Parks v. Corizon, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

LARRY PARKS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:19-cv-631-MMH-PDB

CORIZON, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Larry Parks, an inmate in the custody of the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action on May 28, 2019, by

filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1)1 pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 with exhibits (Doc. 2). In the Complaint, Parks presents claims

against the following Defendants: Corizon, LLC (Corizon); Centurion of

Florida, LLC (Centurion); and four John or Jane Does.2 Parks, who alleges he

1 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

2 Corizon has filed bankruptcy. See Suggestion of Bankruptcy (Doc. 122); Order

(Doc. 123). In accordance with applicable law, the Court stayed the litigation of Parks’

claim against Corizon, and the stay remains in place. See Order (Doc. 123). As such,

the Court does not address the claims against Corizon here. Additionally, the Court

notes that pursuant to a settlement, the Court has dismissed with prejudice the

claims against Defendants Julie Jones, Mark Inch, and Thomas Reimers. See Order

(Doc. 106). Parks also voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the claims against

suffers from the hepatitis C virus (HCV), asserts that Centurion and Corizon

violated the Eighth Amendment when they allegedly created and implemented

a cost-saving policy that sanctioned the delay of medically necessary treatment

for Parks’ HCV infection. As relief, Parks seeks compensatory and punitive

damages.

This matter is before the Court on Centurion’s Motion to Dismiss. See

Defendants Centurion of Florida, LLC, Rhonda Almanza, Teresa A. Woodal,

Elliot E. Perez-Lugo, Daniel P. Cherry, Errol Campbell, and Ernesto L. Toledo

Alverio’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and Incorporated

Memorandum of Law (Motion; Doc. 98).3 Parks filed a response in opposition

to the Motion. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Centurion’s Motion to

Dismiss (Response; Doc. 109). He also submitted exhibits in support of the

Response. See Docs. 109-1 through 109-2. Centurion’s Motion is ripe for review.

Defendants Woodrow A. Myers, Jr., Rhonda Almanza, Helen Sneed, Teresa Woodal,

E. Perez-Lugo, Daniel Cherry, Erron Campbell, and E.L. Toledo. See Notice of

Voluntary Dismissal (Doc. 67); Order (Doc. 107).

3 Because Parks dismissed without prejudice the claims against Almanza,

Woodal, Perez-Lugo, Cherry, Campbell, and Toledo, the Court will only consider

arguments raised on behalf of Centurion.

2

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations4

In his Complaint, Parks brings one claim for relief, alleging Centurion

and Corizon were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need when they

delayed necessary treatment for Parks’ HCV infection in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Complaint at 13. As to the specific underlying facts

supporting his claim, Parks asserts that he entered FDOC custody in March

2002. Id. at 8. According to Parks, “he suffered from [HCV] and the disease had

escalated to such a level that [he] now has decompensated cirrhosis (f4).” Id.

His symptoms include fatigue, depression, joint pain, nausea, chills, shortness

of breath, swelling in legs and ankles, and brain fog. Id. Parks maintains

Defendants would test his blood for ALT and AST enzymes and tell him that

the results “look good.” Id. He avers that when he had abnormal blood test

results, Defendants informed him that the enzyme levels “would have to

remain elevated at least twice over the normal range for two consecutive clinic

reviews, before [Defendants] would take further action, but they never did.” Id.

(emphasis omitted).

4 In considering Centurion’s Motion, the Court must accept all factual

allegations in the Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most

favorable to Parks, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such

allegations. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Okaloosa

Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). As such, the facts recited here are drawn

from the Complaint, and may well differ from those that ultimately can be proved.

3

The United States Food and Drug Administration approved direct-acting

antivirals (DAA) for the treatment of HCV beginning in 2013. Id. at 9. Parks

alleges that he questioned Defendants about the benefits of DAAs and

requested treatment; however, they informed him that he did not require

treatment and the “medical administration” would not authorize it because of

cost. Id. at 10. According to Parks, FDOC did not update its HCV treatment

policy to acknowledge DAAs as the standard of care until 2016. Id. at 11. He

states Defendants established and enforced a policy of delaying DAA

treatments for inmates with HCV because of the cost of treatment. Id. at 12.

