The Williams Family v. Kids First of Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

THE WILLIAMS FAMILY,

including birth parents TANIYAH

CRUTCH-WILLIAMS and

RODNEY WILLIAMS, JR.,

individually and on behalf of T.W, a

minor child; and CHARLOTTE

WILLIAMS and RODNEY

WILLIAMS, SR., individually and

as legal parents of R.W., a minor

child,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-1099-MMH-LLL

KIDS FIRST OF FLORIDA, INC.,

a Florida Corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand

(Doc. 25; Motion) filed by Taniyah Crutch-Williams, Rodney Williams, Jr.,

Rodney Williams, Sr., Charlotte Williams, T.W., and R.W. (Plaintiffs) on

November 10, 2022. Defendant Kids First of Florida, Inc. (KFF) filed

Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand (Doc. 26;

Response) on November 15, 2023. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

For the reasons explained below, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over this action. As such the Motion is due to be granted, and the case will be

remanded to the state court in which it was originally filed.

I. Background

This case arises out of KFF’s involvement in dependency and adoption

proceedings relating to three minor children, which the Court refers to as Lil

R., R.W., and T.W. See generally Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for Damages

(Doc. 10; Complaint), filed October 17, 2022.1 Plaintiffs Rodney Williams, Jr.

and Taniyah Crutch-Williams are the birth parents of all three children, and

Plaintiffs Rodney Williams, Sr. and Charlotte Williams are the paternal

grandparents of the children.2 See id. ¶¶ 10–11. Together, they bring this

action against KFF asserting claims on behalf of themselves as well as two of

the children, Lil R. and T.W. See id. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that

KFF illegally diverted R.W. into the foster care system for placement with

nonrelatives, and “attempted to illegally divert” Lil R. and T.W. as well. See id.

1 The Complaint initially filed on the Court’s Docket contained the full names of the

minor children in violation of Rule 5.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)).

When the Court requested that counsel file a properly redacted Complaint, counsel redacted

the names of the minor children entirely rather than leaving their initials. As a result, in

reading the Complaint, it became impossible to identify the child to which any allegation or

claim related. To rectify the matter, the Court directed Plaintiffs to file an unredacted

Complaint under seal. See Endorsed Order (Doc. 50), entered April 4, 2023. The children’s

initials are drawn from the unredacted Complaint (Doc. 51).

2 Charlotte Williams and Rodney Williams, Sr. legally adopted Lil R. See Complaint

¶ 11. To avoid confusion, however, the Court refers to Charlotte Williams and Rodney

Williams, Sr. as the grandparents of all three children. Likewise, the Court refers to Taniyah

Crutch-Williams and Rodney Williams, Jr. as the birth parents of all three children. See

Complaint ¶¶ 10–11.

¶¶ 1–2, 58–59. According to Plaintiffs, KFF’s interference with the Williams’

familial and parental rights continued for years, “including attempts in 2018

and 2019 through 2021.” See id. ¶ 42.

Plaintiffs initiated this action against KFF by filing a Complaint for

Access to Records and for Damages in the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court in and

for Duval County, Florida, on June 20, 2022. See Notice of Removal and

Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 2 (Doc. 4; Notice), filed October 12, 2022.

But Plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint which is the operative

Complaint at this time. See generally Complaint. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs

bring eight claims against KFF. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert three negligence

claims—Counts I-A (by the birth parents), II-A (by Lil R.), and III-A (by the

grandparents). See id. at 18, 29, 36. Plaintiffs also bring three claims of

Tortious Interference with Constitutionally Protected Rights and Familial

Relationships—Counts I-B (by the birth parents), II-B (by Lil R.), and III-B (by

the grandparents). See id. at 23, 32, 40. And Plaintiffs bring two claims of

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—Counts I-C (by the birth parents

and T.W.) and III-C (by the grandparents and Lil R.). See id. at 27, 42.

