Tran v. Nomad Group LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

MICHAEL TRAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:20-cv-1945-CEH-SPF

NOMAD GROUP LLC, CRISTINA

CHANQUIN and SERGIO

CHANQUIN,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (Doc.

114), issued by Magistrate Judge Sean P. Flynn. In the Report and Recommendation,

Magistrate Judge Flynn recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reasonable

Attorney’s Fees and Costs/Expenses (Doc. 111), be granted in part and denied in part.

Specifically, the magistrate judge recommended that Plaintiff be awarded $47,587.60

in attorneys’ fees under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and $535 in costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920,

and otherwise recommended the motion be denied. All parties were furnished copies

of the Report and Recommendation and were afforded the opportunity to file

objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On December 2, 2022, Defendants filed

their “Objection to Report and Recommendations.” Doc. 115. On December 16, 2022,

Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ Objection. Doc. 116. Upon careful

consideration of the Report and Recommendation, the Defendants’ Objection, the

response to the objection, and upon this Court’s independent examination of the file,

it is determined that the Defendants’ Objection should be overruled, the Report and

Recommendation adopted, and the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and

Costs/Expenses (Doc. 111), be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2018, Plaintiff, Michael Tran, was hired to work at Sushi House as

a sushi preparer by Defendant Nomad Group LLC. (“NGP”). Doc. 86 ¶ 1. Defendants

Christina and Sergio Chanquin are member managers of NGP. Doc. 70 ¶ 1. Plaintiff’s

hourly wage for work performed at NGP’s restaurant “Sushi House” and for catering

jobs started at $14 per hour but was later increased to $15 per hour in April 2019. Doc.

86 ¶ 2. These hours were reflected, respectively, as “Regular Pay” and “Kitchen” on

Plaintiff’s pay stubs. Doc. 70 ¶ 2; Doc. 86 ¶ 3. For seasonal work performed at

Raymond James stadium, Plaintiff was paid $20 per hour. Doc. 70 ¶ 6. These hours

were reflected as “Kazoku” on his pay stub. Doc. 70 ¶ 2. From February 23, 2020, to

April 18, 2020, Plaintiff worked approximately fifty hours per week. Doc. 86 ¶ 7.

In early March 2020, the government implemented restrictions on businesses,

including restaurants, in an effort to control the spread of the coronavirus. Doc. 70 ¶

8; Doc. 86 ¶ 6. Accordingly, Defendants stopped operating Kitchen and Kazoku. Doc.

27-2 ¶ 12. On March 20, 2020, Defendants sent a group text to their employees

indicating they could remain operating, but with limited staff, and Defendants were

working on a plan to provide some benefits to employees who are still working. Doc.

27-1 ¶ 11; Doc. 27-4. Thereafter, Defendants communicated with their staff regarding

options, including furlough. Id. Plaintiff expressed concerns about rising COVID cases

and bringing the virus home to his family. Doc. 27-5 at 5-6. Plaintiff communicated

with Defendants both through the group employee texts as well as private texts

regarding Plaintiff’s employment, his concern regarding the coronavirus, and potential

conflicts working part-time and seeking federal benefits. Doc. 27-5 at 8-10; Doc. 27-6

at 4-13. In an April 3 text message, Plaintiff informed Defendants that he had applied

for unemployment benefits. Doc. 27-6 at 3. Defendants sent text messages to their

employees explaining they would have to cut hours due to their loan request being

denied. Doc. 27-5 at 19-21. Ultimately, Plaintiff complained by text that he was not

paid for his overtime hours worked. Doc. 27-5 at 28-30; Doc. 27-6 at 14. Plaintiff

advised he had spoken with an attorney and believes he is owed overtime as

Defendants’ businesses were not separate businesses for purposes of calculating

overtime pay due under the FLSA. Doc. 27-6 at 15. Defendants advised Plaintiff that

his checks to “make it right” were ready for pick up. Doc. 27-6 at 16. Plaintiff texted

Defendants that their failure to pay him forced his resignation. Doc. 27-6 at 17.

Plaintiff’s last days of work for Defendants were April 24, 25, and 26, 2020. Doc. 86 ¶

8.

