Sanguinetti v. Rambosk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JORGE SANGUINETTI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:21-cv-529-JLB-KCD

KEVIN RAMBOSK, COLLIER

COUNTY, SLR NAPLES CORP.,

ADAM DILLMAN, JOHN

SCADUTO, DAVID DRUCKS,

MICHAEL PUKA, DAVID CRISP,

JR., STERGIOS TALLIDES,

JOESPH MARINO, and JASON

BURO,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

In a second amended complaint (Doc. 72) (the “SAC”) that spans 49 pages and

more than 300 paragraphs, Mr. Sanguinetti claims Defendants—both public

employees and private individuals, in their individual and official capacities—

violated his rights under the United States Constitution and Florida common law.

Defendants have moved for dismissal (Doc. 79; Doc. 81; Doc. 82), which Mr.

Sanguinetti opposes (Doc. 87; Doc. 88; Doc. 89). After careful review, Collier

County’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 79) is DENIED without prejudice, while the

other motions (Doc. 81; Doc. 82) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND1

Defendant Stergios Tallides owns and operates the Cavo Lounge through

Defendant SLR Naples Corp. in Naples, Florida. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 14, 20). Defendants

Jason Buro and Joseph Marino (with Mr. Tallides and the Cavo Lounge, the “Cavo

Lounge Defendants”) are Cavo Lounge employees. (Id. at ¶ 22). The Cavo Lounge

hires CCSO deputies for additional security “in consideration for monetary

compensation and/or other benefits.” (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 18–21). Defendants John

Scaduto and Adam Dillman are two such deputies. (Id. at ¶ 18).

On July 15, 2017, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Mr. Sanguinetti, a thirty-one

year old male Hispanic or Latino citizen of Peru who currently resides in Collier

County, Florida, attempted to enter the Cavo Lounge with a group of friends. (Id.

at ¶¶ 10, 23, 26). Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino observed Mr. Sanguinetti “act, speak

and dress in a manner in which they perceived to be Hispanic or Latino from a

foreign nation or country” and allegedly “uttered several derogatory comments”

about Mr. Sanguinetti’s race or national origin. (Id. at ¶¶ 30–31). They then denied

Mr. Sanguinetti and his friends entry to the Cavo Lounge, ostensibly because the

group did not meet the Cavo Lounge’s dress code. (Id. at ¶ 27). Mr. Sanguinetti

attempted to speak with Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino after noticing that “white and

non-foreign appearing” patrons dressed similarly to—or even less appropriately

1 “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and

the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999)

(citation omitted). Accordingly, this background section accepts as true the well-

pleaded facts recited in the SAC.

than—him and his friends entered the Cavo Lounge without incident. (Id. at ¶¶

33–34).

Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino allegedly conferred and agreed to have Mr.

Sanguinetti “expelled” from the premises. (Id. at ¶ 36). They summoned Deputies

Dillman and Scaduto, who allegedly “were known to exhibit violent and aggressive

tendencies toward patrons.” (Id. at ¶ 37). When Deputies Dillman and Scaduto

arrived, they immediately shouted at Mr. Sanguinetti and ordered him to leave the

premises. (Id. at ¶ 38). Mr. Sanguinetti attempted to explain himself and leave the

area, but the Deputies would not listen and would not let him leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 39–

40). Deputies Dillman and Scaduto shoved and struck Mr. Sanguinetti, after which

Deputies David Drucks, Michael Puka, and David Crisp (with Deputies Dillman

and Scaduto, the “Deputy Defendants”) arrived on the scene and together, they

physically restrained and beat Mr. Sanguinetti with closed fists. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 40–

42). Deputy Scaduto then sprayed Mr. Sanguinetti with mace and incapacitated

him with several shocks from a taser. (Id. at ¶ 43).

Eventually, Mr. Sanguinetti was—allegedly without probable cause—

transported to the Collier County Jail. (Id. at ¶¶ 47–49, 70–72, 93). Mr.

Sanguinetti was arraigned for felony crimes, including battery on a law enforcement

officer and resisting arrest with violence; bail was set at $16,000. (Id. at ¶¶ 49–50,

70–72, 93). But he claims that he did not make unlawful contact with Defendants

or resist arrest, and that the Deputy Defendants did not observe or hear about Mr.

Sanguinetti violating any laws. (Id. at ¶¶ 52–55).

Even so, Mr. Sanguinetti alleges that the Deputy Defendants, along with Mr.

Buro and Mr. Marino, “each submitted knowingly false sworn statements or

testimony regarding [their] interaction [with] Mr. Sanguinetti” that directly

contradicted video evidence of the altercation. (Id. at ¶¶ 56–57). He also alleges

they suppressed “exculpatory evidence, so that Mr. Sanguinetti would be prosecuted

for crimes they were fully aware he did not commit or even attempt to commit.” (Id.

at ¶ 58).

Mr. Sanguinetti contends that Sheriff Rambosk “was immediately apprised of

the facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. Sanguinetti’s arrest and detainment”

and, after “personally evaluat[ing] the evidence against Mr. Sanguinetti,” he

“directed [the Deputy Defendants] to levy all fault and blame” for the incident on

Mr. Sanguinetti. (Id. at ¶¶ 59–61). He alleges that Sheriff Rambosk approved and

ratified Mr. Sanguinetti’s continued and allegedly unlawful imprisonment, and he

forwarded false evidence to prosecutors “despite being fully aware that [Deputies]

Scaduto and Dillman were the true causes of the fiasco.” (Id. at ¶¶ 60–62).

Mr. Sanguinetti claims that Sheriff Rambosk openly instituted, maintained,

and supported a policy or custom within the CCSO that encourages its officers to

work concurrently for private companies and citizens by providing security for

nightclubs. (Id. at ¶¶ 63, 65). This policy allegedly explains why about ten

uniformed deputies were on the scene at the Cavo Lounge for Mr. Sanguinetti’s

arrest. (Id. at ¶ 64). Mr. Sanguinetti states the Deputy Defendants were also

supervised, directed, and compensated by the Cavo Lounge Defendants while

“ostensibly on [] duty and in uniform.” (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 86–89).

