Griffin v. State of Florida (Columbia County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CLARENCE GRIFFIN,

Petitioner,

Vv. Case No. 3:20-cv-1434-HES-JBT

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

. ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Clarence Griffin, a former inmate of the Florida penal

system, initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).! Griffin proceeds on an Amended

Petition (Doc. 4). In the Amended Petition, Griffin challenges a 2020 state

court (Columbia County, Florida) judgment of conviction for attempted false

imprisonment. He raises four grounds for relief. See Amended Petition at 5-

11. Respondents submitted a Response in opposition to the Amended Petition

(Response; Doc. 13). They also submitted exhibits. See Docs. 13-1 through 13-

' For all pleadings and exhibits filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

18. Griffin filed a brief in reply (Reply; Doc. 16) with exhibits (Docs. 16-1

through 16-4). This action is ripe for review.

Il. Relevant Factual and Procedural History

These facts are taken from the Anders? brief Griffin’s appellate counsel

filed on direct appeal:

On the morning of August 6, 2019, Sharlene

Thomas used her cell phone to call 911 and report she

was being held against her will. She requested help—

and gave the dispatcher a brief description of her car,

her and [Griffin], and their current location outside a

Dollar Store on Baya Drive in Lake City, Florida. A

short time later, at approximately 9 a.m., Officer

Ryan Collins spotted a vehicle fitting that description

[gray Nissan Pathfinder] parked outside a S&S

convenience store. Collins approached the vehicle and

made contact with its occupants. At the time, [ ]

Griffin had just positioned himself behind the

steering wheel after returning to the car from the

store. Ms. Thomas was in the back seat and holding

an ice pack to her face. Collins could see the right

side of her face and eye area was severely swollen

and bruised. After Thomas indicated her injuries had

been inflicted by [Griffin], he was taken into custody.

At trial, Ms. Thomas testified [Griffin] was a

person she had once dated. On August 5, 2019, they

decided to go to Jacksonville in her car. While they

were en route to Jacksonville from Baker County, he

took control of her phone, looked at some messages,

and began accusing her of having sex with 2

individuals. At Jacksonville, they spent a short time

at a casino before heading toward home. Upon

leaving the casino, Thomas was driving. It was her

testimony that as they traveled between Duval and

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Baker counties, [Griffin] continued to accuse her of

having sex with others. When she denied it, he would

then punch her with an open hand about her face,

head, and stomach. He threatened and struck her

repeatedly. At one time he put a box cutter to her

neck and threatened to cut her throat. Eventually, he

took over driving the car because Thomas was having

trouble seeing due to swelling on the right side of her

face. She testified she repeatedly begged him to let

her go home but he refused because he felt the need

to keep her hidden until she didn’t look so beat up. At

his insistence, she was required to relieve herself by

the side of the road or in the bushes. She was also

required to sit in the back seat of her vehicle where

the windows were tinted darker than the front

windows. Until such time as the police responded to

her 911 call, she did not believe she was free to leave

the confines of the car.

After [Griffin] was taken into custody and Ms.

Thomas was interviewed, officers retrieved a box

cutter from underneath the driver's seat of her

vehicle.

See Doc. 13-13 at 12-13 (record citations omitted).

On September 9, 2019, the State of Florida (State) charged Griffin by

information with false imprisonment. See Doc. 13-2 at 1-2. At the conclusion

of a trial, a jury found Griffin guilty of attempted false imprisonment, a lesser

included offense. See Doc. 13-8. On February 12, 2020, the trial court

sentenced Griffin to a term of imprisonment of forty-eight months to be

followed by one year of community control. See Doc. 13-12.

Griffin appealed his conviction and sentence to the First District Court

of Appeal (First DCA). His appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, see Doc.

13-13, and Griffin filed a pro se initial brief, see Doc. 13-15 at 1-12.3 The First

DCA per curiam affirmed Griffin’s conviction and sentence on October 20,

2020, and issued the mandate on December 21, 2020. See Doc. 13-16 at 1, 9.

