The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
RUGGED CROSS HUNTING BLINDS,
LLC,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2289-WFJ-NHA
GOOD SPORTSMAN’S MARKETING,
LLC; HADLEY DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
and TRU-VIEW, LLC,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Hadley Development, LLC (“Hadley”) and
Tru-View, LLC’s (“Tru-View”) Motion to Dismiss or Sever and Transfer (Dkt. 17),
as well as Defendant Good Sportsman’s Marketing, LLC’s (“GSM”) Motion to
Dismiss or Sever and Transfer (Dkt. 19). Plaintiff Rugged Cross Hunting Blinds,
LLC (“RCHB”) has responded to both motions (Dkt. 26; Dkt. 27), and Defendants
have replied (Dkt. 31; Dkt. 32). Upon careful consideration, the Court grants
Defendants’ motions. RCHB’s claims against Hadley and Tru-View are dismissed
without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). The remainder of
this case is transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas under the first-filed rule.
BACKGROUND
This patent infringement suit concerns United States Patent No. 11,399,535,
“Camouflage Material, For a Hunting Blind” (the “‘535 Patent”). Dkt. 1-2 at 2. The
‘535 Patent generally discloses a partially transmissive mesh material that prevents
game from seeing inside a hunting blind structure while allowing hunters to see
outside the same. Id. at 12. RCHB claims that Defendants have directly or indirectly
infringed the ‘535 Patent by selling or otherwise inducing sales of hunting blinds
that utilize similar mesh technology. See generally Dkt. 1.
I. The Parties
RCHB is a Florida limited liability company with its principal place of
business in Tampa, Florida. Id. at 2. It got into the hunting blind business in 2015
after its owners “conceived of and reduced to practice the invention disclosed and
claimed in the ‘535 Patent[.]” Id. at 5. Since then, RCHB has largely monetized its
innovative mesh technology by licensing other companies to make and sell products
which incorporate it. Id. at 6.
Hadley and Tru-View are Kansas limited liability companies with their
principal place of business in Wichita, Kansas. Dkt. 17 at 6. They allegedly share
common ownership and operate as outdoor recreational product developers and
manufacturers. Dkt. 1 at 3, 6–11. One of their customers is GSM. Id. at 6.
GSM is a Texas limited liability company with its principal place of business
in Irving, Texas. Dkt. 19 at 23. “GSM sells, advertises, and markets products for
outdoor and recreation nationwide through major retailers.” Dkt. 1 at 2. Two of these
products allegedly infringe the ‘535 Patent. Id.
II. The Parties’ Dispute
On February 28, 2017, RCHB was issued United States Patent No. 10,765,108
(the “‘108” Patent), its first non-provisional patent for a one-way see-through mesh
material. Id. at 6. Shortly thereafter, RCHB licensed Primos Hunting (“Primos”) to
make and sell products that utilize the ‘108 Patent. Id. The result was Primos’ well-
received SURROUNDVIEW hunting blinds. Id.
In response to Primos’ success, GSM and other manufacturers allegedly
approached Hadley about developing a similar one-way see-through material. Id.
Hadley purportedly began working on this project in 2018, and, on November 30,
2018, Tru-View was formed as a limited liability company. Id. On January 11, 2019,
Tru-View was issued United States Patent No. 10,457,015 (the “‘015 Patent”). Id. at
7. The ‘015 Patent discloses a mesh material that “allows a hunter or other person
inside a blind . . . to see things outside the structure without being easily seen[.]” Id.
By January 2019, “GSM, [purportedly] with the design help of Hadley,
introduced its MUDDY brand hunting blinds that included a one-way see-through
mesh material.” Id. RCHB was not pleased. Accordingly, between July and August
2020, RCHB sent letters to Tru-View and GSM explaining that “claims to the RCHB
first patent application had been allowed and that RCHB had information that Tru-
View had licensed GSM to make and sell hunting blinds with a one-way see-through
mesh material.” Id. On August 2, 2022, RCHB was finally issued the ‘535 Patent—
“[t]he application for the ‘535 patent was a continuation of RCHB’s first filed non-
provisional patent application.” Id.
Between August and September 2022, RCHB sent notices of alleged
infringement of the ‘535 Patent to Tru-View and GSM. Id. While Hadley responded
on behalf of Tru-View, it is not clear that it responded on behalf of GSM or whether
GSM responded at all. Id. Notwithstanding, on October 5, 2022, RCHB and Hadley
entered into a Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement (the “Hadley NDA”) to explore
“the possibility of a business relationship including a license under the RCHB
Patents[.]” Dkt. 1-3 at 2. Ultimately, RCHB and Hadley did not resolve RCHB’s
infringement claims or reach a licensing agreement at this time. Dkt. 1 at 9.