After Plaintiffs filed the Complaint, KFF removed the case to this Court

on October 11, 2022. See Notice. Upon review of the Complaint, the Court,

cognizant of its independent obligation to assure the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction, entered an order observing that Plaintiffs’ claims did not appear to

arise under federal law, nor did they appear to present any substantial federal

question. See Order to Show Cause (Doc. 18), entered on October 25, 2022. As

such, the Court ordered KFF to show cause why the case should not be

remanded to the state circuit court due to the apparent absence of subject

matter jurisdiction. See id. KFF timely responded to the Order to Show Cause

by filing Defendant Kids First of Florida, Inc.’s Response to Order to Show

Cause (Doc. 20; Show Cause Response). Not persuaded by KFF’s Show Cause

Response, Plaintiffs filed the Motion, in which they argue that the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction because all of their claims are based on state law,

and also that KFF’s removal was improper because it was untimely. See Motion

at 1–2. KFF disputes both contentions. See generally Response.3

II. Legal Standard

A defendant may remove a case from a state court to federal court if the

federal district court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). Original jurisdiction exists where a federal district court has “at least

one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a specific

3 In its 13-page Response to the Motion, KFF purports to incorporate by reference its

18-page Show Cause Response. See Response at 1. As explained in Mobile Shelter Systems

USA, Inc. v. Grate Pallet Solutions, LLC, incorporation by reference is improper and allows

the filer to circumvent this Court’s page limits. See 845 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1253 (M.D. Fla.

2012), aff’d in part, 505 F. App’x 928 (11th Cir. 2013). The Local Rules require that a legal

memorandum in response to a motion be “no longer than twenty pages inclusive of all parts.”

See Local Rule 3.01(b), Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Florida (Local Rule(s)) (emphasis added). Out of an abundance of caution, however, in

determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has nonetheless considered

the arguments in KFF’s Show Cause Response.

statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331;

or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” PTA-FLA, Inc. v.

ZTE USA, Inc., 844 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Baltin v. Alaron

Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997)). Notably, when a

defendant removes an action to federal court, the defendant bears the burden

of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Conn. State

Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir.

2009). And in assessing a motion to remand, “all doubts about jurisdiction

should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” City of Vestavia Hills v.

Gen. Fidelity Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Univ. of S.

Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999)). Here, KFF seeks

to invoke the Court’s federal question jurisdiction under § 1331, which provides:

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” See Notice at 3;

28 U.S.C § 1331.4

4 In passing, KFF also identifies 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)–(4) as providing a basis for the

Court’s jurisdiction. See Notice at 1–3. These provisions create jurisdiction over civil actions

to redress deprivation of federal rights “under color of any State law,” and to pursue remedies

under federal civil rights statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)–(4). However, in the Complaint

Plaintiffs do not assert that KFF’s actions were performed “under color of any State law,” id.,

nor does KFF attempt to identify any such assertion. Likewise, no party argues that Plaintiffs

are seeking relief “under any Act of Congress.” Id. Accordingly, the Court only analyzes

whether it has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

In determining whether a claim arises under federal law for purposes of

§ 1331, the Court is guided by the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Aetna Health

Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004). That rule demands that a federal

question appear on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. Gully v.

First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112–113 (1936); see also Kemp v. Int’l Bus.

Mach. Corp., 109 F.3d 708, 712 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A case does not arise under

federal law unless a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s

complaint.”). Generally, a federal question appears on the face of the complaint

when federal law creates the cause of action. Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co.,

139 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 1998). To meet the burden of establishing the

existence of proper federal jurisdiction, the removing “defendant[ ] must show

that the plaintiff[’s] complaint, as it existed at the time of removal, provides an

adequate basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Adventure Outdoors,

Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Ehlen Floor

Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, 660 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). Because a federal

question must appear on the face of the complaint, a federal defense alone will

not support removal. Kemp, 109 F.3d at 712.