Mr. Sanguinetti alleges that Sheriff Rambosk and the CCSO have a de facto

policy and custom of tolerating the use of excessive force, and the CCSO has

repeatedly been accused of abuse of discretion, false statements, excessive force, and

failure to discipline officers. (Id. at ¶¶ 66–67).2 Mr. Sanguinetti alleges that—

under the CCSO’s arrangement with Cavo Lounge to arrest and prosecute “any

individual deemed to act in an unsatisfactory or offensive manner toward [the Cavo

Longue Defendants]”—the CCSO Defendants falsely arrested, assaulted, and

battered him, used excessive force against him, and maliciously prosecuted him.

(Id. at ¶¶ 89–90). Mr. Sanguinetti alleges that the Deputy Defendants’ actions “are

representative of a pervasive policy, custom or pattern and practice within the

CCSO,” and that Sheriff Rambosk has tacitly authorized such policies and customs.

(Id. at ¶¶ 98–99, 108).

On or about August 11, 2017, a Florida state criminal information was filed,

allegedly “predicated on . . . false, misleading or incomplete information” which the

CCSO Defendants provided “because of their desire to incur favor and to continue

their lucrative business relationships with” the Cavo Lounge Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶

83–85). Throughout, Mr. Sanguinetti maintained his innocence, and a Florida state

2 Paragraph 67 includes five bullet points listing news articles or federal civil case

numbers intended to provide specific support for these allegations. (Doc. 72 at 13).

jury acquitted Mr. Sanguinetti of all charges. (Id. at ¶¶ 94–95). This lawsuit

followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all

factual allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint as true and take them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1

(11th Cir. 1999). But conclusory allegations are not presumed to be true. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).

The Court employs the Twombly–Iqbal plausibility standard when reviewing

a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 n.2

(11th Cir. 2010). A claim is plausible if the plaintiff alleges facts that “allow[ ] the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege

sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence” that supports the plaintiff’s claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Thus, “an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is insufficient. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if

it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal modifications omitted). And courts are not

“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

DISCUSSION

Broadly speaking, the SAC alleges that Mr. Sanguinetti’s constitutional and

civil rights were violated under federal law, while also raising claims under Florida

common law. (Doc. 72). He sues Sheriff Rambosk in his individual and official

capacities (id. at ¶ 17), and he sues the Deputy Defendants, Mr. Buro, and Mr.

Marino in their individual capacities (id. at ¶¶ 18, 19, 22). He sues Collier County

(the “County”) directly (id. at ¶ 11) and he seeks to hold Sheriff Rambosk, SLR

Naples Corp., the County, and Mr. Tallides vicariously liable for the actions of

others (id. at ¶¶ 11–22, 128, 139, 163, 171, 182–83 205, 223).

Defendants moved the Court to dismiss Mr. Sanguinetti’s initial complaint

(Doc. 7; Doc. 8; Doc. 51); the Court granted in part and dismissed the initial

complaint without prejudice. (Doc. 67). In its order, the Court gave Defendants

leave to renew their arguments and cautioned Mr. Sanguinetti that a failure to

correct the insufficiencies noted in that order would “result in the dismissal of his

claim with prejudice and without further warning.” (Id. at 26).

In the motions now before the Court, Defendants seek dismissal of Mr.

Sanguinetti’s SAC. (Doc. 79; Doc. 81; Doc. 82). As before, while some arguments

are unique to facts alleged against a specific individual or entity, there remains

some overlap among other grounds for dismissal. The Court will first address

general matters that apply to the SAC as a whole or to several specific counts.

Next, the Court will address grounds for dismissing individual counts.

I. Threshold Issues

A. Shotgun Pleading

“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often

disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.

Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). They can: (a) contain multiple

counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (b) contain

conclusory or vague facts not connected to any particular cause of action; (c) fail to

separate into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief when doing so

would promote clarity; or (d) assert multiple claims against multiple defendants

without specifying which defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or

against which defendant the claim is brought. Id. at 1321–23. Ultimately, a

“dismissal under Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) is appropriate where it is virtually

impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s)

for relief.” Id. at 1325 (quotation omitted, emphasis in original).

Defendants devote significant effort to arguing the SAC (like the initial

complaint) is a shotgun pleading. Undoubtedly, the SAC is sprawling, bloated, and

unwieldy.3 But it improves upon the initial complaint because it attributes specific

acts to specific Defendants, separates distinct causes of action,4 winnows the

Defendants named in each count, and realleges only certain factual allegations in

each count. Because it is not “virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact

3 To be fair, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are neither clear nor thorough.

4 Except for Count Twenty-One, which the Court discusses below.

are intended to support which claims for relief,” the Court declines to dismiss the

SAC wholesale on this basis. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325.

B. Claims against Collier County

The SAC raises several counts against the County directly, and in several

other counts it asserts claims against the County based on the conduct of Sheriff

Rambosk and the Deputy Defendants. The County asks the Court to dismiss the

claims against it with prejudice because it has no power or influence over Sheriff

Rambosk’s law enforcement functions and thus, according to the County, it cannot

be held legally responsible for Sheriff Rambosk’s policies or actions, or those of his

deputies. (Doc. 79 at 3–13).

The Eleventh Circuit has “not been entirely consistent on whether the

relevant entity in an official-capacity suit against a sheriff in Florida is the County

or the Sheriff’s Department (as a unit operating autonomously from the County).”

Brown v. Neumann, 188 F.3d 1289, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999). And whether an

official-capacity claim against a Florida sheriff is against the sheriff’s office or the

county the sheriff serves continues to create problems for district courts. See C.P. ex

rel. Perez v. Collier Cnty., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1097 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

(“Determining the entity a Florida sheriff represents in a section 1983 official

capacity suit has proven problematic.”); Hernandez v. Tregea, No. 2:07-cv-149-FtM-

UASPC, 2008 WL 11430027, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2008) (“[D]istrict courts

interpreting Florida’s laws and governmental structure have lamented that . . .

‘[t]he law is screwed up’ in the area of municipal liability.”) (cleaned up) (quoting

Lucas v. O’Loughlin, 831 F.2d 232, 236 (11th Cir. 1987)). Given these murky

waters, the Court denied the County’s initial motion without prejudice and invited

it to address these concerns in a renewed motion. (Doc. 67 at 11).

