Motor Depot, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

In the matter of the Complaint of

MOTOR DEPOT, LLC, as Owner of a

2006 Black Hawk Vessel with Hull

ID Number IT030015G506, its

Engines, Tackle, Apparel, and Case No.: 8:21-cv-2941-WFJ-TGW

Appurtenances, etc. for Exoneration

from or Limitation of Liability

Petitioner.

_________________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court is Tamara Nasser and Nasr Alghrairi’s (collectively

“Claimants”) Motion for Summary Judgment and Relinquishment of Jurisdiction to

State Court (Dkt. 37). Petitioner Motor Depot, LLC (“Motor Depot”) has responded

in opposition (Dkt. 48). Claimants have not replied. Upon careful consideration, the

Court grants Claimants’ Motion.

BACKGROUND

This admiralty action arises from an incident in the waters of Tampa Bay,

Florida. On June 13, 2020, Ben Bengelloun—an owner and managing partner of

Motor Depot—took six passengers for a test ride on a 2006 Black Hawk vessel (the

“Vessel”). As Mr. Bengelloun captained the Vessel back from its initial stop, the

bow started to porpoise and violently bounce. Claimants were sent airborne before

landing back in the Vessel, resulting in serious injury.

I. Factual History

Claimants met Mr. Bengelloun approximately one week before the incident at

a restaurant in Tampa, Florida. Dkt. 38-1 at 41. Upon learning that Mr. Bengelloun

sold recreational crafts, Claimants expressed their interest in buying one. Id. at 43.

Mr. Bengelloun invited Claimants to take the Vessel out the following weekend. Id.

On June 13, 2020, Claimants took Mr. Bengelloun up on his offer. They were

joined by Meral Badawy (a friend of Claimants), “Armine” (a mutual friend of

Claimants and Mr. Bengelloun), and two other individuals—Shankar Manupati and

“Tony” (guests of Mr. Bengelloun).1 Id. at 50, 56–57. The group boarded the Vessel

and headed to “Beer Can Island” at around three in the afternoon. Id. at 50.

The ride to Beer Can Island was uneventful. Claimants and Ms. Badawy sat

in the fore of the Vessel while the other passengers sat in the aft behind Mr.

Bengelloun, who primarily remained at the helm. Id. at 61–62. According to

Claimants, the group drank alcoholic beverages provided by Mr. Bengelloun and

listened to music as they enjoyed the ride. Id. at 64–67. Mr. Bengelloun denies that

he personally drank or provided any alcohol. Dkt. 38-3 at 26–28.

1 Multiple members of this group appear to go by different names among different people, as

reflected in the deposition transcripts. “Armine” (last name unknown) is sometimes referred to as

“Emine,” “Ami,” or “Alex.” Dkt. 38-2 at 21; Dkt. 38-3 at 26. The Court will only use the name

“Armine.” “Tony” (last name unknown) is sometimes referred to as “Ali.” Dkt. 38-2 at 20. The

Court will only use the name “Tony.” Shankar Manupati goes by “Manuel” and “Manu.” Dkt. 38-

3 at 25, 77. The Court will refer to him as “Mr. Manupati.”

After a short stop at Beer Can Island, the Group agreed to dinner at a boat-

accessible restaurant near downtown Tampa. Dkt. 38-1 at 78. Armine raised the

anchor, and everyone returned to the seating arrangement described above.2 Id. at

78–79. There is some disagreement concerning the exact condition of the water and

wind. Claimants and Mr. Bengelloun nevertheless agree that the water was relatively

calm and that the weather was good for boating. Id. at 83; Dkt. 38-3 at 38–39.

Once in open waters, Mr. Bengelloun began to speed up. No one remembers

the Vessel’s exact speed at this point, but Claimants maintain that the bow of the

Vessel “started picking up air” and “bouncing vertically . . . up and down” as a result

of Mr. Bengelloun’s acceleration or speed. Dkt. 38-1 at 84. This went on for “a few

minutes.” Id. Mr. Bengelloun allegedly “maintained the speed” despite Mr.

Alghrairi’s attempts to communicate with him “through hand signals telling him to

slow down.” Id.

Claimants allege that they were sitting down and “holding onto the [side and

front] rails” when the Vessel experienced its first “big bounce.” Id. at 88. Claimants

held on, but the following bounce was even more violent, causing Claimants to pick

up air and collide with the Vessel upon landing. Id. Ms. Nasser had “released her

hand” from the side rail due to injury or pain by the time the next bounce came. Id.

2 There is some ambiguity concerning Armine’s precise relation to Mr. Bengelloun. Mr. Manupati

claims that Armine works for Mr. Bengelloun at Motor Depot. Dkt. 38-2 at 22. Mr. Bengelloun

denies that Armine is a Motor Depot employee. Dkt. 38-3 at 29.

According to Claimants, “the third bounce sent everyone airborne, and the [Vessel]

itself was airborne” as well.3 Id. at 88–89.

