The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CARMEN VELAZQUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:22-cv-1309-JRK
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
I. Status
Carmen Velazquez (“Plaintiff”) is appealing the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s (“SSA(’s)”) final decision denying her claims
for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income
(“SSI”). Plaintiff’s alleged inability to work is the result of degenerative
osteoarthritis, radiculopathy, gastritis, and severe migraines. Transcript of
Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 15; “Tr.” or “administrative transcript”),
filed August 4, 2022, at 120, 134, 241.
1 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge. See Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge
(Doc. No. 13), filed August 4, 2022; Reference Order (Doc. No. 16), entered August 4, 2022.
On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed the applications for DIB and
SSI, alleging in both applications a disability onset date of May 22, 2019. Tr. at
205-11 (DIB), 212-19 (SSI).2 Both applications were denied initially (the SSI
application being denied because Plaintiff’s income was too high to be eligible),
Tr. at 120-30, 131, 132-33, 159-62 (DIB); Tr. at 149-58 (SSI), and the DIB
application was denied upon reconsideration, Tr. at 134-45, 146, 147-48, 164-
69.3
On October 29, 2020, an ALJ held a hearing, during which he heard from
Plaintiff, who elected to represent herself.4 Tr. at 83-93. At the time of the
hearing, Plaintiff was forty-eight (48) years old. Tr. at 88. After the hearing, the
ALJ sent interrogatories to a vocational expert (“VE”) and obtained an opinion
on the type of work Plaintiff might be able to perform. Tr. at 364-68. On August
2 The DIB and SSI applications were actually completed on August 13, 2019. Tr.
at 205 (DIB), 212 (SSI). The protective filing date for the DIB application is listed elsewhere
in the administrative transcript as July 15, 2019, and the SSI protective filing date is listed
in the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ(’s)”) Decision, probably erroneously, as April 17,
2020. Tr. at 120, 134 (DIB), 19 (SSI). (The ALJ recognizes that the application was denied on
October 2, 2019, Tr. at 19, which makes an April 17, 2020 filing date impossible.) The filing
dates are immaterial to the issues presented; for the purposes of this Opinion and Order, the
undersigned assumes the same protective filing date for both applications.
3 The administrative transcript also contains paperwork documenting
administrative denials of prior-filed claims that are not at issue here.
4 The hearing was held telephonically, with Plaintiff’s consent, because of
extraordinary circumstances presented by the earlier stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Tr.
at 19, 85, 201.
20, 2021, the ALJ issued a Decision finding Plaintiff not disabled through the
date of the Decision. See Tr. at 19-36.
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested review of the Decision by the Appeals
Council; she obtained counsel and submitted additional medical evidence and a
brief authored by her counsel in support. Tr. at 2, 5-6 (Appeals Council exhibit
list and orders), 8, 11-15 (letter from counsel and representative appointment
forms), 42-69 (medical evidence), 203-04 (request for review), 373 (brief). On
April 25, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, Tr. at
1-4, making the ALJ’s Decision the final decision of the Commissioner. On June
7, 2022, Plaintiff commenced this action, through counsel, under 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g) and 1383(c)(3) by timely filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1) seeking judicial
review of the Commissioner’s final decision.
Plaintiff on appeal makes two arguments: 1) the ALJ erred “in failing to
develop the record regarding [] Plaintiff’s mental impairments”; and 2) the ALJ
erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s “complaints regarding her migraine headaches.”
Memorandum in Opposition to the Commissioner’s Decision (Doc. No. 18; “Pl.’s
Mem.”), filed September 7, 2022, at 2, 6, 8 (emphasis and capitalization
omitted). On November 1, 2022, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Support of
the Commissioner’s Decision (Doc. No. 20; “Def.’s Mem.”) addressing Plaintiff’s
arguments. After a thorough review of the entire record and consideration of
the parties’ respective arguments, the undersigned finds that the
Commissioner’s final decision is due to be affirmed.