On December 5, 2022, RCHB filed a patent infringement suit against
FeraDyne Outdoors, LLC (“FeraDyne”) in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.1 The parties subsequently communicated about
opening up negotiations for a global settlement. And, in February 2023, Tru-View
1 See Rugged Cross Hunting Blinds, LLC v. FeraDyne Outdoors, LLC, Case No: 3:22-cv-690
(W.D. Wis.).
and RCHB entered into their own Mutual Non-Disclosure agreement (the “Tru-View
NDA”). Like the Hadley NDA, the Tru-View NDA provided the following:
This Agreement, and any disputes directly or indirectly arising from
this Agreement, shall be governed by the laws of the State of Florida,
without reference to its choice of law principles. Each of the parties
hereby irrevocably consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the state and federal courts located in Florida for any such disputes,
and hereby irrevocably waives any objections to the laying of venue in
such courts.
Dkt. 1-3 at 4 (the Hadley NDA); Dkt. 1-4 at 4 (the Tru-View NDA).
Unfortunately, the parties were unable to resolve any of RCHB’s patent
infringement claims or reach a licensing agreement. Dkt. 1 at 10. RCHB maintains
that Defendants continue to sell products or induce the sale of products which
infringe the ‘535 Patent. Id.
III. The Parties’ Lawsuits
On August 31, 2023, following another notice of alleged infringement, GSM
filed a declaratory judgment action against RCHB in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas (the “Texas Lawsuit”). Id. at 11.2 Therein, GSM
seeks a declaratory judgment that the ‘535 and ‘108 Patents are invalid and not
infringed by GSM’s products. Tex. Dkt. 1 at 1. GSM also brings a claim of tortious
2 See Good Sportsman Marketing, LLC v. Rugged Cross Hunting Blinds, LLC, Case No. 4:23-cv-
3243 (S.D. Tex.). Citations to the Texas Lawsuit docket will be as follows: “Tex. Dkt. [x].”
interference against RCHB for allegedly interfering with GSM’s contracts and
relationships with various retailers. Id. at 7–8.
Approximately two months later, RCHB filed the instant patent infringement
suit against Defendants. See generally Dkt. 1. RCHB brings five claims: Count I—
direct infringement of the ‘535 Patent against GSM as to GSM’s “Ameristep
Blinds”; Count II—direct infringement of the ‘535 Patent against GSM as to GSM’s
“Muddy Blinds”; Count III—direct infringement of the ‘535 Patent against Hadley;
Count IV—indirect infringement of the ‘535 Patent against Hadley; and Count V—
indirect infringement of the ‘535 Patent against Tru-View. Id. at 11–16. Defendants
now move to dismiss or sever and transfer RCHB’s claims. Dkt. 17; Dkt. 19.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Personal Jurisdiction
Federal Circuit law controls the analysis of whether personal jurisdiction
exists over an out-of-state patent suit defendant. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal
Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564–65 (Fed. Cir. 1994). This calls for “a two-step
inquiry.” Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 1998). The questions are, “first, whether the forum state’s long-arm statute
permits service of process and, second, whether the assertion of jurisdiction is
consistent with due process.” Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 1373,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In analyzing the due process prong, Courts consider three factors: “(1)
whether the defendant ‘purposefully directed’ its activities at residents of the forum;
(2) whether the claim ‘arises out of or relates to’ the defendant’s activities within the
forum; and (3) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is ‘reasonable and fair.’”
Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Akro Corp.
v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the first two elements, which “correspond with the ‘minimum contacts’
prong of the International Shoe analysis.” Id.3 If the plaintiff does so, the burden
shifts to the defendant to “mak[e] a compelling case that jurisdiction would be
unconstitutional” under the third factor. Akro Corp, 45 F.3d at 1546.
II. Venue
In patent infringement cases, venue is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
rather than 28 U.S.C. § 1391. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
581 U.S. 258, 265–66 (2017). Section 1400(b) provides that “[a]ny civil action for
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant
resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business.” § 1400(b) (emphasis added). “‘[R]esidence’ in §
1400(b) has a particular meaning as applied to domestic corporations: it refers only
to the state of incorporation.” TC Heartland LLC, 581 U.S. at 267–68 (cleaned up).
3 See generally International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Further, there are “three general requirements” to show a regular and established
place of business: “(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a
regular and established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the
defendant.” In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Ultimately, “the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing proper venue[.]” Westech Aerosol Corp. v.
