Harris v. Singletary

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

LUIS MUNUZURI HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-449-MMH-LLL

ROSEANNA SINGLETARY, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Luis Munuzuri Harris, an inmate in the custody of the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action on April 15, 2022, by

filing a pro se Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1)1 with

exhibits (Doc. 1-1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint, Harris names the

following Defendants: Nurse Roseanna Singletary; Sergeant Allen; Sergeant

Brewington; Captain J. Bieghsly; Captain Starling; Warden Barry Reddish;

and Inspector Donaldson. He alleges claims of retaliation against all

Defendants and excessive force against Nurse Singletary, Sergeant Allen, and

Sergeant Brewington. Harris seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.

1 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

This matter is before the Court on the following Motions: (1) Defendants

Reddish, Bieghsly, Starling, and Donaldson’s Motion to Dismiss (Reddish

Motion; Doc. 16) (collectively referred to as the Reddish Defendants); and (2)

Defendant Nurse Singletary’s Motion to Dismiss (Singletary Motion; Doc. 28).2

Harris filed Responses. See Reddish Response (Doc. 24); Singletary Response

(Doc. 30). Defendants’ Motions are ripe for review.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations3

As to the specific underlying facts supporting his claims, Harris asserts

that on January 5, 2020, he was called to medical, and when he arrived in the

“triage room,” Nurse Singletary confronted him using “irate profane language.”

Complaint at 8. According to Harris, Nurse Singletary said, “She ain’t the one

to be [messed] with,” called Harris a rapist, and used a racial slur. Id. Harris

maintains she began to attack him by “clawing and grabbing at [his right] arm,

repeatedly violently striking [him] in [the] face with severe force causing [him]

to go down.” Id. He alleges Nurse Ford stopped Nurse Singletary’s assault, and

2 Defendants Allen and Brewington filed a joint Answer. See Doc. 17.

3 In considering the Motions, the Court must accept all factual allegations in

the Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to Harris,

and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. Hill v.

White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531,

1534 (11th Cir. 1994). As such, the facts recited here are drawn from the Complaint,

and may well differ from those that ultimately can be proved.

2

Nurse Brooker said, “That’s what happens when you [mess] with medical.” Id.

Harris attempted to leave the room, but the door was locked. Id. Harris asserts

that Nurse Singletary then “picked up [the] phone and lied to Captain Duncan

to lock [him] up for ‘disrespect.’” Id. (emphasis omitted). According to Harris,

he sustained bruising, swelling of his head, scratches, and bruises on his torso

from the assault. Id. at 6. He contends that Nurse Singletary assaulted him in

retaliation for a medical grievance that he filed on December 30, 2019. Id. at

8.

On January 6, 2020, Harris submitted a grievance about Nurse

Singletary’s attack. Id. at 9. That same day, a correctional officer escorted

Harris to medical, so staff could evaluate his injuries. Id. Harris alleges that

Nurse Singletary was present for the examination and “taunt[ed]” him about

reporting the incident. Id. According to Harris, Nurse Singletary talked about

his criminal case and said, “We should rape you like you did that lady.” Id. at

9.

Harris asserts that the next day, January 7, 2020, Sergeants Allen and

Brewington removed Harris from his cell and escorted him to a hallway of the

Administrative Classification Office. Id. at 13-14. He alleges that Sergeant

Allen placed him in a chokehold while Sergeant Brewington punched and

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kicked him. Id. at 14. After several minutes, Sergeant Brewington then placed

Harris in a chokehold while Sergeant Allen punched Harris. Id. According to

Harris, Sergeant Allen subsequently took a black “mini-mag” flashlight from

his utility belt and forcefully inserted the flashlight into Harris’s rectum. Id.

Harris asserts Sergeants Allen and Brewington made “racial comments” and

referred to his criminal case throughout the incident. Id. He contends the

attack occurred “under the retaliatory direction of Defendant Singletary” after

Captain Starling allowed Sergeants Allen and Brewington to read the January

5th incident report. Id. at 13, 15.

