GS Holistic, LLC v. Brother Pastor LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GS HOLISTIC, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:22-cv-2179-VMC-TGW

BROTHER PASTOR LLC d/b/a

LARGO SMOKE SHOP, MATTHEW

S. MOSES, and EARL BURDETTE,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to

Defendants Brother Pastor LLC, Matthew S. Moses, and Earl

Burdette’s Motion for Determination of Attorney Fees, Costs,

and Sanctions (Doc. # 36), filed on August 7, 2023. Plaintiff

GS Holistic, LLC responded on August 21, 2023. (Doc. # 38).

As set forth herein, the Motion is granted in part and denied

in part.

I. Background

The Court and the parties are familiar with the facts

and procedural history of this case. Thus, the Court will not

review that history in detail. Suffice it to say, on September

20, 2022, GS Holistic filed its complaint alleging trademark

infringement and unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1114 and 1125(a). (Doc. # 1). Despite months of discussion

between the parties concerning the lack of factual basis to

assert trademark claims against Defendants, GS Holistic

continued to pursue the case.

On February 27, 2023, Defendants sent GS Holistic’s

counsel, Ms. Gabrielle Alexa Penalta, a Rule 11 letter with

a copy of their motion for sanctions, placing her on notice

that they would file the motion in twenty-one days unless GS

Holistic amended or withdrew the complaint. (Doc. # 30-2 at

32). In response, GS Holistic filed its amended motion to

dismiss the case voluntarily without prejudice on March 22,

2023. (Doc. # 28). Defendants filed their motion for sanctions

the next day, seeking the imposition of sanctions against

both GS Holistic and Ms. Penalta. (Doc. # 29). In the motion

for sanctions, Defendants requested attorney’s fees and costs

“incurred in 1) answering [GS Holistic’s] Complaint []; 2)

preparing the Uniform Case Management Report []; 3) preparing

and submitting Defendants’ Rule 26(a) disclosures; 4)

responding to [GS Holistic’s] [m]otion to [s]trike []; 5)

selecting a mediator; 6) engaging in discovery and 7) bringing

th[e] [m]otion for [s]anctions.” (Id. at 15-16).

On June 20, 2023, the Court granted GS Holistic’s amended

motion to dismiss case voluntarily without prejudice and

granted Defendant’s motion for sanctions. (Doc. # 34). The

Court found that the imposition of sanctions in the form of

attorney’s fees and costs against GS Holistic and its counsel,

Ms. Penalta, was warranted under both Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. (Id. at 11-15). The Court

wrote: “Put simply, Ms. Penalta has wasted both Defendants’

and the Court’s time, and made misrepresentations to the Court

which were objectively frivolous and which she knew to be

false.” (Id. at 14).

Now, Defendants seek a determination of the amount of

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to be imposed as a

sanction. (Doc. # 36). The Motion is fully briefed (Doc. ##

38, 39) and ripe for review.

II. Discussion

Defendants ask for $40,070.00 in attorney’s fees,

$13,800.00 in expert fees for the attorney’s fees expert as

costs, $2,052.00 in other costs related to Defendant Moses’s

taking out of loans to pay defense counsel’s fees, and

prejudgment interest. (Doc. # 36). The Court will address

these categories in turn.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the

sanctions imposed on Ms. Penalta are also imposed against her

firm, The Ticktin Law Group, PA, jointly. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(c)(1) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must

be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its

partner, associate, or employee.”).

A. Attorney’s Fees

“When a statute or rule of law permits an award of

reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . , a court should utilize the

lodestar method in computing the appropriate fees.” Baker v.

Fid. Mortg. Direct Corp., No. 8:10-cv-2596-SCB-TBM, 2011 WL

1560665, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011) (citing Norman v.

Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th

Cir. 1988)). “Under the lodestar method, a court determines

the objective value of a lawyer’s services by multiplying the

hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id.

“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate

in the relevant legal community for similar services by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and

reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. “The applicant bears

the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the

requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates.” Id.

“Furthermore, fee applicants are required to exercise

‘billing judgment.’” Omnipol, A.S. v. Worrell, No. 8:19-cv-

794-VMC-TGW, 2021 WL 1842212, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2021)

(citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No.

8:19-cv-794-VMC-TGW, 2021 WL 1840513 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2021).