On June 10, 2020, counsel for Plaintiff sent a demand letter to Defendants

requesting overtime compensation and liquidated damages in the amount of

$2,147.55. Doc. 52-1. Plaintiff made a settlement demand of $15,000 to resolve all

claims. After unsuccessful pre-suit negotiations, Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint

on August 20, 2020, against Defendants alleging a failure to pay overtime wages

(Count I) and for retaliation (Count II) in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act,

29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”). Doc. 1. On September 14, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel

offered to settle all claims for $14,000, stating that fees and costs up to that date were

$4,147.00. Doc. 113-2 at 8. Defendants counter-offered $3,000 to settle Count I

separately. Id. at 7. The counter-offer was rejected the same day. Id. at 6. Plaintiff’s

interrogatory answers that were provided in October 2020 stated he was owed

$2,147.55 in overtime wages. Doc. 11 at 4. By text message to Plaintiff in November

2020, Defendant Cristina Chanquin stated that Defendants offered Plaintiff’s attorneys

$3,600 plus costs to settle the case. Doc. 27-9 at 1. Recognizing that counsel would get

40% of that amount, Cristin Chanquin states that would leave Plaintiff with $2,160.

Id. She asks Plaintiff whether he truly rejected Defendants’ settlement offer that would

allow him to “walk away with $2,160.” Id.

In December 2020, Defendants offer to settle, by way of an “Offer of

Judgment,” for $4,200. Doc. 90-4 at 4. This amount was rejected by Plaintiff. Id. at 2.

In February 2021, the parties engaged in mediation, but it was unsuccessful. Doc. 20.

On March 1, 2021, Defendants sent Plaintiff a check for $2,147.55 for “full satisfaction

of the total amount in damages” Plaintiff claimed on his overtime wages claim. Doc.

27-8. There was no provision for attorney’s fees, nor judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.

Plaintiff’s counsel advised that the check would be accepted only in the event that

Defendants pay attorney’s fees and costs or, alternatively, agree to a Judgment in

Plaintiff’s favor as to Count I and submit the issue of attorney’s fees to the Court. Doc.

54-1 at 2.

On March 26, 2021, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Doc. 27. On

April 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. Doc. 32. On April 19, 2021,

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Doc. 35. On the same date, the Court denied

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as premature and because Plaintiff had

filed an amended complaint. Doc. 34.

The parties engaged in motion practice directed to the amended complaint and

also involving multiple discovery disputes. See Docs. 38–41, 43, 45, 46. On September

13, 2021, the parties filed a joint notice of settlement of Count I only. Doc. 48. On

September 24, 2021, Defendants filed an amended motion to withdraw the joint notice

of settlement. Doc. 51. A motion requesting sanctions, more discovery motions, and

a motion to compel the settlement, and responses thereto, followed. Docs. 52, 54, 55,

58–60, 62, 63.

Thereafter, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Docs. 70, 92.

On July 8, 2022, Magistrate Judge Flynn issued a report and recommendation

recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I be granted

in Plaintiff’s favor and recommending Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be

granted in Defendants’ favor as to the retaliation claim in Count II. Doc. 105. The

magistrate judge recommended that judgment be entered in Plaintiff’s favor on his

claim for overtime compensation and liquidated damages, that Plaintiff be awarded

damages in the amount of $2,147.55, and that Plaintiff be directed to file a motion to

determine the amount of the reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to Plaintiff. No

objections were filed to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations. On July

25, 2022, the undersigned adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations. Doc. 106.

On July 25, 2022, Judgment in the amount of $2,147.55 was entered in favor of

Michael Tran and against Defendants Nomad Group LLC, Christina Chanquin, and

Sergio Chanquin as to Count I of the Amended Complaint. Doc. 107. On the same

date, Judgment was entered in favor of Defendants, and against Plaintiff, as to the

retaliation claim in Count II of the Amended Complaint. Doc. 108.

On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reasonable Attorney’s Fees

and Costs/Expenses seeking an award of $64,295.10 in attorney’s fees and costs. Doc.