The County accepted the Court’s invitation. In its renewed motion, the

County argues that, under Florida law, sheriffs and counties do not have a

principal/agent relationship, and Sheriff Rambosk is not an employee of Collier

County subject to its Board of County Commissioners. (Doc. 79 at 6–7). The

County argues it plays no role in the hiring or supervision of sheriff’s deputies and

cannot dictate how Sheriff Rambosk performs his job. (Id.)

At this juncture, the Court does not have the information necessary to either

dismiss the County from this case or to affirmatively rule that the County is a

proper defendant. Accordingly, the County’s motion is denied without prejudice to

the County renewing these arguments at the summary judgment stage.

Collier County requests that the Court certify the decision on this issue for

interlocutory appeal. (Doc. 79 at 16–18). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court

may certify an order for interlocutory appeal if “such order involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and

[if] an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation” (emphasis added). The party seeking leave to appeal

must satisfy all three elements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); In re Brown, No. 3:18-cv-

415-J-34, 2018 WL 3496790, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2018) (“The party seeking to

appeal an interlocutory order must satisfy all three elements or leave to appeal

must be denied.”) (citation omitted). “Most interlocutory orders do not meet this

test.” OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1359 (11th

Cir. 2008). Indeed, section 1292(b) interlocutory review is a “rare exception.” See

McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hether

to grant permission for an interlocutory appeal lies in the discretion of the appellate

court, which in exercising its discretion should keep in mind that the great bulk of

its review must be conducted after final judgment, with § 1292(b) interlocutory

review being a rare exception.”).

Collier County failed to address the elements of section 1292(b).

Nevertheless, the Court has considered this issue and determines that Collier

County could not meet the standard set forth by section 1292(b) because dismissal

of Collier County would not “materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). An interlocutory appeal would materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation where it “would serve to avoid a

trial or otherwise substantially shorten the litigation.” McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1259.

Collier County is only a defendant in twelve of twenty-one counts (some of which

are dismissed via this order). Even within those twelve counts, Collier County is

the sole defendant in two counts, Counts Thirteen and Fourteen. Thus, resolving

this issue would only remove two counts from the SAC. Accordingly, resolution of

this issue on an interlocutory basis would not serve to avoid a trial or otherwise

shorten the litigation. See, e.g., Collier HMA Physician Mgmt, LLC v. NCH

Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-408-SPC-MRM, 2022 WL 1540396, at *4 (M.D.

Fla. May 16, 2022) (denying request for interlocutory appeal where claims must go

to trial regardless of an appeal and where defendant offered “no reason why

[plaintiff] should wait for its claims to be adjudicated while it pursues an

interlocutory appeal”); Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. v. Montgomery Law

Firm, LLC, No 8:19-cv-1895-CE-CPT, 2021 WL 510273, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 11,

2021) (finding that an immediate appeal would not materially advance the

termination of the litigation because the issue involved one count of nine and there

were multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants involved with many other claims).

Because all three elements must be met for the Court to grant leave to appeal, the

Court need not consider the other elements.

Accordingly, Collier County’s request for the Court to certify the decision for

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is denied.

C. Claims against the Cavo Lounge and Mr. Tallides

In several counts, Mr. Sanguinetti seeks to hold the Cavo Lounge and Mr.

Tallides vicariously liable because they “were the employers and/or supervisors” of

Mr. Buro, Mr. Marino, and the CCSO Defendants. (See, e.g., Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 21, 128,

139, 163, 171, 183).

Section 1983 does not “impose liability vicariously on governing bodies5 solely

on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a

tortfeasor.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692

(1978). It is only when the “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. This policy may not be “nebulous” or

“removed from the constitutional violation.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 822–23 (1985). Rather, a policy “generally implies a course of action

consciously chosen from among various alternatives.” Id. at 823.

To impose Monell liability, it is improper either to infer a municipal entity’s

policy from a single incident or to infer that such a policy caused that single

incident. Id. at 823–24. Broadly speaking, “[o]ne or two incidents of abuse is

generally insufficient to indicate a pattern.” Williams v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

181 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1122 (N.D. Ga. 2016).

And under Florida law, “an employer cannot be held liable for the tortious or

criminal acts of an employee, unless the acts were committed during the course of

5 In Buckner v. Toro, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion

that “the Monell policy or custom requirement applies in suits against private

entities performing functions traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the

state.” 116 F.3d 450, 453 (11th Cir. 1997). The function at issue in Buckner was

the provision of medical care to inmates. Id. Mr. Tallides and the Cavo Lounge

have not challenged whether the actions taken by Mr. Buro, Mr. Marino, and the

Deputy Defendants fall within the scope of Buckner’s holding. As such, that issue is

beyond the scope of this Order.

the employment and to further a purpose or interest, however excessive or

misguided, of the employer.” Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Senor, Inc. v. L.M., 783

So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (citations omitted). An employee’s conduct is

within the scope of his employment when it “(1) is of the kind the employee is hired

to perform, (2) occurs substantially within the time and space limits authorized or

required by the work to be performed, and (3) is activated at least in part by a

purpose to serve the master.” Goss v. Hum. Servs. Assocs., Inc., 79 So. 3d 127, 132

(Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citation omitted).

The Cavo Lounge and Mr. Tallides contend the SAC lacks factual allegations

about any particular, widespread policy or custom of the Cavo Lounge that caused

Mr. Sanguinetti’s alleged injuries and damages.6 (Doc. 82 at 17). Instead, they

argue, all allegations of problematic policies or customs relate to Sheriff Rambosk

and the CCSO. (Id.) The Cavo Lounge opposes the SAC’s efforts to hold it

responsible for the Deputy Defendants’ conduct “simply on the basis that [they]

were working an off-duty detail” that the CCSO approved. (Id.) And they reject

6 In their motion to dismiss, the Cavo Lounge and Mr. Tallides largely ignore the

issue of vicarious liability. They seek dismissal of all claims against them, but they

address the vicarious liability issue only for Counts Seventeen and Eighteen. (Doc.