3M Co., 927 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
III. First-Filed Rule
“Where two actions involving overlapping issues and parties are pending in
two federal courts, there is a strong presumption across the federal circuits that
favors the forum of the first-filed suit[.]” Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132,
1135 (11th Cir. 2005). “The first-filed rule” consequently “provides that when
parties have instituted competing or parallel litigation in separate courts, the court
initially seized of the controversy should hear the case.” Collegiate Licensing Co. v.
Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 713 F.3d 71, 78 (11th Cir. 2013). “[T]he party
objecting to jurisdiction in the first-filed forum carr[ies] the burden of proving
‘compelling circumstances’ to warrant an exception[.]” Manuel, 430 F.3d at 1135
(citation omitted). If no exception is established, “the proper course of action is for
the court to transfer the case to the first-filed court to determine which case should,
in the interests of sound judicial administration and judicial economy, proceed.”
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 631 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (N.D.
Tex. 2009); see also Collegiate Licensing Co., 713 F.3d at 78 (“The first-filed rule
not only determines which court may decide the merits of substantially similar cases,
but also generally establishes which court may decide whether the second filed suit
must be dismissed, stayed, or transferred and consolidated.”).
DISCUSSION
The Court will address Hadley and Tru-View’s venue argument before
shifting to consider GSM’s personal jurisdiction and first-filed rule arguments.
I. Venue (as to Hadley and Tru-View)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the Middle District of Florida is not a proper
venue for GSM’s patent infringement claims against Hadley and Tru-View. Hadley
and Tru-View are both Kansas limited liability companies, Dkt. 1 at 2–3, which
means that they do not “reside” in Florida, See TC Heartland LLC, 581 U.S. at 267–
68. Further, while Hadley and True-View are accused of committing infringement
in Florida, there are no facts which suggest that either have a “regular and established
place of business” in the State. The closest RCHB comes to carrying its burden of
establishing such facts is stating that, “upon information and belief, the Defendants
have a regular and established place of business in this district.” Dkt. 1 at 4. But
“[s]imply stating that [Defendants] ha[ve] a regular and established place of business
within the judicial district, without more, amounts to a mere legal conclusion that
the [C]ourt is not bound to accept as true.” Westech Aerosol Corp., 927 F.3d at 1382.
And a “recitation of § 1400(b) is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for
improper venue.” Id.
Recognizing this, RCHB attempts to rely on waiver. RCHB essentially argues
that the instant dispute directly or indirectly arises out of the Hadley and Tru-View
NDAs, and that Hadley and Tru-View have therefore waived any objections to the
laying of venue in this Court under the NDAs’ forum-selection clauses. Hadley and
Tru-View respond by arguing that the NDAs cannot be read so broadly.
The Court agrees with Hadley and Tru-View. Although it is true that “[t]he
Eleventh Circuit has given a broad interpretation to forum selection clauses[,]” Gen.
Pump & Well, Inc. v. Laibe Supply Corp., No. CV-607-30, 2007 WL 4592103, at *3
(S.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2007), and that the governing law and forum selection provision
“in any patent license agreement . . . covers disputes concerning patent issues[,]”
Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000), the
subject NDAs are not licensing agreements and RCHB’s claims do not directly or
indirectly arise from them. The stated purpose of the NDAs was to facilitate
“discussions concerning [] potential business relationship[s]” by agreeing not to
disclose confidential information to third parties. Dkt. 1-3 at 2; Dkt. 1-4 at 2. RCHB
does not claim a breach of this duty. Nor does RCHB claim that Hadley or Tru-View
used confidential information for improper purposes. The patent allegedly infringed,
moreover, is now public information. There is simply no meaningful relationship
between the NDAs and the instant dispute.
The Federal Circuit’s discussion in Kannuu Pty Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
15 F.4th 1101 (Fed. Cir. 2021) reinforces this conclusion. There, the parties entered
into a non-disclosure agreement “to protect confidential business information while
engaging in business discussions.” Id. at 1104. The agreement provided that “[a]ny
legal action, suit, or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
transactions contemplated hereby must be instituted exclusively in a court” located
in “the borough of Manhattan, City of New York[.]” Id. at 1105 (cleaned up). When
no deal was reached through the agreement, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
patent infringement and filed a petition for inter partes review. Id. “The underlying
question” presented was “whether the forum selection clause in the [agreement]”
prohibited the defendant from “petitioning for inter partes review of [plaintiff’s]
patents at the Board[.]” Id.