As a result of the policy, Parks asserts that his HCV progressed to severe

fibrosis. Id.

III. Summary of the Arguments

In its Motion, Centurion argues that the Court should dismiss the claim

against it because (1) Parks failed to properly exhaust his administrative

remedies, and (2) he fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which

relief can be granted. Motion at 6-17. Parks responds that the Court should not

dismiss his claim because: (1) he exhausted his administrative remedies, and

(2) he states a plausible claim for relief. Response at 13-24.

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IV. Analysis

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. PLRA Exhaustion

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held the exhaustion of

administrative remedies by a prisoner is “a threshold matter” to be addressed

before considering the merits of a case. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,

1286 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Myles v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Corr. & Rehab.

Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012)5 (noting that exhaustion is “a

‘threshold matter’ that must be addressed first”) (citation omitted). It is well

settled that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires an inmate

wishing to challenge prison conditions to first exhaust all available

administrative remedies before asserting any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). A prisoner

such as Parks, however, is not required to plead exhaustion. See Jones v. Bock,

549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, the United States Supreme Court has

recognized that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the

5 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

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PLRA[.]” Id. Notably, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is “a

precondition to an adjudication on the merits” and is mandatory under the

PLRA. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008). Not only is there

an exhaustion requirement, the PLRA “requires proper exhaustion.” Woodford

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal

with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these

parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to

do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full

opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Administrative

law does this by requiring proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies, which “means using all steps

that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so

that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”

Pozo,[6] 286 F.3d, at 1024 (emphasis in original).

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. And, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id.

The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ourts may not

engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one

baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies

6 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).

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as are ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). For an

administrative remedy to be available, the “remedy must be ‘capable of use for

the accomplishment of [its] purpose.’” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084

(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th

Cir. 2007)).

Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, Defendant bears “the burden of proving that [Parks] has failed to

exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Id. at 1082. In accordance with

Eleventh Circuit precedent, a court must employ a two-step process when

examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance

procedures, he may file suit under § 1983. In response

to a prisoner suit, defendants may bring a motion to

dismiss and raise as a defense the prisoner’s failure to

exhaust these administrative remedies. See Turner,

541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v. Burnside we

established a two-step process for resolving motions to

dismiss prisoner lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541

F.3d at 1082. First, district courts look to the factual

allegations in the motion to dismiss and those in the

prisoner’s response and accept the prisoner’s view of

the facts as true. The court should dismiss if the facts

as stated by the prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id.

Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s

view of the facts, the court makes specific findings to

resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based

on those findings, defendants have shown a failure to

exhaust. Id. at 1082-83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining

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that defendants bear the burden of showing a failure

to exhaust).

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).

At step two of the procedure established in Turner, the Court can consider facts

outside the pleadings as long as those facts do not decide the case and the

parties have had sufficient opportunity to develop the record. Bryant, 530 F.3d

at 1376; see also Jenkins v. Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 838-39 (11th Cir. 2020).

Here, Parks submitted grievance records as exhibits to the Complaint. See Doc.

2. The parties neither dispute the accuracy of these grievance records, nor

request an evidentiary hearing. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1377 n.16. Thus, the Court

considers the grievance records solely for purposes of addressing the parties’

competing contentions regarding exhaustion. In evaluating whether Parks has

satisfied the exhaustion requirement, the Court notes that the Eleventh

Circuit has determined that a “prisoner need not name any particular

defendant in a grievance in order to properly exhaust his claim.” Parzyck v.

Prison Health Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations

omitted).

2. Florida’s Prison Grievance Procedure

State law “determines what steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche v.

Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 218

8

(stating that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define

the boundaries of proper exhaustion”). The FDOC provides an internal

grievance procedure for its inmates. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.001

through 33-103.018. Generally, to properly exhaust administrative remedies,

a prisoner must complete a three-step sequential process. First, an inmate

must submit an informal grievance at the institutional level to a designated

staff member responsible for the specific problem. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

103.005. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate must submit a formal grievance

at the institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006. If the matter is

not resolved through formal and informal grievances, the inmate must file an

appeal to the Office of the FDOC Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

103.007. However, under certain specified circumstances, an inmate can

bypass the informal-grievance stage and start with a formal grievance at the

institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005(1); 33-103.006(3). Or

an inmate can completely bypass the institutional level and proceed directly to

the Office of the FDOC Secretary by filing a “direct grievance.” See Fla. Admin.

Code R. 33-103.007(3). Emergency grievances and grievances of reprisal are

types of “direct grievances” that may be filed with the Office of the FDOC

Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007(3)(a).

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Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.011 provides time frames for

the submission of grievances. Informal grievances must be received within

twenty days from the date on which the grieved incident or action occurred.

See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(a). Formal grievances must be received

no later than fifteen days from the date of the response to the informal

grievance. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(b). Similarly, grievance

appeals to the Office of the FDOC Secretary must be received within fifteen

days from the date that the response to the formal grievance is returned to the

inmate. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(c). According to Rule 33-

103.014, an informal grievance, formal grievance, direct grievance, or

grievance appeal “may be returned to the inmate without further processing if,

following a review of the grievance, one or more . . . conditions are found to

exist.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1). The rule provides an enumerated

list as “the only reasons for returning a grievance without a response on the

merits.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1)(a)-(y). A grievance can be

returned without action if it: is untimely; “addresses more than one issue or

complaint;” is “so broad, general or vague in nature that it cannot be clearly

investigated, evaluated, and responded to;” is “not written legibly and cannot

be clearly understood;” is a supplement to a previously-submitted grievance

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that has been accepted for review; does not “provide a valid reason for by-

passing the previous levels of review as required or the reason provided is not

acceptable;” or does not include the required attachments. See Fla. Admin.

Code R. 33-103.014(1).

3. Parks’ Exhaustion Efforts

With the Complaint, Parks provides records of his exhaustion efforts. See

Doc. 2. The records show Parks submitted two formal grievances to Union

Correctional Institution (UCI) on October 19, 2018. Id. at 4, 17. His first formal

grievance (Centurion grievance) stated:

This formal medical grievance regards FDC’s current

health care provider Centurion’s deliberate decision

not to timely honor the accepted means of treatment

for Hepatit[i]s “C” via DAA drugs until Hoffer v. Jones

mandated the same. As a direct result of the

intentional delay, my liver condition worsened and

even though I was eventually treated, my liver

condition is a result of not providing the accepted

treatment in a timely manner. On August 24, 2016[,]

Centurion replaced Corizon as FDC health care

provider and Centurion was aware of the number of

HCV affected prisoners and the policy and custom left

in place by Corizon not to evaluate and or treat per the

required protocol. As a result thereof I am now an F4

on the fibrosis scale and the liver damage is

irreversible.

I contend that I was not treated because of policy,

practice and custom of Centurion condoned by the

FDC to save money.

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Relief Requested: Require Centurion via FDC

physician to explain why I was not treated in a timely

manner and to notify their insurance representative of

the apparent consequences of not having treated me.

Id. at 17. His second formal grievance (Corizon grievance) stated:

This formal medical grievance regards FDC’s prior

health care provider Corizon, LLC’s then deliberate

decision not to honor the June 2014, et al., FBOP

Guidelines, and treat me with DAA drugs for my

Hepatit[i]s “C.” As a result, I am now an F4 on the

fibrosis scale and the liver damage is irreversible. I

contend that I was not treated because of policy,

practice and custom of Corizon, LLC condoned by the

FDC to save money.

