The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
VINCENT MEEKS,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 5:21-cv-242-SPC-PRL
FLORIDA COMMISSION ON
OFFENDER REVIEW and
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Respondents.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
Before the Court is Petitioner Vincent Meeks’ Fourth Amended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 25). Meeks is a prisoner of the Florida
Department of Corrections, and he challenges his Presumptive Parole Release
Date (PPRD) set by the Florida Commission on Offender Review (the
Commission).
The criminal charges against Meeks stem from a drug deal gone bad.
Meeks killed a man when he fired a gun at two fleeing vehicles. In 1994, Meeks
was convicted of First-Degree Murder (Count 1) and two counts of Attempted
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Second-Degree Murder with a Firearm (Counts 2 and 3). (Doc. 33-1 at 179).
The state trial court sentenced Meeks to a life imprisonment with a 25-year
mandatory minimum on Count 1. (Id. at 182). The state appellate court
vacated the convictions for Counts 2 and 3 due to improper jury instructions.
Meeks v. State, 667 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1996). Rather
than re-try Meeks on those two counts, the State of Florida nolle prossed them.
(Doc. 33-1 at 190). The legality of Meeks’ life sentence is not in dispute.
After conducting a parole interview of Meeks, the Commission
established his PPRD as March 12, 2047, and imposed an extended subsequent
interview interval of seven years. (Id. at 204). Meeks filed a petition for writ
of mandamus challenging the Commission’s decision, but the state mandamus
court denied it. (Id. at 310-17). The state appellate court denied certiorari and
a rehearing. (Id. at 117, 126). Meeks then timely sought federal habeas relief.
In his federal habeas petition, Meeks asserts the Commission violated
his due process and equal protection rights by (1) assessing a “committed for
pecuniary gain” aggravating factor, (2) assessing a “risk of great bodily harm”
aggravating factor, (3) not applying mitigation, and (4) extending his interview
interval.
Federal habeas review of state parole decisions is extremely limited.
“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Thus, parole
decisions “do not automatically invoke due process protection; there simply is
no constitutional guarantee that all executive decisionmaking must comply
with standards that assure error-free determinations.” Id. Courts in the
Eleventh Circuit recognize a limited exception. A parole board may not
“engage in ‘arbitrary and capricious’ or ‘flagrant or unauthorized action,’ such
as knowingly or admittedly relying on false information in making parole
decisions.” Walker v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 299 F. App’x 900, 902 (11th Cir.
2008) (citations omitted).
Meeks fails to allege—much less prove—the Commission violated any
constitutional right. He argues throughout his petition that the Commission
misapplied Florida law, but errors of state law do not justify federal habeas
relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“We have stated many
times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”
(internal quotations marks omitted)). Federal habeas courts “must defer to the
state’s construction of its own law.” Pinkney v. Sec’y, DOC, 876 F.3d 1290, 1295
(11th Cir. 2017). Federal habeas courts “can not review a state’s alleged failure
to adhere to its own sentencing procedure[,]” even when a petition “is couched
in terms of equal protection and due process.” Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507,
1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This
Court thus accepts as correct the state mandamus court’s determination that
the Commission complied with Florida law. Meeks’ arguments that the
Commission violated Florida law are facially insufficient and refuted by the
record. The only matter remaining is whether the Commission engaged in any
arbitrary, capricious, flagrant, or unauthorized action.
The Commission’s applications of the “committed for pecuniary gain” and
“risk of great bodily harm” aggravating factors were not arbitrary, capricious,
flagrant, or unauthorized. The record confirms that evidence supported both
factors. The Complaint/Arrest Affidavit states that Meeks and his associates
attempted to rob two vehicles during a drug deal. When the occupants got
spooked and sped away, Meeks shot at both vehicles, killing the victim. (Doc.
33-1 at 186). Meeks does not challenge the veracity of the Complaint/Arrest
Affidavit, and there is no evidence suggesting its description of the crime is
false. It is reasonable to conclude that Meeks shot at the fleeing vehicles in
furtherance of the attempted robbery, and that the shots created a risk of great
bodily harm in addition to the death of the victim.
Meeks’ third and fourth claims raise no federal due process issue. The
state mandamus court explained that Florida law gives the Commission
discretion to apply or not apply mitigation and to schedule subsequent parole
interviews. (Id. at 316-17). The Commission’s exercise of that discretion is not
subject to federal habeas review. See, Branan, supra.
Finally, Meeks peppered boilerplate equal protection language
throughout his petition. He makes conclusory claims that he was similarly
situated to several other individuals, but that is not enough to state a claim.
In a class-of-one equal protection claim, a plaintiff must prove he “has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there
is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). “To be ‘similarly situated,’ the comparators
must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” Grider v. City of
Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Meeks does
not describe the circumstances of any comparator. He thus fails to state an
equal proception claim.
In sum, Meeks’ arguments that the Commission violated state law are
not cognizable on federal habeas review. Meeks’ Fourth Amended Petition fails
to state a claim that the Commission violated his federal rights to due process
and equal protection. And to the limited extent that this Court can review the
Commission’s decision, the Court finds no constitutional error.
Certificate of Appealability
A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement
to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather,
a district court must first issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”). “A [COA]
may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Dial
must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 4738, 484
(2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further,” Miller—El, 537 U.S. at 3385-36. Meeks has not made the
requisite showing.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Petitioner Vincent Meeks’ Fourth Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Doc. 25) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 3, 2023.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record