The resulting impact caused significant injury to Claimants. Notably, Ms.

Nasser suffered “a compound fracture in her leg[.]” Id. at 99. Her “tibia and fibula

were both protruding from her skin” and “there was plenty of blood.” Id. at 99, 101.

Mr. Alghrairi—who was also allegedly injured—tended to Ms. Nasser’s leg and

improvised a cast from materials on the Vessel. Id. at 100. Meanwhile, Mr.

Bengelloun set a course for Tampa General Hospital.

Upon arriving outside of Tampa General Hospital, the Vessel experienced an

allision as Mr. Bengelloun attempted to find the correct location to drop off

Claimants.4 Id. at 101. Paramedics arrived soon thereafter and loaded Ms. Nasser

onto a medical vehicle. Id. at 102. Mr. Nasser sought medical attention for his own

injuries days later. Id.

3 Mr. Bengelloun described the event as follows:

I was going on a reasonable speed and suddenly, you know, like, I mean the boat

lifted. Once it lifted, by lifted – like a big lift, you know, never encountered

something like that, and drop again. But as soon as it lifted, I tried to control the

boat, put it on neutral, you know, like, I mean – and it went down, and again another

time. That’s like a sneaker wave that did that. I tried to control the boat, you know,

like I got it to stop.

Dkt. 38-3 at 47.

4 Mr. Alghrairi claims that Mr. Bengelloun “smashed the boat into the concrete wall around the

Tampa Bay area, and then he realized that he went off to the [wrong ramp.]” Dkt. 38-1 at 101. Mr.

Bengelloun claims that he “touch[ed] a pillar[,]” which resulted in “no damage to the Vessel.” Dkt.

38-3 at 14, 50.

II. Procedural History

On December 17, 2021, Motor Depot filed a Complaint for Exoneration from

or Limitation of Liability against Claimants and Ms. Badawy for injuries sustained

onboard the Vessel during the June 13, 2020, incident. Dkt. 1. Motor Depot

subsequently moved for entry of an order approving a $21,250 security, directing

issuance of monition, and restraining prosecution of claims beyond those in the

instant action. Dkt. 13. The Court granted Motor Depot’s motion on March 25, 2022.

Dkt. 14.

On May 27, 2022, Claimants answered and brought personal injury claims

against Motor Depot in its capacity as the limitation petitioner in the instant action.

Dkts. 19 & 20. Claimants now request: 1) summary judgment dismissing Motor

Depot’s Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability petition; and 2) relinquishment

of jurisdiction over the underlying negligence action to state court. Dkt. 37.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see

also Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). An issue

of fact is “genuine” only if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

fact is “material” if the fact could affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the

governing law. Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the

record demonstrating the lack of a genuinely disputed issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If met, the burden shifts to the non-

moving party to “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation

omitted). To satisfy its burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving

party must go beyond the pleadings and “identify affirmative evidence” that creates

a genuine factual dispute. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998).

In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court

must view the evidence and draw all factual inferences therefrom in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136

(11th Cir. 2007). In addition, the Court must resolve any reasonable doubts in the

non-moving party’s favor. Id. Summary judgment should only be granted “[w]here

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-

moving party[.]” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

DISCUSSION

This admiralty and maritime action is controlled by 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (the

“Limitation Act”). The Limitation Act “limits a vessel owner’s liability for any

damages arising from a maritime accident to the value of the vessel and its freight,

provided that the accident occurred without such owner’s ‘privity or knowledge.’”

In re Schneider, No. 2:21-CV-549-JES-KCD, 2022 WL 17104935, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

Nov. 22, 2022) (quoting Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1033–

34 (11th Cir. 1996)). In determining whether the Limitation Act applies to a

maritime tort, the presiding admiralty court generally conducts a two-step analysis

that divides the burden of proof between the parties. Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v.

Shubert, 86 F.3d 1060, 1062–63. (11th Cir. 1996). “First, the court must determine

what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused the accident.

Second, the court must determine whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity

of those same acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness.” Hercules

Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Fla., Dep't of Transp., 768 F.2d 1558, 1563–64

(11th Cir. 1985) (citation and quotations omitted). If the claimant satisfies his or her

initial burden of proving negligence or unseaworthiness, the burden shifts to the

shipowner to prove lack of knowledge or privity. Id. at 1564.

“A vessel owner’s claim to limited liability must be adjudicated exclusively

in [an] admiralty court, which sits without a jury.” Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1063 (citations

omitted). Notwithstanding, “the same statute that grants the federal courts exclusive

admiralty and maritime jurisdiction saves to suitors ‘all other remedies to which they

are otherwise entitled.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)). Given this, an admiralty

court “may decide the privity or knowledge issue without first deciding the liability

issue—at least where the boat owner concedes privity or knowledge, or where it is

otherwise impossible under any set of circumstances for the vessel owner to

demonstrate the absence of privity or knowledge.” Id. at 1064. Limitation of liability

is impossible under the Limitation Act in such cases; and, “where no limitation is

possible[,] the damage claimants are entitled to have the injunction against other

actions dissolved, so that they may, if they wish, proceed in a common law forum as

they are entitled to do under the saving to suitors clause [(28 U.S.C. § 1333(1))].”

