O'Neal v. American Shaman Franchise Systems, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

THOMAS O’NEAL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:20-cv-00936-KKM-AAS

AMERICAN SHAMAN FRANCHISE

SYSTEM, LLC, CBD AMERICAN

SHAMAN, LLC, SHAMAN BOTANICALS,

LLC, SVS ENTERPRISES, LLC, STEPHEN

VINCENT SANDERS II, BRANDON

CARNES, and FRANCIS KALAIWAA,

Defendants.

___________________________________

ORDER

In April 2021, Thomas O’Neal settled claims against a group of Defendants

(collectively, the Shaman Defendants) related to his efforts to open several new American

Shaman CBD stores in Florida. (Doc. 65). Eight months later, O’Neal filed a supplemental

complaint in aid of execution of a default judgment against a different group of Defendants,

claiming that the Shaman Defendants made fraudulent transfers to help the defaulted

Defendants evade enforcement. Supplemental Compl. (Doc. 135). The Shaman

Defendants counterclaimed that O’Neal breached the settlement agreement by filing the

supplemental complaint. 2d Shaman Counterclaim (Doc. 188) at 19–34.

After the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, I granted the

Shaman Defendants judgment on the pleadings as to O’Neal’s supplemental claims, leaving

only the counterclaims. (Doc. 230). Recently, the Magistrate Judge entered four orders

resolving the Parties’ final tranche of discovery motions, (Docs. 360–61, 374–75), and

issued a Report and Recommendation on the Parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment, R&R (Doc. 410). O’Neal objected to each of the discovery orders and to the

Report and Recommendation. (Docs. 376–77, 379, 382, 411). After carefully considering

O’Neal’s objections, I affirm the Magistrate Judge’s rulings in three of the four discovery

orders and adopt the Report and Recommendation in full.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

In April 2020, O’Neal sued a large group of defendants, including the Shaman

Defendants, for acts related to American Shaman’s efforts to expand its hemp-based CBD

business in Florida. Compl. (Doc. 1); Am. Compl. (Doc. 6). After a year of litigation,

O’Neal settled his claims against the Shaman Defendants and the parties jointly stipulated

to dismiss the claims with prejudice. (Docs. 65, 72). O’Neal obtained a default

judgment against other Defendants, including Brandon Carnes. (Docs. 58, 76–78).

In December 2021, O’Neal filed a supplemental complaint against the Shaman

Defendants in aid of execution of his default judgment. Supplemental Compl. The

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supplemental complaint alleged that the Shaman Defendants had engaged in fraudulent

transfers to help Carnes evade O’Neal’s efforts to enforce his judgment.

The Shaman Defendants counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and breach of the

settlement agreement. 2d Shaman Counterclaim at 19–33. The counterclaim requested

that I hold O’Neal and his attorney jointly and severally liable for the Shaman Defendants’

attorney’s fees based on an allegation that both men acted in bad faith and knew that the

claims in the supplemental complaint were barred by the settlement agreement. at

32–33.

In July 2022, on review of objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and

recommendation, (Docs. 184, 213, 224), I granted the Shaman Defendants judgment

on the pleadings with respect to O’Neal’s supplemental claims, (Doc. 230). Since that

order, the Parties have extensively litigated the Shaman Defendants’ counterclaims.

O’Neal has also repeatedly attempted to relitigate already-decided issues. , (Doc.

404) at 1 (denying motion to reconsider because “none of O’Neal’s arguments, old or new,

justify reconsideration,” especially given that “O’Neal’s motion is largely duplicative of

already-litigated issues and was filed months after [the orders] that he requests I

reconsider”).

All matters are now ripe. The Magistrate Judge has decided the last remaining

evidentiary issues, (Docs. 360–61, 374–75), discovery has closed, (Doc. 353), and the

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Parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on the counterclaims, (Docs. 385, 390).

The Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation with respect to the cross-

motions recommending that both motions should be granted in part and denied in part,

R&R, and O’Neal’s objections are ripe, (Docs. 376–77, 379, 382, 411).

