Scafidi v. B. Braun Medical, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

COURTNEY SCAFIDI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:22-cv-2772-VMC-TGW

B. BRAUN MEDICAL, INC.,

Defendant.

______________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant

B. Braun Medical, Inc.’s Omnibus Motion in Limine (Doc. #

76), filed on December 19, 2023. Plaintiff Courtney Scafidi

responded on January 9, 2024. (Doc. # 79). For the reasons

that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Legal Standard

“A motion in limine presents a pretrial issue of

admissibility of evidence that is likely to arise at trial,

and as such, the order, like any other interlocutory order,

remains subject to reconsideration by the court throughout

the trial.” In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06–

md–1769–ACC-DAB, 6:07–cv–15733–ACC-DAB, 2009 WL 260989, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). “The real purpose of a motion in

limine is to give the trial judge notice of the movant’s

position so as to avoid the introduction of damaging evidence

which may irretrievably [a]ffect the fairness of the trial.”

Id. (internal quotation omitted). “A court has the power to

exclude evidence in limine only when evidence is clearly

inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Id. (internal

quotation omitted).

“A motion in limine is not the proper vehicle to resolve

substantive issues, to test issues of law, or to address or

narrow the issues to be tried.” LSQ Funding Grp. v. EDS Field

Servs., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (citing

Royal Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 07–80172–

CIV, 2008 WL 2323900, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2008)). “Denial

of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all

evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted at

trial.” In re Seroquel, 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Instead, denial of the motion

means the court cannot determine whether the evidence in

question should be excluded outside the trial context.” Id.

“The court will entertain objections on individual proffers

as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls within

the scope of a denied motion in limine.” Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 401 defines “relevant

evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. All

relevant evidence is admissible unless “its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.

402, 403; United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1524 (11th

Cir. 1994). Use of Rule 403 to exclude relevant evidence is

an “extraordinary remedy” whose “major function . . . is

limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative

force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial

effect.” United States v. Grant, 256 F.3d 1146, 1155 (11th

Cir. 2001).

The district court has broad discretion to determine the

admissibility of evidence, and the appellate court will not

disturb this Court’s judgment absent a clear abuse of

discretion. United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th

Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273,

1285 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Inherent in this standard is the firm

recognition that there are difficult evidentiary rulings that

turn on matters uniquely within the purview of the district

court, which has first-hand access to documentary evidence

and is physically proximate to testifying witnesses and the

jury.”).

II. Discussion

In its Motion, Braun seeks to exclude nine categories of

evidence. The Court will address the various categories

separately.

A. Categories Seven through Nine

As a preliminary matter, Scafidi does not oppose the

Motion as to categories seven through nine because she “will

not seek to introduce evidence on those topics at trial.”

(Doc. # 79 at 1).

Thus, the Motion is granted as unopposed for the

following categories of evidence:

7. Testimony of Plaintiff’s pastor and parents

regarding any documents or notes prepared

concerning any counsel they provided Plaintiff;

8. Evidence and argument related to Plaintiff’s

causes of action for retaliation; and

9. Evidence about the existence of liability

insurance.

(Doc. # 76 at 2).

B. Vestal Recorded Video Conversation

Braun seeks to exclude a video “showing a conversation

between [Braun employee] Ms. Juliet Vestal and a non-customer

facing employee.” (Id. at 3). According to Braun, this video

should be excluded because it “(a) was unlawfully recorded

under Pennsylvania law, (b) is not relevant under Federal

Rule of Evidence 401, and (c) its probative value, if any, is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury under Rule

403.” (Id. at 4).

While there is a factual dispute as to whether the video

was lawfully recorded, the Court agrees with Braun that

exclusion of the video is proper. The video — which was

recorded after Scafidi’s termination — is irrelevant to the

issues in this case, given that Ms. Vestal was discussing

religious accommodations with a non-customer-facing employee.

(Id. at 4-6). Scafidi, however, was a customer-facing

employee who traveled to hospitals and other medical

facilities as part of her work. As such, she was subject to

Braun’s vaccine policy for customer-facing employees — not

its policy for non-customer-facing employees. Thus, the video

sheds no light on whether Braun offered Scafidi a reasonable

accommodation or whether giving Scafidi a blanket exemption

from the vaccine requirement for customer-facing employees

would have been an undue hardship. Furthermore, even if the

video had arguable relevance, there is a high risk that it

would confuse or mislead the jury about the issues in this

case such that the video is due to be excluded under Rule

403.

The Motion is granted as to the video.

C. Scafidi’s Job Performance

Next, Braun seeks to exclude any evidence or testimony

about Scafidi’s “favorable job performance” from trial as

irrelevant and a waste of time. (Id. at 7).