Harris next contends that Captain Bieghsly prevented him from

reporting the January 7th assault. Id. at 19. Harris alleges that on January

15, 2020, Captain Bieghsly “c[a]me to [his] cell [] with a witness statement

falsely representing that [Harris] was to give a statement saying that [he] ‘had

no-new allegations.’” Id. at 20. Captain Bieghsly told Harris that Lieutenant

Mark Avery had already reported the incident; however, Harris asserts that

the incident “was not already reported” because the statement was “suppose[d]

to be related to a Direct Grievance . . . regarding physical and sexual abuse

suffered on January 07, 2020.” Id. Harris further alleges that Inspector

Donaldson arrived at Harris’s cell to verify his identity on January 30, 2020.

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Id. at 23. Harris agreed to speak with Inspector Donaldson, who ordered

Captain Starling to remove Harris from the cell. Id. Captain Starling directed

Harris through a “a ‘strip-search’ process twice.” Id. Although Harris avers

that he complied with the procedure, Captain Starling reported that Harris did

not do so. Id. According to Harris, Captain Starling told him that he was “not

going to talk to anybody,” and that “the warden and ICT ain’t transferring you

. . . you’re dead.” Id.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint

should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)

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(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further,

the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when

the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and

quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”

which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine

whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less

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stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be

liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th

Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto

counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th

Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359,

1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other

grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

IV. Summary of the Arguments

In her Motion, Nurse Singletary argues that Harris’s claims against her

should be dismissed because: (1) the Complaint does not include a short and

plain statement of the facts as required by Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure (Rule(s)); (2) Harris alleges only de minimis physical injuries

which do not entitle him to compensatory and punitive damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(e); (3) he has not plead facts sufficient to state a Fifth

Amendment due process claim upon which relief can be granted; (4) he fails to

state a First Amendment retaliation claim upon which relief can be granted;

(5) he failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (6) Harris abused the

judicial process when he failed to accurately disclose his litigation history.

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Singletary Motion at 6-17. In their Motion, the Reddish Defendants argue that

Harris’s claims against them should be dismissed because he fails to state a

First Amendment retaliation claim upon which relief can be granted. See

Reddish Motion at 5-6.

In his Responses, Harris asks the Court to deny Defendants’ Motions

because he states plausible claims against Defendants. Singletary Response at

1-3; Reddish Response at 1-2. He also contends that he exhausted his

administrative remedies, and truthfully disclosed his litigation history.

Singletary Response at 3-6.

V. Analysis

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

First, Nurse Singletary argues that Harris did not properly exhaust

administrative remedies. Singletary Motion at 15. The Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals has held the exhaustion of administrative remedies by a prisoner is

“a threshold matter” to be addressed before considering the merits of a case.

Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Myles v.

Miami-Dade Cnty. Corr. & Rehab. Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir.

8

2012)4 (noting that exhaustion is “a ‘threshold matter’ that must be addressed

first”) (citation omitted). It is well settled that the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(PLRA) requires an inmate wishing to challenge prison conditions to first

exhaust all available administrative remedies before asserting any claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 532 (2002). A prisoner such as Harris, however, is not required to plead

exhaustion. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, the United

States Supreme Court has recognized that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative

defense under the PLRA[.]” Id. Notably, exhaustion of available administrative

remedies is “a precondition to an adjudication on the merits” and is mandatory

under the PLRA. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008). Not

only is there an exhaustion requirement, the PLRA “requires proper

exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal

with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these

parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to

do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full

opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Administrative

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

9

law does this by requiring proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies, which “means using all steps

that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so

that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”

Pozo,[5] 286 F.3d, at 1024 (emphasis in original).

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. And, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id.

The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ourts may not

engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one

baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies

as are ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). For an

administrative remedy to be available, the “remedy must be ‘capable of use for

the accomplishment of [its] purpose.’” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084

(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th

Cir. 2007)).

Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, Defendant bears “the burden of proving that [Harris] has failed to

exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Id. at 1082. In accordance with

5 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).

