Woods v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CARL EZEKIEL WOODS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-316-TJC-LLL

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action

through counsel by filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1). He also filed a counseled Memorandum of Law in Support of

his Petition (Doc. 4). Petitioner challenges a state court (Duval County, Florida)

judgment of conviction for first degree murder, armed robbery, and armed

burglary. See id. at 1. Petitioner is serving life imprisonment. Respondents filed

a Response (Doc. 11; Response) with exhibits (Docs. 11-1 to 11-17; Ex.).

Petitioner filed a Notice, through counsel, indicating that he would not file a

reply (Doc. 13). This case is ripe for review.1

1 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need

for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure

that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in

the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.

(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See

Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The

state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s

decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,

(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th

Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must

consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s

factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the

record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,

a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that

“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is

unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that

does provide a relevant rationale. It should then

presume that the unexplained decision adopted the

same reasoning. But the State may rebut the

presumption by showing that the unexplained

affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as

alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or

argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the

record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted

“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for

evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears

repeating that even a strong case for relief does not

mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has

repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an

unreasonable application of law requires more than

mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear

error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal

citations modified).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254

habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court

remedies available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present[]”

every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on

direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351

(1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state prisoners

must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional

issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Pope

v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting “that Boerckel applies to the

state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.”).

In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state

prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the

“‘“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.’” Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d

865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404

U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To

provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,” the

prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each

appropriate state court (including a state supreme

court with powers of discretionary review), thereby

alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.

Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O’Sullivan

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144

L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies

results in a procedural default which raises a potential bar to federal habeas

review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of

procedural default as follows:

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality

of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided

by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments

are accorded the finality and respect necessary to

preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our

system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine

of procedural default, under which a federal court will

not review the merits of claims, including

constitutional claims, that a state court declined to

hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,[2] supra, at 747–

748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[3] supra, at 84–85, 97 S. Ct.

2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural rule to

deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the

claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural

rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the

judgment and the rule is firmly established and

consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562

U.S. --, --, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62

(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. --, --, 130 S. Ct. 612,

617–618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring

procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not

without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal

review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the

default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.

See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may be

excused under certain circumstances. Even though a claim has been

procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state

habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the

default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d

1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). For a petitioner to establish cause and prejudice,

the procedural default “must result from some objective

factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from

raising the claim and which cannot be fairly

attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v. Newsome,

2 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).

3 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Carrier,

477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[4] Under the prejudice

prong, [a petitioner] must show that “the errors at trial

actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense

so that he was denied fundamental fairness.” Id. at

1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).

Without a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may receive

consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner

can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the continued

incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would result. The

Eleventh Circuit has explained:

[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, there

remains yet another avenue for him to receive

consideration on the merits of his procedurally

defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of

a showing of cause for the procedural default.” Carrier,

477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This exception is

exceedingly narrow in scope,” however, and requires

proof of actual innocence, not just legal innocence.

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.

2001).

Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that it

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’ of

the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.

4 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).

2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be

credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not

presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,

allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513

U.S. at 324.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)

(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a

person must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of

reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the

Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.

2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to

show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance

prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id.

(citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in

Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should

be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.

Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state

court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether

that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If

there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court

decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s

representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is

combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling

on counsel’s performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc)

(Jordan, J., concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir.

2004).

III. Analysis

A. Ground One

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the standard jury instructions on stand your ground and for failing to request

a special jury instruction concerning common law self-defense and the duty to

retreat for an individual engaged in unlawful activity. Doc. 1 at 5. Petitioner

explains that because he was participating in an unlawful activity (a drug

transaction) at the time deadly force was used, the standard jury instruction on

stand your ground did not apply and counsel should have requested a special

jury instruction concerning common law self-defense. Doc. 4 at 18.

Petitioner, through counsel, raised this claim in his postconviction motion

filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The state court held

an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied the claim, reasoning as follows:

In Ground One of his motion, Defendant argues

his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to

move for a common law self-defense jury instruction.

The common law self-defense jury instruction that

Defendant contends his attorney should have

requested reads:

If you find the defendant was

engaging in an unlawful activity or was

attacked in a place where he did not have

the right to be, then you must consider if

the defendant had a duty to retreat. If the

defendant was in a position of imminent

death or great bodily harm and it would

have increased his own danger to retreat,

then his use of force likely to cause death

or great bodily harm was justifiable.