B. Factual Background

O’Neal’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation turns on

the settlement agreement’s confidentiality provision. That provision states:

As consideration and inducement for this settlement, all terms of the

settlement and this document will be held in strict confidence by all parties

to this action, including but not limited to the O’Neal and O’Neal’s

attorneys, agents, representatives and relations. The parties and their

attorneys agree to keep the terms of this settlement in confidence and not to

publish, advertise, disclose, disseminate or reveal the settlement amount,

terms and/or conditions to anyone, including, but not limited to, any non-

party attorneys, publishers, advertisers, websites, web publications, internet

publications, media outlets, representatives of the media (which include but

are not limited to printed media (such as newspapers), internet media and

radio media), legal or other journals or periodicals, legal publications and

ATLA publications, in the absence of a court order compelling them to do

so and not without prior written notice to the other parties’ attorneys. All

parties acknowledge that this requirement of confidentiality is a material

term of the settlement of this litigation and that any failure to fully and

completely comply with the confidentiality requirement may subject the

offending party to legal damages, including sanctions. By way of clarification,

however, all parties may be allowed to disclose the terms of this settlement

to a court in order to obtain an order seeking enforcement of the settlement,

only or as required by law and only to the minimal extent necessary to state

and federal tax authorities, officers of the court, lienholders, related

caregivers, and bill collectors. Out of the settlement payments being made

herein, One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) is being paid to the O’Neal as

consideration for entering into this confidentiality agreement and Shaman

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agrees that these payments are adequate consideration for entering into the

confidentiality agreement.

Shaman Statement of Facts (Doc. 391) ¶ 24; Settlement Agreement (Doc. 391-11)

¶ 4.1.

The only other relevant facts are as follows: On September 21, 2021, O’Neal

initiated an action for registration of a default judgment in the Western District of

Missouri. Shaman Statement of Facts ¶ 34. O’Neal issued subpoenas to several Shaman

Defendants related to his fraudulent transfer theories and later moved to compel.

¶¶ 35–36. In support of their opposition, the Shaman Defendants filed a redacted version

of the settlement agreement on the public docket. ¶¶ 37–40. The motion was

eventually denied without prejudice based on the Court’s understanding that O’Neal

“appear[ed] to no longer be pursuing enforcement of the subpoena.” ¶ 41. The Shaman

Defendants also filed a redacted copy of the settlement agreement in this Court as an

attachment to their opposition to O’Neal’s motion for leave to file a supplemental

complaint. ¶¶ 42–44; (Doc. 119-6). It is undisputed that the Shaman

Defendants did not provide O’Neal’s counsel with prior written notice before filing the

redacted settlement agreement in the Missouri action. O’Neal Statement of Facts (Doc.

388) ¶ 4.

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Discovery Orders

Rule 72 permits objection to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive orders and

provides that “[t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify

or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 72(a). The clear error standard is highly deferential.

, 425 F.3d 1325, 1350 (11th Cir. 2005). For a finding to be clearly

erroneous, the district court must be “left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.”

Additionally, magistrate judges are afforded substantial discretion in resolving non-

dispositive pretrial discovery orders. , 947

F.3d 1322, 1327 (11th Cir. 2020); Local Rule 1.02(a);

, No. 8:20-mc-100 (M.D. Fla.

Oct. 29, 2020) (Doc. 3). Thus, for a non-dispositive discovery ruling to merit reversal, the

objecting party must show that the “ruling resulted in substantial harm to [that party’s]

case.” , 367 F. App’x 102, 104 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam);

, 654 F. App’x 683, 690 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (applying the substantial

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harm standard to a district court’s affirmance of a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive

discovery order).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute of material fact exists and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact

is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.

, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The movant always bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate an absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. , 929 F.2d 604, 608

(11th Cir. 1991). When that burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present

evidentiary materials (e.g., affidavits, depositions, exhibits, etc.) demonstrating that there

is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment. A moving party

is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party “fail[s] to make a sufficient

showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of

proof.” , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court reviews the record

evidence as identified by the parties and draws all legitimate inferences in the nonmoving

party’s favor. , 946 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020);

, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008).

