Booher v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

RYAN LEE BOOHER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:22-cv-677-KCD

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Ryan Lee Booher sues under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)

to challenge the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying his

application for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits.

(Doc. 1.)1 For the reasons below, the Commission’s decision is affirmed.

I. Background

The procedural history, administrative record, and law are summarized

in the parties’ briefs (Docs. 16, 17) and not fully repeated here. In short, Booher

filed for benefits claiming he could not work because of PTSD, bilateral

compartment syndrome, anxiety, depression, shoulder injuries, sleep apnea,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have

been omitted in this and later citations.

chronic fatigue, and GERD. (Tr. 337.) After his application was denied, Booher

sought review by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 224.)

Following a hearing, the ALJ agreed that Booher was not disabled.

(Tr. 28-43.) To make that determination, the ALJ used the multi-step

evaluation process established by the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a).2 The ALJ found that although Booher had severe impairments of

cervical radiculopathy, posterior fossa compression syndrome, obstructive

sleep apnea, PTSD, major depressive disorder, anxiety, and adjustment

disorder, he retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to engage in

some work with certain non-exertional limitations:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the

undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual

functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20

CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except occasionally climb

stairs or ramps; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch; never kneel,

frequently reach; occasional exposure to moving

mechanical parts; no exposure to unprotected heights;

understand, remember, and carry out simple, repetitive,

reasoning level 1-2 tasks; and occasional interaction with

the public.

2 An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that he is disabled.

Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). “The Social Security Regulations

outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is

disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether

the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of

Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity assessment, whether the claimant

can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether

there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform

given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).

(Tr. 35.)

After considering the RFC and other evidence, including vocational

expert testimony, the ALJ ultimately concluded that Booher could not perform

his past relevant work but could perform other jobs, including Routing Clerk,

Carwash Attendant, and Small Products Assembler I. (Tr. 42-43.) Thus,

Booher was not disabled as that term is defined in this context. (Id.)

Booher further exhausted his administrative remedies, and this lawsuit

followed. (Doc. 16 at 2.)

II. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner’s (and, by extension, the ALJ’s) decision

denying benefits is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the

factual findings and the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. §

405(g); see also Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).

Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.

Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a

preponderance. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). The

Supreme Court recently explained, “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in

other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.”

Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.

When determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence, the court must view the record as a whole, considering

evidence favorable and unfavorable to the Commissioner. Foote v. Chater, 67

F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). The court may not reweigh the evidence or

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. And even if the evidence

preponderates against the Commissioner, the reviewing court must affirm if

the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703

F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Finally, “[u]nder a substantial evidence

standard of review, [the claimant] must do more than point to evidence in the

record that supports [her] position; [she] must show the absence of substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion.” Sims v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 706 F.

App’x 595, 604 (11th Cir. 2017).

III. Analysis

Booher makes four arguments on appeal: (1) the ALJ erred in crafting a

contradictory RFC; (2) the ALJ erred in providing a flawed hypothetical to the

vocational expert (“VE”); (3) the ALJ erred by finding jobs available which

require greater specific vocational preparation (“SVP”) than recommended by

the Social Security Administration; and (4) the ALJ erred in failing to provide

him an opportunity to cross examine consultative examining psychologist Dr.

Michael Inman. All of these arguments fail.

A. Contradictory RFC

Booher’s first argument focuses on the RFC, which states he can both

“occasionally kneel” and “never kneel.” (Tr. 35.) At first blush, this would seem

to be a problem, but Booher has not shown error. As persuasively argued by

the Commissioner, it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s notation of “never

kneel” was a scrivener’s error. For instance, when discussing the

persuasiveness of the state agency administrative medical findings, the ALJ

adopted the consultant’s assessment that Booher could occasionally kneel. (Tr.

39, 152.) And during the administrative hearings, the ALJ’s hypothetical

question to the VE included a limitation of occasionally kneeling. (Tr. 57-58,

84-91.) Finally, the hypothetical which ultimately produced the testimony

regarding the jobs the ALJ cited in his decision specifically included a

limitation to occasional kneeling. (Tr. 86-88.)