82 at 17). Consequently, the Court would be entirely justified in denying their

motion with respect to all the other claims in which Mr. Sanguinetti seeks to hold

the Cavo Lounge and Mr. Tallides vicariously liable. But because the Court

concludes that the SAC contains adequate factual allegations about the Cavo

Lounge’s policies and Mr. Buro, Mr. Marino, and the Deputy Defendants’

motivations to serve the interests of the Cavo Lounge that the Court must take as

true for the sole purpose of deciding the pending motions to dismiss, the Court

rejects Cavo Lounge and Mr. Tallides’s request for dismissal on both substantive

and procedural grounds.

allegations that the Cavo Lounge “engaged in any particular widespread policy or

custom” that “exhibited a deliberate indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights

and developed a culture of excessive force among its employees, including the

[Deputy Defendants].” (Id.)

In its order on Defendants’ motions to dismiss the initial complaint, the

Court agreed. (Doc. 67 at 12–13). The Court found the initial complaint lacked

factual allegations that Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino summoned the Deputy

Defendants to the Cavo Lounge to benefit anyone other than themselves, or that

they falsified evidence to benefit the Cavo Lounge. (Id.)

But the factual allegations in the SAC provide more detail than those of the

initial complaint. As to Defendants’ motivations, it alleges: (1) Mr. Buro, Mr.

Marino, and the Deputy Defendants acted to benefit the Cavo Lounge, to curry the

Cavo Lounge’s favor, and to continue their arrangement with the Cavo Lounge (Doc.

72 at ¶¶ 36, 85, 100, 202, 211); (2) the Cavo Lounge benefited from “the protection of

officers of the CCSO,” and anyone the Cavo Lounge deemed to have acted

offensively would “be subject to arrest, criminal prosecution and the use of force”

(id. at ¶ 89); and (3) the Cavo Lounge paid CCSO deputies to take orders from, and

substitute their own judgment for that of, the Cavo Lounge (id. at ¶ 90).

As to the Cavo Lounge’s policies, the SAC alleges: (1) the Cavo Lounge had a

“well-settled practice” of “deliberate indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights,”

and it “developed a culture of excessive force among its employees,” both of which

caused Mr. Sanguinetti’s injuries (id. at ¶¶ 262, 264); and (2) the Cavo Lounge’s

practices and policies included militarizing its employees, emphasizing aggression

and violence in employee encounters with citizens (including deployment of tasers),

and initiating criminal prosecutions against their “citizen-victims” for “‘obstruction

of justice’ type offenses” (id. at ¶ 264).

And regarding what the Cavo Lounge knew about the Deputy Defendants’

propensities, the SAC alleges: (1) the Cavo Lounge knew about, but failed to act to

correct, the Deputy Defendants’ propensities to use excessive force and arrest

individuals without probable cause (id. at ¶¶ 265, 267, 268); (2) the CCSO, Sheriff

Rambosk, and certain of the Deputy Defendants have “been the repeated focus of

news making stories on the abuse of police discretion, false statements, excessive

force, and failure to discipline officers” (id. at ¶ 67); (3) the Cavo Lounge knew of the

Deputy Defendants’ “propensities to arrest individuals without probable cause and

to apply excessive force during arrests,” and it was aware or should have been

aware of incidents like Mr. Sanguinetti’s arrest and prosecution that resulted in

media attention and lawsuits (id. at ¶¶ 267–68, 289); and (4) based on these prior

incidents, the Cavo Lounge knew or should have known that further training or

supervision was needed, but it made a deliberate choice not to provide that training

or supervision (id. at ¶¶ 275–76).

These allegations, again accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage, offer

sufficient factual support to state claims for vicarious liability against the Cavo

Lounge and Mr. Tallides, under both § 19837 and Florida law.

II. Individual Claims

A. Count One: First Amendment Retaliation under § 1983

Count One raises claims of retaliatory arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution

in violation of the First Amendment against Sheriff Rambosk and the Deputy

Defendants, who argue dismissal is appropriate because no factual allegations

established a causal connection between Mr. Sanguinetti’s speech and the disputed

conduct. (Doc. 81 at 17–19).

“To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) he engaged in protected speech; (2) the defendant’s conduct

adversely affected the protected speech; and (3) a causal connection exists between

the speech and the defendant’s retaliatory actions.” Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473,

480 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “[T]o establish a causal connection, the

plaintiff must show that the defendant was subjectively motivated to take the

adverse action because of the protected speech.” Castle v. Appalachian Tech. Coll.,

631 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

7 The Court notes that in its order dismissing the initial complaint, it concluded

that Mr. Sanguinetti’s factual allegations were sufficient at the motion to dismiss

stage to find Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino were acting under the color of law under a

“joint-engagement theory.” (Doc. 67 at 13–15). Here, too, the SAC’s factual

allegations are sufficient to allow § 1983 claims against the Cavo Lounge and Mr.

Tallides to survive a motion to dismiss. And based on this conclusion, Counts

Seventeen and Eighteen survive.

Count One states Mr. Sanguinetti was arrested, imprisoned, and prosecuted

“because [he] disputed the accuracy of [the] charges against him.” (Doc. 72 at ¶¶

113, 115). But this claim is unsupported by the SAC’s factual allegations, which

attribute Defendants’ conduct to their biases against Mr. Sanguinetti’s race,

ethnicity, or national origin. (See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 44–45, 98, 100, 102–07). The only

factual allegation pertaining to Mr. Sanguinetti’s communication with the Deputy

Defendants states “[he] attempted to explain himself to [Deputies] Dillman and

Scaduto to no avail, as they refused to listen or even allow [him] to do so.” (Id. at ¶

39).

Because the SAC contains no factual allegations causally connecting Mr.

Sanguinetti’s speech and his arrest, imprisonment, or prosecution, this claim fails.

Count One is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

B. Counts Two through Five: False Arrest and False Imprisonment

under § 1983 and Florida Law

Counts Two through Five are brought against the Deputy Defendants, Mr.

Buro, Mr. Marino, Mr. Tallides, and the Cavo Lounge in their individual capacities,

and against the County and Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶

120–53). Defendants’ arguments for dismissal focus mainly on shotgun pleading

concepts.8 (Doc. 81 at 8–10; Doc. 82 at 9–10). The Court addressed and rejected

that argument, and thus Counts Two through Five survive the motions to dismiss.