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III. ANALYSIS

I begin by addressing O’Neal’s objections to the discovery orders before turning to

the report and recommendation on summary judgment.

A. Document 360: Order Denying Motion to Compel

First, the Magistrate Judge denied O’Neal’s motion to compel the production of

documents responsive to his second request for production. (Docs. 313, 360). “Each

request ask[ed] for documents related to Mr. O’Neal’s pursuit of post-judgment claims

against Mr. Carnes.” (Doc. 360) at 3. The Magistrate Judge denied the motion because,

rather than show such discovery was relevant and proportional to the needs of the case

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,1 O’Neal wrongly invoked Rule 69(a), which

allows judgment creditors to “obtain discovery from any person—including the judgment

debtor—as provided in these rules or by the procedure of the state where the court is

located” “[i]n aid of the judgment or execution.” FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2). The Magistrate

Judge explained that Rule 69(a)(2) was inapplicable because, in the light of my order

granting the Shaman Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to O’Neal’s

1 Because the only remaining claims are the Shaman Defendants’ counterclaims for declaratory judgment

and breach of contract, there is no way that O’Neal could show that documents related to his pursuit of

post-judgment discovery against Carnes were relevant or proportional to the needs of the case. (Doc. 360)

at 5–6. But even if O’Neal could meet this burden, he has made no effort to do so.

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supplemental complaint, “O’Neal no longer ha[d] active post-judgment claims in this

action.” (Doc. 360) at 4.

O’Neal objects to the ruling on two grounds. First, he argues that he need not meet

the ordinary requirements of Rule 26 to show that his proposed discovery is relevant and

proportional because Rule 69 controls. (Doc. 376) at 10–11. Second, he argues that the

Shaman Defendants’ objections to his discovery requests should have been overruled

because the objections did not comply with Rule 34(b)(2)(C)’s procedural requirements.

at 11–12. Neither objection is meritorious.

Rule 69(a)(2) applies when deployed “[i]n aid of the judgment or execution.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2). For the almost two years since I granted judgment on the pleadings as

to O’Neal’s supplemental claims, this has ceased to be a suit “[i]n aid of the judgment or

execution”—only the Shaman Defendants’ counterclaims remain, and those have nothing

to do with the default judgment against Carnes or O’Neal’s efforts to enforce it. O’Neal

has cited no authority where a judgment creditor filed a supplemental complaint in aid of

execution based on independent fraudulent transfer claims, had judgment entered against

him on those claims, and yet still had a right to seek discovery under Rule 69(a)(2). That

makes sense—the “independent action” in aid of execution is no more.

, 727 F.3d 1127, 1138–39 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Quite simply,

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Florida’s courts have treated a [Florida fraudulent transfer] supplementary proceeding as a

substantive, independent action.” (footnote omitted)).

Second, O’Neal’s own authority and the plain text of Rule 69(a)(2) show that, even

if the rule applied here, O’Neal may not simply ignore Rule 26. FED. R. CIV. P.

69(a)(2) (providing that a judgment creditor may seek post-judgment discovery “

or by the procedure of the state where the court is located”

(emphases added)); (Doc. 376) at 10 (citing , No.

8:16-cv-705, 2018 WL 7017412, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2023) (analyzing motion to

quash under Rule 26 in a case in which Rule 69(a)(2) also applied).

Finally, O’Neal cannot show that the failure to receive this discovery substantially

harmed his case because information about Carnes and any allegedly fraudulent transfers

has nothing to do with the Shaman Defendants’ counterclaims. No amount of post-

judgment discovery into Carnes’s finances can change the meaning of the settlement

agreement or whether either party committed a material breach. Thus, any error would

have been harmless. , 367 F. App’x at 104; , 654 F. App’x at 690. The lack

of substantial harm likewise dooms O’Neal’s second objection.