More impotently, however, Booher cannot show that the scrivener’s error

was harmful. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“[T]he burden

of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the

agency’s determination”). The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) job

description for each job the ALJ found Booher could perform indicates

“kneeling not present – activity or condition does not exist.” (Tr. 43); see DOT,

§ 222.687-022, 1991 WL 672133 (routing clerk); § 915.667-010, 1991 WL

687869 (carwash attendant); § 706.684-022, 1991 WL 679050 (small products

assembler). Thus, even if the ALJ had intended to limit Booher to never

kneeling, he could still perform the jobs cited. (Tr. 43.) The Eleventh Circuit

has “declined to remand for express findings when doing so would be a wasteful

corrective exercise in light of the evidence of record and when no further

findings could be made that would alter the ALJ’s decision.” Sanchez v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 507 F. App’x 855, 856 (11th Cir. 2013). Remanding here would be

just such an exercise considering the scrivener’s error caused no harm.

Despite the DOT job descriptions, Booher claims all three jobs require

kneeling. (Doc. 16 at 14-16.) His only support for these conclusions is data from

the Occupational Requirements Survey (“ORS”), which is prepared by the U.S.

Bureau of Labor Statistics.3 (Id.) Booher seems to suggest that remand is

required for the ALJ to address the ORS data regarding exertions levels. The

Court disagrees.

To deny disability benefits, the Commissioner must “show that there is

other work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the

claimant [can] perform” despite his impairments. Sampson v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 694 F. App’x 727, 734 (11th Cir. 2017). To carry this burden, the

Commissioner may “take administrative notice of reliable job information

3 The ORS is prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and “provides job-related information

regarding physical demands; environmental conditions; education, training, and experience;

as well as cognitive and mental requirements for jobs in the U.S. economy.” See U.S. Bureau

of Labor Statistics, Occupational Requirements Survey, at https://www.bls.gov/ors/.

available from various governmental and other publications,” including the

DOT, the County Business Patterns, Census Reports, Occupational Analyses,

and the Occupational Outlook Handbook. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d). The

regulations also let the Commissioner base his decision on information

supplied by a VE. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004).

In Webster v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 773 F. App’x 553 (11th Cir. 2019), the

Eleventh Circuit faced a similar argument: an ALJ allegedly erred by failing

to investigate a conflict between the VE’s testimony and a job availability

publication of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Occupational Employment

Statistics (“OES”). It held that an ALJ must only independently verify a VE’s

testimony when it conflicts with the DOT. Webster, 773 F. App’x at 555-56. And

further, the Eleventh Circuit noted “the figures in the OES are not part of the

SSA’s regulatory scheme.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1), (5)). The same

reasoning applies here. The ALJ did not have to resolve conflicts between the

VE’s testimony and the ORS. And, like the OES, the ORS is not “part of the

SSA’s regulatory scheme.” Thus, ALJ did not err by failing to consider the ORS

data or coming to a contrary conclusion. See Mesa v. Kijakazi, No. 21-20424-

CIV, 2022 WL 4369733, at *14 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2022).

In any event, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reliance on the

VE’s testimony. As explained, a VE may rely on DOT data. In fact, an ALJ may

credit on a VE’s opinion even without statistical support. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at

1156-57. Booher alleges no tension between the DOT data and the VE’s

testimony, much less a “reasonably ascertainable or evident” conflict. See

Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 2021).

Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion.

B. Hypothetical Questions to VE

Booher next argues that the hypothetical questions posed to the VE did

not match the RFC. Here is what the ALJ said at the hearing:

ALJ. Identifying the claimant’s past relevant work as an ammunition

specialist, please assume a hypothetical individual vocationally situated

as the claimant with the same work history and education. The

hypothetical individual is able to perform light exertional work.

Occasionally climb stairs and ramps. Never climb ladders or scaffolds.

Occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch. Never crawl. Frequently

reach. Must avoid – excuse me. Only occasional exposure to moving

mechanical parts and avoid all unprotected heights. Would such an

individual be able to perform the claimant’s past relevant work?

(Tr. 86.) The ALJ then asked, “Is there any other work that such an individual

is able to perform?” (Id. at 87.) From there, the VE identified the three jobs

cited in the ALJ’s decision—routing clerk, carwash attendant, and small

products assembler. (Id.)