Relief Requested: Require Corizon[,] LLC via FDC

physician to explain why I was not timely treated.

Id. at 4. On October 26, 2018, UCI denied both grievances, noting Parks was

“being treated in accordance with FDC policy and procedure.” Id. at 5, 18.

On November 2, 2018, Parks appealed the denial of his Centurion

grievance. Id. at 19. He stated in pertinent part:

This is a Central Office Appeal regarding the attached

formal medical grievance. I reallege [and] incorporate

by reference the facts [and] matters set forth therein

[and] without adding any new grounds present the

following in form of comment thereon: Not contesting

the specific allegation regarding not having been

timely treated by Centurion [and] the resulting liver

damage, constitutes admission.

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Regarding not having been timely treated [and] FDC

policy to condone Centurion’s practice, I note the

answer to the attached that treatment is vs. was[] in

compliance with FDC procedure. No timely treatment

resulted in my liver damage.

Relief Requested: Remains the same[,] require

Centurion via FDC physician to explain why I was not

treated in a timely manner [and] to notify their

insurance representative that claim for untimely

treatment is forthcoming.

Id. The Office of the FDOC Secretary provided the following response:

Appeal Returned without Action:

Please be advised that you are outside the timeframe

to grieve an issue from 2016 and the Institution should

have returned your formal grievance.

Formal Grievances must be received no later than 15

calendar days from: 1. The date on which the informal

grievance was responded to; or 2. The date on which

the incident or action being grieved occurred.

You are also not to use the grievance process to ask

questions, seek information, guidance or assistance.

Just because the Institution failed to return your

formal grievance does not negate our office from

returning your appeal.

Therefore, your appeal is being returned without

action.

Id. at 20.

On November 2, 2018, Parks appealed the denial of his Corizon

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grievance, stating:

This request for Central Office Appeal results from

denial of the attached formal medical grievance #1810-

213-131, denied on 10-30-2018. I reallege [and]

incorporate by reference the facts [and] matters set

forth in the attached [and] without adding any new

grounds state the following in form of comment

thereon: Because the answer does not contest the

policy practice [and] custom of Corizon, LLC not

treating the condition, it is admitted.

You know the FDC condoned Corizon, LLC not

following the FBP [and] CDC guidelines to care for my

condition with DAAs. Now my liver damage is

resulting from cost cutting policy of Corizon LLC [and]

condoned by FDC constitutes cause of action. Relief

Requested remains the same: Require Corizon[,] LLC

via FDC physician to explain why I was not timely

treated [and] to notify their insurance.

Id. at 6. The Office of the FDOC Secretary provided the following response:

Appeal Returned without Action:

Please be advised that you are outside the timeframe

to grieve an issue from 2014 and the Institution should

have returned your formal grievance.

Formal Grievances must be received no later than 15

calendar days from: 1. The date on which the informal

grievance was responded to; or 2. The date on which

the incident or action being grieved occurred.

You are also not to use the grievance process to ask

questions, seek information, guidance or assistance.

Just because the Institution failed to return your

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formal grievance does not negate our office from

returning your appeal.

Therefore, your appeal is being returned without

action.

Id. at 7. Parks did not submit any other grievances concerning the denial of

treatment for his HCV.7

4. Turner Step One

Under the first step of the Turner analysis, the Court must review the

allegations in the Motion and Response and accept as true Parks’ allegations.

See Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082). If Parks’

allegations in the Response shows a failure to exhaust, then dismissal would

be appropriate. See id.