B. Document 361: Order Denying Motion to Compel

Second, the Magistrate Judge denied a different motion to compel responses to

O’Neal’s third request for production. (Docs. 339, 361). Several of the requests, like those

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discussed above, sought “documents related to Mr. O’Neal’s post-judgment action against

Mr. Carnes.” (Doc. 361) at 7. Because O’Neal’s objections and arguments on that issue are

identical to the ones I rejected above, I reject them here as well. And none of the other

objections, at 3–7; (Doc. 377) at 5–11, fare any better.

As to O’Neal’s requests for drafts of the settlement agreement, information

sufficient to identify the drafter of any proposed edits, and various communications related

to the settlement agreement, the Shaman Defendants produced responsive documents and

otherwise asserted the attorney-client and work-product privileges. (Doc. 377) at 5–6,

8–10. O’Neal’s objection lacks clarity, but he appears to argue that the Magistrate Judge

should have allowed him to inspect the Shaman Defendants’ computer systems to look for

additional responsive documents. at 6–8, 10–11. Indeed, it remains unclear if some of

O’Neal’s disagreements are really objections. at 10–11. In any case, O’Neal never

explains why he would be entitled to more than the Shaman Defendants produced, nor

does he mount any real attack on either the asserted privileges or the Magistrate Judge’s

substantive grounds for denying the motion to compel. Absent such arguments, O’Neal’s

objections fail.

C. Document 374: Order Granting Motion for Protective Order

Next is the Magistrate Judge’s order granting nonparty Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &

Smith, LLP’s motion for a protective order barring O’Neal from executing demand letters

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seeking liability insurance information from the firm. (Docs. 349, 374). O’Neal argues that

he was entitled to Lewis Brisbois’s insurance information as a “claimant” under § 627.4137,

FLA. STAT. (Doc. 382) at 11–13. The statute provides that “the insured, . . . upon

written request of the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, shall disclose the name and

coverage of each known insurer to the claimant and shall forward such request for

information as required by this subsection to all affected insurers.” § 627.4137(1), FLA.

STAT. “The insurer shall then supply the information required in this subsection to the

claimant within 30 days of receipt of such request.” O’Neal also argues that the demand

letter was not discovery governed by Rules 26 or 37. at 13–14.

I need not address the merits of O’Neal's arguments because the motion for

protective order was mooted on June 28, 2024, when Lewis Brisbois informed the Court

that O’Neal had withdrawn the demand letters. (Doc. 351) at 2–3. Because the

underlying controversy is moot, the Magistrate Judge’s order resolving the motion and

awarding Lewis Brisbois expenses under Rule 37 is vacated as moot, which in turn moots

O’Neal’s objection. Under these circumstances, I conclude that it would be unjust to award

Rule 37 expenses to either party. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5) (requiring that the court not

award expenses if the “circumstances make an award of expenses unjust”).

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D. Document 375: Order Granting Motion to Compel

Finally, the Magistrate Judge granted the Shaman Defendants’ motion to compel

O’Neal’s current and former counsel, attorneys Scott Terry and Kevin Graham, to sit for

depositions. (Docs. 364, 375). The Magistrate Judge granted this relief after granting

O’Neal’s opposed motions to compel depositions of current and former counsel for the

Shaman Defendants, David Luck and Nicholas Porto, (Docs. 358–59), on the theory

that O’Neal had “injected” counsel’s role in drafting the settlement agreement by raising a

defense that Graham “was not part of the negotiations of the Prior Settlement Agreement

and thus did not know it barred Mr. O’Neal from raising his post-judgment action,”

supported by declarations from Terry to that effect. (Doc. 375) at 6; at 3–7.

O’Neal objects, arguing that the Magistrate Judge erred by failing to apply a test from the

Eighth Circuit, that the attorneys’ testimony was privileged, and that the testimony was

not crucial to the Shaman Defendants’ counterclaims. (Doc. 379) at 10–18. The Shaman

Defendants argue that this objection is moot because, despite a court order extending the

discovery deadline solely to take the attorney depositions, (Doc. 353), none of the

depositions ever occurred and discovery subsequently closed, (Doc. 389) at 3–4.

