Carrafa v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Duval County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

BERNARD CARRAFA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-139-TJC-PDB

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Bernard Carrafa, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Doc. 1. Petitioner challenges three state court

(Duval County, Florida) negotiated pleas of guilty and resulting judgments of

conviction for three counts of burglary of a dwelling. Petitioner is serving three

concurrent fifteen-year terms of incarceration as a Prison Releasee Reoffender.

Respondents responded. See Doc. 6 (Resp.).1 Petitioner replied. See Doc. 13.

1 Attached to the Response are various exhibits. The Court refers to the exhibits

as “Resp. Ex.”

This case is ripe for review.2

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure

that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in

the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.

(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See

Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The

state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s

2 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish

the need for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299,

1318 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060

(11th Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court

must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s

factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the

record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,

a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that

“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

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decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is

unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that

does provide a relevant rationale. It should then

presume that the unexplained decision adopted the

same reasoning. But the State may rebut the

presumption by showing that the unexplained

affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as

alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or

argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the

record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted

“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for

evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal

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quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears

repeating that even a strong case for relief does not

mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has

repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an

unreasonable application of law requires more than

mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear

error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal

citations modified).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)

(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a

person must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of

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reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

The two-part Strickland test applies to challenges to the validity of guilty

pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

58 (1985). The petitioner must still show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. See id. at 56-59; Lynch v. Sec’y Fla. Dept. of Corr., 776 F.3d 1209,

1218 (11th Cir. 2015). To establish prejudice, however, the petitioner “must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”

Hill,474 U.S. at 59 (footnote omitted); Lynch, 776 F.3d at 1218.

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the

Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.

2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to

show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance

prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id.

(citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in

Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

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lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should

be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.

Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state

court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether

that determination was unreasonable – a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If

there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court

decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s

representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is

combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling

on counsel’s performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc)

(Jordan, J., concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir.

2004).

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III. Factual and Procedural History

On October 10, 2017, officers went to Petitioner’s residence to serve an

outstanding warrant for violating his probation and because Petitioner was a

known suspect in a recent burglary. Resp. Ex. A at 2. When officers arrived,

another individual named Jarvis advised she owned the home and gave officers

consent to search, during which they found among Petitioner’s belongings

property stolen during the October 2, 2017, burglary of David De Berry’s home

and the October 7, 2017, burglary of Terrie Boatwright’s home. Id.; Resp. Ex. K

at 2. Officers then arrested Petitioner for the two burglaries.3 Resp. Ex. A at 1-

2; Resp. Ex. K at 1-2. During their search, other residents of the house also

advised officers that Petitioner had recently brought home several items, even

bringing home items earlier that day, and identified over 250 objects that

officers collected and placed in the sheriff’s office property room. Resp. Ex. F at

2.

On the day Petitioner was arrested, October 10, 2017, Gregory Thomas

reported that his home had been burglarized. Id. at 2. On October 20, 2017,

Officer Angresano was investigating burglaries that coincided with the

timeframes that Petitioner’s housemates reported Petitioner brought items

home; and while examining the items collected during Petitioner’s arrest,

3 Officers also arrested Petitioner for the VOP offense. Resp. Ex. K at 2.

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Officer Angresano identified three items stolen from Thomas’s home. Id. Officer

Angresano then located Petitioner at the Duval County Jail and when he tried

to transport Petitioner to the burglary office to be interviewed, Petitioner

invoked his right to remain silent and refused to speak about any suspected

burglary. Id. Petitioner was then arrested for the October 10, 2017, burglary of

Thomas’s home. Id.

A few weeks later, the state charged Petitioner with the October 2, 2017,

burglary of DeBerry’s home in No. 2017-CF-9238, Resp. Ex. K at 12; the October

7, 2017, burglary of Boatwright’s home in No. 2017-CF-9296, Resp. Ex. A at 12;

and the October 10, 2017, burglary of Thomas’s home in No. 2017-CF-9659,

Resp. Ex. F at 12. The trial court appointed the office of the public defender to

represent Petitioner, and the state soon filed a notice of intent to classify

Petitioner as a Prison Releasee Reoffender in all three cases. Resp. Ex. A at 15,

141. In January 2018, the office of the public defender withdrew as counsel and

Theodore Zentner and William Durden, III, filed a notice of appearance on

behalf of Petitioner. Resp. Ex. A at 20. Three months later, Zentner and Durden

moved to withdraw asserting irreconcilable differences. Id. at 29. The trial court

granted their motion and reappointed the public defender’s office to represent

Petitioner in all cases. Id. at 32.