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Eleventh Circuit precedent, a court must employ a two-step process when

examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance

procedures, he may file suit under § 1983. In response

to a prisoner suit, defendants may bring a motion to

dismiss and raise as a defense the prisoner’s failure to

exhaust these administrative remedies. See Turner,

541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v. Burnside we

established a two-step process for resolving motions to

dismiss prisoner lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541

F.3d at 1082. First, district courts look to the factual

allegations in the motion to dismiss and those in the

prisoner’s response and accept the prisoner’s view of

the facts as true. The court should dismiss if the facts

as stated by the prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id.

Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s

view of the facts, the court makes specific findings to

resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based

on those findings, defendants have shown a failure to

exhaust. Id. at 1082-83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining

that defendants bear the burden of showing a failure

to exhaust).

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).

The FDOC provides an internal grievance procedure for its inmates. See

Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.001 through 33-103.018. Generally, to properly

exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must complete a three-step

sequential process. First, an inmate must submit an informal grievance to a

designated staff member at the institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

103.005. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate must submit a formal grievance

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at the institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006. If the matter is

not resolved at the institutional level, the inmate must file an appeal to the

Office of the Secretary of the FDOC. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007.

Notably, an inmate may bypass the informal grievance step if he or she raises

a grievance of reprisal. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33.103.006(3)(c). An informal

grievance must be received within twenty days of when the action being

grieved occurred. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.11(1)(a). If an informal

grievance was not required, then the formal grievance must be received within

fifteen days from the date on which the grieved action occurred. See Fla.

Admin. Code R. 33-103.11(1)(b).

With the Complaint, Harris provides records of his exhaustion efforts.

See Complaint at 8-12. The records reflect that on January 6, 2020, Harris

submitted a formal grievance about Nurse Singletary’s use of force. Id. at 8.

Florida State Prison responded:

Your request for Administrative Review or Appeal has

been received, reviewed and evaluated as follows:

Incident Report #W20-206-0024 was submitted with

your allegations of Staff Misconduct as outlined in

Chapter 33-208.002 and your fear for your personal

safety. This report is being referred to the Office of the

Inspector General for review. Upon Completion of all

necessary action, information will be provided to

appropriate administrators for final determination

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and handling. [T]his may or may not result in a

personal interview with you. Until this process is

completed you will remain in Confinement for your

own safety.

As action was initiated, you may consider your

Grievance “Approved” from that standpoint. However,

this does not constitute substantiation of you[r]

allegations.

Id. at 10. Harris appealed, id. at 11, and the Office of the FDOC Secretary

denied the appeal, stating in relevant part:

Your appeal has been reviewed and evaluated. The

subject of your grievance was previously referred to

the Office of the Inspector General. It is the

responsibility of that office to determine the amount

and type of inquiry that will be conducted. This

inquiry/review may or may not include a personal

interview with you. Upon completion of this review,

information will be provided to appropriate

administrators for final determination and handling.

As this process was initiated prior to the receipt of

your appeal, your request for action by this office is

denied.

Id. at 12.6

In her Motion, Nurse Singletary argues that although Harris filed a

grievance on January 6, 2020, complaining about the use of force, the grievance

6 While the face of the Complaint shows that Harris has submitted other

grievances, the Court references only the January 6th grievance and appeal because

Nurse Singletary relies on it alone to support her argument.

13

did not comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.-014(1)(a)

because “it addressed multiple topics and issues involving multiple different

people, torts, and actions.” Complaint at 14-15. She therefore contends that

Harris did not exhaust his administrative remedies where he failed to comply

with the FDOC’s grievance procedure. Id. at 14. Harris responds that he

properly exhausted his administrative remedies because the FDOC never

rejected his grievance on the basis identified by Nurse Singletary. Singletary

Response at 3.

Nurse Singletary’s argument is plainly without merit. The Eleventh

Circuit has held that a prisoner exhausts his administrative remedies “when

prison officials decide a procedurally flawed grievance on the merits . . . [and]

district courts may not enforce a prison’s procedural rule to find a lack of

exhaustion after the prison itself declined to enforce the rule.” Whatley v.

Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2015). Even

assuming Harris’s formal grievance and appeal were “procedurally flawed,” the

FDOC reached the merits of Harris’s grievances and declined to enforce the

procedural bar identified by Nurse Singletary. The Court will not enforce the

FDOC’s procedural bar on its behalf. Therefore, Nurse Singletary’s Motion is

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due to be denied as to her assertion that Harris failed to properly exhaust

administrative remedies.

B. Short and Plain Statement

Nurse Singletary asks the Court to dismiss Harris’s Complaint because

it “does not come anywhere close to a ‘short and plain’ statement of a claim

showing that [Harris] is entitled to relief against Nurse Singletary as required

by Rule 8(a)(2).” Singletary Motion at 6. She contends that the Complaint

amounts to “a series of administrative complaints” without any well-plead facts

connecting her to Harris’s injuries or any subsequent acts of violence. Id. at 6-

7. In response, Harris argues that he provided a “synopsis of claims” that

incorporated the factual basis from his grievances “in the interest of judicial

economy.” Singletary Response at 30. He maintains that he identified Nurse

Singletary as the person responsible for the retaliatory use of force, and alleged

specific facts to support the claims against her. Id.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The

purpose of Rule 8(a)(2) is “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation

marks and citation omitted). And, while pro se pleadings are liberally

15

construed, they “must suggest (even if inartfully) that there is at least some

factual support for a claim; it is not enough just to invoke a legal theory devoid

of any factual basis.” Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th

Cir. 2015).

To the extent Nurse Singletary contends the Complaint does not comply

with Rule 8(a)(2) because Harris uses grievance records to set forth the

underlying facts of his claim, her argument is unavailing. Harris identifies four

separate claims for relief against different Defendants in the Complaint. See

generally Complaint. He asserts Claim One against Nurse Singletary, Claim

Two against Sergeants Allen and Brewington, Claim Three against Captain

Bieghsly, and Claim Four against Warden Reddish, Inspector Donaldson, and

Captain Starling. Id. at 7, 13-15, 19, 22. As Claim One, Harris alleges Nurse

Singletary violated the First Amendment when she retaliated against him for

using the grievance process and violated the Eighth Amendment when she

used excessive force. Id. at 7. The purported use of force occurred on January

5, 2020, and as a result, Harris contends he sustained “bruising, swelling to

the face/head, scratches and bruising to torso.” Id. at 6. To support Claim One,

Harris “incorporates by reference . . . the original facts set forth in ‘Approved’

Grievance Log #2001-206-004” on pages eight through ten of the Complaint.

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Id. at 7. He labels the relevant grievances as “Claim One.” Id. at 8-10. The

grievances detail the use of force that he asserts occurred on January 5th and

identify Nurse Singletary as the person who used the force. Considering the

above, Harris has set forth a short and plain statement of his entitlement to

relief such that Nurse Singletary should have fair notice of the claims against

her and the facts underlying those claims. The Court thus will evaluate the

sufficiency of the factual allegations as set forth in the Complaint and its

attachments. See MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co.,

40 F.4th 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2022) (finding district court erred when it

refused to consider whether the complaint and an exhibit attached and

incorporated by reference, taken together, plausibly stated a claim for relief);

Clark v. Huntleigh Corp., 119 F. App’x 666, 667-68 (5th Cir. 2005) (reversing

and remanding dismissal for failure to state a claim where pro se plaintiff’s

complaint “on its face included only hints of claims [and] included no real

factual or legal allegations” but attached as an exhibit his “EEOC charge of

discrimination, which set out his race and age discrimination allegations).

Accordingly, Nurse Singletary’s Motion is due to be denied as to her claim that

the Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2).

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C. Physical Injury

Nurse Singletary next argues that Harris has not plead physical injury

sufficient to entitle him to compensatory and punitive damages. Singletary

Motion at 10-11. Pursuant to § 1997e(e), “[n]o Federal civil action may be

brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,

for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” To satisfy §

1997e(e), a prisoner must assert physical injury that is more than de minimis.

