The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER LORCH,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-18-SPC-KCD
WILLIAMS, ROOKS, POLK,
HUNT, CARDENAZ, COURTNEY
JONES, JON CARNER and
RECOVERY SOLUTIONS,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Christopher Lorch’s Complaint (Doc. 1).
United States Magistrate Judge Kyle Dudek granted Lorch leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, so the Court must review the Complaint to determine if it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages from
anyone immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Lorch is an involuntarily committed resident of the Florida Civil
Commitment Center (FCCC). He sues several FCCC employees under 42
U.S.C. §1983, which authorizes civil-rights actions against state officials. To
state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff first must allege a violation of
a right secured by the Constitution or under the laws of the United States; and
second, allege that the deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Arrington v.
Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998).
Lorch’s claims stem from his interactions with Defendant Williams,
which Lorch characterizes as psychological abuse. According to the Complaint,
Williams goads Lorch, talks and flirts with other residents in front of Lorch,
and violates facility rules just to show Lorch that she can. Lorch has
repeatedly reported Williams’ conduct to Defendant Rooks. On September 6,
2023, Rooks scolded Williams. Williams then threatened Lorch, triggering a
mental health crisis that resulted in three behavioral management reports
(BMRs)—Defendant Hunt wrote one for insolence or disrespect, Defendant
Cardenas wrote one for disorderly conduct, and Defendant Polk wrote one for
a gestured or spoken threat. On September 13, 2023, a multidisciplinary board
including Defendant Courtney Jones substantiated all three BMRs. As a
result, Lorch lost his job and his care level, potentially delaying his release
from the FCCC. Jones did nothing to stop Williams’ allegedly abusive conduct.
Lorch appealed the board’s substantiation of the BMRs. Defendant Jon
Carner—the FCCC’s facility administrator—denied the appeal. Lorch also
unsuccessfully appealed the decision to corporate decision makers of an entity
he calls Recovery Solutions.
Lorch also makes two unrelated allegations. On November 9, 2023,
Jones came to Lorch’s dorm accompanied by security officers. Lorch
complained about being housed with a particular resident, and Jones told him
to deal with it or go to confinement. Also on November 9, 2023, Carner told a
resident about “sending 6 hits on residents.” (Doc. 1 at 14). Neither of these
allegations has any apparent relationship with the rest of Lorch’s Complaint,
and they are far too vague to be actionable on their own, so the Court will not
consider them in its analysis.
Lorch’s Complaint does not state a plausible claim. The precise legal
nature of this action is unclear. In the “Nature of Suit” section of the
Complaint, Lorch wrote “8th amendment violation cruel & unusual
punishment. Deliberate indifference.” (Doc. 1 at 8). The Eighth Amendment
does not apply to the civilly committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
is relevant here. The Supreme Court held in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307 (1982) that “the involuntarily committed have liberty interests under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe conditions
of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such
minimally adequate training as might be required to ensure safety and
freedom from restraint.” Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860, 862-63 (11th
Cir. 2006).
The due process rights of the civilly committed are at least as extensive
as the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners, so Eighth Amendment case law
“also serves to set forth the contours of the due process rights of the civilly
committed.” Id. (quoting Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir.
1996)). Thus, FCCC residents can rely on a “deliberate indifference”
framework to make a claim. But Lorch does not allege any conduct that could
support a deliberate indifference claim. To establish deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must allege, among other things, a risk of serious harm. Ray v. Foltz,
370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004). Lorch does not allege he faced a risk of
serious harm, so he has not stated a plausible claim of deliberate indifference.
The real thrust of Lorch’s claims is the reduction of his care level, which
could delay his release from the FCCC. The reduction resulted from the
substantiation of three BMRs. Lorch does not deny the truth of the BMRs. He
does allege one of the decision-makers—Jones—had a conflict of interest, but
that claim is barred by the Heck1 doctrine. See Hall v. Profert, No. 22-12184,
2023 WL 6274833, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 26, 2023) (applying Heck to FCCC
residents). Lorch cannot pursue a claim that would imply the BMR hearing
was invalid until the result of the hearing is overturned. Id. Lorch’s appeals
were rejected, so Heck bars his attack on the BMR hearing.
Lorch does not state a § 1983 claim under any theory the Court can
reasonably apply to his Complaint, so the Court will dismiss it and give Lorch
a chance to amend.
1 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Christopher Lorch’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without
prejudice. Lorch may file an amended complaint by March 14, 2024.
Otherwise, the Court will enter judgment and close this case without
further notice.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 22, 2024.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record