“Section 1997e(e), however, bars any claim seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress suffered while in custody.”
How later courts described this case
- “Section 1997e(e), however, bars any claim seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress suffered while in custody.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JOHNNY HOFFSTETTER,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 8:24-cv-395-SDM-CPT
MANATEE COUNTY JAIL TRINITY
CANTEEN,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
Hoffstetter, a pre-trial detainee, alleges that the defendant is violating his civil
rights by charging high prices for the items sold to the detainees. An earlier order
(Doc. 3) grants Hoffstetter leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires dismissal of an in forma pauperis prisoner’s case “if the
allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the case “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Although the complaint is entitled
to a generous interpretation, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam), this pro se
complaint lacks merit under this standard.
Hoffstetter alleges that the Manatee County jail “is price gouging on these
canteen prices.” (Doc. 1 at 3) Consequently, Hoffstetter’s claim is properly construed
as a Fourteenth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of his confinement as a
pretrial detainee. But the Due Process Clause creates no prohibition against merely
uncomfortable conditions and inconvenient restrictions. “[I]f a particular condition or
restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
535, 539 (1979). District courts throughout the Eleventh Circuit hold that allegedly
high prices charged by a jail’s canteen present no constitutional violation. See, e.g., Ray
v. Florida, No. 2:23-cv-770-JES-NPM, 2024 WL 22066 at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2024)
(“[C]laims regarding prison or jail canteen prices do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.”) (unpublished); Ferguson v. Thomas, No. 5:14-cv-02396-RDP-
JHE, 2016 WL 3774126, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Jun. 20, 2016) (“Claims concerning canteen
prices do not [state a § 1983 claim] because prisoners have no right to use of a prison
commissary.”) (unpublished); Munson v. Wilcher, No. 4:19-CV-58, 2019 WL 2339264, at
*3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2019) (recognizing that the “Constitution does not guarantee fair
prices at the commissary”) (unpublished); Black v. Donald, No. 7:06-CV-75-HL, 2006
WL 3535404, *2 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2006) (“The United States Constitution does not
guarantee fair prices at the commissary.”) (unpublished).
Hoffstetter requests $500,000 in damages for “mental health anguish [and] in fear
of retaliation . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 5) Hoffstetter cannot recover compensatory damages
because an actual physical injury is required under the PLRA, which under
Section 1997e(e) states, “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined
in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury . . . .” As explained in
Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2002),
“Ti]n order to avoid dismissal under § 1997e(e), a prisoner’s claims for emotional or
mental injury must be accompanied by allegations of physical injuries that are greater
than de minimis.” See also Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Section
1997e(e), however, bars any claim seeking compensatory damages for emotional
distress suffered while in custody.”). Because Hoffstetter alleges no actual injury, the
complaint fails to allege a basis for recovering compensatory damages.
As shown above, Hoffstetter fails to state a clatm upon which relief can be
granted. Amendment of the action would prove futile because Hoffstetter can state no
valid Section 1983 claim for relief. See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir.
2001) (“A district court need not, however, allow an amendment (1) where there has
been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment would cause undue
prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment would be futile.”).
The complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failing to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The clerk must enter a judgment of
dismissal against Hoffstetter and CLOSE this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 7, 2024.
Asdonnaging
STEVEN D. MERRYDAY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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