’s version of the facts. Defendant claims that he was
unable to understand the meaning of his statements and answers
to detectives. Defendant asserts that since counsel failed to
suppress his confession it became a feature of the trial, and this
caused Defendant not to prevail on his theory of self-defense.
Defendant argues that without the prejudicial statements, the jury
would have found that he acted in self-defense, and found him not
guilty of the crime charged. Defendant contends that since he was
prejudiced, the jury verdict is unreliable.
11. The State argues that the record reflects that Defendant’s
confession was freely and voluntarily given because Defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda Rights. The State
claims that Defendant’s allegations are refuted by Defendant’s
ability to respond to the Detectives questions during his four-hour
interview, and Defendant’s testimony was directly refuted by his
ability to lead detectives to the location where he hid the murder
weapon and discarded his bloody shirt.
12. As to Ground 1, the Court finds that the record refutes
Defendant’s claim. At trial, Defendant testified that law
enforcement read him his Miranda Rights, he voluntarily agreed
to speak with them, and he told them the truth…As the State
argued, although the Defendant testified at trial that he was under
the influence of drugs, blacked out before being interviewed, and
had memory problems during his interview, Defendant’s testimony
was refuted by Defendant’s ability to coherently respond to
questions and interact with detectives during the interview that
lasted approximately four hours. Further, even if defense counsel
had filed the motion to suppress, the Court would have denied the
motion. See Teffeteller v. Duggar, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1024 (Fla.
1999). Defendant has failed to demonstrate both prongs of
Strickland. Therefore, Ground 1 is DENIED.
(Doc. 10-2 at 2780-81) (citations to the trial transcript omitted). The state
appellate court affirmed without a written opinion.
The state court’s rejection of Marquardt’s claim is consistent with federal
law and supported by the record. The only evidence Marquardt cites to support
his claim are a few excerpts of his interview that he describes as “manic and
bizarre utterances and responses.” (Doc. 1 at 11). But a review of the complete
interview transcripts shows that Marquardt was able to understand and
answer the detectives’ questions. (See Doc. 10-2 at 634-840). He was coherent
and responsive throughout the interview. The detective who led the interviews
testified that Marquardt did not appear to be under the influence of drugs,
alcohol, or any other substance. (Doc. 10-2 at 663). And as the state court
noted, Marquardt was able to lead police to the locations where he left the gun
and his bloody shirt.
The postconviction court reasonably found that the record refuted
Marquardt’s claim that his confession was involuntary. A motion to suppress
would have been futile. The constitution does not require defense counsel to
raise meritless arguments. The Court thus denies Marquardt’s federal habeas
claim.
DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement
to appeal a district court's denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather,
a district court must first issue a certificate of appealability (COA). “A [COA]
may issue…only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a
petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard
v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further,” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–
36 (2003) (citations omitted). Marquardt has not made the requisite showing
here and may not have a certificate of appealability on any ground of his
Petition.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Petitioner Randy A. Marquardt’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to
terminate any pending motions and deadlines, enter judgment, and close this
case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 28, 2024.
, Lh platrathe 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record
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