Opinion

Juravin v. Kennedy

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Sep 19, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.0%

“[T]he removal of a bankruptcy trustee is a ‘final’ order appealable to this Court.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[T]he removal of a bankruptcy trustee is a ‘final’ order appealable to this Court.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

In Re: Don Karl Juravin

DON KARL JURAVIN,

Appellant,

v. Case No: 5:23-cv-164-GAP

DENNIS D. KENNEDY,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court without oral argument on appeal from

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. Appellant

Don Karl Juravin (the “Debtor”) appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s Order granting in

part and denying in part his pro se Motion to Unseal Documents, for Contempt, to

Compel, and for Removal of the Chapter 7 Trustee (“Motion”). With the parties’

briefing complete (Docs. 12 & 15), the matter is ripe for disposition.

I. Background

This appeal arises from the execution of a “break order” in connection

with the Debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. Following difficulties

obtaining discovery from the Debtor, the Appellee and Chapter 7 Trustee,

Dennis D. Kennedy (the “Trustee”), filed an ex parte motion for a break order to

search the Debtor’s home for documents, electronic data, and certain assets that

may be part of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court granted that

motion, and on May 5, 2021, the Trustee executed the Break Order in the

presence of the Debtor’s wife, Anna Juravin (“Mrs. Juravin”). See In re Juravin,

No. 6:21-cv-1922-GAP, 2022 WL 846074, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2022). The

Trustee filed an inventory with the Bankruptcy Court listing all the items

obtained during the execution of the Break Order. Id.

Five months later, the Debtor and Mrs. Juravin, through their counsel, filed

a motion seeking the removal of the Trustee, the disqualification of his counsel,

and a protective order relating to evidence obtained during the execution of the

Break Order. Id. On October 18, 2021, the Debtor and Mrs. Juravin filed an

amended motion seeking the same relief. Id. On November 9, 2021, the

Bankruptcy Court held a hearing where it heard argument and denied the motion.

See In re Juravin, 6:18-bk-6821-LVV, Doc. 669-1 at 37 (Br. M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2021).

Mrs. Juravin appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the motion, and, on March

22, 2022, this Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. See In re Juravin, 2022 WL

846074, at *1.

Nearly a year later, the Debtor—now proceeding pro se—filed the instant

Motion. See Doc. 12 at 16-24 (Motion filed on January 9, 2023). The Debtor asked

the Bankruptcy Court to unseal the motion for a break order or provide copies to

the Debtor, to require the Trustee to file a report detailing the assets he uncovered

in executing the Break Order, and to remove the Trustee from the case and

disqualify the Trustee’s counsel. Id. On February 1, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court

granted the Debtor’s Motion in part, directing the clerk to unseal certain filings and

any hearing record related to the Break Order. Id. at 40-41. The Bankruptcy Court

denied the Debtor’s Motion in all other respects, and it directed the Debtor to cease

requesting removal of the Trustee or the Trustee’s counsel, warning him that it

may impose sanctions against him if he fails to comply. Id. The Debtor now appeals

the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling.

II. Legal Standard

Bankruptcy court orders removing or denying the removal of the trustee

are final, appealable orders. See In re Walker, 515 F.3d 1204, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“[T]he removal of a bankruptcy trustee is a ‘final’ order appealable to this

Court.”); see also In re Steffen, No. 8:09-cv-353-JDW, 2011 WL 13174777, at *2 (M.D.

Fla. Oct. 12, 2011) (concluding that the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning with respect to

orders removing the trustee “applies with equal force to orders denying the

removal of a trustee”). Therefore, district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals

of such orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

A bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to remove a trustee is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. See In re Steffen, 2011 WL 13174777, at *3 (citing In re AFI

Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2008)). And a bankruptcy court’s ruling on

employment of counsel is also reviewed for abuse of discretion, as is a bankruptcy

court’s ruling with respect to sanctions. See In re Cecil, 8:12-cv-958-T-27, 2012 WL

3231321, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2012) (collecting cases); In re Adell, 296 F. App’x

837, 839 (11th Cir. 2008).1

A court “abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies

the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in

making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”

Torres v. First Transit, Inc., 979 F.3d 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brown v. Ala.

Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1173 (11th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “A ‘clear error in judgment’ is also an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting

United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005)).