The next part of the hearing is where Booher claims error. He says that

rather than imposing additional limitations reflected in the RFC, the ALJ

asked whether an individual with the limitations specified in the first

hypothetical could perform certain tasks:

ALJ. Please assume the same abilities as a [sic] hypothetical 1. Could

such an individual be able to perform simple, repetitive, reasoning level

1 to 2 tasks with occasional interaction with the public? Would there be

any other work such an individual is able to perform?

(Tr. 87-88.) According to Booher, because the final hypothetical question did

not include the reasoning level and public interaction characteristics found in

the RFC as additional mental restrictions, it was flawed.

For the VE’s opinion to constitute substantial evidence, “the ALJ must

pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s

impairments.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir.

2011). “If the ALJ presents the VE with incomplete hypothetical questions, the

VE’s testimony will not constitute substantial evidence.” Jacobs v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 520 F. App’x 948, 950 (11th Cir. 2013). But an ALJ need not include

impairments in the hypothetical that the ALJ found to be unsupported by the

record. Lee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 448 F. App’x 952, 953 (11th Cir. 2011).

Booher again shows no error. The VE’s response to the ALJ’s questioning

shows he understood the ALJ’s addition of limitations to the initial

hypothetical was meant to inquire as to whether an individual with that

combination of mental restrictions could perform work. (Tr. 87-88.)

Specifically, the VE testified that all the jobs he cited (routing clerk, car wash

attendant, and small product assembler) were consistent with the additional

mental restrictions (i.e., reasoning level 1 to 2 tasks with occasional interaction

with the public) the ALJ added and would not reduce the availability of the

jobs in the national economy. (Id.) In fact, in further questioning, the VE asked

the ALJ if he should carry over the mental restrictions from the first

hypothetical when evaluating a later hypothetical limiting the individual to

sedentary work. (Tr. 88.) Thus, the VE understood that the ALJ’s hypothetical

question included all physical and mental limitations ultimately assessed in

the RFC, and his testimony as to the jobs that could be performed with those

limitations is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Booher

could perform work available in significant numbers in the national economy.

C. Specific Vocational Preparation

This next issue involves the Specific Vocational Preparation—i.e., the

time to learn how to complete a task—for the jobs the ALJ found Booher could

perform. The three jobs identified by the VE have an SVP of 2.4 The heading

for Booher’s argument summarizes his position:

The ALJ erred in finding plaintiff could perform work with

an SVP of 2 given that the Social Security Administration

repeatedly informed plaintiff that his condition may limit

his ability to perform his past work but he could perform

work requiring only a very short on-the-job training period

equating to SVP 1, the ALJ did not indicate he rejected this

finding, and he gave no reason for rejecting the finding.

(Doc. 16 at 18.) Booher essentially claims the ALJ should have rejected the

VE’s testimony about his ability to perform the routing clerk, carwash

4 SVP 1 requires a short demonstration only; SVP 2 requires anything beyond short

demonstration up to and including 1 month.

attendant, and small products assembler jobs, because the Social Security

Administration stated that he could only perform work equivalent to SVP 1,

and those three jobs have an SVP of 2. (Id. at 18-19.)

Two problems. First, the Social Security Administration never limited

Booher to SVP 1 work. The Social Security Administration said he is “capable

of performing work that requires less physical effort, and only a very short, on-

the-job training period.” (Tr. 139, 140, 177, 179, 180, 182.) This statement does

not have an SVP component, and Booher fails to explain how these limitations

translate to only SVP 1 work. Second, and equally preclusive, the statement

above was made by the Social Security Administration’s disability examiner,

first at initial consideration and then at reconsideration. Thus, the ALJ had a

good reason for ignoring it: “Findings made by a State agency disability

examiner made at a previous level of adjudication about a medical issue,

vocational issue, or the ultimate determination about whether [the claimant

is] disabled” are “inherently neither valuable nor persuasive.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520b(c), 416.920b(c). As a result, the ALJ “will not provide any analysis

about how [he] considered such evidence in [his] determination or decision.”

Id. Under this framework, the ALJ did not have to incorporate the disability

examiner’s findings even if they somehow limited Booher to SVP 1 work.