8 Mr. Tallides and the Cavo Lounge also argue, “the Plaintiff is bringing these

counts against Cavo and Tallides in their individual capacity, however, Cavo is a

corporation (Doc. 72 at ¶ 14), and Tallides is the owner of Cavo (Doc. 72 at ¶ 20), but

there are absolutely no allegations that he was present at the time of the encounter

C. Counts Six and Seven: Battery under Florida Law and Excessive

Force under § 1983

Counts Six and Seven are brought against the Deputy Defendants, Mr.

Tallides, and the Cavo Lounge in their individual capacities, and against the

County and Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 154–72).

Defendants argue Counts Six and Seven should be dismissed mainly on shotgun

pleading grounds. (Doc. 81 at 10–11; Doc. 82 at 11–12). The Court addressed and

rejected that argument, and thus Counts Six and Seven also survive the motions to

dismiss.

D. Count Eight: Malicious Prosecution under Florida Law

In Count Eight, Mr. Sanguinetti raises a claim of malicious prosecution

under Florida law against the Deputy Defendants, Mr. Tallides, and the Cavo

Lounge in their individual capacities, and against the County and Sheriff Rambosk

in his official capacity. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 173–86). Under Florida law, the elements of

malicious prosecution are:

(1) The commencement or continuance of an original

criminal or civil judicial proceeding[;] (2) [i]ts legal

causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who

was defendant in the original proceeding[;] (3) [i]ts bona

fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff[;] (4) [t]he

absence of probable cause for such proceeding[;] (5) [t]he

presence of malice; and (6) [d]amage conforming to legal

standards resulting to plaintiff.

Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).

with Sanguinetti.” (Doc. 82 at 9–10). And they make this and similar arguments

for other counts. (See id. at 11–12, 16). In so doing, they ignore Mr. Sanguinetti’s

claims for vicarious liability, which the Court already addressed.

The CCSO Defendants move for dismissal of Count Eight against the County

and Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity because the government is immune

from suit for malicious prosecution. (Doc. 81 at 19). Mr. Sanguinetti agrees. (Doc.

87 at 18). Accordingly, Count Eight is dismissed with prejudice as to Sheriff

Rambosk, in his official capacity, and the County.

Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino move for dismissal of Count Eight because Mr.

Sanguinetti failed to support his claim for malicious prosecution under Florida law

with sufficient factual allegations. (Doc. 82 at 13). They fault the SAC for not

offering factual support for the allegation that they knowingly and intentionally

engaged in the suppression of exculpatory evidence and giving false statements.

(Id.)

The SAC alleges Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino: (1) never observed Mr.

Sanguinetti commit a crime or violate the law and were never informed by

witnesses of any such crime or violation (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 52–55); (2) submitted

knowingly false sworn statements or testimony, which were directly contradicted by

truthful accounts and video evidence (id. at ¶¶ 56–57, 71); (3) knowingly and

intentionally suppressed exculpatory evidence, and submitted fabricated

inculpatory evidence to prosecutors (id. at ¶¶ 58, 69, 104); (4) were motivated to act

because of Mr. Sanguinetti’s race or national origin (id. at ¶¶ 101–05); and (5) used

derogatory insults toward Mr. Sanguinetti and his family (id. at ¶¶ 30, 104).

These allegations, accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage, offer

sufficient factual support to state a claim of malicious prosecution under Florida

law. Count Eight survives, except for claims against the County and Sheriff

Rambosk in his official capacity.

E. Count Nine: Malicious Prosecution under § 1983

Count Nine raises a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 against

Sheriff Rambosk, the Deputy Defendants, Mr. Buro, and Mr. Marino. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶

187–97). “To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the

plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable seizures in addition to the elements of the common law tort of

malicious prosecution.”9 Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003).

Malicious prosecution “requires a seizure pursuant to legal process.” Williams v.

Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). For a warrantless arrest, such a seizure would occur “following an

arraignment, indictment, or probable-cause hearing.” Id. “‘[N]ormal conditions of

pretrial release’ do not ‘constitute a continuing seizure barring some significant,

ongoing deprivation of liberty, such as a restriction on the defendant’s right to

travel interstate.’” Brienza v. City of Peachtree City, Georgia, No. 21-12290, 2022

WL 3841095, at *8 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022) (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami,

382 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) abrogated on other grounds by Nieves v.

Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019)).

9 Under the common-law elements of malicious prosecution grounded in the Fourth

Amendment, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the officers instituted or continued a

criminal prosecution against him; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3)

that terminated in his favor and caused damage to him. Williams v. Aguirre, 965

F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020).

The CCSO Defendants move for dismissal of Count Nine because they claim

there are not sufficient allegations of a constitutional violation in relation to the

prosecution because the SAC focuses on circumstances related to Mr. Sanguinetti’s

warrantless arrest, which occurred before the legal process began.10 (Doc. 81 at 20–

21). But the SAC alleges the conditions of Mr. Sanguinetti’s bail restricted his post-

arraignment liberty and freedom of movement—including the ability to travel out of

Florida. (Doc. 72 at ¶ 80). This allegation (along with the allegations enumerated

in the Court’s discussion of Count Eight), accepted as true at the motion to dismiss

stage, offers sufficient factual support to state a claim of malicious prosecution

under § 1983. See Brienza, 2022 WL 3841095, at *8. Count Nine survives the

motions to dismiss.

F. Counts Ten and Eleven: Abuse of Process under § 1983 and

Florida Law

Count Ten raises an abuse of process claim under Florida law against Sheriff

Rambosk and the Deputy Defendants, in their individual capacities, and against the

County and Sheriff Rambosk, in his official capacity. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 198–206). And

Count Eleven raises an abuse of process claim under § 1983 against Sheriff

Rambosk and the Deputy Defendants, in their individual capacities. (Id. at ¶¶ 207–

13).

Under Florida Law, abuse of process “involves the use of criminal or civil

legal process against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was not

10 Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino move for dismissal only on shotgun pleading grounds,

(Doc. 82 at 13–14), which the Court has already rejected.

designed.” Scozari v. Barone, 546 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The three

elements of an abuse of process claim are:

(1) the defendant made an illegal, improper, or perverted

use of process; (2) the defendant had an ulterior motive or

purpose in exercising the illegal, improper or perverted

process; and (3) the plaintiff was injured as a result of

defendant’s action.