Nevertheless, “even when a plaintiff has pled only state-law causes of

action, he may not avoid federal jurisdiction if either (1) his state-law claims

raise substantial questions of federal law or (2) federal law completely preempts

his state-law claims.”5 Dunlap v. G&L Holding Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1290

(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,

463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)). A state-law claim raises a substantial question of federal

law “if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3)

substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the

federal–state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251,

258 (2013); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 578 U.S.

374, 383 (2016). Importantly, however, “‘[t]he mere presence of a federal issue

in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question

jurisdiction.’” Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.

Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986)). Rather, to confer federal jurisdiction, “the

state-law claim must ‘really and substantially involve[ ] a dispute or

controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’” Id.

(quoting Mobile Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 422 (11th Cir.

1982)); Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,

314 (2005).

5 KFF does not argue that federal law preempts Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Rather,

KFF asserts that Plaintiffs’ “allegations of constitutional wrongdoing, with specific reference

to the First Amendment, due process, and equal protection,” suffice to create jurisdiction. See

Response at 12. Accordingly, federal preemption is not implicated in this case.

III. Discussion

As an initial matter, the Court rejects KFF’s contention that the Motion

should be denied because Plaintiffs have conceded that their claims are actually

federal claims. See Response at 1–13. In support, KFF points to the Show

Cause Response, in which it asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on the

First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Response at 1; see also Show Cause

Response. According to KFF, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately address this

argument, and thus Plaintiffs “all but concede[ ]” the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction, and “‘a party who fails to respond to an argument in her response

necessarily forfeits the point.’” Response at 3 (quoting Hollis v. Miami-Dade

Cnty., No. 20-cv-21930, 2022 WL 4124300, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2022)).

Apparently KFF believes that this purported failure by Plaintiffs resolves the

question of whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

KFF is mistaken.

First, KFF incorrectly views Plaintiffs’ Motion as a “response” to the Show

Cause Response. See Response at 3. But, while Plaintiffs did file the Motion

after KFF filed the Show Cause Response, Plaintiffs’ Motion is not a response

to that document at all. The Court did not order Plaintiffs to respond to the

Show Cause Order, nor did the Court order them to address the arguments

presented by KFF in the Show Cause Response. And Plaintiffs were not

otherwise obligated to respond to that filing. Instead, Plaintiffs filed the Motion

under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1447, challenging KFF’s assertion that their

claims fell within the jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, Plaintiffs have conceded

nothing and KFF, as the party invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, must establish

that the Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case.

Second, and more importantly, federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction and therefore have an obligation to assure the existence of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1279–

80 (11th Cir. 2001). Because this requirement “involves the court’s competency

to consider” a case, “subject matter jurisdiction ‘cannot be waived or otherwise

conferred upon the court by the parties.’” Mayfield v. Shelley’s Elec. Serv. Inc.,

582 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1107 (N.D. Ala. 2022) (quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)).6 Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs

did “concede[ ] the point,” Response at 3, the Court could not accept the

concession as establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. And as

noted above, the Court entered the Show Cause Order based upon the Court’s

own doubts about the existence of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims

pled by Plaintiffs. As such, KFF’s concession-of-jurisdiction argument fails, and

the Court must satisfy its obligation to determine whether any of Plaintiffs’

6 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they

may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310

(11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any

other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”).

claims arise under federal law such that the exercise of jurisdiction under

§ 1331 is proper.

The Court will first examine whether federal law creates any cause of

action set forth in the Complaint, and if not, will consider whether any claim

raises a substantial question of federal law. See Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1290. On

this issue, the parties appear to agree that Plaintiffs have—at least

superficially—pled all eight claims as state-law tort claims. Nonetheless, KFF

contends that the claims are actually “federal constitutional tort claims in the

guise of” state-law causes of action. Response at 2. This contention is

unavailing.