111. Specifically, the motion requests $62,557.50 in attorney’s fees which consists of

183.05 attorney hours at the hourly rate of $450.00 for attorney Marc Edelman and

$300.00 for attorney George Triantis. Plaintiff seeks $1,737.60 in costs and expenses

for postage, mediation costs, court filing fees, process server fee, and notary fee. In

support of his motion, Plaintiff files the declarations of attorneys Edelman and Triantis

(Docs. 111-1, 111-2), time records (Doc. 111-3), and expenses report (Doc. 111-4). In

addition, Plaintiff attaches Defendants’ objection to the fees and costs to which most

items are objected. Docs. 111-5, 111-6. Plaintiff argues that, although the amount of

fees requested appears disproportionate to the award recovered, the time records reveal

Defendants’ continued obstinance and opposition to an early resolution of this action

and unnecessary motion practice, which substantiate Plaintiff’s fee claim.

Defendants filed a response in opposition to the fee motion arguing that they

conceded very early on the amount of overtime damages owed while contesting the

Plaintiff’s non-meritorious retaliation claim, upon which Defendants ultimately

prevailed. Doc. 133. Defendants contend that the claim for fees is excessive, and they

object to any fees being awarded after July 10, 2020, which they submit was the date

the overtime claim was conceded. At the latest, Defendants submit no fees are

recoverable after September 14, 2020, which was the date Defendants offered to settle

the claims for $3,000. See Doc. 113 at 5. Defendants accuse Plaintiff and his counsel

of churning the file to create an excessive fee claim. Because they prevailed on the

retaliation claim, which was not conceded, Defendants contend all hours expended

after their concession on the overtime claim can only be related to Count II, for which

Plaintiff is not entitled to any fees.

As for the proposed hourly rates, Defendants do not object to attorney

Edelman’s hourly rate of $450 given his number of years of experience. Defendants do

oppose attorney Triantis’ hourly rate of $300 per hour as excessive given the fact that

Triantis had only been a practicing attorney for one year before filing this action.

As for the number of hours, Defendants argue the proposed hours are

unreasonable. Further, Defendants object to Plaintiff’s claim that the time spent

litigating the two separate claims is inextricably intertwined given Defendants’ early

concession of the overtime claim. Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s billing records

are guilty of block billing, unit billing, billing for clerical work, billing for unnecessary

work, multiple attorney billing, and billing for office conferences, which Defendants

argue are violative of Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5. Defendants request the Court reduce

Plaintiff’s requested hours to the reasonable amounts incurred up until September 14,

2020 and award no fees for work performed following that date.

B. Report and Recommendation

On November 18, 2022, Magistrate Judge Flynn issued his Report and

Recommendation in which he recommends Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and

costs be granted in part and denied in part. Doc. 114.

1. Costs and Expenses

As the Report and Recommendation reflects, Defendants did not respond to

those portions of Plaintiff’s motion regarding costs. The magistrate judge found

Plaintiff’s request for $1,202.60 in litigation expenses for postage, mediation, and

notary fees is recoverable as attorney’s fees under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as such expenses

were necessary to litigate and resolve the case. Accordingly, the magistrate judge

added $1,202.60 in litigation expenses to the recommended fee award.

As for the costs, the magistrate judge recommended Plaintiff be awarded total

costs of $535 for the filing fee ($400) and process server fees ($135 for three Defendants

served) under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

2. Attorney’s Fees

In his motion, Plaintiff seeks an award of $62,557.50 in attorney’s fees. Doc.

111 at 8. Magistrate Judge Flynn recommended Plaintiff be awarded $46,385 for

attorney time expended on behalf of Plaintiff in this action. The report and

recommendation detailed the settlement communications between the parties over the

course of the litigation as well as the flurry of discovery and motion practice, noting

that is atypical of these types of cases.

The Defendants in their opposition to the fee motion again argue that Plaintiff’s

counsel purposely prolonged litigation to rack up exorbitant fees. As Magistrate Judge

Flynn pointed out in the Report and Recommendation, Defendants’ accusations were

rejected at summary judgment and again in denying Defendants’ motion for sanctions.

Doc. 114 (citing Docs. 105, 112).

In analyzing the fee request, the magistrate judge applied the lodestar method

to determine a reasonable fee award. As to the issue of the hourly rate, the magistrate

judge concluded that attorney Edelman’s $450 hourly rate pushed the bounds of

reasonableness for the Tampa Bay market. The cases relied upon by counsel to support

the requested rate were outside of the Tampa division. Thus, Magistrate Judge Flynn

recommended $425 per hour for attorney Edelman’s hours as this rate was more

consistent with hourly rates awarded in the Tampa Division of the Middle District of

Florida for these types of cases. Regarding attorney Triantis, given his relative

inexperience, the magistrate judge concluded $300 was on the high side and instead

recommended an hourly rate of $275 given Triantis’ level of experience and

considering rates awarded in the Middle District of Florida for newer attorneys

practicing in the FLSA area.