“If they do not exclude ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary hours,’ the court must exercise billing judgment

for the applicant.” Id. (citation omitted). “The fee opponent

‘has the burden of pointing out with specificity which hours

should be deducted.’” Id. (citation omitted). “There is a

strong presumption that the lodestar yields a reasonable fee

for this purpose.” In re Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1082

(11th Cir. 2019).

As mentioned above, Defendants request $40,070.00 for

the work of three attorneys and a paralegal. (Doc. # 36 at

9). Defendants support their claim for attorney’s fees with

the declarations of counsel Crystal Broughan, Defendant

Moses, and an attorney’s fees expert, Dineen Wasylik. (Doc. #

36-1; Doc. # 36-2; Doc. # 36-3). Ms. Broughan’s declaration

reveals that the “total time expended by the Defense team

through July 31, 2023” was 100.4 hours. (Doc. # 36-2 at 6-

7). Broughan explains that Defendants’ counsel “exercised

billing judgment to remove any hours [they] deemed

duplicative or excessive for the tasks performed.” (Id. at

6). According to the Motion, “[p]rior to the case rising to

the level of Defendants seeking Rule 11 sanctions, the total

time spent on the case by all of Defendants’ timekeepers was

39.2 hours.” (Doc. # 36 at 5). Defendants’ counsel spent 13.2

hours preparing the motion for sanctions and 20.7 hours

responding to GS Holistic’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the

case without prejudice. (Id. at 5-6). Finally, Defendants’

counsel spent 26.7 hours researching and preparing the

instant Motion, including obtaining the attached

declarations. (Id. at 6). However, upon review of the hours

billed by Defendants’ counsel, Ms. Wasylik opined that only

99.6 hours were reasonably expended, for a total of $40,070

in reasonable attorney’s fees. (Doc. # 36-3 at 16). Ms.

Wasylik reached the 99.6 hours after reducing the 100.4 total

hours by 0.7 hours of Ms. Broughan’s time on administrative

or clerical tasks between July 17 and 19, 2023. (Id. at 11).

Ms. Broughan, a partner with twenty-three years’

experience, billed at a reasonable hourly rate of $500. (Doc.

# 36 at 9). Mitchell Ghaneie, a partner and patent attorney

with eight years’ experience, initially billed at an hourly

rate of $500 but later voluntarily reduced his rate to $250

an hour. (Id.). Associate attorney Julianna Favale, with

nearly two years’ experience, billed at an hourly rate of

$350. (Id.). Finally, paralegal Erin Poovey billed at an

hourly rate of $175. (Id.).

In response, GS Holistic agrees that the hourly rates

charged by Defendants’ counsel are reasonable. See (Doc. # 38

at 2) (“[T]he Plaintiff does not challenge the hourly fee

charged.”). But GS Holistic insists that an across-the-board

reduction of the attorney’s fees “to an amount between $15,000

and $20,000” is appropriate because “there was no need for

much of the work to have been done where there was an

irrefutable and determinative fatal flaw in [GS Holistic’s]

case.” (Id. at 2-3). It also argues that defense “counsel

failed to exercise billing judgment and [are] improperly

seeking attorneys’ [fees] for non-compensable or non-

reimbursable hours.” (Id. at 3). If the Court is not inclined

to issue an across-the-board reduction, GS Holistic has

identified numerous entries in Defendants’ attorney’s fees

ledger that it maintains should be reduced. (Doc. # 38-2;

Doc. # 38-3). According to GS Holistic’s calculation,

Defendants’ attorney’s fees of $40,070.00 should be reduced

by $16,875.00. (Doc. # 38 at 8). This would reduce the

approximately 100 hours of attorney time by 38.10 hours, for

a total of 61.90 hours remaining. (Id.).

The Court disagrees with GS Holistic’s assertion that

Defendants spent too many hours working on this case, given

its frivolous nature. Although GS Holistic and its counsel

never should have filed this trademark infringement action in

the first place, they did. And they continued litigating it

actively for months after Defendants advised GS Holistic of

the lack of factual or legal foundation for the case. GS

Holistic and counsel’s decision to actively litigate this

action after being alerted to the case’s frivolousness —

including requiring Defendants to file an answer, filing a

motion to strike Defendants’ affirmative defenses, scheduling

mediation, and failing to dismiss this action during the 21-

day safe harbor after being served with the motion for

sanctions — necessitated defense counsel’s extensive time

dedicated to the case.