7 Parks attaches other grievances as exhibits to the Complaint and Response.

See Docs. 2; 109-1 through 109-2. However, many of the grievances do not concern

the denial of treatment for his HCV; therefore, they failed to alert officials to the

issues in contention in Parks’ Complaint. See Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1287 (noting that

the purpose of administrative exhaustion “‘is to put the [administrative authority] on

notice of all issues in contention and to allow the [authority] an opportunity to

investigate those issues.’”) (citation omitted). Parks submitted the remaining

grievances to the FDOC after he filed the Complaint. As such, they are not pertinent

to the Court’s determination of whether Parks satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement. See Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen a

state provides a grievance procedure for its prisoners . . . an inmate alleging harm

suffered from prison conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies

available under that procedure before pursuing a § 1983 lawsuit.”) (emphasis added).

15

The Court now turns to the allegations in the Motion and Response

concerning Parks’ exhaustion efforts. The parties agree that Parks filed two

formal grievances and UCI denied his grievances. Motion at 9; Response at 5-

7. Parks subsequently filed appeals that the Office of the FDOC Secretary

returned without action because it considered the grievances to be untimely.

Id. Centurion asserts Parks did not properly exhaust administrative remedies

because he failed to comply with the FDOC’s grievance procedure. Motion at 9.

However, Parks responds that the FDOC waived its right to enforce the

procedural rule when UCI denied his grievances on the merits. Response at 13-

14, 16. He also contends the Office of the FDOC Secretary did not properly

apply its procedural rule because his claim “is not related to one specific date

such that [Parks] had to grieve it within twenty days.” Id. at 20. Accepting

Parks’ view of the facts as true, the Court cannot dismiss the Complaint at the

first step of the Turner analysis.

5. Turner Step Two

As dismissal would not be appropriate based on the allegations in the

Motion and Response, the Court next turns to the second prong of the Turner

analysis. Here, the Court finds Parks failed to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies because he did not comply with the FDOC’s grievance

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procedure. Parks grieved the denial of HCV treatment in 2018 by filing formal

grievances at the institutional level, which UCI denied on the merits. Doc. 2 at

4-5, 17-18. However, the Office of the FDOC Secretary returned his

corresponding appeals without action based upon a determination that they

were untimely. Id. at 7, 20; see Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1)(e). “Proper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

procedural rules.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Parks did not comply with the

FDOC’s deadlines when he filed untimely grievances. The FDOC did not waive

the procedural defect by denying his formal grievances on the merits because

it ultimately returned his appeals without action. See Whatley v. Smith, 898

F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e hold that a prison does not waive a

procedural defect unless and until it decides the procedurally flawed grievance

on the merits at the last available stage of administrative review.”) (emphasis

added). Therefore, Parks failed to properly exhaust his administrative

remedies.

Parks contends that his grievances were timely filed because “his

grievances and Complaint do not concern multiple separate episodes, but

rather one continuing deprivation of medical care over a period of years.”

Response at 20 (emphasis omitted). However, his argument is unavailing.

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“‘Courts must give deference to prison officials regarding the interpretation

and application of their own grievance procedures so long as the procedures

provide inmates with a meaningful opportunity to present grievances,’ and

provided that the application of the grievance rules was not ‘clearly erroneous,

arbitrary or intended to prevent plaintiff from exercising his right of access to

the courts.’” Stephens v. Corizon, LLC, No. 3:20-cv-70-BJD-PDB, 2021 WL

2981317, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2021)8 (quoting Jones v. Frank, No. 07-cv-

141-BBC, 2008 WL 4190322, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 14, 2008)); see also White

v. Moore, 789 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA) (2001) (noting that courts defer

to an agency’s interpretation of a rule that it administers).

The Court finds that the FDOC’s interpretation of its rule was not clearly

erroneous, arbitrary, or intended to prevent plaintiff from exercising his right

of access to the courts. A formal grievance may be returned without action if

“[t]he formal grievance was not received within 15 calendar days of the date on

which the incident or action being complained about occurred, if an informal

grievance was not filed . . . .” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1)(e). In his

8 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union

Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court

would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision

would have significant persuasive effects.”).

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Corizon grievance, Parks stated his grievance concerned Corizon’s refusal “to

honor the June 2014 . . . FBOP guidelines and treat [him] with DAA drugs . . .