I agree with the Shaman Defendants. The extended discovery deadline closed

without either party moving for a further extension and the Parties’ cross-motions for

summary judgment are fully briefed. And neither party is substantially disadvantaged

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because neither took attorney depositions. O’Neal’s objection is moot. The Shaman

Defendants request that I award them expenses under Rule 37 because O’Neal’s objections

were not substantially justified given that they were filed after the close of discovery. (Doc.

389) at 9. That issue is referred to the Magistrate Judge.

E. Document 414: Report and Recommendation on Cross-Motions for

Summary Judgment

O’Neal asserts two objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation. Objections (Doc. 411). First, he argues that the Magistrate Judge

wrongly rejected his contention that, by filing a redacted copy of the settlement agreement

on the public docket in the Missouri action, the Shaman Defendants materially breached.

at 6–15. Second, he objects that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized his argument

by failing to include his contention that the Missouri disclosure was made without prior

written notice. at 15.

I begin with the second objection. To the degree that this discussion should even be

considered an objection, I understand O’Neal to take issue with the Magistrate Judge’s

phrasing of his lack-of-prior-written-notice theory of material breach in the Missouri

action. To be sure, the Magistrate Judge did not restate O’Neal’s precise notice argument

as to the Missouri disclosure. R&R at 13–14. But she expressly acknowledged the

argument as to similar disclosures in this case in the same sentence, and there is no sign

that her conclusion that the Shaman Defendants did not materially breach relied on

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treating the Missouri disclosure differently. Regardless, the point is moot because I

consider and reject O’Neal’s prior written notice argument, including as to the Missouri

disclosure, on contract interpretation grounds below.

O’Neal’s main objection is to the rejection of his argument that the Shaman

Defendants materially breached when they filed a redacted copy of the settlement

agreement on the public docket in the Missouri action without providing prior written

notice to O’Neal’s counsel. Objections at 6–15. This argument fails because it depends on

an incorrect interpretation of the confidentiality provision.

As fully set out above, the general obligations clause requires the Parties “to keep

the terms of this settlement in confidence and not to publish, advertise, disclose,

disseminate or reveal the settlement amount, terms and/or conditions to anyone, including,

but not limited to, [a list of entities] in the absence of a court order compelling them to do

so and not without prior written notice to the other parties’ attorneys.” Settlement

Agreement ¶ 4.1. That language is broad and unequivocal—if it were the only language in

the confidentiality provision, O’Neal might well have a point.

But the general clause is followed—two sentences later—by a carveout that narrows

the Parties’ general obligations: “

, only or as required by law and only to the minimal extent

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necessary to state and federal tax authorities, officers of the court, lienholders, related

caregivers, and bill collectors.” (emphases added). The Shaman Defendants and the

Magistrate Judge both read this more specific language to establish an exception to the

general clause’s prior written notice requirement. R&R at 13–14; Resp. (Doc. 413) at

2–8. I agree with both.

Under Florida law, which governs the settlement agreement’s interpretation, “when

‘provisions of a contract conflict . . . a specific provision dealing with a particular subject

will control over a different provision dealing only generally with that same subject.’ ”

, No. 20-11800, 2023

WL 2707318, at *8 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2023) (quoting

, 985 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (Lagoa,

J.), and citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (Am. L. Inst. 1981)).

The settlement agreement contains two conflicting clauses regarding the Parties’

confidentiality obligations, one general and the other specific. The general clause imposes

a broad obligation that applies to all potential recipients “in the absence of a court order

compelling [disclosure] and not without prior written notice to the other parties’ attorneys.”

Shaman Statement of Facts ¶ 24. But that obligation is qualified by the more specific

carveout clause, expressly offset with the phrase “[b]y way of clarification, however,” to

highlight the contradiction. And the carveout clause, within its scope, is permissive—

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it provides that “

.” (emphases added).