Furthermore, GS Holistic, through counsel, informed

Defendants that it would be amending the complaint to assert

a patent infringement claim. Thus, Defendants reasonably

dedicated hours of attorney time to investigating the

anticipated non-frivolous claim. These hours were wasted only

because GS Holistic failed to timely amend the complaint to

assert the patent claim.

Notably, Defendants have already made concessions in

their billing to account for this odd procedural situation

created by GS Holistic’s misconduct. One of Defendants’

attorneys, Mr. Ghaneie, “voluntarily reduced his hourly rate”

— by 50% — “as a patent attorney once he realized [GS

Holistic’s] counsel was not going to file an amended complaint

for patent infringement and the Defense was going to have to

defend the Defendants in a frivolous case.” (Doc. # 36 at

10). The Court agrees with Defendants’ fee expert, Ms.

Wasylik, that Mr. Ghaneie’s “reduction in fee shows a strong

exercise of billing judgment.” (Doc. # 36-3 at 7).

In short, an across-the-board reduction in Defendants’

attorney’s fees is unwarranted here. The lodestar is the

appropriate method to apply. Defendants are entitled to all

reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in, among other things,

answering the complaint, preparing the Case Management

Report, preparing and submitting Defendants’ Rule 26(a)

disclosures, responding to GS Holistic’s motion to strike,

selecting a mediator, engaging in discovery, bringing the

motion for sanctions, and bringing the instant Motion. See

Norelus v. Denny’s, Inc., 628 F.3d 1270, 1302 (11th Cir. 2010)

(“The district court [] acted within the scope of its

discretion by including in the sanctions award the costs,

expenses, and attorney’s fees incurred by the defendants in

obtaining the award.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (“If

warranted, the court may award to the prevailing party the

reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred for

the motion [for sanctions].”). Because this case was

frivolous from the very beginning and Defendants advised GS

Holistic’s counsel of the frivolous nature of the case before

Defendants even appeared in this action (Doc. # 34 at 2-3),

effectively all of Defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs incurred in defending this case are recoverable by

Defendants.

However, the Court will address some specific charges in

Defendants’ fee ledger to which GS Holistic objects. First,

the Court rejects GS Holistic’s assertion that hours incurred

by Defendants’ counsel in seeking dismissal of this case with

prejudice, including responding in opposition to GS

Holistic’s motion to dismiss the case without prejudice,

should be excluded from the award of attorney’s fees. (Doc.

# 38 at 4). Defense counsel were zealously advocating for

their clients in seeking dismissal with prejudice of this

frivolous case, given the sanctionable conduct of GS Holistic

and its counsel throughout the entirety of the case. While

the Court ultimately permitted the case to be dismissed

without prejudice as GS Holistic desired, Defendants were not

unreasonable in seeking dismissal with prejudice and

reasonably incurred over 20 hours in drafting their response

to GS Holistic’s motion for dismissal without prejudice and

in compiling the over 100 pages of exhibits that supported

the response. (Doc. # 36-3 at 10; Doc. # 30).

Next, GS Holistic has not persuaded the Court that any

of the hours billed by defense counsel were duplicative or

redundant because two or more attorneys were performing work

for Defendants. (Doc. # 38 at 5). “There is nothing inherently

unreasonable about a client having multiple attorneys, and

they may all be compensated if they are not unreasonably doing

the same work and are being compensated for the distinct

contribution of each lawyer.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. Upon

review of the fee ledgers, the fee entries to which GS

Holistic objects (Doc. # 38-3), and Ms. Wasylik’s

declaration, the Court agrees with Defendants and Ms. Wasylik

that counsel exercised good billing judgment and did not

unreasonably have two or more lawyers perform the same work.

(Doc. # 36-3 at 8).

Finally, GS Holistic’s objection that some of the tasks

for which Defendants’ counsel billed are administrative or

clerical in nature has a bit more merit. (Doc. # 38 at 6);

see Cordova v. R & A Oysters, Inc., No. CV 14-0462-WS-M, 2016

WL 2642220, at *4 (S.D. Ala. May 9, 2016) (“Hours for clerical

activity will thus be cut in their entirety.”); Machado v. Da

Vittorio, LLC, No. 09-23069-CIV, 2010 WL 2949618, at *3 (S.D.