Griffin filed the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 21, 2020.

See Doc. 1.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to

establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to

grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a

hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834

F.3d 1299, 1818-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at

3 While his direct appeal was pending, Griffin also filed pro se petitions for

writ of prohibition and writ of habeas corpus. See Doc. 13-17 at 1-6; Doc. 13-18 at 1-

2. The First DCA dismissed both petitions. See Doc. 13-17 at 15; Doc. 13-18 at 3.

474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before

the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Griffin’s] claim[s]

without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), abrogation recognized on other grounds by Smith v. Comm’, Ala.

Dep't of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 13848 (11th Cir. 2023). “The purpose of AEDPA

is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of

error correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (201 1)). As

such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “sreatly

circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state

court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall

v. Secy, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state

court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the

state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s

adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United

States Supreme Court has instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the

unexplained decision to the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It

should then presume that the unexplained decision

adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 188 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be

rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely

relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision,

such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the

higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d)

bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or

(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope

of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As

explained by the Supreme Court in Williams vy,

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d

389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct

clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable

application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows

for relief only “if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id.

at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The

“unreasonable application” clause allows for relief

only “if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous factual

determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal

courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of

the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §

2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),

which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the

state court's factual findings “by clear and convincing

evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 1384S. _

Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013): accord Brumfield

v. Cain, 576 USS. ---, ---, 185 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192

L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise

relationship” may be, “a _ state-court factual

determination is not unreasonable merely because

the federal habeas court would have reached a

different conclusion in the first instance.” Titlow, 571

U.S. at ---, 1384 8. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 301, 180 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d

738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential

review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made’).

Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for

prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,

134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a

state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in

existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could disagree.” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one

to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s

claims were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be

evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a §

2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court

remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly

present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest

court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim,

“state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan yv. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

845 (1999).

In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a

state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies,

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the

“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d

865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438

(1971)). To provide the State with the necessary

“opportunity,” the prisoner must “fairly present” his

claim in each appropriate state court (including a

state supreme court with powers of discretionary

review), thereby alerting that court to the federal

nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115

S. Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845,

1198S. Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies

results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas

review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of

procedural default as follows:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality

of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are

guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court

judgments are accorded the finality and respect

necessary to preserve the integrity of legal

proceedings within our system of federalism. These

rules include the doctrine of procedural default,

under which a federal court will not review the

merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that

a state court declined to hear because the prisoner

failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g.,

Coleman,[*] supra, at 747-748, 111 S. Ct. 2546;

Sykes,[5] supra, at 84-85, 97 S. Ct. 2497. A state

court’s invocation of a procedural ‘rule to deny a

prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the

claims if, among other requisites, the state

procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to

support the judgment and the rule is firmly

established and consistently followed. See, e.g.,

Walker v. Martin, 562 U\S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120,

1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler,

558 U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617-18, 175 L.Ed.2d 417

(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted

claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A

prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted

claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice

from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501

U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults

may be excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim

has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim

+ Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).

5 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

10

if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice

from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward vy. Hall,

592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish

cause,

the procedural default “must result from some

objective factor external to the defense that

prevented [him] from raising the claim and which

cannot be fairly attributable to his own conduct.”

McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (ith Cir.

1992) (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct.

2639).[°] Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner]

must show that “the errors at trial actually and

substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he

was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261

(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).

In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may

receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the

petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the

continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would

result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

(I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,

there remains yet another avenue for him to receive

consideration on the merits of his procedurally

defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence

6 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).

11

of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This

exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,

and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal

innocence. Johnson y. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171

(11th Cir. 2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’

of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally,

“[t]o be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable

evidence not presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559

(1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in

most cases, allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily

rejected. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per

curiam) (first citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); and then

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s

12

representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.

Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective

assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that

counsel's representation was within the “wide range”

of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104

5. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.

2052.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct.