The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree

murder, as charged in the indictment. In addition, the

jury made special findings concerning the nature of

the murder. The jury found both that Defendant’s

killing of the victim was premeditated and that the

killing was done during the commission of a burglary

or robbery. The jury’s finding that Defendant

committed premediated murder belies any claim that

Defendant’s proposed common law self-defense jury

instruction would have changed the outcome of

Defendant’s case. Simply stated, there is no way to

reconcile a finding of premeditation with a finding of

justifiable self-defense. “Premeditation” requires a

finding that a defendant had “intent before the act,”

i.e., “a fully formed purpose to kill, with enough time

for thought . . . .” Powell v. State, 112 So. 608, 610

(Fla. 1927). Even if the jury was equipped with

Defendant’s proposed instruction, it follows a fortiori

that the jury would not have found Defendant acted

in self-defense because the jury found that Defendant

acted with a fully formed, pre-existing intent to kill

the victim. As such, Defendant cannot prove prejudice

as required by Strickland. Accordingly, this Court

denies Ground One of Defendant’s motion.

Ex. H at 106-07 (internal record citations omitted and citations modified).

Through counsel, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion.

Petitioner filed an initial brief, Ex. I, the state filed a response, Ex. J, and

Petitioner filed a counseled reply, Ex. K. The First District Court of Appeal

affirmed the denial and issued the following written opinion:

Carl Woods appeals the trial court’s denial of his

motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary

hearing. He presents three arguments, all relating to

jury instructions he claims his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to request. We affirm and write

only to address the first argument: whether trial

defense counsel should have requested a jury

instruction on common law self-defense.

. . .

After a 2016 jury trial, Woods was found guilty

and convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery,

and armed burglary. The convictions stemmed from an

incident that Woods testified was a drug deal gone

bad.

Woods claimed he was the middleman between

Rolando Valencia, a drug dealer, and his roommate

Xavier Davis. He testified the drug transaction was to

take place in Valencia’s apartment. When they

arrived, Woods introduced Valencia and Davis. Then,

inexplicably, after a “split second” Valencia and Davis

became engaged in a violent physical encounter.

Furniture was knocked over and Woods saw Valencia

and Davis with guns out trying to shoot one another.

Woods testified this turn of events was unexpected and

he was only trying to watch Valencia’s television. But

because the other two were attempting to shoot one

another, Woods thought it best to approach them in an

effort to break up the fight. Shots rang out and Woods

believed he had been struck by a bullet.[FN1] Though

he had not anticipated a firefight, he had indeed

brought along his own firearm. He did not know who

shot him. Nevertheless, Woods testified he drew his

firearm, approached Valencia who was up against a

wall in a corner of the room fending off an attacking

Davis, reached around Davis who was standing

between them, pressed the barrel of his gun against

Valencia and pulled the trigger—in self-defense. Davis

and Woods then fled the scene together. Neither called

to report the incident. To avoid disclosing his

involvement by going to a hospital, Woods stated he

had a friend remove the bullet from his leg.[FN2]

FN1. Woods later testified he was not sure

if he had been struck by a bullet.

FN2. Woods showed the jury a mark on his

leg and testified it was the location of his

injury.

Woods acknowledged he was engaged in

criminal activity—facilitating the purchase and sale of

illicit drugs—when he shot Valencia. The State sought

to disprove the self-defense claim and put on strong

circumstantial evidence that Woods intended to rob

and murder Valencia.

The jury found Woods guilty on all three

charges. On the murder charge, it found him guilty on

theories of premeditation and felony murder. It found

Woods committed the murder during the commission

of a burglary or robbery. It found Woods guilty of

burglary, necessarily finding Woods entered

Valencia’s apartment or remained therein with

criminal intent to commit another offense. It also

found Woods guilty of robbery, that he carried a

firearm while committing the offense, and that he

discharged the firearm during the commission of the

robbery causing death or great bodily harm. Woods

appealed his convictions and they were affirmed by

this Court. He subsequently filed a postconviction

motion.

. . .

In his postconviction motion, Woods claimed his

trial defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to request a jury instruction on common law

self-defense as it pertains to a person engaged in an

unlawful activity. This instruction can be given when

a defendant admits being engaged in unlawful activity

but is forced to act in self-defense. Dorsey v. State, 74

So. 3d 521, 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“[W]here, as here,

a defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity or

was in a place where he did not have a right to be at

the time he was attacked, the common law duty to

retreat still applies.”). Florida abrogated the common

law duty to retreat in all circumstances except when

engaged in unlawful activity. Id. at 526 (“Section

776.013 thus altered the law so that now there is ‘no

duty to retreat’ under a broad array of

circumstances.”). In such a case a defendant is entitled

to, upon request, the common law instruction which

includes a duty to retreat unless one cannot safely do

so. Id.

Because Woods admitted to being engaged in

unlawful activity, he argued this instruction should

have been given. And he argues because it was not

given, even if the jury believed his account, an

acquittal was extremely unlikely because the

instruction given conveys the impression deadly force

can only be used when in a lawful position.

The postconviction court denied the claim. It

found that because the jury determined the murder

was premeditated, Woods’ self-defense claim was

necessarily rejected and he could not show prejudice

from the error. This appeal followed. We affirm, but on

different grounds.