Fla. July 26, 2010) (“Clerical work, such as the compilation

of facts and statistics, coordinating schedules, basic

communications, procedural matters, and housekeeping matters,

is usually performed by legal assistants, not lawyers.”).

While most of the fee entries to which GS Holistic objects

are reasonable (and the Court is not convinced that any

constitute impermissible block billing), a few fee entries

identified by GS Holistic are clerical in nature. For example,

an October 14, 2022, entry for 0.2 hours for a call to Ms.

Penalta’s legal assistant to schedule a call with Ms. Penalta

was clerical. (Doc. # 38-3 at 1). Also clerical were three

entries involving emailing the mediator to schedule the

mediation and later canceling it after the case’s dismissal,

for a total of 0.4 hours. (Id. at 3, 6).

Likewise, certain emails between Defendants’ counsel and

Ms. Wasylik, regarding the timeline for the signing of a

letter of engagement, as well as the uploading and emailing

of relevant documents and invoices to Ms. Wasylik for her

review, were clerical, for a total of 1.2 hours. (Id. at 7-

10). Notably, some of these fee entries related to Ms.

Broughan’s communications with Ms. Wasylik (0.7 hours

incurred between July 17 and 19) were already removed as

administrative by Ms. Wasylik in reaching her total of 99.6

hours of reasonable attorney time. (Doc. # 36-3 at 11). Thus,

the 1.2 hours should be reduced by 0.7, for a total of 0.5

hours of administrative tasks regarding Ms. Wasylik to be

deducted from the 99.6 hours figure.

Yet, many of the fee entries to which GS Holistic objects

— including editing a notice of appearance, editing a draft

affidavit, and emails with Ms. Wasylik discussing the amount

and the reasonableness of attorney’s fees — are not clerical.

(Id. at 1, 6-10). These tasks are not clerical as they involve

the exercise of legal judgment.

In short, 1.1 hours of fee entries should be cut as

clerical from the 99.6 total hours, reducing the recoverable

attorney’s fees by $550. The Court awards Defendants a total

of $39,520 in attorney’s fees.

B. Costs

Defendants ask for an award of two types of costs, which

they claim are reasonable: (1) $13,800.00 in expert fees for

hiring Dineen Wasylik, an attorney and expert on reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs in trademark infringement cases;

and (2) $2,052 for the direct loan expenses Defendant Moses

incurred. (Doc. # 36 at 14-15).

If “warranted for effective deterrence,” the Court may

enter a sanctions order “directing payment to the movant of

part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other

expenses directly resulting from the violation.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 11(c)(4) (emphasis added). Likewise, Section 1927 allows

for the imposition of “excess costs” and “expenses”

“reasonably incurred because of” the attorney’s unreasonable

and vexatious conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

As to the expert fees, Defendants explain that they hired

Ms. Wasylik to review their fee ledgers and other materials

to determine the reasonable attorney’s fees to be charged in

this trademark infringement case. (Doc. # 36 at 14). Ms.

Wasylik spent twenty-three hours reviewing documents and

drafting her declaration, at an hourly rate of $600, for a

total of $13,800. (Doc. # 36-3 at 15).

The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged the value of

expert opinions to establishing the amount of reasonable

attorney’s fees. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299 (emphasizing

that “more than the affidavit of the attorney performing the

work” is needed to establish the prevailing market rate for

attorney’s fees and noting that “[e]vidence of rates may be

adduced through direct evidence of charges by lawyers under

similar circumstances or by opinion evidence” (emphasis

added)). Given the value of expert testimony to establishing

the reasonable attorney’s fee award, the Court finds that

Defendants are entitled to recover the reasonable cost of Ms.

Wasylik’s services. See Blossom v. Blackhawk Datsun, Inc.,

120 F.R.D. 91, 98 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (including the attorney’s

fees expert witness’s fee in the award of reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs as sanctions under Rule 11);

Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 729 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (S.D.

Fla. 1990) (“Given the perverse possibility that the

imposition of Rule 11 sanctions will often give rise to

satellite litigation, the need to deter frivolous litigation

demands that this Court not only impose sanctions where Rule

11 is violated, but to also award attorneys’ fees and costs

in pursuing such sanctions.”).

GS Holistic asserts that “[e]xpert witness fees in

excess of the statutory amount under 28 U.S.C. § 1821 limits

are not recoverable.” (Doc. # 38 at 6). This is incorrect.

