The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
AFRICAN PEOPLE’S EDUCATION AND
DEFENSE FUND, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2395-TPB-AAS
PINELLAS COUNTY,
Defendant.
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction and Incorporated Memorandum of Law,” filed by
counsel on November 20, 2023. (Doc. 12). On November 22, 2023, the Court denied
the motion to the extent it sought a temporary restraining order and deferred the
request for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 13). On December 14, 2023, Defendant filed
a response in opposition. (Doc. 23). After reviewing the motion, response, court file,
and the record, the Court finds as follows:
Background
This action stems from Defendant Pinellas County’s decisions not to award
Plaintiff federal grant money available under the Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal
Recovery Funds (“SLFRF”) authorized by the American Rescue Plan Act (“ARPA”), 15
U.S.C. § 9058c. The program was created by Congress to alleviate the economic
impact of Covid-19 by awarding funds to states, territories, tribal, and local
governments. Local governments were granted broad flexibility to use the funding,
and Pinellas County decided to use a portion of the SLFRF award to provide
assistance to nonprofits through grants for capital expenditures. Defendant
contracted with the Pinellas Community Foundation, as a subrecipient of the funds, to
administer the program and to review, rank, and award ARPA grant funds to various
nonprofit entities, subject to approval by Defendant.
Plaintiff African People’s Education and Defense Fund, Inc., a nonprofit
organization that has served the black community of south St. Petersburg, Florida, for
over 28 years, applied for two separate grants under the program – the first for radio
equipment, and the second for a generator. The grants were ultimately not approved.
As to the radio equipment grant, the Pinellas Community Foundation ranked
Plaintiff’s application 4th out of 55 applications, and the grant was initially approved
by the Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners. On January 9, 2023, the
Pinellas Community Foundation sent a draft contract, which Plaintiff signed and
returned on February 9, 2023. On February 14, 2023, the Pinellas County Board of
Commissioners voted to rescind or terminate the radio equipment contract. As to the
generator grant, the Pinellas Community Foundation ranked Plaintiff’s application 4th
out of 19 approved applications. However, the Pinellas County Board of County
Commissioners denied the application on June 13, 2023.
In the instant lawsuit, Plaintiff claims Defendant’s decisions not to award the
ARPA grant funds to Plaintiff were the result of a mistaken and discriminatory belief
that Plaintiff is associated with the Uhuru Movement, a black nationalist, allegedly
antisemitic political organization under investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: Violation of the First
Amendment (Freedom of Association) (Count I), Violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II), and Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
(Racial Discrimination) (Count III).
Legal Standard
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish: “(1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the
relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief
would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public
interest.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir.
2005). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, and [the
movant] bears the burden of persuasion to clearly stablish all four of these
prerequisites.” Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotations omitted).
Analysis
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to (1) enjoin Defendant from
distributing the ARPA grant funds that Plaintiff believes it is entitled to; (2) require
Defendant to award the funds to Plaintiff; and (3) declare that Defendant violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. After careful review, the Court finds that Plaintiff
cannot meet the threshold for a preliminary injunction as to any of these requests.
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show irreparable harm.
Cunningham v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Shatel Corp. v. Mao
Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1983)). Because “a
preliminary injunction is premised on the need for speedy and urgent action to protect
a plaintiff’s rights before a case can be resolved on its merits,” a “delay in seeking a
preliminary injunction of even only a few months . . . militates against a finding of
irreparable harm.” Wreal, LLC, 840 F.3d at 1248. In this case, the first grant was
rescinded or terminated on February 13, 2023. The second grant was denied on June
13, 2023. And yet, Plaintiff did not file the instant lawsuit challenging the denials
until October 20, 2023. Moreover, Plaintiff did not file a motion seeking a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction until November 20, 2023. Plaintiff has
failed to provide any explanation for the months-long delays in challenging the denials
at issue or in seeking preliminary injunctive relief.
In addition, “[a]n injury is ‘irreparable’ only if it cannot be undone through
monetary remedies.” Cunningham, 808 F.2d at 821 (citing Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d
1176, 1189 (11th Cir. 1983)). In this lawsuit, Plaintiff is essentially requesting a
monetary remedy by seeking the reversal of Defendant’s grant decisions and the
award of the grant money Plaintiff believes it is entitled to. Plaintiff’s alleged injuries
are compensable and may be remedied by monetary damages.
Plaintiff attempts to argue that it has suffered irreparable harm due to the
chilling effect of the allegedly improper grant denials on Plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights. However, “[a]lthough some courts have held that the very violation of certain
fundamental constitutional rights can satisfy the irreparable harm requirement in
obtaining preliminary injunctive relief, […] the facts of this case do not fit under the
rationale of those decisions.” See id. The Cunningham case is instructive. If Plaintiff
is successful in this litigation, the Court can direct Defendant to award the grants to
Plaintiff and can award other compensatory damages for the time that Plaintiff was
wrongfully deprived of the grant money. See id. Moreover, the Court notes that it
appears that Plaintiff is still operating its radio station and building even without the
grants for radio equipment and the generator, cutting against Plaintiff’s chilling effect
arguments. Under these facts, there is no substantial threat of irreparable harm.
Plaintiff’s specific requests for a preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to
award the grants to Plaintiff and for a declaration that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
were violated are not well-taken. Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to determine the
outcome of this case – on an incomplete or nonexistent record – while a motion to
dismiss remains pending and before discovery has begun. This is improper.
There are other reasons to deny these particular requests for injunctive relief.
The Court notes that the request for a mandatory preliminary injunction ordering
Defendant to award the grant money even more directly seeks monetary damages
rather than equitable relief, so Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that monetary
damages are an insufficient remedy. See Edwards v. Commissioner for the Internal
Revenue Service, No. 5:23-cv-51-RH-MJF, 2023 WL 6049534, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 11,
2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6037901 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 15,
2023) (denying motion for preliminary injunction that would direct the defendant to
“loan” $12,000 to the plaintiff).
As to the request for a declaration that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, consideration of the nature of declaratory relief (a final
determination as to the rights and obligations of parties) compared to the nature of a
preliminary injunction (temporary relief to maintain the status quo during the
pendency of an action) weighs heavily against injunctive relief. Plaintiff has provided
no case law, and the Court is unaware of any, that shows declaratory relief is available
as a remedy in the context of a preliminary injunction.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. Plaintiff's “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction and Incorporated Memorandum of Law” (Doc. 12) is hereby
DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 18th day of
January, 2024.
FY 2
-TOMBARBER i asssi‘(‘“‘i;it;™:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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