2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.” Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s

errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at

687, 1048. Ct. 2052.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of

any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test

before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part

Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a

court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet

the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d

1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which

18

we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697.

A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great

deference.

“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation

is a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,

131 S. Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state

court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable

under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The

standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are

both highly deferential, and when the two apply in

tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (citations and

quotation marks omitted). “The question is not

whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination under the Strickland standard was

incorrect but whether that determination was

unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S. Ct.

1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (quotation marks

omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,”

then a federal court may not disturb a state-court

decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,

1318. Ct. at 788.

Fittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “fiJn addition to the

deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds

another layer of deference — this one to a state court’s decision —- when we

are considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s

decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As

14

such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).

VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Mootness

A United States district court has jurisdiction to entertain a § 2254

petition only if the petitioner is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)

(emphasis added). The Supreme Court has interpreted the “in custody”

requirement to mean “that the habeas petitioner [must] be ‘in custody’ under

the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.”

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). Here, Griffin satisfied the “in

custody” requirement because he was in FDOC custody serving his sentence

for the conviction at issue—attempted false imprisonment—at the time he

filed his federal habeas petition. Gyiffin’s sentence, however, has since

expired. He was released from FDOC custody on December 28, 2022, and was

scheduled to be released from community supervision on December 27, 2023.7

“[A] habeas petitioner who has been released from imprisonment

subsequent to his filing a § 2254 petition must establish that his petition still

7 See Corrections Offender Network, Florida Department of Corrections,

available at https://fde.myflorida.com/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx (last visited

March 15, 2024).

15

presents a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the United States

Constitution, and therefore is not moot.” Mattern v. Secy, Dep’t of Corr., 494

F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2007). Once a petitioner’s sentence expires, “some

concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or

parole—some ‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction—must exist if the suit

is to be maintained.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1988). “Ultimately, the

burden remains on the petitioner to establish that his case still presents a

live ‘case or controversy’ by demonstrating that a collateral consequence of

his imprisonment persists after his release.” Djadju v. Vega, 32 F.4th 1102,

1107 (11th Cir. 2022). “In considering mootness, we look at the events at the

present time, not at the time the complaint was filed or when the federal

order on review was issued.” Id. at 1106 (citing Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 256

F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001).

On February 22, 2024, the Court directed Griffin, if he intended to

continue the prosecution of this case, to file a memorandum of law advising

why this case is not moot given his release from custody. See Order (Doe. 31).

On March 4, 2024, Griffin filed a memorandum in which he asserts that his

2020 conviction remains a “burden in [his] life” because he has encountered

“problems getting certain jobs.” See Doc. 32 at 3. He also asserts that his

“wrongful conviction” may be used to enhance a future sentence now that he

16

has been arrested again and is awaiting trial.’ Id. The Court finds the case is

not moot and will proceed to consider the merits of the Amended Petition. See

Jamerson _v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 410 F.3d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 2005)

(“Completion of a criminal sentence does not render a petition for habeas

relief moot, because the ongoing collateral consequences of a wrongful

conviction, such as the possible enhancement of a later criminal sentence on

the basis of the earlier wrongful conviction, satisfy the case-or-controversy

jurisdictional requirement”); McCray v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t_ of Corr., 2022 WL

3536719, at *1 (11th Cir. 2022) (petitioner’s appeal of the denial of his § 2254

petition was not “rendered moot by his release from incarceration because he

challenges the validity of his conviction, and thus we presume that he is

subject to collateral legal consequences.”).

B. Merits

. 1. Ground One

As Ground One, Griffin asserts his counsel rendered ineffective

assistance and committed fundamental error when she failed to pursue a

8 According to the Alachua County Sheriffs Office website, the Gainesville

Police Department arrested Griffin on April 19, 20238. See

https://asosite.alachuasheriff.org/ASOInmateLookup.aspx (last visited Mar. 15,

2024). Griffin is currently confined at the Alachua County Jail awaiting resolution

of an aggravated battery charge. See State v. Griffin, No. 01-2023-CF-001221A (Fla.

