explaining that a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint as a shotgun pleading but that the Court must “sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy such deficiencies”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint as a shotgun pleading but that the Court must “sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy such deficiencies”
- “[O]nce a pro se . . . litigant is in court, [s]he is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JOANN KNIGA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 8:23-cv-1045-KKM-UAM
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION,
Defendants.
___________________________________
ORDER
On May 11, 2023, Joann Kniga, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint detailing
allegations of employment discrimination and violations of her constitutional rights and
requesting an “emergency hearing.” Emergency Compl. (Doc. 1) at 13. I denied the
request for an emergency hearing because Kniga failed to move for emergency relief as
required by Local Rule 3.01(e), and I struck the Complaint as an impermissible shotgun
pleading. Strike Order (Doc. 2).
Kniga filed an amended complaint that was also a shotgun pleading. Am.
Compl. (Doc. 6). I struck it and again granted leave to amend. 2d Strike Order (Doc. 9).
The same series of events played out with the Second Amended Complaint. 2d Am.
Compl. (Doc. 10); 3d Strike Order (Doc. 12). I then granted Kniga a third chance to file
a complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while emphasizing
that this would be “Kniga’s final opportunity to . . . remedy the above specified deficiencies
before the Court dismisses this action.” 3d Strike Order at 6. Kniga has now filed a Third
Amended Complaint. 3d Am. Compl. (Doc. 18). Because it, too, is a shotgun
pleading, this action is dismissed with prejudice.
The Third Amended Complaint—like each of Kniga’s pleadings to date—
constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading.
, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
requires that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 10(b) provides that “[a] party must state its claims or
defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances.” FED. R. CIV. P. And “[i]f doing so would promote clarity, each claim
founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.”
“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly
referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’ ” , 792 F.3d at 1320. The Eleventh Circuit has
explained that such complaints are “altogether unacceptable” because they “exact an
intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket.” , 117 F.3d 1258, 1263
(11th Cir. 1997). And although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a
less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, the Court has “little tolerance for
shotgun pleadings.” , 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint as a
shotgun pleading but that the Court must “sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy
such deficiencies”); , 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)
(“[O]nce a pro se . . . litigant is in court, [s]he is subject to the relevant law and rules of
court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized four basic types of shotgun pleadings: (1) a
complaint that contains multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts; (2) a complaint that is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial
facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3) a complaint that fails to
separate into different counts each cause of action or claim for relief; and (4) a complaint
that asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the
defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions or which of the defendants the claim
is brought against. , 792 F.3d at 1321–23. But “[t]he unifying characteristic of all
types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or
another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds
upon which each claim rests.” at 1323.
Although the Third Amended Complaint attempts to address the problems
identified by earlier orders, it remains a prototypical shotgun pleading. Most notably,
despite scattered instances of numbered paragraphs at several points throughout, Kniga
still fails to “state [her] claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). The Third Amended
Complaint is also not “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [Kniga] is
entitled to relief.” 8(a)(2). For example, Kniga devotes several pages to an alleged
criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 242. 3d Am. Compl. at 1–3, 9. But she never
explains how such a conspiracy, if true, would result in a civil claim against either named
Defendant, both of which are state governmental entities. Kniga’s invocation of § 448.102,
FLA. STAT., does not resolve this problem. That statute applies only to “employers,” and
Kniga has never alleged that she was employed by the Florida Department of Health or
the Board of Nursing. 3d Am. Compl. at 5–8 (detailing Kniga’s employment at several
different healthcare facilities). All told, the Third Amended Complaint remains so “replete
with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular
cause of action,” , 792 F.3d at 1322, that it fails to give Defendants “adequate
notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests,” at
1323.
On top of being an impermissible shotgun pleading, the Third Amended
Complaint fails to comply with the Local Rules. As I have explained before to Kniga (who
is on notice now when drafting this fourth complaint), “pro se parties are not exempt from
compliance with relevant laws and Local Rules.” See 3d Strike Order at 5; Moon, 863 F.2d
at 837. Kniga’s Third Amended Complaint again violates Local Rule 1.08’s strictures
concerning spacing, page numbering, and margins for pleadings.
Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 18) is DISMISSED.
2. The Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT, which shall read “This case is
dismissed with prejudice,” and to CLOSE this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on September 18, 2023.
athryn’ Kimball Mizelle
United States District Judge