The evidence of Scafidi’s job performance appears

largely irrelevant to the claims of religious discrimination

given that Braun has already admitted that Scafidi’s

termination was unrelated to her job performance. (Id.).

Indeed, during her deposition, Scafidi also acknowledged that

her termination was unrelated to her performance. (Scafidi

Depo. at 74:1-3). Thus, evidence about Scafidi’s job

performance does nothing to establish any of the issues in

this case, such as whether Scafidi had a sincerely held

religious belief that conflicted with the vaccine

requirement, whether Braun offered Scafidi a reasonable

accommodation, or whether Braun would have suffered an undue

hardship if it had exempted Scafidi from the vaccine

requirement. Furthermore, Scafidi’s introduction of

significant evidence and testimony on this subject could

confuse or mislead the jury as to the actual legal and factual

issues to be decided in this case.

Nevertheless, the Court will not exclude this evidence

in its entirety at this time. So that she may tell her story

during trial, it is reasonable to allow Scafidi to briefly

touch upon her job performance while at Braun. However, the

Court warns that it will limit such testimony and evidence so

that the Court and the jury’s time is not wasted. The Motion

is denied without prejudice as to this category of evidence.

D. Braun’s Relative Wealth

Braun also seeks to preclude Scafidi “from submitting

evidence or making argument regarding [] Braun’s wealth,

size, finances, number of employees, or ability to pay.” (Doc.

# 76 at 9). It argues that its “size, finances, and/or ability

to pay is not relevant to the cause of action or defenses and

would only be used to prejudice the jury.” (Id.).

This request is denied without prejudice. As even Braun

acknowledges, Braun’s size and wealth are at least minimally

relevant to its undue burden defense. (Id.). Furthermore,

Scafidi is correct that “the financial size and condition of

[Braun] is relevant in proving punitive damages.” Lawson v.

KFH Indus., Inc., No. 1:09CV609-WHA, 2010 WL 11692214, at *1

(M.D. Ala. Aug. 18, 2010).

Still, the Court is mindful of the potential unfair

prejudice that focus on this evidence could create for Braun.

“[T]he relative wealth of the parties should not be the focus

of the trial, and to the extent [Scafidi] attempt[s] to

compare the parties’ wealth or size to make a ‘David and

Goliath’ argument, [Braun] may re-raise this objection at

trial.” Delta T, LLC v. Dan’s Fan City, Inc., No. 8:19-cv-

1731-VMC-SPF, 2021 WL 2159889, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2021)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

McHale v. Crown Equip. Corp., No. 8:19-cv-707-VMC-SPF, 2021

WL 4527509, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2021) (“Plaintiffs may

not make quintessential ‘David versus Goliath’ arguments, or

compare Crown to other corporations such as Enron.”), aff’d,

No. 21-14005, 2022 WL 4350702 (11th Cir. Sept. 20, 2022).

E. Other Employees’ Allegations of Discrimination

Next, Braun argues that “evidence of other individuals

who were denied accommodation requests, some of whom have

brought their own lawsuits against [] Braun,” should be

excluded from trial. (Doc. # 76 at 11). Among other things,

Braun insists such “me too” evidence of alleged religious

discrimination is irrelevant to Scafidi’s claims, presents

inadmissible hearsay, will waste limited trial time, and “its

admission will confuse the issues, mislead the jury and cause

unfair prejudice that outweighs any probative value under

Rule 403.” (Id. at 12-14). It emphasizes that Scafidi is

asserting only claims of religious discrimination; she is not

asserting a hostile work environment claim or a pattern and

practice-based claim.

“In cases alleging employment discrimination and

retaliation, ‘me too’ evidence involving claims made by other

employees may be properly admitted pursuant to Federal Rule

of Evidence 404(b) ‘to prove the defendant’s motive, . . .

intent, . . . [or] plan’ to discriminate against the

plaintiff.’” Hausburg v. McDonough, No. 8:20-cv-2300-JSS,

2024 WL 111994, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2024) (quoting

Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1286 (11th

Cir. 2008)). However, “courts are reluctant to consider

‘prior bad acts’ in this context where those acts do not

relate directly to the plaintiffs.” Denney v. City of Albany,

247 F.3d 1172, 1189 (11th Cir. 2001). “Even when ‘me too’

evidence is relevant under Rule 401, the district court

retains the discretion to exclude that evidence, under Rule

403, if it is unduly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or

cumulative.” Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240,

1258 (11th Cir. 2014).