EMI Sun Vill., Inc. v. Catledge, 779 F. App’x 627, 634–35 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing

Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1111 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). “[T]he tort of

abuse of process is concerned with the improper use of process after it issues . . . for

some wrongful and unlawful object or collateral purpose.” Verdon v. Song, 251 So.

3d 256, 258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added). For example, whereas malicious prosecution deals with prosecuting a

person without reasonable grounds to believe him to be guilty, abuse of process

involves prosecuting an innocent person to, for example, extort payment of a debt.

See Cline v. Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (citation

omitted).

Similarly, under federal law, the “gravamen of [abuse of process] is not the

wrongfulness of the prosecution, but some extortionate perversion of lawfully

initiated process to illegitimate ends.” Harvey v. United States, 681 F. App’x 850,

853 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 n.5 (1994))

(alterations in original) (emphasis added).

Because Mr. Sanguinetti failed to allege that Defendants took any action

after process issued to misuse Mr. Sanguinetti’s criminal case, he failed to state a

claim for abuse of process. See id.; see also Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Gagnon,

353 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1212 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Under Florida law, abuse of process

involves the use of criminal or civil legal process against another primarily to

accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed.”). Counts Ten and Eleven are

therefore dismissed with prejudice.

G. Count Twelve: Deprivation of Rights and Denial of Equal

Protection under § 1981 and § 1983

Count Twelve raises an equal protection claim under § 1981 and § 1983

against Sheriff Rambosk, the Deputy Defendants, Mr. Buro, Mr. Marino, Mr.

Tallides, and the Cavo Lounge in their individual capacities, and against the

County and Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 214–24).

Defendants argue that Count Twelve should be dismissed because there are

insufficient factual allegations to support the claim. (Doc. 81 at 23–24; Doc. 82 at

15).

“In order to state an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must prove that he

was discriminated against by establishing that other similarly-situated individuals

outside of his protected class were treated more favorably.” Amnesty Int’l, USA v.

Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2009).

The SAC alleges Mr. Buro and Mr. Marino: (1) denied Mr. Sanguinetti entry

into the Cavo Lounge because of his national origin or ethnicity (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 29,

31); (2) made several derogatory comments about Mr. Sanguinetti’s national origin,

ethnicity, accent, mannerisms, and way of dress (id. at ¶ 30); and (3) allowed white

and “non-foreign appearing individuals” into the Cavo Lounge, regardless of their

attire (id. at ¶ 33).

The SAC alleges the Deputy Defendants: (1) observed Mr. Sanguinetti “act,

speak and dress in a manner [that] they perceived to be Hispanic or Latino from a

foreign nation or country” and “brutally battered [Mr. Sanguinetti] because of their

impermissible biases against individuals who appear to be of Hispanic or Latino

national origin or ethnicity” (id. at ¶ 44); and (2) “unlawfully punched, kicked and

otherwise struck or applied excessive force against [Mr. Sanguinetti], arrested him

without probable cause and caused the commencement of [the criminal case]

against him, due solely to his racial, ethnic or national origin based on

discriminatory prejudices” (id. at ¶ 100).

The SAC alleges that the Deputy Defendants, Mr. Buro, and Mr. Marino: (1)

assumed their version of events would be credited over Mr. Sanguinetti’s because of

his ethnicity or national origin (id. at ¶ 101); (2) used derogatory insults toward Mr.

Sanguinetti and his family, used excessive force against him, arrested him despite

the clear absence of probable cause, and submitted false sworn incident and arrest

reports, all to further their “obviously discriminatory inclinations and motivations”

(id. at ¶¶ 102–05); and (3) did not strike, grab, seize or arrest any non-Latino or

non-Hispanic individuals acting similarly to Mr. Sanguinetti (id. at ¶ 107).

Between Mr. Sanguinetti’s allegations about the prejudices the CCSO

Defendants, Mr. Buro, and Mr. Marino harbored, and the allegations that—on this

basis—they treated Mr. Sanguinetti differently than similarly situated individuals,

Count Twelve survives for all Defendants.

H. Counts Thirteen and Fourteen: Monell Liability against the

County

Counts Thirteen and Fourteen raise claims of Monell liability against the

County. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 225–44). “[A] plaintiff bringing a Monell claim must show

(1) the violation of a constitutional right, (2) that a municipality had a custom or

policy of deliberate indifference to that right and (3) that the custom or policy

caused the violation.” Rogers v. Sheriff of Santa Rosa Cnty., Fla., No. 21-13994,

2023 WL 2566087, at *6 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2023) (citing McDowell v. Brown, 392

F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). And for purposes of Monell liability, a plaintiff

must show a constitutional violation by establishing, as to an individual, “(1) a

substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the [individual’s] deliberate indifference to that

risk; and (3) causation.” Id. at *6 (alterations in original) (quoting Hale v.

Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995)).

In section I.B. above, the Court noted that it did not have the information

necessary to either dismiss the County from this case or to affirmatively rule that

the County is a proper defendant in this matter. Moreover, the SAC alleges the

following facts: (1) Mr. Sanguinetti’s constitutional rights were violated (see, e.g.,

Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 19, 40–43); (2) the County instituted and maintained a well-settled

practice that exhibited a deliberate indifference to citizen’s constitutional rights and

developed a culture of excessive force amount its Sheriff’s Deputies (id. at ¶ 229)

and the County knew or should have known that additional training or supervision

was needed to avoid the use of excessive force from recurring in the future (id. at ¶

242); and (3) Plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional rights and sustained

damages as a result of those policies (id. at ¶¶ 237, 244). At the motion to dismiss

stage, accepting these allegations as true, Counts Thirteen and Fourteen are

adequately pleaded and survive the motions to dismiss. That said, should the Court

later determine that the County is not a proper party here, Counts Thirteen and

Fourteen will be dismissed.

I. Counts Fifteen and Sixteen: Supervisory Liability for Failure to

Correct and Failure to Train under § 1983

Counts Fifteen and Sixteen raise Failure to Correct and Failure to Train

claims under § 1983 against Sheriff Rambosk (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 245–60), who argues

the factual allegations supporting these counts are deficient for two reasons. He

argues, first, that the SAC fails to identify what the Sheriff’s training policy is or

how it is improper. (Doc. 81 at 28). Second, Sheriff Rambosk argues the SAC fails

to show he knew about any deficiencies, much less that he was deliberately

indifferent to them. (Id. at 29).