II. The ALJ’s Decision
When determining whether an individual is disabled,5 an ALJ must
follow the five-step sequential inquiry set forth in the Regulations, determining
as appropriate whether the claimant (1) is currently employed or engaging in
substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one listed in the
Regulations; (4) can perform past relevant work; and (5) retains the ability to
perform any work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see
also Simon v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 7 F.4th 1094, 1101-02 (11th Cir. 2021)
(citations omitted); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004).
The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four, and at step five,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5
(1987).
Here, the ALJ followed the five-step inquiry. See Tr. at 22-36. At step one,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful
5 “Disability” is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A).
activity since May 22, 2019, the alleged onset date.” Tr. at 22 (emphasis and
citation omitted). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the following
severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, including cervical spondylosis
and radiculopathy; degenerative osteoarthritis; gastritis; gastro-esophageal
reflux disease (GERD); iron deficiency anemia; [and] migraine headaches.” Tr.
at 23 (emphasis and citation omitted). At step three, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
[C.F.R.] Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. at 25-26 (emphasis and citation
omitted).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following residual functional
capacity (“RFC”):
[Plaintiff can] perform light work as defined in 20 CFR [§§]
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with the following limitations:
[Plaintiff] can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally, and 10
pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for six (6) hours in an eight-
hour day; and sit for six (6) hours in an eight-hour day. [Plaintiff]
can frequently climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl. [Plaintiff] must avoid climbing ladders and scaffolds.
[Plaintiff] can occasionally handle and feel with both hands.
[Plaintiff] can frequently finger with both hands. [Plaintiff] must
avoid working around high, exposed places and moving, mechanical
parts.
Tr. at 26 (emphasis omitted).
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “is unable to perform any past
relevant work” as a “tagger,” an “attendant, laundry and dry cleaning service,”
and a “presser, machine.” Tr. at 35 (some emphasis and citation omitted). The
ALJ then proceeded to the fifth and final step of the sequential inquiry. Tr. at
35-36. After considering Plaintiff’s age (“47 years old . . . on the alleged
disability onset date”), education (“at least a high school education”), work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony and found that
“there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
[Plaintiff] can perform,” Tr. at 35, such as “usher,” “children’s attendant,” and
“furniture rental consultant.” Tr. at 36 (some emphasis omitted). The ALJ
concluded Plaintiff “has not been under a disability . . . from May 22, 2019,
through the date of th[e D]ecision.” Tr. at 36 (emphasis and citation omitted).
III. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision as to disability
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given
to the ALJ’s conclusions of law, findings of fact “are conclusive if . . . supported
by ‘substantial evidence.’” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Substantial
evidence is something ‘more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.’” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)). The substantial
evidence standard is met when there is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see also Biestek v.
Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019); Samuels v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
959 F.3d 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). It is not for this Court
to reweigh the evidence; rather, the entire record is reviewed to determine
whether “the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted). The decision reached by the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is
supported by substantial evidence—even if the evidence preponderates against
the Commissioner’s findings. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155,
1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to develop the record regarding
her mental impairments, Pl.’s Mem. at 6-8, and in evaluating her complaints
regarding the effects of her migraine headaches, id. at 8-11. The arguments are
addressed in turn.
A. Development of Record Regarding Mental Impairments
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by not fully developing the record as to her
alleged mental impairments. Pl.’s Mem. at 6-8. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ
should have “order[ed] a consultative examination regarding [] Plaintiff’s
psychological difficulties.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff also asserts the Court should take
into account that the hearing was only fifteen minutes long in determining
whether the record was fully and fairly developed. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff recognizes that she submitted (largely illegible) mental
treatment notes from Bharminder Bedi, M.D., only after the hearing in the case,
id. at 7-8, but the reality reflected in the administrative transcript is only two
of Dr. Bedi’s notes were submitted to the ALJ, see Tr. at 872-77. The rest of the
evidence from Dr. Bedi was submitted to the Appeals Council after ALJ issued
the Decision. See Tr. at 2 (Appeals Council Order), 42-53 (notes). Some of
Plaintiff’s argument is seemingly premised on the erroneous factual contention
that the ALJ had before him all of Dr. Bedi’s notes. See Pl.’s Mem. at 8. Plaintiff
does not challenge the Appeals Council’s denial of review in light of this
evidence. See id. In the end, Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have “asked for
a typed transcript of the records from Dr. Bedi, utilized a medical advisor at a
supplemental hearing, ordered a consultative psychological examination, sent
interrogatories to a psychiatrist or psychologist, or otherwise developed the
record regarding [Plaintiff’s] mental limitations.” Id.