“Determining whether Rule 404(b) or corroborative

evidence is admissible is a ‘fact-intensive, context-specific

inquiry’ that ‘rests within the sound discretion of the

district court[.]’” Hausburg, 2024 WL 111994, at *2 (quoting

Adams, 754 F.3d at 1258). “Courts generally admit only that

corroborative evidence that ‘closely compares’ with the

circumstances alleged by the plaintiff.” Id.

The Court is hesitant to allow admission of “me too”

evidence here given its limited relevance and the high risk

of undue prejudice and confusing the jury. Nevertheless, the

Court denies the Motion without prejudice at this time because

it is unclear what witnesses would present this “me too”

evidence or whether their experiences closely compare to

Scafidi’s. At trial, when it becomes clear what evidence

Scafidi intends to introduce, Braun may raise its objections

again.

F. Scafidi’s Physical Ailments

Braun “anticipates that Scafidi will testify that she

suffered two ‘stroke like type episodes’ because of her

separation from [] Braun in an attempt to bolster her non-

economic damages.” (Doc. # 76 at 14). Braun contends that

this testimony “should be excluded as inadmissible lay

opinion evidence that is unsupported by any medical

evidence.” (Id.). Indeed, Scafidi testified during her

deposition that these episodes had not been diagnosed as a

stroke by a doctor. (Scafidi Depo. at 232:24-238:19).

In this case, Scafidi seeks, among other things,

compensatory damages for emotional distress. “[A]lthough a

plaintiff’s testimony, standing alone, can support an award

of compensatory damages for emotional distress . . . , the

testimony must establish that the plaintiff suffered

demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently

articulated.” Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408

F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Scafidi “need not provide expert

testimony or abundant corroborating evidence of emotional

distress.” Ramones v. Experian Info. Sols., LLC, No. 19-

62949-CIV, 2021 WL 4050874, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2021).

Her “testimony alone can be sufficient” to establish

emotional distress. Id.

That said, a stroke is not emotional distress. Rather,

it is a medical event that requires a medical diagnosis — not

merely a plaintiff’s speculation that she suffered a stroke.

See Wingster v. Head, 318 F. App’x 809, 814 (11th Cir. 2009)

(stating that it was “clear that the cause of Haynes’s

aneurysm was a medical causation issue beyond the scope of a

layperson’s knowledge that required competent medical

testimony”). While Scafidi certainly may testify about any

emotional anguish, anxiety, and depression she experienced

after her termination, she may not testify that she suffered

a stroke or “stroke-like episode.” Again, as she admitted in

her deposition, the “stroke-like episodes” she suffered have

not been medically diagnosed as strokes. Nor does Scafidi

have other medical expert testimony to present at trial to

that effect.

Thus, the Motion is granted to the extent that Scafidi

may not testify that she suffered a stroke or “stroke-like

episode.” This ruling does not prevent her from testifying as

to the emotional distress she experienced.

G. Opinion Testimony about Braun’s Motives

Finally, Braun seeks to exclude “argument and testimony

related to non-decision makers’ opinions regarding [] Braun’s

motives for implementing its COVID-19 vaccine policy and its

actions towards Scafidi.” (Doc. # 76 at 15). Because “such

evidence and argument is based on speculation and hearsay and

is not based on personal knowledge,” Braun argues that such

“testimony would likely confuse and mislead the jury and

unfairly prejudice” Braun. (Id.).

Although it is unclear at this time whose testimony

Scafidi intends to offer, the Court agrees with Braun that

testimony on this subject should be entirely excluded if a

witness does not possess personal knowledge. “Co-workers’

opinions . . . are generally irrelevant to establish

discrimination or any [discriminatory] intent on the part of

the employer.” Brown v. Progress Energy, No. 8:07-cv-1599-

RAL-TGW, 2009 WL 212426, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2009),

aff’d, 364 F. App’x 556 (11th Cir. 2010). Scafidi may not

introduce any lay opinion testimony about Braun’s motive or

the reason for Scafidi’s termination from Braun employees who

have no personal knowledge of Braun’s decision to terminate

Scafidi. See Johnson v. Scotty’s, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1276,

1283 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (striking a co-worker’s affidavit

because the co-worker was “a lay witness giving an opinion,

from which she forms on the basis of comments, about

management’s decision to terminate the Plaintiff” and the co-

worker “had no personal knowledge as to the reasons for

[Plaintiff’s] termination”).

The Motion is granted as to this category of evidence,

which would essentially be lay speculation about Braun’s

motives. Such lay speculation is both irrelevant and unduly

prejudicial. However, testimony from other Braun employees

who do possess personal knowledge of Braun’s motives and

decision to terminate Scafidi is not excluded.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

Defendant B. Braun Medical, Inc.’s Omnibus Motion in

Limine (Doc. # 76) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as

set forth herein.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this lst

day of February, 2024.

Eigen Maca ee

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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