In each count of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the elements of a state-

law cause of action—not a federal claim. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 69–73

(pleading negligence by alleging that KFF owed Plaintiffs a duty of care,

breached that duty, and caused damages); id. ¶¶ 75–83 (asserting tortious

violation of “the prohibitions against kidnapping in Florida law,” including

under Fla. Stat. § 787.01); id. ¶¶ 120–25 (pleading intentional infliction of

emotional distress by alleging that KFF engaged in intentional, “outrageous”

conduct that “caused severe emotional distress”). Aside from describing

Plaintiffs’ claims as “constitutional tort claims,” KFF does not explain how

federal law creates any cause of action in the Complaint. Instead, KFF points

to the numerous references to constitutional rights that Plaintiffs believe KFF

has violated. But KFF fails to identify any legal authority supporting the

proposition that references to, or the need to construe rights under, the United

States Constitution in a state-law tort claim against a private,

nongovernmental actor transforms the state-law tort claim into a federal

constitutional tort.

More importantly, KFF’s contention that Plaintiffs are pursuing federal

claims, or constitutional tort claims, is belied by the arguments KFF makes in

Defendant Kids First of Florida, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24; Motion to

Dismiss). In the Motion to Dismiss, in addition to other arguments, KFF

contends that each count of Plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed for failure

to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In doing so, KFF recognizes that

Plaintiffs allege state-law torts and analyzes the sufficiency of each claim by

reference to the elements of the state-law tort claim under Florida law, as well

as case law assessing the merits of each state-law claim.7 See Motion to Dismiss

at 17–28. Thus, KFF acknowledges that the claims Plaintiffs assert in the

7 In arguing that Plaintiffs’ claim for “‘Attempted’ ‘Internal Diversion’” fails, KFF

identifies the elements of a cause of action for abuse of process under Florida law and argues

that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first or second elements. See Motion to Dismiss at 17–20.

KFF does the same in arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims for Tortious Interference with Familial

Relationships, see id. at 24–26, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, see id. at 26–

28, fail under established Florida precedent. Last, the Court notes that KFF defends against

Plaintiffs’ claims relating to the withholding of records by reference to Florida public records

law. See id. at 21–23.

Complaint are claims that arise under—and are governed by—Florida law, not

federal law.

This does not end the inquiry, however. As discussed above, federal

courts have jurisdiction over state-law claims that raise substantial questions

of federal law. See Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1290. “[F]ederal jurisdiction over a

state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually

disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without

disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at

258. On this point, KFF emphasizes Plaintiffs’ frequent references to

constitutionally protected rights. See Response at 2. But mere references to

federal laws or rights, even if included as an element of a state law claim, do

not “transform what are in all other respects state laws claims into federal

claims.” Hill v. Marston, 13 F.3d 1548, 1550 (11th Cir. 1994). Indeed, the

Eleventh Circuit has explained that the Supreme Court in Moore v. Chesapeake

& Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1934), made “clear that violation of a

federal standard as an element of a state tort recovery does not fundamentally

change the state tort nature of the action.” Hill, 13 F.3d at 1550. Here,

Plaintiffs assert only state-law claims. While their claims may refer to federal

constitutional rights and may require analysis of federal constitutional rights,

that does not mean they raise a substantial question of federal law. As the

Eleventh Circuit stated in Adventure Outdoors,

To be sure, the jury would have to apply federal law to reach its decision.

But as the Supreme Court explained in Grable, the federal courts have

rejected the “expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a

state-law claim will suffice to open the ‘arising under’ door.”

Adventure Outdoors, 552 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313). And

KFF has failed to even attempt to identify “a stated federal issue, actually

disputed and substantial,” which the Court could entertain without disturbing

the balance of state and federal power. Grable, 545 U.S. at 314; Gunn, 568 U.S.

at 258.

Equally problematic for KFF is the fact that interference with

constitutionally protected rights is but one of several alternative theories that

Plaintiffs use to support their state-law claims. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 77

(alleging a breach of KFF’s “duty to comply with federal and Florida laws”); id.