The Federal Circuit found that it did not. In so doing, the court made two
significant points. The first was somewhat specific to the agreement in Kannuu:
[E]ven assuming the parties understood there was a chance they would
ultimately enter into a separate intellectual property license agreement
down the road, the issues underlying patent infringement and invalidity
fall outside the scope of the NDA. This is not to say we ignore the
realities of the positions of the parties in entering into an NDA. Surely
the parties entered into the NDA to exchange information in furtherance
of some sort of business relationship. The Agreement explains as
much. See J.A. 211 (“Company and Samsung desire to disclose to one
another certain Confidential Information ... to further a business
relationship between the parties ... and to protect such Confidential
Information from unauthorized disclosure.” (emphasis added)). But
that does not mean that future, hoped-for transactions fall within the
scope of the Agreement.
Id. at 1107. The second point concerned “the fundamental difference between the
nature of a patent license agreement and an NDA[:]”
An adjudication of patent infringement allegations or a patent's validity
are patent-centric considerations that will necessarily impact the rights
under a patent license agreement. But the same is not true for an NDA:
an invalidated patent or non-infringement determination does not
change, disrupt, or otherwise impact the parties’ NDA obligations.
Likewise, a finding that a party has breached an NDA is devoid of
undertaking any patent-related determinations such as infringement or
validity.
Id. at 1108.
Both of these points are applicable here. RCHB, Hadley, and Tru-View never
entered into a separate license agreement. Indeed, the NDAs, which are substantially
similar to the agreement in Kannuu, were merely a means of facilitating relationships
which never came to fruition. A finding of infringement would have no impact on
the parties’ obligations thereunder. Accordingly, this dispute does not arise from the
parties’ agreement to merely share confidential information with one another.
As a final matter, the Court notes that Cocona, Inc. v. Columbia Sportswear
Co. is persuasive. No. 17-CV-01195-CMA-CBS, 2017 WL 4029860 (D. Colo. Sept.
12, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-01195-CMA-CBS,
2017 WL 11547853 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2017). There, the parties entered into a
“Reciprocal Non-Disclosure Agreement” in anticipation of a “possible business
relationship that never consummated.” Id. at *1. After the plaintiff filed suit for
patent infringement, the defendant attempted to enforce the forum-selection clause
therein because the parties’ patent dispute was arguably “regarding [the]
agreement.” Id. The plaintiff responded by arguing that “because the [a]greement
did not grant any license or patent rights, it ha[d] no bearing on the infringement of
a public patent” and that “the parties could have written a broader forum-selection
clause had they intended the [a]greement to govern all future actions concerning the
parties.” Id. at *3.
The Cocona court ultimately agreed with the plaintiff. It explained that:
Considering the Agreement in the context of its formation, the term
“regarding” is unlikely to be so broad as to include Cocona's Amended
Complaint. There is no confidential information alleged in the
Complaint or Amended Complaint, and the business negotiations under
the Agreement ended several years ago. The harm that the “Reciprocal
Non–Disclosure Agreement” was intended to prevent, the unlawful
disclosure of confidential information, is no longer possible in this
context because Cocona's allegations concern only public information.
To consider this action as “regarding” the Agreement would be to
construe the Agreement so expansively as to include almost any future
activity that has any factual link with the parties’ initial business
discussions.
Id. So it is here. Hadley and Tru-view have not waived venue under the NDAs.
“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Given the existence of multiple
defendants, and the applicability of the first-filed rule (discussed below), the Court
finds dismissal of RCHB’s claims against Hadley and Tru-View to be appropriate.
Counts III, IV, and V are severed and dismissed without prejudice.
II. Personal Jurisdiction (as to GSM)
GSM does not dispute that it is reached by Florida’s long-arm statute or that
it has established minimum contacts with Florida. See generally Dkt. 19 at 8–16. It
follows that the only personal jurisdiction issue to consider is whether the assertion
of jurisdiction over GSM would “comport with notions of fair play and substantial
justice” under the Due Process clause. Akro Corp, 45 F.3d at 1546. The Supreme
Court has provided five considerations relevant to this inquiry: (1) “the burden on
the defendant;” (2) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute;” (3) the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;” (4) “the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;”
and (5) “the shared interests of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477
(1985) (cleaned up).