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Following the public defender’s office reappointment, the trial court

conducted a pretrial status conference on April 11, 2018, during which trial

counsel advised the trial court that he had conferred with the state, reviewed

everything for the three burglary cases, and was preparing to depose the

“Category A” witnesses for No. 2017-CF-9238 but otherwise he did not

anticipate doing anything further before setting the cases for trial. Resp. Ex. A

at 92-94. As trial counsel and the trial court discussed these matters, the

transcript indicates Petitioner was “raising his hand” to address the trial court.

Id. Once the trial court finished discussing scheduling issues, it asked

Petitioner if he wished to say something, to which he responded that he wished

to have a Nelson4 hearing “because there was a breach of confidentiality with

[him] and” his attorney. Id. at 94. The trial court then conducted an inquiry

about Petitioner’s concerns, during which Petitioner advised that on the day the

public defender’s office was reappointed, his trial attorney discussed with him

his potential status as a PRR and a Habitual Felony Offender, and during the

pretrial hearing right after their discussion, the state filed a notice of intent to

classify Petitioner as an HFO.5 Id. at 98. Petitioner suggested trial counsel

4 Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).

5 The state did not file a notice of intent to seek an HFO sentence in any of the

three cases Petitioner challenges here, and thus the Court assumes the state filed the

alleged notice in an unrelated case pending at that time.

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encouraged the state to file the HFO notice, or disclosed information discussed

during their private conversation. Id. at 98. In response, trial counsel stated

that after his appointment, he discussed with Petitioner his extensive criminal

record and potential sentencing enhancements he could face; but trial counsel

clarified that it was merely a coincidence that the state filed an HFO notice the

same day they had that discussion and he neither encouraged nor influenced

the state’s decision to file the HFO notice. Id. at 100.

After considering trial counsel’s statements, the trial court found counsel

was not ineffective and denied Petitioner’s request to appoint another attorney.

Id. at 101. The trial court explained that Petitioner’s criminal record is “not a

secret” and any good attorney would know those details and discuss them with

his client, including potential sentencing enhancements, and it is common for

trial counsel to also discuss those issues with the state during potential plea

negotiations. Id. at 102. Petitioner confirmed he understood the trial court’s

explanation and ruling and advised he was “just ready to get this taken care

of.” Id. at 104.

About two months later, Petitioner hired private counsel Otto Rafuse and

the public defender’s office withdrew. Id. at 38. Trial counsel soon moved to

strike the state’s notice to classify Petitioner as a PRR. Id. at 39. The trial court

held a hearing on the motion on August 23, 2018. Resp. Ex. A at 118. During

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the hearing, trial counsel argued that Petitioner could not be classified as a PRR

on the burglary of a dwelling charges because the offenses were not forcible

felonies. Id. at 119. According to trial counsel, Petitioner had conducted the

legal research supporting that argument and trial counsel advised he believed

Petitioner had “a good argument.” Id. at 118. The trial court ultimately denied

Petitioner’s motion and following the trial court’s ruling, trial counsel advised

he was meeting with Petitioner the next day and explained that while the cases

were set for trial, the parties “might possibly have a resolution”; thus, counsel

asked the trial court to set a status conference before the final pretrial hearing.

Id. at 133.

A week later, on August 30, 2018, Petitioner entered a negotiated plea of

guilty to the burglary of a dwelling offense charged in each of the three cases

and reserved his right to appeal his classification as a PRR.6 Resp. Ex. A at 48,

138-39. That same day, in accordance with his negotiated disposition, the trial

court, in all three burglary cases, adjudicated Petitioner as a PRR and

sentenced him to a fifteen-year term of incarceration, with each sentence to run

concurrently. Resp. Ex. A at 50-56; Resp. Ex. F at 42-48; Resp. Ex. K at 48-54.

In his three direct appeals, Petitioner, with the benefit of counsel, filed

an initial brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), representing

6 That same day, Petitioner also entered a plea of guilty to the violation of

probation charged in an unrelated case. Resp. Ex. A at 138.

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that no good faith argument of reversible error could be made. Resp. Exs. B, G,

L. The First District Court of Appeal granted Petitioner leave to file a pro se

initial brief. Resp. Exs. C, H, M. Petitioner then filed a pro se initial brief

arguing that the trial court erred in imposing a PRR sentence and that section

775.082, Florida Statutes, is vague and ambiguous. Resp. Exs. D, I, N. The First

DCA per curiam affirmed all three judgments and convictions without written

opinions. Resp. Exs. E, J, O. After seeking postconviction relief with the state

court, Petitioner filed the Petition.