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 either when he participated in the

alleged constitutional violation or when his actions are causally connected to the

alleged constitutional violation. Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir.

2003). Causal connections can be established in several ways. First, “when a

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to

correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.” Id. at 1234–35 (quoting Rivas

v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991)). Second, “when the supervisor’s

improper ‘custom or policy . . . resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional

rights.’” Id. (quoting Rivas, 940 F.2d at 1495). And third, when facts “support an

inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew

that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.”

Id. at 1235 (citing Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th

Cir.1993)).

As to CCSO policies, the SAC alleges Sheriff Rambosk: (1) maintained a

policy of tolerating and normalizing excessive force (Doc. 72 at ¶ 66); (2) “has tacitly

authorized a policy or custom of falsely arresting and applying excessive force

against individuals, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to do so or

predicated solely on their race, color, ethnicity or national origin” (id. at ¶¶ 98, 102–

03); (3) approved the Deputy Defendants’ concurrent employment with the Cavo

Lounge (id. at ¶ 108); (4) failed to correct the Deputy Defendants’ known

constitutionally violative behaviors, and assigned them to crowd control when they

were unfit to interact with members of the public (id.); and (5) instituted a practice

that exhibited a deliberate indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights and

developed a culture of excessive force among its deputies, illustrated by (a) the

militarization of deputies, (b) emphasis on aggressive and violent behavior during

citizen encounters, (c) unnecessary deployment of tasers, and (d) initiating criminal

prosecutions to justify otherwise unlawful actions (id. at ¶ 229).

And regarding notice, the SAC alleges: (1) through prior lawsuits,

psychological exams, civilian complaints, internal performance reviews, internal

whistleblowers, or his own observations, Sheriff Rambosk was aware of the Deputy

Defendants’ propensities to make arrests without probable cause and to use

excessive force (including deploying tasers), but he failed to act to correct this

behavior, and this failure constitutes his tacit approval of, or deliberate indifference

to, this misconduct (id. at ¶¶ 230, 232–35, 241–43); and (2) Sheriff Rambosk knew

or should have known that the Deputy Defendants needed additional training or

supervision in using force, including the use of tasers, but he made the deliberate

choice not to provide that added training or supervision (id. at ¶¶ 240, 242–43).

These allegations, accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage, offer sufficient

factual support to state a claim for supervisory liability against Sheriff Rambosk in

his individual capacity. Counts Fifteen and Sixteen survive the motions to dismiss.

J. Counts Seventeen and Eighteen: Monell Liability against the

Cavo Lounge

Counts Seventeen and Eighteen raise claims of Monell liability against the

Cavo Lounge. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 261–77).

In section I.C., above, the Court concluded the SAC’s allegations, accepted as

true at the motion to dismiss stage, offer sufficient factual support the state claims

against Mr. Tallides and the Cavo Lounge. This conclusion applies to Counts

Seventeen and Eighteen, and thus, these counts survive as well.

K. Count Nineteen: Failure to Intervene under § 1983

Count Nineteen raises a claim for failure to intervene under § 1983 against

Sheriff Rambosk and the Deputy Defendants. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 278–81). The only

argument for dismissing Count Nineteen is that, like its predecessor in the initial

complaint, it fails to state factual allegations that Sheriff Rambosk had any

involvement in the treatment of Mr. Sanguinetti before his arrest. (Doc. 81 at 31–

32). The Court dismissed this count as to Sheriff Rambosk on that basis (Doc. 67 at

10), and he asks the Court to do the same here (Doc. 81 at 31–32).

Mr. Sanguinetti responds that “[p]ersonal involvement may be viably alleged

regardless of . . . physical presence,” and that “the Sheriff had the power, authority,

and opportunity to cause [Mr. Sanguinetti] to be subjected to excessive force despite

his lack of physical presence.” (Doc. 87 at 30). But there are two problems with Mr.

Sanguinetti’s position. First, the SAC lacks any factual allegations that would

support holding Sheriff Rambosk liable in his individual capacity under a

traditional failure-to-intervene theory. And second, Mr. Sanguinetti offers no legal

support for holding Sheriff Rambosk liable in his individual capacity under the

theory as presented.

The Court rejects Mr. Sanguinetti’s argument. Count Nineteen is therefore

dismissed with prejudice as to Sheriff Rambosk.

L. Count Twenty: Negligent Hiring and Retention under Florida

Law

Count Twenty raises a negligent hiring and retention claim against the Cavo

Lounge. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 282–92). The Cavo Lounge argues that “other than the

general, vague, conclusory, and unsupported allegations” about the Deputy

Defendants’ history with the CCSO, the SAC does not allege that the Cavo Lounge

would have been put on notice that it needed to investigate the Deputy Defendants

further. (Doc. 82 at 20).

A plaintiff states a claim for negligent hiring or retention by alleging that “(1)

the agent/employee/contractor was incompetent or unfit to perform the work; (2) the

employer knew or reasonably should have known of the particular incompetence or

unfitness; and (3) the incompetence or unfitness was a proximate cause of the

plaintiff’s injury.” Murphy v. Carnival Corp., 426 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1314 (S.D. Fla.

2019) (citation omitted). A plaintiff satisfies the second of these elements by

“showing that the employer was put on notice of the harmful propensities of the

agent/employee/contractor.” Id. (citation omitted).