However, the injury does not need to be significant. See Thompson v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 551 F. App’x 555, 557 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Until recently, the Eleventh Circuit read this statute to mean that “an

incarcerated plaintiff cannot recover either compensatory or punitive damages

for constitutional violations unless he can demonstrate a (more than de

minimis) physical injury.” Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307-08 (11th Cir.

2015). However, in Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021), the

Eleventh Circuit reexamined § 1997e(e)’s physical injury requirement and

precisely defined its limitation on the damages a prisoner can recover for

constitutional violations. The court held and instructed “the district court to

dismiss only a request for compensation for an alleged mental or emotional

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injury in the absence of an alleged physical injury.” Id. at 1361. It reasoned

that “a plaintiff – at least one alleging a constitutional violation – need not

allege a compensable injury to seek punitive damages, so long as he plausibly

alleges that the underlying misconduct was willful or malicious.” Id.

Here, the Court finds that Harris pleads sufficient facts to support a

claim for compensatory damages under current Eleventh Circuit precedent. In

the Complaint, Harris details the injuries that he sustained from the assault:

“bruising, swelling to the face/head, scratches[,] and bruising to torso.”

Complaint at 6. Harris allegedly received “minor medical treatment,” and the

Office of the Inspector General photographed his injuries. Id. While it appears

Harris may have sustained minimal injuries, the Court finds the allegations

set forth in the Complaint support a claim for compensatory damages at this

juncture.

Harris also requests punitive damages. He asserts that Nurse Singletary

used excessive force on January 5th in retaliation for his filing a medical

grievance on December 30, 2019. Id. at 7-8. During the assault, Nurse

Singletary allegedly stated, “She ain’t the one to be [messed] with”; used a

racial slur; and referred to Harris as a “rapist.” Id. at 8. As such, Harris

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plausibly alleges that Nurse Singletary’s conduct was willful. Therefore, Nurse

Singletary’s Motion is due to be denied on this ground.

D. Fifth Amendment Due Process

In her Motion, Nurse Singletary requests dismissal of the Fifth

Amendment claim against her because Harris pleads no facts that “connect

[her] to any Fifth Amendment constitutional violation.” Singletary Motion at

11. Harris did not respond to the argument. See generally Singletary Response.

It is unclear why Nurse Singletary makes this argument as Harris only raises

claims against her under the First and Eighth Amendments in the Complaint.

See Complaint at 7. As such, Nurse Singletary’s Motion is due to be denied as

moot on this basis.

E. Abuse of the Judicial Process

Nurse Singletary requests dismissal of the claims against her because

Harris failed to fully disclose his litigation history. Singletary Motion at 15.

She asserts that, in the Complaint, Harris identified one prior lawsuit

involving prison conditions (Case No. 5:13-cv-382-WS-EMT) but “omitted

several prior federal lawsuits involving prison conditions.” Id. at 16. Moreover,

Nurse Singletary contends that “[Harris’s] own Complaint indicates that he

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filed a writ of habeas corpus in the First District Court of Appeals related to

prison conditions (alleged retaliation and sexual assault).” Id.

Harris responds that he disclosed only case number 5:13-cv-382-WS-

EMT because he reached a settlement with the defendants in that case such

that he would dismiss two other federal civil rights cases arising from the same

facts. Response at 5. Harris explains that “the complaint [in that case] became

the ‘operative pleading,” which was resolved through financial settlement in

favor of [Harris], and in turn, [he] voluntarily dismissed the two other civil

rights complaints.” Id. He further argues that the state petition for writ of

habeas corpus did not concern retaliation and sexual assault, but rather

requested release from close management status. Id.