.” Doc. 2 at 4. While UCI denied the Corizon grievance on the merits, the Office

of the FDOC Secretary determined on appeal that Parks was “outside the

timeframe to grieve an issue from 2014.” Id. at 7. Similarly, in the Centurion

grievance, Parks grieved that Centurion continued Corizon’s policy of denying

DAA treatments and noted Centurion replaced Corizon as the healthcare

provider for FDOC inmates on August 24, 2016. Id. at 17. On appeal, the Office

of the FDOC Secretary determined that Parks was “outside the timeframe to

grieve an issue from 2016.” Id. at 20. Considering the record, the Court cannot

find that the FDOC arbitrarily interpreted its rules by counting fifteen days

from June 2014, when Corizon declined to adopt the Federal Bureau of Prisons

guidelines, or fifteen days from August 24, 2016, when Centurion assumed

Corizon’s contract and continued its refusal to adopt the guidelines. Notably,

the Centurion grievance makes clear that by the time Parks submitted it, he

was already receiving DAA treatment, and thus could not be timely grieving

“one continuing deprivation.” Response at 20.

Although Parks cites to Kinard v. Centurion of Fla., LLC, No. 3:19-cv-

490-J-34JRK, 2020 WL 3542650, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2020), to support

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his argument, the facts in Kinard are distinguishable from the facts of this

case. In Kinard, the plaintiff filed his grievance while the FDOC continued to

deny him DAA treatment. Id. at *9. As such, “[p]rison officials were still

capable of resolving the ongoing deprivation of Kinard’s medical care.” Id. The

FDOC also did not find the grievance to be untimely filed on appeal. Id. Here,

as Parks admitted in the Centurion grievance, he had already received

treatment for HCV. Doc. 2 at 17 (“As a direct result of the intentional delay,

my liver condition worsened and even though I was eventually treated, my

liver condition is a result of not providing the accepted treatment in a timely

manner.”) (emphasis added). UCI’s responses to the Centurion and Corizon

grievances confirmed that he had “completed the treatment for Hepatitis C”

such that the deprivation of care was not ongoing. Id. at 5, 18. And, while UCI

rejected Parks’ grievances on the merits, the Office of the FDOC Secretary

found his grievances to be untimely. Id. at 7, 20.

To the extent Parks alleges the grievance procedure was not available to

him such that he could not timely file a grievance, the record demonstrates

otherwise. Parks filed numerous grievances from February 2014 to February

2022. See Doc. 109-1. In turn, the grievance procedure was available to Parks.

Based on the above, the Court determines Parks failed to properly exhaust

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available administrative remedies, and Centurion’s Motion to Dismiss is due

to be granted on that basis.

B. Centurion’s Remaining Argument

Because Parks’ claim against Centurion is due to be dismissed for failure

to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the Court need not address

Centurion’s argument that Parks fails to state a claim for relief. Therefore, as

to that issue, the Motion is due to be denied without prejudice.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Centurion’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 98) is GRANTED

to the extent Defendant seeks dismissal for Parks’ failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies. In all other respects, the Motion is denied without

prejudice.

2. Plaintiff Larry Parks’ claim against Centurion is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court directs the Clerk to terminate

Centurion as a Defendant in the case.

3. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), there being no

just reason for delay, the Clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this

order.

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4, Parks’ Request for Documents (Doc. 126) is DENIED. Parks is

advised that his in forma pauperis status does not entitle him to free copies.

The cost for photocopies is $.50 per page. The Complaint is 14 pages,

Centurion’s Motion to Dismiss is 25 pages, and Corizon’s Motion to Dismiss is

20 pages. Any future request for copies to the Clerk must be accompanied by

the appropriate payment.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 12th day of

June, 2023.

United States District Judge

Jax-9 6/6

C: Larry Parks, #581520

Counsel of record

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