Turning to the number of hours reasonably expended, the magistrate judge

concluded the hours requested were excessive and determined that an across-the-board

cut was warranted. Plaintiff seeks 183.05 hours, of which 50.95 are attributable to work

performed by Edelman and 132 hours for attorney Triantis’ time on this case.

According to Plaintiff, approximately 31 hours had already been deducted from

counsel’s time for work related to the retaliation claim, on which Plaintiff did not

prevail.

In response to the Defendants’ claim that no hours are recoverable after

September 14, 2020, the magistrate judge outright rejected this proposition. September

14, 2020 was the date that Plaintiff rejected Defendants’ counteroffer to settle Count I

for $3,000. The magistrate judge noted that Defendants have been repeatedly advised

that offering to pay the overtime hours without paying the reasonable attorney’s fees

frustrates the goals of the FLSA. However, the magistrate judge did agree with

Defendants, in general, that the hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel were excessive and

found that counsel did not exercise proper billing judgment. Although Plaintiff claims

that his counsel’s hours were already reduced to reflect time spent on the unsuccessful

retaliation claim, the magistrate judge found a reduction of only 31 hours out of the

over 200 hours to be suspect. The magistrate judge also found the purported reductions

to be inconsistent and, at times, illogical. Also evident in the billing records were

entries reflecting excessive time spent on certain tasks, duplicative time spent by the

two attorneys, vague entries with little to no explanation, and tasks attributed to

attorneys that are clerical in nature. Rather than conduct an entry-by-entry analysis,

the magistrate judge recommended a 20% across-the-board cut in hours to take into

consideration “Plaintiff’s counsel’s excessive hours, their failure to adequately

segregate time spent on successful and unsuccessful claims, and their vague billing

entries.” Doc. 114 at 14.

Applying the 20% reduction in hours, the magistrate judge recommended

Plaintiff’s counsel’s hours be reduced from 183.05 hours to 146.44 hours, of which

40.76 hours are attributed to attorney Edelman and 105.68 hours are attributed to

attorney Triantis. Multiplying the reasonable hourly rates by the reasonable number

of hours, Magistrate Judge Flynn recommended fees of $46,385, based on 40.76 hours

at the rate of $425 per hour ($17,323) and 105.68 hours at the rate of $275 per hour

($29,062).1 Adding in the $1,202.60 in litigation expenses discussed above, the

magistrate judge recommended a total fee award of $47,587.60.2

C. Objection to Report and Recommendation and Response

On December 2, 2022, Defendants filed their objection to the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendations. Doc. 115. Defendants claim they never opposed the

recovery of attorney’s fees, but rather submit that they only disputed the amount of

fees recoverable. Defendants generally argue that Plaintiff failed to provide detailed

billing records to separate the fees attributable to pursuing Plaintiff’s two separate

claims, noting that Plaintiff would not be entitled to any fees on its retaliation claim

on which Defendants prevailed. Next Defendants agree that the magistrate judge

appropriately reduced the hourly rates and the number of hours, but they argue the

reduction was inadequate. In that regard, Defendants contend that given the limited

1 $17,323 + $29,062 = $46,385.

2 $46,385 + $1,202.60 = $47,587.60.

success by Plaintiff, fees should be awarded only in relation to the amount recovered

on the overtime claim. According to Defendants, they tried to obtain the billing records

from Plaintiff’s counsel early on so they could assess the amount of fees attributable to

Count I, but to no avail.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff was making misstatements of his unemployment

status to the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity at the same time he was

employed by Defendants and accruing overtime hours.