That still leaves the question of whether the VE’s testimony that Booher

could perform jobs with an SVP of 2 conflicts with the RFC. Even read this

broadly, Booher’s argument still fails. The RFC restricted him to “simple,

repetitive, reasoning level 1-2 tasks.” (Tr. 35.) Booher has not shown this

limitation categorically conflicts with an SVP 2 designation. See Peterson v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-10086, 2021 WL 3163662, at *3 (11th Cir. July 27,

2021) (“We conclude that there was no apparent conflict between an RFC

limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and the DOT’s description of jobs

requiring level two reasoning.”).

D. Opportunity to Cross-Examine

Next up, Booher claims the ALJ erred by not proving an opportunity to

cross-examine consultative examining psychologist Michael Inman, Ph.D. at

the administrative hearing.5 (Doc. 16 at 21-24.) The Commissioner counters

that Booher cannot show prejudice. (Doc. 17 at 15.)

Dr. Inman performed a consultative psychological evaluation after the

first administrative hearing. (Tr. 965-70.) He opined that Booher’s mental

status assessment indicated no cognitive impairments that would limit his

ability to perform unskilled work. (Id. at 969.) In his Medical Source

Statement, Dr. Inman concluded Booher had no more than mild functional

limitations. (Id. at 961-63.)

5 The Commissioner frames the issue as whether the ALJ was required to subpoena Dr.

Inman for cross-examination. But that is slightly different than what Booher is arguing.

Booher focuses on the ability to cross-examine, not on any failure to subpoena Dr. Inman.

In a letter to Booher’s attorney, the ALJ stated that he had Dr. Inman’s

report and was entering it into the record. (Tr. 426.) The letter laid out the

actions Booher could take:

You may also request a supplemental hearing. If you request a

supplemental hearing, I will grant the request unless I decide to issue a

fully favorable decision. If a supplemental hearing is scheduled, the

claimant may testify, produce witnesses, and, subject to the provisions

of 20 CFR 404.935, 404.949, 416.1435, and 416.1449, submit additional

evidence and written statements. In addition, you may request an

opportunity to question witnesses, including the author(s) of the new

evidence. I will grant a request to question a witness if I determine that

questioning the witness is needed to inquire fully into the issues. If a

witness declines a request by me to appear voluntarily for questioning,

I will consider whether to issue a subpoena to require his or her

appearance.

(Tr. 426.)

Booher’s attorney objected to Dr. Inman’s findings, stating that his

evaluation was inconsistent with the opinions and medical records from

treating physicians and asked for a supplemental hearing “so that we may

cross examine Dr. Inman with regard to these inconsistencies.” (Tr. 429.)

Booher also forwarded Dr. Inman’s report to his treating provider, Dr. Alfred

Vonetes, who provided a letter addressing Booher’s condition. (Id. at 1045.) The

ALJ conducted a supplemental hearing (Id. at 49-65), but Dr. Inman did not

participate. At that hearing, Booher’s counsel made this statement:

ATTY: I don’t really have any questions for the claimant, Judge. I had

objected to 9F and l0F, the reports of Dr. Inman [phonetic] and had

requested the opportunity to talk to him about his reports. I understand

that it is difficult to get them to appear for hearings but essentially my

objections were based on the fact that the only thing that Dr. Inman

reviewed in regards the medical records before giving any opinion was

the Von Care report from November 18, 2021, of Dr. Vonnet. So I was a

little perplexed because his opinions are completely different. However,

if he is basing it on that report, it was peculiar as to how he would arrive

at those things. Nevertheless, I sent the RFC over and the things over

to Dr. Vonnet to ask him to opine on what his opinions were and you

now have that in I believe 13F where he notes that while certainly he

understands other doctors’ opinions but what he is talking about would

be difficulty in maintaining employment. He notes he would leave work,

frequent tardiness, absences, [INAUDIBLE], things of that nature. So

that’s what I want to bring to the court attention and that I would like

the opportunity to pose hypotheticals to the vocational witness based on

those limitations. As far as testimony –

(Tr. 53-54.)

The ALJ considered Dr. Inman’s opinion in his decision, finding it

partially persuasive. (Tr. 41.) In doing so, the ALJ evaluated the supportability

and consistency of Dr. Inman’s assessment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that while Dr. Iman’s assessment was

supported by his own mental status examination and Booher’s education, his

opinion was not consistent with the other evidence in the record, which

supported moderate functional difficulties in Booher’s ability to interact with

others and maintain concentration, persistence, and pace (rather than mild

difficulties opined by Dr. Inman). (Id.)

The ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. But that does

not relieve the claimant of his burden. “[T]he claimant bears the burden of

proving that he is disabled, and consequently, he is responsible for producing

evidence in support of his claim.” Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276

(11th Cir. 2003). An ALJ is required to step in only when the record lacks

“sufficient evidence . . . to make an informed decision.” Ingram v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007). “The duty is triggered,

for example, when there is an ambiguity in the record or when the record is

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mishoe v. Astrue,

No. 5:08-CV-371-OC-GRJ, 2009 WL 2499073, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2009).

Further, “there must be a showing of prejudice before [the court] will find

that the claimant’s right to due process has been violated to such a degree that

the case must be remanded to the [ALJ] for further development of the record.”

Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995). In evaluating the

necessity for a remand, courts are “guided by whether the record reveals

evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness or clear prejudice.” Id. To establish

an evidentiary gap in the record, a claimant must “identify what facts could

have been submitted that would have changed the outcome.” Correa v. Colvin,

No. 8:15-CV-461-T-TGW, 2016 WL 7334642, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2016).

When an ALJ “substantially relies upon a post-hearing medical report that

directly contradicts the medical evidence that supports the claimant’s

contentions,” the opportunity for cross-examination of the medical report’s

author should generally be provided. Demenech v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health

& Hum. Servs., 913 F.2d 882, 885 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Martz v. Comm’r,

Soc. Sec. Admin., 649 F. App’x 948, 962 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating, “[t]he

determination of whether cross-examination is warranted appears to be within

the discretion of the ALJ”).

Here, the ALJ granted the request for a supplemental hearing, but

warned Booher he would only grant a request to question Dr. Inman “if [he]

determine[d] that [it was] needed to inquire fully into the issues.” (Tr. 426.)

Booher did not ask that the ALJ subpoena Dr. Inman.6 (Id.) In any event,

Booher has not shown prejudice. The ALJ reviewed the evidence of record,

properly considered Dr. Inman’s opinion, and only found his opinion partially

persuasive, concluding that Booher is more restricted than Dr. Inman opined.

(Tr. 41.) Further, the ALJ provided Booher with a supplemental hearing, heard

his counsel’s argument about the report at the hearing, and reviewed Dr.

Vonetes’s letter submitted after Dr. Inman’s report and opinion. (Tr. 1045.) The

ALJ provided Booher ample opportunity to be heard. See Santos v. Soc. Sec.

Admin., Comm’r, 731 F. App’x 848, 855 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding “[b]ecause [the

claimant] cannot show prejudice, we need not consider his arguments about

whether the ALJ followed [the Administration’s] internal rules or whether its

failure to do so could constitute a violation of due process”).

And unlike in the case law Booher cites, Dr. Inman’s report was not the

primary basis on which the ALJ relied in denying his application. See

6 Booher did request that a subpoena be issued for another medical provider if they failed to

provide records. (Tr. 432-33.)

Demenech v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 913 F.2d 882, 884 (11th

Cir. 1990). The ALJ assigned the report partial weight, noting that he had

afforded Booher “the greatest benefit of the doubt and finds the totality of the

evidence, including the findings of an anxious mood, support a finding that the

claimant has moderate difficulties in his ability to interact with others and

concentrate, persist, or maintain pace.” (Tr. 41.) Thus, the Court agrees with

the Commissioner—Booher failed to show the ALJ was required to allow him

to cross-examine Dr. Inman. (Doc. 17 at 15-17.)

One last issue. Booher seems to separately claim that the ALJ failed to

properly weigh Dr. Inman’s opinion. (Doc. 16 at 23-24.) This argument also

falls short. The ALJ conducted the required supportability and consistency

analysis. Although not overly robust, the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Inman’s

assessment in conjunction with the remaining medical record is sufficient. See

Roussin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-905-SPC-MRM, 2021 WL 6205948,

at *6 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2021).

IV. Conclusion

Considering the record as a whole, substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s findings, and the correct standards were applied. Accordingly, the Court

AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision and directs the Clerk to enter

judgment for the Commissioner and against Ryan Lee Booher and close the

file.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this January 3, 2024.

Dudek

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies: All Parties of Record

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