III. Analysis

In yet another frivolous appeal, the Debtor requests relief that both the

Bankruptcy Court and this Court have already determined is unwarranted. See In re

Juravin, 2022 WL 846074. As an initial matter, the Debtor’s underlying Motion

includes no more than cursory references to the issue that he focuses on in his

1 In the Eleventh Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent,

but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36–2.

appeal. In his briefing on appeal, the Debtor focuses on the Bankruptcy Court’s

alleged refusal to sanction the Chapter 7 Trustee and his attorneys for failing to serve

the Debtor with a copy of both the Trustee’s Renewed and Supplemental Motion for

issuing a “Break Order” and the resulting Break Order. See Doc. 12 at 16-24.

However, the Debtor’s underlying Motion focused on two different requests:

(1) that the Court unseal the Trustee’s Renewed and Supplemental Motion for

issuing a “Break Order”—a request which the Court granted—and (2) that the Court

remove the Trustee and his counsel. See id.; see also Doc. 1-1 at 5-6.

The Debtor’s shift in focus on appeal seemingly relates to the Bankruptcy

Court’s direction that the Debtor “cease requesting removal of the Trustee or

Trustee’s counsel” and statement that, if he failed to comply, the Bankruptcy Court

“may impose sanctions against the Debtor, including but not limited to, attorney’s

fees and costs.” Id. at 6; see also Doc. 12 at 11. The Debtor also takes issue with this

warning in his briefing; specifically, he asserts that the “Bankruptcy Court not only

failed to impose a warranted sanction against a party, it then found a way to threaten

the party seeking relief.” Doc. 12 at 5, 10.

The Debtor’s appeal is meritless. Assuming the Debtor preserved the

arguments he raises on appeal,2 the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion

2 “[I]f the record reflects an issue was presented in a cursory manner and never properly

presented to the Bankruptcy Court, the issue is not preserved for appeal.” In re Monetary Grp., 91

when it chose not to impose sanctions against the Trustee or his counsel and instead

reprimanded the Debtor for again seeking their removal. As even the Debtor

recognizes, the Bankruptcy Court has significant discretion in determining whether

(or not) to impose sanctions. See Doc. 12 at 12; In re Adell, 296 F. App’x at 839–40.

“The bankruptcy court’s power to sanction ‘must be exercised with restraint

and discretion.’” In re Adell, 296 F. App’x at 839 (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991)). Here, the Bankruptcy Court appropriately exercised restraint

and discretion when it declined to sanction the Trustee and his counsel and

reprimanded the Debtor. This is particularly true considering (1) that the

Bankruptcy Court unsealed the Trustee’s Renewed and Supplemental Motion for

issuing a “Break Order,” as well as the record of any hearing related to it, at the

Debtor’s request, 3 and (2) that the Bankruptcy Court and this Court have

previously denied the Debtor’s request for the removal of the Trustee and his

counsel. Given the circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court clearly did not abuse its

discretion.4

B.R. 138, 140 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (citing In re Espino, 806 F.2d 1001, 1002 (11th Cir. 1986)).

3 It is worth noting that the Bankruptcy Court’s granting of this request was magnanimous,

especially considering the Trustee’s evidence, which appears to demonstrate that counsel for the

Trustee emailed copies of the Trustee’s Renewed and Supplemental Motion for issuing a Break

Order and the resulting Break Order to the Debtor’s prior counsel the day after the Break Order

was executed. See Doc. 10-19 at 8-10 (Email from Lauren Schindler to Aldo Bartolone dated May 6,

2021) and Doc. 10-11 (Trustee’s Notice of Compliance with Break Order [502], dated May 17, 2021).

4 The Debtor’s instant appeal constitutes another “abusive and frivolous filing” stemming

from his underlying bankruptcy proceeding in 6:18-bk-06821-LVV. See In re: Vexatious Litigants in

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Bankruptcy

Court’s Order is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is hereby ORDERED to enter judgment

for the Trustee.

Additionally, the Debtor is ORDERED to show cause as to why sanctions

should not be imposed pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8020

due to his filing of this frivolous appeal. The Debtor shall file a written response

within fourteen days of the date of this order.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on September 19,

2023.

aun) |) GREGORY A. PRESNELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Party

the Orlando Division, 6:23-mc-03-RBD, at 1. The Debtor is reminded that this Court “has a

responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery

needed by others,” id. (quoting Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986)), and is

“authorized to restrict access to vexatious and abusive litigants.” Id. (quoting Brewer v. United

States, 614 F. App’x 426, 427 (11th Cir. 2015)).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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