The PLRA requires courts to dismiss a case at any time if the court

determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). When a complaint

form requires a plaintiff to list his litigation history, and the plaintiff makes

affirmative misrepresentations regarding his litigation history under penalty

of perjury, those misrepresentations constitute an abuse of the judicial process

warranting dismissal of the case as “malicious.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1);

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Jenkins v. Hutcheson, 708 F. App’x 647, 648-49 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam);

Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that dismissal of

an action without prejudice as a sanction for a pro se prisoner’s failure to

disclose the existence of a prior lawsuit, where that prisoner was under penalty

of perjury, was proper), abrogated in part on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,

549 U.S. 199 (2007); see also Sears v. Haas, 509 F. App’x 935, 935-36 (11th Cir.

2013) (per curiam) (holding that dismissal of prisoner’s case for abuse of the

judicial process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) was warranted where the

prisoner failed to disclose cases he previously filed). “It is well settled that

federal courts have the inherent power to sanction parties, but the court must

make a finding of bad faith on the part of the litigant before imposing such

sanctions.” Harris v. Warden, 498 F. App’x 962, 964 (11th Cir. 2012).

Here, the Court declines to dismiss Harris’s Complaint for abuse of the

judicial process. Harris disclosed one federal civil rights case from the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Complaint at 33. He

identified the case number, noted that the parties reached a settlement, and

stated that “[a] joint notice of voluntary dismissal was filed.” Id. He failed to

disclose two other federal civil rights cases brought in the Northern District.

22

However, considering Harris’s Response, the omission seemingly arose from

ignorance of procedure, rather than bad faith.

Harris also omitted information about his state petition. Yet, it does not

appear he did so in an attempt to deceive the Court as he includes as part of

his Complaint a letter from the First District Court of Appeal’s Clerk of Court

about the state petition. Complaint at 18. Based on the pleadings, the Court

finds the severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice to be inappropriate. As

such, Nurse Singletary’s Motion is due to be denied as to her assertion that the

Court should dismiss the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

F. First Amendment Retaliation

Lastly, Nurse Singletary and the Reddish Defendants argue that Harris

fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim upon which relief can be

granted. “The core of [a retaliation claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983]

is that the prisoner is being retaliated against for exercising his right to free

speech.” O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted). It is firmly established that “an inmate is considered to be exercising

his First Amendment right of freedom of speech when he complains to the

prison’s administrators about the conditions of his confinement.” Smith v.

Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). An inmate may pursue a cause

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of action against a prison official who retaliated against him for engaging in

that protected speech. Id.

To establish a retaliation claim, a prisoner must

demonstrate “that the prison official’s actions were the

result of his having filed a grievance concerning the

conditions of his imprisonment.” Farrow v. West, 320

F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). [A plaintiff] can prevail

on a retaliation claim if “(1) his speech was

constitutionally protected; (2) [he] suffered adverse

action such that the administrator’s allegedly

retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of

ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and

(3) there is a causal relationship between the

retaliatory action and the protected speech.” Smith v.

Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008).

Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2023). As to the third

prong, a plaintiff must do more than make “general attacks” upon a

defendant’s motivations and must articulate “affirmative evidence” of

retaliation to prove the requisite motive. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,

600 (1998) (citations omitted). “In other words, the prisoner must show that,

as a subjective matter, a motivation for the defendant’s adverse action was the

prisoner’s grievance or lawsuit.” Jemison v. Wise, 386 F. App’x 961, 965 (11th

Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

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1. Nurse Singletary

In her Motion, Nurse Singletary requests dismissal of Harris’s First

Amendment claim against her because “there is no evidence that Nurse

Singletary violated [Harris’s] First Amendment free speech rights, i.e., the

right to file grievances.” Singletary Motion at 11. She relies on the grievances

attached to the Complaint to argue that Harris had access to and used the

grievance process. Id. at 11-12. According to Nurse Singletary, Harris therefore

fails to state a claim for relief. Id. at 12.