The SAC alleges: (1) under a “special detail” contract, the Cavo Lounge paid

the Deputy Defendants and the CCSO specially to assign the Deputy Defendants to

provide security to the Cavo Lounge (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 15, 21–22); (2) the Deputy

Defendants were agents, servants, and employees of both the CCSO and the Cavo

Lounge, which was responsible for ensuring its personnel obeyed all applicable laws

(id. at ¶¶ 16, 18–19, 88, 263); (3) the CCSO, Sheriff Rambosk, and certain of the

Deputy Defendants have been “the repeated focus of news making stories on the

abuse of police discretion, false statements, excessive force, and failure to discipline

officers” (id. at ¶ 67); (4) the Cavo Lounge knew of the Deputy Defendants’

“propensities to arrest individuals without probable cause and to apply excessive

force during arrests,” and it was aware or should have been aware of incidents like

Mr. Sanguinetti’s arrest and prosecution that resulted in media attention and

lawsuits (id. at ¶¶ 267–68, 289); (5) based on these previous incidents, “[a]n

appropriate investigation would have revealed the unsuitability of the [Deputy

Defendants] for employment assignments requiring interaction with the public or

crowd control” (id. at ¶ 284); (6) in light of what the Cavo Lounge knew or should

have known, it was unreasonable for the Cavo Lounge to hire the Deputy

Defendants to handle crowd control or interact with the public (id. at ¶ 287); and (7)

without investigating, the Cavo Lounge placed the Deputy Defendants into a

position where they could foreseeably inflict harm, and it failed to take reasonable

measures in hiring and retaining the Deputy Defendants that would have

prevented Mr. Sanguinetti’s injuries and his damages (id. at ¶¶ 288, 290–91).

The SAC alleges that the Deputy Defendants were unfit to handle crowd

control or interact with the public, that the Cavo Lounge knew or reasonably should

have known of their unfitness, and that the Deputy Defendants’ unfitness caused

Mr. Sanguinetti’s injuries. Accepting these allegations as true at the motion to

dismiss stage, the Court finds them sufficient to state a claim for negligent hiring

and retention against the Cavo Lounge. Accordingly, Count Twenty also survives

the motions to dismiss.

M. Count Twenty-One: Negligent Training and Supervision under

Florida Law

Count Twenty-One raises a negligent training and supervision claim against

the County, Sheriff Rambosk, and the Cavo Lounge. (Doc. 72 at ¶¶ 293–302).

Under Florida law, negligent supervision and retention occurs when, during

the employment, “the employer knows or should know of an employee’s unfitness

and fails to take further action such as ‘investigating, discharge or reassignment.’”

Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 362 n.15 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So.

2d 435, 438–39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)). A plaintiff states a claim for negligent

supervision by alleging “(1) the existence of a relationship giving rise to a legal duty

to supervise; (2) the negligent breach of that duty; and (3) that the negligence was

the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.” Nationwide Mut. Co. v. Ft. Myers Total

Rehab Ctr., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Collins v. Sch.

Bd. of Broward Cnty., 471 So. 2d 560, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)). And to establish

the second prong, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the employer received actual or

constructive notice of an employee’s unfitness, and (2) the employer did not

investigate or take corrective action such as discharge or reassignment.” See Doe v.

Carnival Corp., 470 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

“Florida law also holds employers liable for reasonably foreseeable damages

resulting from the negligent training of its employees and agents.” Clary v. Armor

Corr. Health Servs., Inc., No. 6:13-cv-90-Orl-31KRS, 2014 WL 505126, at *4 (M.D.

Fla. Feb. 7, 2014) (citing Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th

Cir. 2001)). “Negligent training occurs when an employer was negligent in the

implementation or operation of the training program and this negligence caused a

plaintiff's injury.” Doe v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 1:16-cv-23733-UU, 2016 WL

6330587, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). To state a claim for negligent training, a plaintiff must allege that the

nature of the employment put the plaintiff in a “zone of risk” such that the employer

had a duty running to the plaintiff. Clary, 2014 WL 505126, at *4–5.

Count Twenty-One alleges both negligent training and supervision. (Doc. 72

at 47–48). The two torts are similar, but they are distinct causes of action. Thomas

v. City of Palm Coast, No. 3:14-cv-172-J-32PDB, 2015 WL 7429051, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

Nov. 23, 2015) (citing Adler v. WestJet Airlines, Ltd., 31 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1387

(S.D. Fla. 2014)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) establishes “a flexible

standard that turns on whether pleading multiple claims in one count advances or

hinders the interests of clarity.” Cont’l 332 Fund, LLC v. Albertelli, 317 F. Supp. 3d

1124, 1139 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)). Notice is the guiding

principle of the Eleventh Circuit’s shotgun pleading analysis, and the key inquiry is

whether the “failure to more precisely parcel out and identify the facts relevant to

each claim materially increase[s] the burden of understanding the factual

allegations underlying each count.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324.

It is unclear whether the parties recognize the distinction between the two

claims. (Doc. 81 at 32–34; Doc. 82 at 18–20). It may well be because of the way

they are alleged in a single count. The Court dismisses Count Twenty-One without

prejudice to re-filing separate claims for each tort and the bases for those claims.

Accord Thomas, 2015 WL 7429051, at *4.

That said, this is not an invitation for Mr. Sanguinetti to do anything more

than separate the negligent supervision and retention and negligent training claims

into two counts, citing to the factual support for such in the SAC in a Third

Amended Complaint. Defendants, of course, will be allowed to move to dismiss

those two claims anew. The Court is mindful that this will further protract this

litigation but believes, in the interests of justice, that this is an even-handed

approach and the best way to proceed at this time.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

(1) Collier County’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 79) is DENIED without

prejudice to being renewed at the summary judgment stage.

(2) The Motion to Dismiss by Sheriff Rambosk, David Crisp Jr., Adam

Dillman, David Drucks, Michael Puka, and John Scaduto (Doc. 81) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

(3) The Motion to Dismiss by SLR Naples Corp., Sergio Tallides, Joseph

Marino, and Jason Buro (Doc. 82) is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

(4) Counts One, Ten, and Eleven are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(5) Count Eight is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the County

and Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity.

(6) Count Nineteen is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Sheriff

Rambosk.

(7) Count Twenty-One is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

(8) Should Mr. Sanguinetti wish to file a third amended complaint to

correct the deficiencies noted in Count Twenty-One, he is directed to do

so by September 26, 2023. Otherwise, the Court will dismiss Count

Twenty-One with prejudice without further notice.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on September 5, 2023.11

iy 3 Zo 5 □

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11 The Court strongly recommends that the parties consider settlement

negotiations before the preparation of motions for summary judgment, which will

invariably increase litigation costs. The Court is not requiring such at this time but

hopes that the parties consider doing so. Should the parties choose to do so, the

Court would invite a joint motion to stay existing deadlines such that the parties

may engage in good faith settlement negotiations.