8th Cir. Ct. April 19, 2023). The Court notes that in Griffin's pending criminal

proceeding, the State has designated Griffin as a prison release reoffender and filed

a notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties if Griffin is convicted. Id. (Notice filed

Jan. 26, 2024).

17

motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). See

Amended Petition at 5.

To the extent Griffin asserts fundamental error in connection with his

counsel’s failure to file a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion, his claim is unexhausted

because he failed to raise it in his direct appeal. Since future attempts to

exhaust the claim would be futile, it is procedurally defaulted.® Griffin has

not shown either cause excusing the default or actual prejudice resulting

from the bar. Moreover, he has failed to identify any fact warranting the

application of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. Therefore, to

the extent Griffin asserts a fundamental error claim in Ground One, it is due

to be denied.

To the extent Griffin argues his counsel was ineffective for not

pursuing a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion, the record reflects that Griffin raised a

substantially similar claim in his pro se brief on direct appeal. See Doc. 13-15

at 7-8. The First DCA affirmed Griffin’s conviction and sentence without a

written opinion. See Doc. 13-16 at 1. The Court addresses the claim under the

deferential standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. In

° As more than two years have elapsed since judgment was entered, Griffin

cannot present the claim in a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for

postconviction relief. See Kimbrough v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 809 F. App’x 684,

692 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that a Rule 3.850 motion must be filed within two years

of the criminal judgment “unless the motion alleges that the facts on which the

claims for relief are predicated could not have been discovered earlier by the

exercise of due diligence.” (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1)).

18

doing so, the Court notes that there is a strong presumption in favor of an

attorney's competence when evaluating the performance prong of the

Strickland ineffectiveness inquiry. See Anderson v, Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

752 F.3d 881, 904 (11th Cir. 2014). The inquiry is “whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Notably,

the test for ineffectiveness is neither whether counsel could have done more

nor whether the best criminal defense attorneys might have done more; in

retrospect, one may always identify shortcomings. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d

1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that “perfection is not the standard of

effective assistance”) (quotations omitted). Instead, the test is whether what

counsel did was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1164 (quotations and citation omitted); Dingle v. Sec’y for

Dep’t of Corr., 480 F.8d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The question is whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted as defense counsel acted

in the trial at issue and not what ‘most good lawyers’ would have done.”)

(citation omitted).

Here, the Court finds defense counsel acted within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance when she determined there was no basis

to file a pretrial motion to dismiss. See Doc. 13-6 at 3-4. Rule 3.190(c)(4)

permits a defendant to move to dismiss a charge when “[t]here are no

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material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima

facie case of guilt against the defendant.” Griffin’s arguments, both in the

state court proceedings and in his Amended Petition, plainly demonstrate the

existence of material disputed facts. Griffin asserts the depositions of the

victim and the arresting officers were contrary to the arrest report. Griffin

also references an affidavit that he prepared and filed shortly after his arrest.

In his affidavit, Griffin alleged facts that he argued supported a finding that

he committed no crime in Columbia County. See Doc. 13-3 at 1-2. Griffin also

argued in the state court proceedings that depositions had been “tampered

with” and that the State’s witnesses, including the victim, had “changed their

story from what the arrest report says.” Doc. 13-5 at 12-13. Thus, even if

defense counsel had filed a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss, the trial court

would have denied the motion. As such, defense counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion. See Brownlee v. Haley, 306

F.3d 1043, 1066 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that counsel was not ineffective for

failing to raise issues that lacked merit).

Upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law, the Court

concludes that the state court’s decision to deny Griffin’s ineffective

assistance claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

Strickland, and it was not based on an unreasonable determination of the

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facts given the evidence presented to the state court. Accordingly, Griffin is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on Ground One.

2. Ground Two

As Ground Two, Griffin argues the trial court committed fundamental

error when it failed to address his contention that the body camera footage

“prove[d] no crime occured [sic] in Lake City, [Florida].” See Amended

Petition at 7. Initially, the Court determines that Griffin has failed to present

a federal claim in Ground Two. See Estelle vy. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)

(stating that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law”).