Defendants again complain that Plaintiff’s entitlement to overtime pay was

conceded as early as July 2020 and that Plaintiff’s litigation only served to delay his

recovery. Defendants contend that not reducing the attorney’s fees more than 20%

rewards Plaintiff for bringing his unrelated and non-meritorious claim of retaliation

against Defendants and punishes Defendants for defending against the patently

frivolous claim. Defendants argue that since the billing records failed to precisely

segregate and explain the time expended for the respective claims, the magistrate judge

was unable to fairly assess the fees recoverable for Count I only. Defendants request

the Court reject the magistrate judge’s recommendations and limit the fees to only

those accruing up to September 14, 2020, which were $4,147.00.

In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ objections are improper as they

fail to specifically identify which findings Defendants disagrees with. Doc. 116.

Plaintiff submits that Defendants merely rehash arguments previously rejected.

Plaintiff submits this Court should, based on its de novo review, upwardly adjust the

fees awarded to the amount originally requested because the record supports

Defendants’ aggressive litigation tactics which resulted in a substantial increase in the

hours expended on the case.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), in pertinent part, provides that “a

party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations” of a magistrate judge. The district judge “shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Jeffrey S. v. State

Bd. of Educ. of State of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990). The district judge may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Report and Recommendation. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The district judge may also receive further evidence or recommit

the matter to the magistrate judge with further instructions. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A prevailing FLSA plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs of the action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Here, Plaintiff has prevailed against Defendants

on his claim for unpaid overtime wages. Docs. 105, 106, 107. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled

to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

A. Costs and Litigation Expenses

Defendants do not object to the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions

regarding the costs and litigation expenses to be awarded to Plaintiff. A district court

reviews those portions of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that are not

objected to under a clearly erroneous standard. Liberty Am. Ins. Grp., Inc. v. WestPoint

Underwriters, L.L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Gropp v.

United Airlines, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.

140, 150 (1985) (holding that the de novo standard of review applies to both factual and

legal conclusions to which a party objects)).

Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $1,737.60. The magistrate judge

recommended Plaintiff be awarded $535 in costs for recovery of the filing fee and

process server expenses. These costs are allowable under 28 U.S.C. ¶ 1920. Regarding

the $1,202.60 in expenses for postage, mediation, and notary fees, the magistrate judge

found such litigation expenses recoverable as part of the attorney’s fee award as the

expenses were necessary to litigate and resolve the case. See Doc. 114 at 16 (citing

Lockwood v. CIS Servs., LLC, No. 3:16-cv-965-BJD-PDB, 2019 WL 2226126, at *21-22

(M.D. Fla. May 3, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3383628 (M.D.

Fla. June 13, 2019)). While the law on this issue is not consistent across the Circuit,

see Doc. 114 at 15–16, an award of litigation expenses is not clearly erroneous. The

Court adopts in full the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding costs and

litigation expenses to be awarded to Plaintiff.

B. Attorney’s Fees

In the Eleventh Circuit, courts use the lodestar approach to determine

reasonable attorneys’ fees. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292

(11th Cir. 1988). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate for the services

provided by counsel for the prevailing party. Id. at 1299; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1983). After applying the lodestar method to determine a

reasonable fee award, Magistrate Judge Flynn recommended Plaintiff be awarded

$46,385 for attorney’s fees. Doc. 114.

In determining the lodestar figure, a “reasonable hourly rate” consists of “the

prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers

of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at

1299. In this context, “market rate” means the hourly rate charged in the local legal

market by an attorney with expertise in the area of law who is willing and able to take

the case, if indeed such an attorney exists. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168

F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999). The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing the

requested rates are in line with the prevailing market rates by producing direct evidence

of rates charged in similar circumstances or opinion evidence of reasonable rates.

Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299.

After considered the prevailing rates awarded to FLSA attorneys in the Tampa

Bay area, see Doc. 114 at 9–10, Magistrate Judge Flynn recommended an hourly rate

of $425 for the work performed by attorney Edelman and $275 for the work performed

by attorney Triantis. Defendants do not object to the magistrate judge’s hourly rates

for attorneys Edelman and Triantis. Doc. 115 at 3. The Court agrees these rates are

reasonable and consistent with hourly rates awarded to attorneys in the Middle

District of Florida, Tampa Division, who practice in this area of the law. Accordingly,

the Court will adopt the recommended hourly rates of $425 and $275 for attorneys

Edelman and Triantis, respectively.