¶ 90 (treating the “loss of . . . constitutionally protected parental rights” as

damages resulting from KFF’s breach of a common-law duty); id. ¶ 106

(asserting that KFF breached “statutory, contractual, constitutional and

common law duties to the adoptive parents”). Review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint

confirms that they assert non-federal theories in each of the eight claims they

plead. See Complaint ¶¶ 69, 77–78, 90, 93, 100–01, 106, 116, 125. Accordingly,

none of the claims in the Complaint raises a sufficient federal question to invoke

the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331. See Christianson v. Colt

Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (explaining that “a claim

supported by alternative theories in the complaint” does not establish

jurisdiction unless federal law is essential to each theory of the claim).8

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek relief for violations of

constitutional law, the only unambiguous reference to the United States

Constitution is in Paragraph 106(c) of the Complaint.9 This paragraph asserts

that KFF violated a duty to “keep siblings placed together and, if siblings were

separated, [sic] from each other, then providing a sufficiently frequent visitation

schedule . . . that constitutionally protected First Amendment associational

bonds were maintained or strengthened.” Complaint ¶ 106(c). It is unclear

whether Plaintiffs are asserting that the First Amendment creates this duty.

To the extent that this uncertainty casts doubt on the Court’s subject matter

8 Christianson was a patent case, and the court thus analyzed its jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1338, not § 1331. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810. However, the test is the same

under both jurisdictional provisions. See id. at 808–09; Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257 (“Adhering to

the demands of ‘[l]inguistic consistency,’ we have interpreted the phrase ‘arising under’ in both

sections identically, applying our § 1331 and § 1338(a) precedents interchangeably.” (citing

Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–09)); see also Mobile Cnty. Bd. of Health v. Sackler, No. 1:19-

01007-KD-B, 2020 WL 223618, at *5 & n.2 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2020) (collecting cases applying

Christianson in determining the existence of jurisdiction under § 1331).

9 KFF dedicates much of its Show Cause Response to identifying Plaintiffs’ numerous

references to constitutional rights in the Complaint, including references to freedom of

association, due process, and equal protection. See Show Cause Response at 3–9. But these

references do not necessarily implicate federal law if Plaintiffs seek to invoke those rights

under Florida’s Constitution. See State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263, 264 (Fla. 1990)

(acknowledging Florida’s constitutional “right of free association”); Agency for Health Care

Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1250 & n.18 (Fla. 1996) (Florida’s

due process rights); Estate of McCall v. U.S., 134 So. 3d 894, 900–01 (Fla. 2014) (equal

protection). Where the references could be understood to refer to the Florida Constitution, the

Court must construe this ambiguity in favor of remand. See City of Vestavia Hills, 676 F.3d

at 1313. Even if these references did refer to the federal Constitution, however, that would

not mean the federal rights are “necessarily raised” by Plaintiffs’ claims.

jurisdiction, this doubt “should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”

City of Vestavia Hills, 676 F.3d at 1313; see also Jones v. LMR Intern., Inc., 457

F.3d 1174, 1177 (11th Cir. 2006) (“In reviewing matters concerning removal and

remand, ‘it is axiomatic that ambiguities are generally construed against

removal.’” (quoting Butler v. Polk, 592 F.2d 1293, 1296 (5th Cir. 1979))).

Regardless, this First Amendment reference is one of eight separate duties that

KFF allegedly breached under Count III-A. As such, it does not appear to raise

a substantial question of federal law. See Adventure Outdoors, 552 F.3d at

1297 (holding that a claim for negligence did not raise a federal question

because the alleged legal duties also existed “independently of federal law,” and

the breach of those duties was “a factual matter that [could] be resolved without

applying federal law”).