Even if Griffin presented a federal constitutional challenge in Ground

Two, the claim is procedurally barred because Griffin did not present the

federal nature of this claim to the state court. The record reflects that Griffin

raised a substantially similar claim in his pro se brief on direct appeal. See

Doc. 13-15 at 8. In his brief, Griffin framed his argument solely in terms of

fundamental error, which is a question of state law. See Pinkney v. Sec’y,

Dept. of Corr., 876 F.3d 1290, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017). Although Griffin

referenced the Sixth Amendment in passing, he did not articulate and fairly

present a federal constitutional claim. See Kelley v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 377

F.3d 1317, 1345 (11th Cir. 2004) (a petitioner cannot “scatter some makeshift

needles in the haystack of the state court record. The ground relied upon

must be presented face-up and squarely; the federal question must be plainly

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defined. Oblique references which hint that a theory may be lurking in the

woodwork will not turn the trick.”); French v. Warden, Wilcox State Prison,

790 F.3d 1259, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015) (reference to the Sixth Amendment in a

passing citation was insufficient to alert the state court to the presence of a

federal claim). Therefore, to the extent Griffin now raises a federal claim, the

Court finds he failed to fairly present a federal claim to the state court, which

deprived the state court of a meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. Since future attempts to exhaust this claim would be

futile, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Griffin has alleged neither cause

and prejudice nor a miscarriage of justice to overcome his failure to exhaust.

As such, the claim in Ground Two is due to be denied.

3. Ground Three

As Ground Three, Griffin argues the trial court committed fundamental

error when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. See Amended

Petition at 8. As in Ground Two, Griffin does not present a federal claim in

Ground Three. A claim that does not allege a federal constitutional violation

is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Branan v. Booth, 861

F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[A] habeas petition grounded on issues of

state law provides no basis for habeas relief.”).

Even if Griffin presented a federal constitutional challenge in Ground

Three, the claim is unexhausted because Griffin did not present the federal

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nature of his claim to the state court. The record reflects that Griffin raised a

substantially similar claim in his pro se brief on direct appeal. See Doc. 13-15

at 9. Griffin did not present any federal constitutional grounds in support of

this claim on direct appeal. Instead, he relied on the record evidence in

arguing that the trial court fundamentally erred when it denied his motion

for judgment of acquittal. As stated in Ground Two, fundamental error is a

state law issue. See Pinkney, 876 F.3d at 1299. Therefore, even assuming

Griffin now raises a federal claim, the Court finds he failed to fairly present a

federal claim to the state court, which deprived the state court of a

meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29.

Since future attempts to exhaust this claim would be futile, the claim is

procedurally defaulted. Griffin has alleged neither cause and prejudice nor a

miscarriage of justice to overcome his failure to exhaust. As such, the claim is

procedurally barred.

Alternatively, even if the claim in Ground Three was properly before

the Court, the claim lacks merit. “A judgment of acquittal should only be

granted when the jury cannot reasonably view the evidence in any manner

favorable to the opposing party.” See Criner v. State, 943 So. 2d 224, 225

(Fla. Ist DCA 2006). Here, the evidence supported the trial court’s denial of

Griffin’s motion for judgment of acquittal. At trial, the victim testified that

Griffin forced her to drive across multiple counties after they left a casino in

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Jacksonville. See Doc. 13-7 at 33-38. He struck her multiple times on her

head, face, neck, and stomach. Id. Griffin also made verbal threats and at one

point, threatened the victim by holding a box cutter against her throat. Id. at

35-36. The victim testified Griffin forced her to keep the vehicle “in drive with

[her] foot on the brake while he... punched” her. Id. at 37-38. Eventually,

Griffin began driving because the victim could no longer see from her swollen

right eye. Id. The victim testified that Griffin repeatedly refused to take her

home and only let her out of the vehicle to relieve herself on the side of the

road or in the bushes. Id. at 46-48, 50. Even after Griffin parked the vehicle

and fell asleep, the victim testified she was was afraid to leave the vehicle

because he woke up every time she moved. Id. at 50-52. Griffin also took the

victim’s cell phone; she testified she was only able to retrieve it the next

morning after Griffin left the phone in the car when he went inside a store.