Although Defendants agree with the recommended hourly rates, Defendants

urge the Court not to follow Magistrate Judge Flynn’s recommended 20% across-the-

board cut of the attorney hours expended. Instead, Defendants suggest an award of

$4,147.00 in attorney’s fees for fees accrued up to September 14, 2020 is appropriate.

Doc. 115 at 6.

For the most part, Defendants’ objections are general and non-specific and do

not provide a basis for this Court to reject the magistrate judge’s factual findings and

conclusions. The objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation and report must

be “specific” and “clear enough to permit the district court to effectively review the

magistrate judge’s ruling.” Knezevich v. Ptomey, 761 F. App’x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2019).

Defendants argue that the billing entries are not segregated by claim or precisely

explained. Doc. 115 at 5. But Defendants fail to identify any specific billing entry to

which they object. Defendants appear to challenge the veracity of statements made by

Plaintiff to the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity in March 2020, see Doc.

115 at 4, but such arguments are not objections to the magistrate judge’s findings or

conclusions. Defendants next argue that they tried to get the billing records from

counsel early on and accuse Plaintiff of bringing an unfounded retaliation claim to

increase fees. Doc. 115 at 4–5. Again, these complaints are not objections to the report

and recommendation as contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2).

Defendants object to the magistrate judge’s 20% reduction as insufficient

arguing the court should award only the amount of fees that is reasonable in relation

to the results obtained. Here, Plaintiff’s recovery for his overtime wage claim was

$2,147.55. Thus, Defendants argue the magistrate judge’s recommended fee is vastly

disproportionate to Plaintiff’s recovery. At the core of this dispute is Defendants’

unwavering position that its early concession of the amount owed to Plaintiff for his

overtime hours mooted Count I, or at least any claim for fees after the concession.

However, as detailed in the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation on the

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which this Court adopted, Count I was

not mooted by Defendants’ early agreement to pay the amount owed in overtime

wages where there was no agreement as to the amount owed for attorney’s fees.

In their objection, Defendants continue to rehash the same argument that

Plaintiff’s counsel churned the file to generate fees. This argument, advanced by

Defendants throughout the litigation, has been rejected multiple times. See Docs. 105,

112, 114. That said, the magistrate judge did find the hours to be excessive given the

straightforward nature of this FLSA claim, and accordingly the magistrate judge

reduced the number of hours by 20%. The Eleventh Circuit has held that when a court

finds that the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the court may conduct

an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-

board cut. Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing

Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 1994). The 20% reduction was a

proper procedure, and the magistrate judge’s findings are supported by the record.

Defendants do not demonstrate to the contrary. The Court declines to award the full

amount of the fees as requested by Plaintiff’s counsel as the recommended reductions

are supported by the record evidence. Accordingly, the Court will adopt Magistrate

Judge Flynn’s recommendations as to the reasonable hourly rates and the reasonable

number of hours expended by counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate

Judge Flynn and Defendants’ Objection thereto, in conjunction with an independent

de novo examination of the file, the Court concurs with the magistrate judge’s findings

and conclusions of law in the Report and Recommendation, and Plaintiff’s Motion for

Attorney’s Fees and Costs/Expenses will be granted in part. The Court further

concludes that Defendants’ Objection is due to be overruled. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Objection to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 115) is

OVERRULED.

2. The Report and Recommendation entered by United States Magistrate

Judge Sean P. Flynn (Doc. 114) is ADOPTED, CONFIRMED, and APPROVED in

all respects and is made a part of this Order for all purposes, including appellate review.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reasonable Attorney’s Fees and Costs/Expenses

(Doc. 111) is GRANTED-in-part and DENIED-in-part.

4. Plaintiffs motion is granted to the extent that Plaintiff, Michael Tran, is

awarded $47,587.60 in reasonable attorney’s fees under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and $535

in costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. In all other respects, Plaintiff's motion is denied.

5. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment, consistent with this Order, in

favor of Plaintiff, Michael Tran, and against Defendants, Nomad Group LLC,

Cristina Chanquin and Sergio Chanquin for Plaintiff's reasonable attorney’s fees and

costs incurred in the total amount of $48,122.60, as to Count I of the Amended

Complaint.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on May 19, 2023.

Chalen et Grads No Ts pl uel

Charlene Edwards Honeywell

United States District Judge

Copies to:

Counsel of Record and Unrepresented Parties, if any

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