Responding, Defendant contends the ALJ did not abrogate the duty to
fully and fairly develop the record. Def.’s Mem. at 5-8. Moreover, Defendant
argues Plaintiff has failed to show the required prejudice that would necessitate
a remand. Id.
Although the parties do not cite the law applicable to a claimant who
proceeds without representation, because Plaintiff represented herself during
the hearing before the ALJ, the undersigned provides a brief overview of the
legal framework for self-represented claimants later making a “development of
the record” challenge.
A claimant has a statutory right to be represented at a hearing before an
ALJ. 42 U.S.C. § 406; see also Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934 (11th Cir.
1995); Smith, 677 F.2d at 828. The Commissioner “has a duty to notify [the]
claimant of his or her right to [representation] before the hearing.” Smith, 677
F.2d at 828 (citation omitted). Though the right to be represented may be
waived by the claimant, the waiver must be knowing and voluntary. See Brown,
44 F.3d at 935; Smith, 677 F.2d at 828. “[S]uch a waiver must establish, at some
point, that the claimant is properly apprised of his [or her] options concerning
representation to be effective.” Smith, 677 F.2d at 828 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)
“When an unrepresented claimant unfamiliar with administrative
hearing procedures appears before an ALJ, the ALJ is under an obligation to
develop a full and fair record; i.e. the record must disclose that there has been
a full and fair hearing.” Kelley v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985)
(emphasis and citation omitted). If the claimant did not validly waive the right
to be represented, “the ALJ is under a ‘special duty’ to develop a full and fair
hearing by conscientiously probing into all relevant facts.” Id. n.2 (citations
omitted). “This duty requires, essentially, a record which shows that the
claimant was not prejudiced by the lack of [representation].” Id. (quoting Smith,
677 F.2d at 829). In examining whether a claimant was prejudiced by the lack
of representation, a reviewing court must ensure the ALJ “scrupulously and
conscientiously probe[d] into, inquire[d] of, and explore[d] for all the relevant
facts.” Brown, 44 F.3d at 934-35 (quoting Smith, 677 F.2d at 829).
Conversely, if the claimant validly waived the right to be represented, the
claimant must show “clear prejudice or unfairness” caused by the lack of
representation to prove that he was denied a full and fair hearing.6 Kelley, 761
F.2d at 1540 n.2 (quoting Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Of particular importance is “whether the record reveals evidentiary gaps which
result in unfairness or ‘clear prejudice.’” Brown, 44 F.3d at 935. Missing medical
documentation or documentation of vocational services supporting a claim of
disability can be prejudicial, especially when it relates to treatment occurring
6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has stated the
following regarding the two standards and their application:
These two standards appear to differ only in degree. Both require that the ALJ
fully develop the record. Both require a showing of prejudice to necessitate a
remand to the [Commissioner] for reconsideration. The only discernable
difference is that a more specific showing of prejudice is required if [a] claimant
did not waive his [or her] right to [representation].
Kelley, 761 F.2d at 1540 n.2.
near or during the period in which the claimant is eligible for disability
insurance benefits. See id.
While “[t]he [ALJ] has a duty to develop the record where appropriate[,]”
the ALJ “is not required to order a consultative examination as long as the
record contains sufficient evidence for the [ALJ] to make an informed decision.”
Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing
Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1281).