. . .

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.

Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), governs ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. “The defendant must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

Even if Woods was entitled to the common law

self-defense instruction, a conclusion we need not

reach, his claim fails because he cannot demonstrate

prejudice. See Boone v. State, - - - So.3d - - - , 2020 WL

4524638, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1869 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug.

6, 2020) (denying relief after finding the jury

instruction the defendant argued his counsel should

have requested would not have changed the outcome

of the proceeding); Martinez v. State, 655 So. 2d 166,

169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“The question for our review

is whether his counsel’s failure to request that

instruction was so prejudicial that had the request

been made the outcome of the trial would have been

different.”). The jury found Woods guilty of robbery

and, therefore, found Woods had criminal intent to use

force in furtherance of an unlawful taking. There was

an express finding that Woods carried a firearm and

shot Valencia during the commission of the robbery.

That is, the jury found Woods shot Valencia as part of

his commission of a robbery and not in self-defense.

There is no reasonable probability the jury accepted

his account of self-defense but, due to the jury

instructions, felt compelled to find him guilty of

murder.

Ex. L; Woods v. State, 306 So. 3d 1236, 1236-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential

standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough

review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Nor was the state court’s adjudication based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the

state court proceedings. As such, Ground One is denied.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

request the use of the standard jury instruction on the taking of property

occurring as an afterthought to the use of force or violence against the victim.

Doc. 1 at 7. He contends that this standard instruction was central to his

defense and without it, “the remaining robbery instructions that were given to

the jury did not adequately explain that a jury could not convict Woods if it

determined the taking of the property occurred as an afterthought to the use of

force or violence against [the victim].” Doc. 4 at 23.

Petitioner, through counsel, raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion.

The state court held an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied the claim,

reasoning as follows:

In Ground Two of his motion, Defendant argues

his attorney was ineffective for failing to move for an

afterthought jury instruction. Defendant contends this

jury instruction would have resulted in the jury

finding Defendant not guilty of robbery (Count Two).

The record demonstrates that Defendant’s attorney

was not deficient in failing to move for an afterthought

instruction. Additionally, the record shows that even

if Defendant’s attorney had moved for and received

such an instruction, the jury’s verdicts would not have

changed.

The afterthought jury instruction provides: “If

you find that the taking of property occurred as an

afterthought to the use of force or violence against the

victim, the taking does not constitute robbery but may

still constitute theft.” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.)

15.1; see also DeJesus v. State, 98 So. 3d 105 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2012).

Defendant testified at trial. Defendant testified

that he did not take anything from the victim’s

apartment. Defendant further testified that he did not

learn that his associate, Xavier “Shaun” Davis, took

anything from the victim’s apartment until later that

night. Defendant denied that he and Davis had any

common design to rob the victim. Defendant also

denied that he had anything to do with the taking of

the victim’s money.

Here, it is plain that the standard jury

instruction on robbery adequately covered the theory

of defense. Defendant did not contend that he took the

victim’s property as an afterthought to the use of force.

Instead, Defendant claimed he did not take anything

from the victim’s apartment. Believing Defendant’s

version of events would not have necessitated finding

Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of theft,

but would have instead necessitated finding

Defendant not guilty of either robbery or the lesser-

included offense of theft. Defendant’s trial testimony,

in which Defendant maintained actual innocence of

robbery, rendered an afterthought instruction

inapplicable. It is obvious that Defendant’s attorney

did not perform deficiently in failing to move for an

afterthought instruction when such an instruction

would have been fundamentally incompatible with

Defendant’s trial testimony. See Rigternick v. State,

193 So. 3d 846, 868 (Fla. 2016) (holding that defense

counsel was not ineffective for failing to present

evidence which contradicted the defendant’s trial

testimony).

Moreover, the jury’s premeditation finding in

Count One undermines any contention that the jury

would have found Defendant not guilty of robbery if

they received an afterthought instruction. The State

presented ample evidence at trial that Defendant’s

motive in murdering the victim was to steal a large

shipment of high quality marijuana from the victim.

The jury’s finding that Defendant committed

premeditated murder proves the jury simply did not

believe Defendant’s “drug deal gone bad” version of

events. Accordingly, it is clear the jury would not have

acquitted Defendant of robbery even if the trial court

gave the jury an afterthought instruction.

Because Defendant can demonstrate neither

deficiency nor prejudice as required under Strickland,

this Court denies Ground Two of Defendant’s motion.

Ex. H at 107-09 (internal record citations omitted).

Through counsel, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion.

Petitioner filed an initial brief, Ex. I, the state filed a response, Ex. J, and

Petitioner filed a counseled reply, Ex. K. The First DCA affirmed the denial of

this claim without comment. See Ex. L (affirming and writing only to address

the first argument set forth in Ground One above).