In an effort to identify a basis for federal jurisdiction where Plaintiffs

have pled none, KFF contends that Plaintiffs’ stated rights are not “cognizable

under” Florida law, and thus argues—by process of elimination—that the

claims must derive from federal rights. See Response at 5–6 (disputing

Plaintiffs’ alleged statutory rights under Florida law); id. at 7 (arguing that

Florida does not recognize a constitutional or statutory right to family

integrity); id. at 8–9 (contending that Plaintiffs have no cognizable right to

freedom of association under Florida law). But in making these arguments,

KFF addresses the merits of the state-law claims—not the Court’s jurisdiction

to hear them. This puts the cart before the horse: the Court may not decide

whether Plaintiffs state a claim under Florida law before determining whether

it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims at all. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

678, 682 (1946) (“Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief

could be granted is a question of law and . . . must be decided after and not

before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.”10). To the

extent that the claims may ultimately fail under state law, this does not mean

that they are actually federal claims sufficient to support the Court’s

jurisdiction, and KFF fails to cite any authority that would support the unusual

proposition that the failure to successfully state a claim under state law

warrants the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner

& Smith Inc. v. Manning, 578 U.S. 374, 383 (2016) (“[W]hen ‘a claim finds its

origins’ in state law, there is ‘a special and small category of cases in which

arising under jurisdiction still lies.’” (quoting Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258)).

Finally, KFF points to a related lawsuit that Plaintiffs filed in a

neighboring federal district court as evidence “that Plaintiffs’ claims are indeed

of a federal constitutional character/dimension.” Response at 11. This separate

10 Indeed, KFF implicitly relies on this principle by arguing that the Court should both

exercise jurisdiction and dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. See Motion to Dismiss at 28 (requesting that the Court dismiss

Plaintiffs’ claims “with prejudice and without leave to amend”). To the extent KFF disputes

that Plaintiffs’ claims are supported by Florida law, it can raise those arguments in state

court.

lawsuit, which is brought against various state of Florida agencies, see Show

Cause Response at 12, does not persuade the Court that “Plaintiffs’ claims

against KFF are clearly directed . . . at the state adoption system, as a whole,”

or “are clearly premised upon federal constitutional provisions.” See id. at 16.

Although both sets of claims may derive from the same alleged facts, the claims

in Plaintiffs’ related lawsuit are not brought against KFF, and unlike in this

action, Plaintiffs do assert rights arising under federal law. See id. at 12

(quoting Plaintiffs’ complaint in their related action as invoking “rights secured

by the United States Constitution and federal laws,” including the “First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights and rights secured by 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a) et seq.

and 675a(a)(1)”). Indeed, in the related action Plaintiffs specifically assert

claims “arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the Defendants’ deprivation

under color of law of the federal rights, privileges and immunities secured . . .

by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint ¶ 21 (Doc. 7-1). Plaintiffs present no such claims in this action.

Notably, Plaintiffs are the “the masters of the complaint,” and they are

“‘free to avoid federal jurisdiction’ by structuring their case to fall short” of

invoking federal court jurisdiction so long as their avoidance is not fraudulent.

See Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations

omitted). Perhaps Plaintiffs could have brought federal claims against KFF,

but they simply have chosen not to do so. See Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1290

(recognizing that a plaintiff “‘may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive

reliance on state law,’ even where a federal claim is also available”). KFF’s

reliance on this related lawsuit does nothing to convince the Court of the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have

alleged only state-law claims that do not provide any basis to exercise subject

matter jurisdiction over this action.11 As such, Plaintiffs’ Motion is due to be

granted, and this case remanded to the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court in and for

Duval County, Florida.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand (Doc. 25) is GRANTED.

2. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Fourth

Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida.

11 Because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, the Court does not reach

Plaintiffs’ argument that KFF’s removal was untimely. See Motion at 9.

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a certified copy of this Order to

the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval

County, Florida, terminate any pending motions, and CLOSE the

case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 9th day of May,

2023.

United States District Judge

Ice31

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