Id. at 1063–64 (quoting Fecht v. Makowski, 406 F.2d 721, 722–23 (5th Cir. 1969)).

With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the privity or knowledge

issue presented by the instant case. “If it is truly impossible under any set of

circumstances for [Motor Depot] to establish its lack of privity or knowledge, the

limitation action should be dismissed, and [Claimants] should be allowed to try

liability and damages issues in state court.” Id. at 1064.

Privity or knowledge under the Limitation Act can be actual or constructive.

Actual privity or knowledge “generally refers to the vessel owner’s personal

participation in, or actual knowledge of, the specific acts of negligence or conditions

of unseaworthiness which caused or contributed to the accident.” Id. Constructive

privity or knowledge generally refers to what the vessel owner “is charged with

discovering in order to apprise himself of conditions likely to produce or contribute

to a loss.” Hercules, 768 F.2d at 1564. “In the context of a corporate shipowner, the

privity and knowledge of ‘corporate managers vested with discretionary authority’

is attributed to the corporation.” Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1064 (citations omitted).

That being the case, there are no circumstances under which Motor Depot

could demonstrate the absence of privity or knowledge concerning whatever

negligent acts or unseaworthy conditions (if any) caused or contributed to the June

13, 2020, incident.5 Mr. Bengelloun is the co-owner and only functional managing

partner of Motor Depot. Dkt. 38-3 at 7–9. Mr. Bengelloun drove the Vessel to the

public dock from which he himself launched the Vessel. Id. at 25. And all parties

agree that Mr. Bengelloun was the only person who operated the Vessel after its

departure from Beer Can Island. Mr. Bengelloun therefore necessarily had actual or

constructive privity or knowledge of whatever negligent acts or unseaworthy

conditions (if any) caused or contributed to Claimants’ injuries.6 The Court must

5 “The shipowner's privity or knowledge is not measured against every fact or act regarding the

accident; rather, privity or knowledge is measured against the specific negligent acts or

unseaworthy conditions that actually caused or contributed to the accident.” Suzuki, 86 F.3d at

1064 (citations omitted).

6 Mr. Bengelloun’s only argument to the contrary is that there could have been “some type of

heretofore unknown latent or mechanical defect in the Vessel for which [Mr. Bengelloun] and

Motor Depot had no knowledge of.” Dkt. 48 at 17. Mr. Bengelloun, as the co-owner and sole

managing partner of Motor Depot, is charged with discovering such conditions of

charge Motor Depot with the same. See Hercules, 768 F.2d at 1574 (finding that, “in

the context of a corporation, ‘privity and knowledge’ means the privity and

knowledge of a managing agent, officer or supervising employee, including

supervisory shoreside personnel”).

It follows that there are no issues bearing on Motor Depot’s liability under the

Limitation Act. This is true even if there is a genuine issue of material fact

concerning whether Mr. Bengelloun was negligent or the Vessel was unseaworthy;

for, if these predicates do exist, Motor Depot would not be entitled to a limitation of

liability, and, if they do not exist, Motor Depot will be found not liable by the state

court that Claimants “should be allowed to try liability and damages issues” before.

Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1064. The Court therefore grants Claimants’ Motion.

CONCLUSION

Motor Depot is not entitled to exoneration or limitation of liability under the

Limitation Act.7 Claimants may litigate negligence in state court before a jury.

unseaworthiness. See Avera v. Fla. Towing Corp., 322 F.2d 155, 166 (5th Cir. 1963) (“knowledge

means not only personal cognizance but also the means of knowledge—of which the owner or his

superintendent is bound to avail himself—of contemplated loss or condition likely to produce or

contribute to loss, unless appropriate means are adopted to prevent it”). Accordingly, even under

Mr. Bengelloun’s theory, Mr. Bengelloun had constructive knowledge of whatever unseaworthy

condition (if any) caused the accident. See Hercules, 768 F.2d at 1564.

7 “The Limitation Act was designed to encourage investment in the shipping industry by limiting

the physically remote shipowner's vicarious liability for the negligence of his or her water-borne

servants.” Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1064 (citing Tittle v. Aldacosta, 544 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir.1977)).

Accordingly, “[f]or his own fault, neglect, and contracts[,] the owner remains liable.” Am. Car &

Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261, 264 (1933) (citation omitted). The Limitation Act was not

designed to limit Mr. Bengelloun’s liability in these circumstances.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

(1) Claimants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Relinquishment of

Jurisdiction to State Court (Dkt. 37) is GRANTED.

(2) The Court’s injunction against other actions (Dkt. 14) is dissolved.

(3) The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Claimants Tamara

Nasser and Nasr Alghrairi against Petitioner Motor Depot.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on April 27, 2023.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record