Consideration of these factors does not render jurisdiction unreasonable. As
an initial matter, GSM admits that it “operates nationally, with over 40 brands
involved with hunting, shooting sport, rugged outdoors, and fishing[.]” Dkt. 19 at
12. This suggests that the financial burden of an out-of-state patent suit will be
manageable for GSM. The nature of the instant suit also alleviates a number of
possible evidentiary burdens, as there will likely not be a significant amount of
physical evidence for GSM to produce. What is more, even if Florida does not have
a significant interest in adjudicating this dispute (which is questionable), RCHB
clearly has a substantial interest in obtaining relief in this district. RCHB only has
two members and is headquartered in Tampa, Florida. Id. at 10. Lastly, as GSM
recognizes, “the shared interests of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies” do not weigh in GSM’s favor—the same federal patent
law will apply wherever this case is tried.
The burden of proof is on GSM to present “a compelling case that jurisdiction
would be constitutionally unreasonable.” Akro Corp, 45 F.3d at 1546. Given the
foregoing, GSM has not carried this burden. The Court has jurisdiction.
III. First-Filed Rule (as to GSM)
Despite having jurisdiction over GSM, the Court finds that it would be
improvident to adjudicate the instant case in light of the first-filed rule. “In making
the determination whether to transfer pursuant to the first-filed rule, the court where
the second-filed action was filed considers the following: ‘(1) the chronology of the
two actions; (2) the similarity of the parties, and (3) the similarity of the issues.’”
Salt Life, LLC v. Shaka Life, Inc, No. 3:18-CV-1151-J-39-JRK, 2018 WL 8332698,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2018) (quoting Rudolph & Me, Inc. v. Ornament Cent.,
LLC., No. 8:11-CV-670-T-33EAJ, 2011 WL 3919711, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 7,
2011)). Here, these factors all weigh in favor of transfer: RCHB filed instant action
after GSM filed the Texas Lawsuit; the parties are identical (now that Hadley and
Tru-View have been dismissed); and the issues in this case are inherently related to
the same ‘535 Patent issues presented by GSM in the first-filed suit. See Actsoft, Inc.
v. Alcohol Monitoring Sys., Inc., No. 8:08-CV-00628-T-23-EAJ, 2008 WL 2266254,
at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 2008) (finding similar issues and applying the first-filed
rule where both cases in question involved putative infringement of the same patent).
Transfer is therefore appropriate unless RCHB can prove “compelling circumstances
to warrant an exception to the rule.” Salt Life, LLC, 2018 WL 8332698, at *2.
RCHB’s arguments are not compelling. To begin with, the Court is not
persuaded by RCHB’s argument that the Texas Lawsuit is purely anticipatory in
nature. While GSM likely anticipated litigation, RCHB itself states that “[a]fter
RCHB sent correspondence to Bass Pro Shop on August 24, 2023, GSM
immediately filed its Texas suit[.]” Dkt. 27 at 15. This suggests that the Texas
Lawsuit was a response to RCHB’s interference with GSM’s business relationships,
a possibility which is further evinced by GSM’s claim of tortious interference. See
Tex. Dkt. at 7–8.4 All the same, “even if a court finds that a [first] filing is
4 The Court expresses no opinion concerning the merits of this claim.
anticipatory, such a finding does not automatically compel abandoning the first-filed
rule. Rather, the matter remains one of discretion for the trial court.” Collegiate
Licensing Co., 713 F.3d at 79.
Because RCHB’s other equitable arguments are unavailing, the Court believes
that its discretion is best exercised by following the widely favored first-filed rule.
First, as explained above, “[t]he first-filed rule not only determines which court may
decide the merits of substantially similar cases, but also generally establishes which
court may decide whether the second filed suit must be dismissed, stayed, or
transferred and consolidated.” Collegiate Licensing Co., 713 F.3d at 78. Whether
GSM “engaged in forum shopping when it first-filed its Texas suit” is consequently
irrelevant. Dkt. 27 at 16. Second, because Hadley and Tru-View are no longer parties
to this case, “this Court is [not] better equipped to explore the unique issues
stemming from the relationship between GSM and its suppliers.” Id. at 17. Finally,
although RCHB likely “has significantly less time and means for traveling to
different forums to litigate” than GSM, this did not stop RCHB from filing suit
against FeraDyne in Wisconsin. Id. And even if the Court declined to apply the first-
filed rule, RCHB would still have to defend the Texas Lawsuit. There is simply no
compelling reason to abandon the rule.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
(1) Hadley and Tru-View’s Motion (Dkt. 17) is GRANTED.
(2) GSM’s Motion (Dkt. 19) is GRANTED.
(3) Counts III, IV, and V are severed and dismissed without prejudice for
improper venue.
(4) The remainder of this case is transferred to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas under the first-filed rule.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on January 22, 2024.
/s/ William F. Jung
WILLIAM F. JUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record