IV. The Petition

Petitioner raises one ground for relief. He argues his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate and present a defense that Petitioner was

insane at the time of the offenses. Doc. 1 at 6. According to Petitioner, before

the burglaries, Petitioner was in the Florida Department of Corrections’ custody

serving a sentence for an unrelated offense at Phoenix House. Id. at 6-7. He

contends that during his time at Phoenix House, officials administered a

monthly medication that balanced Petitioner’s emotions and let him think

rationally about his decisions. Id. at 6-7. Petitioner asserts he stopped receiving

the medication after his June 2017 release and soon began suffering from

depression, memory loss, irrational behavior, and anxiety. Id. at 7. He

maintains he was suffering from these illnesses at the time of the offenses and

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advised his trial counsel of these facts, but trial counsel did not investigate

Petitioner’s mental state or pursue an insanity defense. Id. at 8-9. Petitioner

argues that if his trial counsel had investigated an insanity defense, he would

not have entered a guilty plea and would have insisted on going to trial. Id. at

10.

Petitioner raised this claim in his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.850 motion filed in state court. Resp. Ex. P at 6. The trial court summarily

denied the claim, finding:

In Ground One, Defendant alleges counsel was

ineffective for not pursuing an insanity defense.

However, accepting Defendant’s factual allegations as

true, insanity would not have been a viable defense at

trial. See Crockham v. State, 723 So. 2d 355, 356 (Fla.

4th DCA 1998). Further, when he entered his plea,

Defendant knew he would be waiving his right to

present evidence. Accordingly, Defendant is not

entitled to relief on Ground One.

Resp. Ex. P at 65 (record citations omitted). The First DCA per curiam affirmed

the trial court’s denial without a written opinion. See Carrafa v. State, No.

1D20-1061 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 21, 2020).7

The Court addresses the claim under the deferential standard for federal

court review of state court adjudications. In doing so, the Court finds that

Petitioner fails to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

7 Respondents filed a copy of the First DCA’s mandate for Petitioner’s Rule

3.850 appeal but did not provide a copy of the First DCA opinion.

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errors, [he] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Indeed, after a thorough review,

the Court finds no evidence in the state court record or otherwise that Petitioner

was insane at the time of the offenses such that an insanity defense would have

been viable at trial. Rather, the record shows Petitioner invoked his right to

remain silent when officers tried to interview him about the Thomas burglary;

he actively participated in defending each of his cases; conducted his own legal

research about his sentencing enhancement; and hired several attorneys

throughout the process. During pretrial hearings, Petitioner addressed the trial

court in a coherent manner and never mentioned a desire to pursue an insanity

defense; and on at least one occasion, he expressed to the trial court that he was

“just ready to get this taken care of.” Resp. Ex. A at 104.

Also, Petitioner’s solemn declarations during his plea colloquy carry a

strong presumption of truth. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see

also Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014)

(stating that a defendant who makes statements under oath at a plea colloquy

bears a heavy burden to show his statements were false). And Petitioner’s

representations at the plea hearings “constitute a formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceedings.” Id. at 73-74; see also Stano v. Dugger, 921

F.2d 1125, 1152 (11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that the record of the plea

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proceedings may contradict any subsequent claim that counsel’s representation

was deficient). Notably, during his plea hearing, he testified that he understood

that if he were found guilty at trial, the trial court could impose consecutive

fifteen-year PRR sentences for the three burglary cases, for a total forty-five-

year term of incarceration. Resp. Ex. A at 143. But by entering his negotiated

pleas, Petitioner knew he would receive concurrent fifteen-year PRR sentences.

Id. at 145-46. Trial counsel and Petitioner also made the strategic decision to

reserve Petitioner’s right to appeal the PRR designations and he filed a pro se

brief on direct appeal doing so. But the First DCA found his argument lacked

merit.

During Petitioner’s plea colloquy, the state also presented a factual basis

for each burglary charge and Petitioner acknowledged, under oath, that he

accepted the stated facts supporting the three charges. Resp. Ex. A at 154-55.

Petitioner testified that he was entering his negotiated pleas of guilty because

he was, in fact, guilty of committing the offenses, thus waiving any potential

defense for which he discussed with counsel before he entered those guilty pleas.

Id. at 147-48; see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a

criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty

of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to

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the entry of the guilty plea.”). Petitioner acknowledged that he was waiving his

right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Resp.

Ex. A at 148-49. And based on Petitioner’s representations, the trial court

accepted the factual basis for the pleas and found that Petitioner freely and

voluntarily entered his pleas with an understanding of the consequences

thereto. Id. at 162-63.

Thus, upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law, the

Court finds that the state court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s claim was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland, and it was not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented to

the state court. This claim is denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

3. If Petitioner appeals this denial, the Court denies a certificate of

appealability. Because this Court has determined that a certificate of

appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending

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motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed

in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.®

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of

January, 2024.

□ Cirmotheg Corrig oN

W TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

United States District Judge

Jax-7

C: Bernard Carrafa, #296996

Counsel of record

8 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner

makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were

‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

Here, after consideration of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of

appealability.

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