This Court is not limited by Section 1821 or 28 U.S.C. § 1920

in the amount of expert fees that can be awarded as a sanction

under Rule 11 and Section 1927. Barrios v. Regions Bank, No.

5:13-cv-29-WTH-PRL, 2013 WL 5230653, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Sept.

16, 2013) (“Although the other requested costs are not

enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the Court likely has authority

to tax such costs pursuant to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and

its own inherent authority.”), aff’d, 572 F. App’x 839 (11th

Cir. 2014). Rather, Rule 11 and Section 1927 themselves limit

what costs and expenses may be imposed, by providing that

“expenses directly resulting from the violation” of Rule 11

and “expenses” “reasonably incurred because of” the

sanctioned attorney’s unreasonable and vexatious conduct are

recoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4); 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

The only case cited by GS Holistic regarding a limitation

on costs, Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir.

1996), is neither binding on this Court nor persuasive as to

the issue before the Court. That case involved the award of

attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party in a

copyright case under 17 U.S.C. § 505 and whether the “full

costs” awardable under Section 505 were limited by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1920 and Section 1821. Id. at 293-95. Pinkham did not

involve an award of fees and costs as a sanction under Rule

11 or Section 1927. Id. Furthermore, Section 1821 sets at $40

the attendance fee a witness may charge “for each day’s

attendance” “at any court of the United States, or before a

United States Magistrate Judge, or before any person

authorized to take his deposition pursuant to any rule or

order of a court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)

& (b). The expert fees here are not to cover attendance at

any deposition or court proceeding. Rather, the expert fee

here covers the expert’s preparation of a declaration. Thus,

the Court rejects GS Holistic’s argument.

The Court must determine, however, whether the fee

charged by Ms. Wasylik was reasonable in this case. Ms.

Wasylik’s hourly rate of $600 is reasonable for an attorney

of her experience and ability. Furthermore, upon review, Ms.

Wasylik’s dedication of twenty-three hours to reviewing the

record and drafting her expert declaration were reasonable.

(Doc. # 36-3). The declaration is sixteen-pages and provides

an in-depth analysis of the reasonable hours expended by

counsel. (Id.). In its discretion and applying the Court’s

experience and common sense, the Court awards the entirety of

Ms. Wasylik’s fee of $13,800. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303

(“The court . . . is itself an expert on the question [of

attorney’s fees] and may consider its own knowledge and

experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form

an independent judgment either with or without the aid of

witnesses as to value.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the

Motion is granted with respect to the expert fees.

Next, Defendants seek to recover $2,052 “in direct loan

expenses” Defendant Moses incurred “when he applied for an

$8,000 loan in May 2023” “to afford legal representation in

this case.” (Doc. # 36 at 14). Defendants maintain that GS

Holistic and its counsel “should be responsible for paying

these direct loan expenses which were incurred after [the]

Rule 11 Motion was filed.” (Id.).

While the Court sympathizes with Defendants, the Court

in its discretion determines that these loan expenses are not

a reasonable cost that should be imposed on GS Holistic and

its counsel. Defendants’ choice to take out loans to finance

their defense, while understandable, was their own.

Furthermore, the relevant loan was taken out after the vast

majority of defense counsel’s work was complete; notably,

Defendants’ motion for sanctions and GS Holistic’s motion to

voluntarily dismiss the case were both filed in March 2023,

months before Defendant Moses took out the loan in May 2023.

(Id. at 14). Given that all reasonable attorney’s fees and

expert fees incurred by Defendants are being awarded to them,

it would be excessive to additionally award Defendants these

loan expenses. Thus, the Motion is denied as to these loan

costs.

C. Prejudgment Interest

Finally, Defendants seek the imposition of 12.95%

prejudgment interest on the award of attorney’s fees and

costs, calculated from the date the case was filed in

September 2022. (Doc. # 36 at 15). In support, Defendants

cite a Fifth Circuit case in which the court upheld the

district court’s award of prejudgment interest as a Rule 11

sanction. (Id.) (citing F.D.I.C. v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d

566, 594-95 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming award of prejudgment

interest on sanctions award “under its inherent powers based

on ‘the cost of the delay for the fees and expenses’”)).

But “[a] number of courts have held that an award of

prejudgment interest on a sanction award is inappropriate.”

Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., No. 2:11-CV-03577-

RDP, 2020 WL 13260391, at *2 (N.D. Ala. June 11, 2020); see

also Hoffman v. L & M Arts, No. 3:10-CV-0953-D, 2015 WL

3999171, at *10 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2015) (in the context of

Rule 37 sanctions, declining to award prejudgment interest on

an award of attorney’s fees). “The reason courts award

prejudgment interest is to ‘fully compensate plaintiffs by

accounting for the time-value of money’ that was wrongly

withheld.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 2020 WL 13260391, at

*3 (citation omitted). “On the other hand, a sanction award

(at least the type imposed here) is designed to require a

party to pay its opponent’s attorney fees.” Id. “Generally,

a sanction is not intended ‘to compensate the prevailing party

for the loss of use of monies owed.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Upon reflection and in its discretion, the Court

declines to award prejudgment interest on the attorney’s fees

and costs award here. See Id. (“After careful review, the

court determines that AAI is not entitled to prejudgment

interest on the sanction award entered against Boeing.”).

III. Conclusion

Thus, the Court determines that the instant Motion is

granted in part and denied in part, with Defendants awarded

$39,520 in attorney’s fees and $13,800 in costs. The Court is

mindful that this is a large sanctions award. However, these

reduced fees and costs are reasonable, given the work

Defendants’ counsel and its expert were required to perform

in litigating the case and pursuing sanctions.

The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to “‘reduce frivolous

claims, defenses or motions’ and to deter ‘costly meritless

maneuvers,’ thus avoiding unnecessary delay and expense in

litigation.” Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th

Cir. 1987). Likewise, “[t]he purpose of [Section] 1927 is to

deter frivolous litigation and abusive practices by attorneys

and to ensure that those who create unnecessary costs bear

them.” Boler v. Space Gateway Support Co. LLC, 290 F. Supp.

2d 1272, 1277 (M.D. Fla. 2003).

Here, the need for deterrence is strong. The Court notes

that GS Holistic is a frequent litigant, having filed forty-

seven cases in the Middle District of Florida alone and

approximately seven hundred cases across the country. (Doc.

# 36-3 at 12). Given its frequent resort to the federal

courts, it is imperative that GS Holistic comport itself in

accordance with Rule 11 in other pending and future cases.

The deterrent function of this sanctions award is

likewise important as to Ms. Penalta, given the waste of

judicial resources and numerous rule violations committed in

this case and Ms. Penalta’s various other cases in this

District. See, e.g., GS Holistic, LLC v. Kinder Combs 7 LLC,

No. 3:22-cv-1206-TJC-LLL, 2023 WL 5104701, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Aug. 9, 2023) (“In each of the above [six] cases listed in

the caption, Ms. Penalta has failed to take some action

required by the Local Rules of this Court by either failing

to timely file a case management report, failing to timely

move for clerk’s default or default judgment. She has been

repeatedly warned. Enough is enough. Each of the above listed

cases are dismissed without prejudice.” (emphasis in

original)); IMiracle (HK) Limited v. Okie Smoky LLC, Case No.

3:22-cv-1389-MMH-MCR (M.D. Fla. July 5, 2023) at (Doc. # 40)

(order recounting numerous cases in which Ms. Penalta has

failed to follow the Local Rules, describing her practice in

this Court as “exceedingly careless,” and warning Ms. Penalta

that future violations will carry consequences throughout the

district); GS Holistic, LLC v. Venice Smoke Shop #3, Inc.,

No. 3:22-cv-1364-HES-PDB (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2023) at (Doc. #

16) (noting multiple Local Rule violations by Ms. Penalta and

ordering her to “file a paper certifying she has read the

Local Rules and will comply with them”).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendants Brother Pastor LLC, Matthew S. Moses, and

Earl Burdette’s Motion for Determination of Attorney

Fees, Costs, and Sanctions (Doc. # 36) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

(2) The Court awards $39,520 in attorney’s fees and $13,800

in costs for Defendants and against GS Holistic and its

counsel, Gabrielle Alexa Penalta and The Ticktin Law

Group, PA, jointly.

(3) The Clerk is directed to enter a judgment of attorney’s

fees and costs for Defendants Brother Pastor LLC,

Matthew S. Moses, and Earl Burdette and against

Plaintiff GS Holistic, LLC, and Gabrielle Alexa Penalta

and The Ticktin Law Group, PA, jointly in the total

amount of $53,320.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 5th

day of September, 2023.

tin In. Mecmeply (neh

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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