Id. at 54-56. After the victim called 911, law enforcement officers arrived on

the scene and found the victim in the backseat of the car. Id. at 57. In

addition to the victim’s testimony, the State also presented the arresting

officers’ testimony and physical evidence consisting of photographs of the

victim’s injuries, the box cutter, and a belt cam recording.

The foregoing evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury.

Although Griffin argues there was conflicting evidence, the existence of

contradictory, conflicting testimony or evidence “does not warrant a judgment

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of acquittal because the weight of the evidence and the witnesses’ credibility

are questions solely for the jury.” Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 508

(Fla. 2005). Accordingly, Griffin is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

claim raised in Ground Three.

4. Ground Four

As Ground Four, Griffin asserts his trial counsel was ineffective when

she failed to impeach the State’s witnesses regarding inconsistencies between

their trial testimony, the arrest report, and their prior depositions. See

Amended Petition at 10. Griffin maintains the State’s witnesses should have

been charged with perjury because they “recant[ed]” their stories at trial. Id.

Griffin also asserts the trial court fundamentally erred when it overlooked

the allegedly perjured testimony. Id. Griffin raised substantially similar

arguments in his pro se brief on direct appeal. See Doc. 13-15 at 9-11.

Insofar as Griffin asserts a fundamental error claim in Ground Four, he

failed to present the federal nature of this claim to the state court as he only

addressed the claim in terms of state law. See Pinkney, 876 F.3d at 1299.

Because Griffin failed to present the federal nature of this claim to the state

court, the claim is procedurally barred on federal habeas review. Griffin fails

to show cause or prejudice to excuse the bar. He also has not shown a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. As such, his fundamental error claim in

Ground Four is due to be denied.

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As to Griffin’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, the record

reflects that he raised the claim in his pro se brief on direct appeal. See Doc.

13-15 at 9-11. The First DCA per curiam affirmed Griffin’s judgment and

sentence. See Doc. 13-16. The Court addresses this claim in accordance with

the deferential standard for federal court review of state court adjudications.

Upon thorough review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s

adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the state court’s

adjudication based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Thus, Griffin is not

entitled to relief on the basis of the ineffectiveness claim.

Nevertheless, even if the state court’s adjudication of the claim is not

entitled to deference, Griffin’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit because

the record supports the state court’s conclusion. Griffin’s trial counsel

extensively cross-examined the victim, see Doc. 13-7 at 60-68, and the

arresting officer, id. at 92-96. During her closing argument, defense counsel

asserted that the victim lied to officers in order to “set up” Griffin because she

was jealous. Id. at 133, 136-39. Defense counsel also pointed out conflicts in

the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 136-39. Griffin has failed to carry his

burden of showing that his counsel’s representation fell outside the range of

reasonably professional assistance. Even assuming arguendo deficient

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performance by defense counsel, Griffin has not shown any resulting

prejudice. He has not shown that a reasonable probability exists that the

outcome of the case would have been different if counsel had acted as Griffin

claims she should have. As such, Griffin’s ineffectiveness claim in Ground

Four is denied.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The Amended Petition (Doc. 4) is DENIED, and this action is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment denying the

Amended Petition and dismissing this case with prejudice.

3. If Griffin appeals the denial of the Amended Petition, the Court

denies a certificate of appealability.10 Because the Court has determined that

a certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from

the pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that

10 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner

makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Griffin “must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U-S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were

‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (19838)).

Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a certificate of appealability.

27

may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the

motion.

4, The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and terminate

any pending motions.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, F lorida, this Za OG day of

March, 2024.

H EY E. INGER

ited Sta’ District Judge

Jax-10 3/19

C: Clarence Griffin, #P80755

Counsel of Record

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