Here, Plaintiff does not challenge whether she validly waived the right to
representation. See generally Pl.’s Mem. Prior to the hearing, on two occasions,
the Administration sent documents to Plaintiff explaining her right to
representation. Tr. at 176-77, 194-95. In a separate document entitled,
“Important Notice About Representation,” the Administration again advised
Plaintiff of her right and listed organizations that provide free legal services
(with corresponding addresses and contact information). Tr. at 178-90
(emphasis omitted). At the hearing, the ALJ advised Plaintiff of the right to
representation, including how fees work in social security cases. Tr. at 85-86.
The ALJ then ensured Plaintiff understood her right, and asked if she would
“like to proceed today or . . . to find a representative.” Tr. at 86. Plaintiff
responded that she wanted to proceed. Tr. at 86.
Under the circumstances, Plaintiff validly waived her right to
representation. Moreover, the ALJ did not abrogate the duty to fully and fairly
develop the record. The ALJ obtained much of the medical evidence on his own
initiative. See Tr. at 339, 341, 343, 352. Because Plaintiff did not even allege a
mental disorder and had no recent mental diagnosis, the Administration
determined at an early stage that there was no need to develop the record
further on mental impairments. Tr. at 297. At the hearing, the only mention of
mental limitations was Plaintiff testifying that she “get[s] anxious” and “get[s]
stressed for nothing sometimes and maybe because of the pain.” Tr. at 91-92.
The ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on the mental
impairments, recognizing diagnoses of “generalized anxiety disorder, major
depressive disorder, and bipolar disorder.” Tr. at 24. The ALJ found, however,
that “considered singly and in combination,” the disorders “do not cause more
than minimal limitation in [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic mental work
activities and are therefore nonsevere.” Tr. at 24. The ALJ then discussed in
detail all of the evidence on the broad areas of functional limitation and made
findings that Plaintiff had either mild or no limitation in each area. Tr. at 24-
25. Later, in discussing the medical evidence as it pertained to the RFC, the
ALJ summarized in detail the evidence relating to Plaintiff’s alleged mental
impairments, including a 2015 mental examination that had been conducted in
relation to a past application for benefits. Tr. at 28, 34, 28-34. The ALJ assigned
an RFC that does not contain specific mental limitations. Tr. at 26.
Plaintiff does not challenge any of the ALJ’s mental findings, instead
contending the ALJ should have sent her for a mental consultative examination
or otherwise developed the record more on her mental impairments. But, the
record contained enough evidence upon which to make an informed decision. In
any event, Plaintiff has not demonstrated prejudice. The ALJ did not reversibly
err. Moreover, Plaintiff does not challenge the Appeals Council’s denial of
review in the face of the mental treatment notes (which are largely illegible
anyway).
B. Effects of Migraine Headaches
Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of her complaints about the
effects of her migraine headaches. Pl.’s Mem. at 9-11. According to Plaintiff,
“[a]lthough the [ALJ] gives reasons for discrediting [Plaintiff’s] testimony, they
are not good reasons.” Id. at 11. Responding, Defendant argues the ALJ gave
explicit reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discrediting Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints about how her headaches affect her. Def.’s Mem. at 9-11.
“[T]o establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other
symptoms, the claimant must satisfy two parts of a three-part showing:
(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective
medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the
objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise
to the claimed pain.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002)
(citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)). “The claimant’s
subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard
is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223.
“In evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms,
the ALJ considers the entire record, including the objective medical evidence,
the claimant’s history, and statements of the claimant and [his or] her doctors.”
Belser v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, No. 20-12121, 2021 WL 6116639, at *6 (11th
Cir. Dec. 27, 2021) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1)-(2)); see also
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (SSA 2017). The Regulations in effect at the time
of the ALJ’s Decision provided that an ALJ “will” also consider other factors
related to symptoms such as pain, including:
(i) [The claimant’s] daily activities; (ii) The location,
duration, frequency, and intensity of [the claimant’s]
pain or other symptoms; (iii) Precipitating and
aggravating factors; (iv) The type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of any medication [the
claimant] take[s] or ha[s] taken to alleviate [his or her]
pain or other symptoms; (v) Treatment, other than
medication, [the claimant] receive[s] or ha[s] received
for relief of [his or her] pain or other symptoms; (vi) Any
measures [the claimant] use[s] or ha[s] used to relieve
[his or her] pain or other symptoms . . .; and (vii) Other
factors concerning [the claimant’s] functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other
symptoms.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii). To reject the claimant’s assertions of
subjective symptoms, “explicit and adequate reasons” must be articulated by
the ALJ. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225; see also Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210; Marbury v.
Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992).7
Here, Plaintiff testified she gets “migraine headaches a lot” and she takes
“migraine pills every day.” Tr. at 91. She indicated the headaches occur “all day”
but can “stop[] for like a couple of hours” after taking medication. Tr. at 92.
According to Plaintiff, sometimes she has to “stay in bed all day” because of the
headaches.” Tr. at 92.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms” but that Plaintiff’s
“symptoms concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record.” Tr. at 27. The ALJ adequately summarized the medical
evidence, particularly as it relates to the migraine headaches. Tr. at 28. The
ALJ recognized Plaintiff’s reports of “daily headaches and need for rescue
7 In 2017, the SSA issued new guidance to ALJs about how to evaluate subjective
complaints of pain and other symptoms. The SSA has “eliminat[ed] the use of the term
‘credibility’ from [its] sub-regulatory policy, as [the R]egulations do not use this term.” SSR
16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2 (Oct. 25, 2017). “In doing so, [the SSA has] clarif[ied] that
subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character.” Id.
Accordingly, ALJs are “instruct[ed] . . . to consider all of the evidence in an individual’s record
when they evaluate the intensity and persistence of symptoms after they find that the
individual has a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to
produce those symptoms.” Id. “The change in wording is meant to clarify that [ALJs] aren’t in
the business of impeaching claimants’ character; obviously [ALJs] will continue to assess the
credibility of pain assertions by applicants, especially as such assertions often cannot be either
credited or rejected on the basis of medical evidence.” Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411, 412 (7th
Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original).
medication daily.” Tr. at 31. On Plaintiff’s headaches, the ALJ made the
following findings:
With respect to [Plaintiff’s] headaches, it is not entirely
clear whether these are truly migraine headaches or
headaches related to her cervical degenerative disc
disease, as suggested by her primary care provider.
Regardless, [Plaintiff’s] allegations concerning her
headaches have been consistent, including her
description of the location of pain, type and severity of
pain, onset, duration, occurrence, associated
symptoms, and aggravating factors (SSR 19-4p). That
being said, even with these headaches, [Plaintiff]
consistently appears alert, oriented, and in no acute
distress at her various appointments. One would expect
someone experiencing headaches of the severity and
frequency described by [Plaintiff] to exhibit some
constitutional abnormalities. Similarly, although she
reports complaints of episodes of lightheadedness and
dizziness, for which she uses medication, she is
consistently noted as having intact coordination and
cranial nerves on examination, and there is no evidence
of recurrent falls.
Tr. at 32 (citations omitted). The ALJ then included “safety precaution”
measures in the RFC to account for the headaches. Tr. at 33; see Tr. at 26 (RFC).
Plaintiff does not challenge whether these findings are supported by
substantial evidence, instead arguing summarily that the ALJ did not provide
good reasons for the findings on her headaches. Pl.’s Mem. at 11. But, the ALJ
adequately complied with the applicable authority in considering the various
factors, and the ALJ’s reasons for finding Plaintiff’s allegations are not entirely
consistent are accurate and supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not
reversibly err.
V. Conclusion
The ALJ’s Decision is supported by substantial evidence. In light of the
foregoing, it is
ORDERED:
1. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 18838(c)(3), AFFIRMING the
Commissioner’s final decision.
2. The Clerk is further directed to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on September 22, 20238.
amare KR. Khincdt
JAMES R. KLINDT
United States Magistrate Judge
kaw
Copies:
Counsel of Record
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