A plain reading of the Complaint demonstrates that Harris does not

allege that Nurse Singletary impeded his access to the grievance process, but

rather alleges that she used force on January 5th in retaliation for Harris

“exercising his right to the grievance procedures.” Complaint at 7; see also

Singletary Response at 2 (“Plaintiff clearly claimed that, ‘[the January 5th

assault] was a retaliatory response, because [Harris] wrote one medical

grievance . . . .”). Harris asserts that he submitted a “medical grievance” on

December 30, 2019, and his family filed a complaint with the Office of the

Inspector General. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). According to Harris, on January

5, 2020, Nurse Singletary “confronted” him in medical, saying she “ain’t the

one to be [messed] with,” and hit him. Id. He maintains that another nurse

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who witnessed the assault, stated, “That’s what happens when you [mess] with

medical.” Id. Based on the above, the Court finds Harris raises a plausible

claim of First Amendment retaliation against Nurse Singletary for his exercise

of the right to utilize the grievance process on December 30th. Accordingly,

Nurse Singletary’s Motion is due to be denied as to this claim.

2. Reddish Defendants

In their Motion, the Reddish Defendants assert that “there is no

constitutional right to the grievance procedure under the Federal

Constitution.” Reddish Motion at 5. Therefore, they allege that Harris fails to

state a claim of constitutional proportion to the extent he asserts that the

Reddish Defendants prevented him from accessing the grievance process. Id.

The Reddish Defendants also argue that because Harris never engaged in

constitutionally protected speech, he cannot maintain a cause of action for

retaliation. Id. at 6.

A prisoner can establish retaliation when he demonstrates prison

officials’ actions were “the result of his having filed a grievance concerning the

conditions of his imprisonment.” Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468

(11th Cir. 1989) Here, the basis of Harris’s claims against the Reddish

Defendants is that they “thwart[ed] [him] from exercising the grievance

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process.” See Complaint at 19, 22 (emphasis added). Harris has failed to allege

that the Reddish Defendants’ actions were taken in retaliation for filing

grievances, and, as such, he cannot state a claim for relief.

Nevertheless, even assuming Harris alleged that he engaged in

protected speech when he filed grievances concerning the January 5th and 7th

assaults, he fails to allege the requisite causal connection between those

grievances and the Reddish Defendants’ actions. He provides no well-plead

facts, beyond mere supposition, to plausibly support his conclusion that the

Reddish Defendants had retaliatory motives. Rather, according to the

allegations in the Complaint and the incorporated grievances, the Reddish

Defendants did not participate in the January 5th or January 7th assaults

involving Nurse Singletary, Sergeant Allen, and Sergeant Brewington, nor

were they the subject of grievances regarding those assaults. Harris does not

allege any facts that would suggest the Reddish Defendants had a subjective

motive to retaliate against him for filing grievances or reporting the assaults

by Nurse Singletary, Sergeant Allen, and Sergeant Brewington. See Thomas

v. Lawrence, 421 F. App’x 926, 929 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of

prisoner’s retaliation claim where grievance complained about only one staff

member and “his complaint failed to allege any facts that would suggest that

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any of the other named defendants had a reason to retaliate against him for

filing the grievance against [the named staff member].”). Accordingly, Harris

fails to plead facts sufficient to nudge his claim of retaliation “across the line

from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

In addition, “an inmate has no constitutionally-protected liberty interest

in access to [the grievance] procedure.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171,

1177 (11th Cir. 2011). To the extent Harris asserts a due process claim against

the Reddish Defendants based on his inability to access the grievance

procedure or contends that he has a constitutional interest in a particular

outcome of the grievance process, he fails to state a claim for relief. Therefore,

the Reddish Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted, and the claims against

them dismissed.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants Reddish, Bieghsly, Starling, and Donaldson’s Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. 16) is GRANTED.

2. Harris’s claims against Defendants Reddish, Bieghsly, Starling,

and Donaldson are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court directs the

Clerk to terminate them as Defendants in the case.

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3. Defendant Nurse Singletary’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) is

DENIED.

4. Nurse Singletary shall respond to the Complaint (Doc. 1) no later

than July 31, 2023. Upon the filing of her answer, the Court, by separate

Order, will set deadlines for discovery and the filing of dispositive motions.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 3rd day of

July, 2023.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-9 6/21

C: Luis Munuzuri Harris, #V09696

Counsel of record

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