The ordinary meaning of this language, taken in context, is a limited exception for certain

disclosures to the general clause’s more rigorous procedural requirements. Indeed, it could

not be anything else without being superfluous, as courts are already within the unlimited

universe of potential disclosures covered by the general clause’s “including, but not limited

to” language. ,

556 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that, under Florida contract law, courts

“must read [a] contract to give meaning to each and every word it contains” and “avoid

treating a word as redundant or mere surplusage if any meaning, reasonable and consistent

with other parts, can be given to it.” (quotations omitted)).

A potential drafting error, the use of “ as required by law and only to the

minimal extent necessary” introduces some ambiguity with respect to the precise scope of

the carveout clause. The Shaman Defendants argue that the first “only” is a scrivener’s error

and that the carveout clause should read “all parties may be allowed to disclose the terms

of this settlement to a court in order to obtain an order seeking enforcement of the

settlement, as required by law and only to the minimal extent necessary to state and

federal tax authorities, officers of the court, lienholders, related caregivers, and bill

collectors.” Resp. at 3 n.1 (emphasis added). Given that “only or as required by law”

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makes little sense, I am inclined to agree that either the “only” or the “or” is an error. But

I need not delve deeply into the matter or decide whether the sub-qualifier “as required by

law and only to the minimal extent necessary” applies to the first subclause because either

way, the carveout clause conflicts with and supersedes the general clause’s court order and

prior written notice requirements. And that point is the only one O’Neal has properly

preserved.

In sum, the general clause of the confidentiality provision requires a court order and

prior written notice. But the carveout clause allows parties to disclose to a court to obtain

an order seeking enforcement without satisfying the general clause’s procedural

requirements. The Missouri disclosure, made seeking an order quashing O’Neal’s subpoena

based on the settlement agreement, fell squarely within the carveout clause’s exception.

Thus, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the Shaman Defendants did not

materially breach. O’Neal’s objection to the Report and Recommendation is overruled.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. O’Neal’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s orders denying motions to compel

(Docs. 376–77) and to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 411) are OVERRULED.

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2. O’Neal’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s order granting the Shaman

Defendants’ motion to compel (Doc. 379) is DENIED as moot.

a. The issue of whether an award of expenses under Rule 37 is appropriate

is referred to the Magistrate Judge.

3. O’Neal’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s order granting Lewis Brisbois a

protective order (Doc. 382) is DENIED as moot. The Magistrate Judge’s order

granting the motion for protective order and awarding Lewis Brisbois Rule 37

expenses (Doc. 374) is VACATED as moot. Under these circumstances, the

Court concludes that it would be unjust to award either party expenses under

Rule 37.

4. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 410) is ADOPTED

and made a part of this Order for all purposes.

a. O’Neal’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 385) is GRANTED-

IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. The motion is GRANTED on

the issue of the Shaman Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees as

declaratory judgment damages in Count I. Otherwise, the motion is

DENIED.

b. The Shaman Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 390) is

GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. As to Count I, the

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motion is DENIED as moot as to liability and DENIED as to damages.

As to Count II, the motion is GRANTED. Nominal damages of one

dollar are awarded for breach of the non-disparagement provision and

reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses are awarded as damages for breach

of the release. The Shaman Defendants are DIRECTED to file a

supplemental motion on the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses under

Local Rule 7.01(c) no later than April 22, 2024.

c. The Shaman Defendants’ request for sanctions against Attorney Graham

is DENIED without prejudice pending more detailed briefing and an

evidentiary hearing. Additionally, given Attorney Graham’s request for a

hearing and the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to hold a

consolidated sanctions hearing, (Doc. 409) at 2 n.1, the portion of the

Court’s Order Denying Reconsideration (Doc. 404) awarding the

Shaman Defendants reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1927 is VACATED and the related supplemental motion (Doc. 408)

is DENIED as moot. The Shaman Defendants are DIRECTED to file

a single consolidated sanctions motion addressing every ground asserted

for the imposition of sanctions against Attorney Graham, which will be

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the subject of a single hearing. The motion should be filed no later than

April 22, 2024.

d. O’Neal’s request for oral argument (Doc. 412) is DENIED as moot.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 25, 2024.

pate oe Mizelle

United States District Judge

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