The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential

standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough

review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Nor was the state court’s adjudication based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the

state court proceedings. As such, Ground Two is denied.

C. Ground Three

According to Petitioner, his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

request the use of the standard jury instruction on an independent act. Doc. 1

at 8. He contends that without this standard instruction, “the remaining

instruction[s] given to the jury did not adequately explain that Woods could not

be convicted if the unlawful taking of property was outside of and not a

reasonably foreseeable consequence of the common design or unlawful act

contemplated.” Doc. 4 at 27.

Petitioner, through counsel, raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion.

The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing and then denied this

claim:

In Ground Three of his motion, Defendant

argues his attorney was ineffective for failing to

request the jury instruction regarding the

independent acts of another party. The independent

acts jury instruction in Defendant’s case would have

read:

If you find that the crimes alleged

were committed, an issue in this case is

whether the crimes of robbery and

burglary were independent[] acts of a

person other than the defendant. An

independent act occurs when a person

other than the defendant commits or

attempts to commit a crime

1. which the defendant did not

intend to occur, and

2. in which the defendant did not

participate, and

3. which was outside of and not a

reasonably foreseeable consequence of the

common design or unlawful act

contemplated by the defendant.

If you find the defendant was not

present when the crimes of robbery and

burglary occurred, that, in and of itself,

does not establish that the crimes of

robbery and burglary were independent

acts of another.

If you find that the crimes of robbery

and burglary were independent acts of

Xavier Davis, then you should find Carl

Woods not guilty of the crimes of robbery

and burglary.

See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(l).

At trial, the State presented overwhelming

evidence tending to show Defendant stole marijuana

and cash from the victim. On these facts, it is clear

that an independent act instruction was inapplicable.

See Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, 609 (Fla. 2000)

(“Where, however, the defendant was a willing

participant in the underlying felony and the murder

resulted from forces which [defendant and his

accomplice] set in motion, no independent act

instruction is appropriate.”). Indeed, the jury found

Defendant guilty of both premeditated murder and

felony murder, which demonstrates the jury’s ultimate

conclusion that Defendant traveled to the victim’s

home with the conscious intent to murder and steal

from the victim. As such, an independent act

instruction would not have made any difference in the

trial’s outcome.

Thus, the record shows that Defendant’s

attorney did not perform deficiently by failing to move

for an independent act instruction. Moreover, the

record further shows that even if the trial court had

given such an instruction, the jury’s verdicts would not

have changed. Accordingly, this Court denies Ground

Three of Defendant’s motion.

Ex. H. at 109-110 (internal record citations omitted).

Through counsel, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion.

Petitioner filed an initial brief, Ex. I, the state filed a response, Ex. J, and

Petitioner filed a counseled reply, Ex. K. The First DCA affirmed the denial of

this claim without comment. See Ex. L (affirming and writing only to address

the first argument set forth in Ground One above).

The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential

standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough

review of the record, the Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Nor was the state court’s adjudication based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the

state court proceedings. As such, Ground Three is denied.

D. Ground Four

Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s errors

rendered his trial unfair. Doc. 1 at 10. Petitioner raised this claim, through

counsel, in his Rule 3.850 motion. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on

the three ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the postconviction court

denied the cumulative error claim:

In Ground Four of his motion, Defendant asserts

cumulative error. However, “[c]laims of cumulative

error do not warrant relief where each claim of error is

either meritless, procedurally barred, or does not meet

the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 562

(Fla. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). As such,

Defendant’s cumulative error claim necessarily fails

and this Court denies Ground Four of Defendant’s

motion.

Ex. H at 110.

Through counsel, Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion.

Petitioner filed an initial brief, Ex. I, the state filed a response, Ex. J, and

Petitioner filed a counseled reply, Ex. K. The First DCA affirmed without

comment. See Ex. L (affirming and writing only to address the first argument

set forth in Ground One above).

The First DCA’s opinion did not acknowledge that Petitioner raised this

claim on appeal, even though it was included in his initial brief. See id. (“He

presents three arguments, all relating to jury instructions he claims his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to request.” (emphasis added)). Regardless,

assuming that cumulative error claims are cognizable on federal habeas review,

none of Petitioner’s individual ineffectiveness claims warrant relief; thus, there

is nothing to accumulate. See Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117,

1132 (11th Cir. 2012). Petitioner’s trial counsel’s alleged errors, neither

individually nor cumulatively, deprived him of a fair trial or due process. Thus,

considering the record, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on Ground Four.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED

with prejudice.

2. If Petitioner appeals, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.

Because the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not

warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any

motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such

termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.5

5 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To

make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration

of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20% day of

February, 2024.

. Cimelbeg □□ Corrig on

Ww TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

United States District Judge

JAX-3 2/8

C:

Carl Ezekiel Woods, #J50110

Counsel of Record

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