Isaacs v. Isaacs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

ROBERT LOUIS ISAACS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:21-cv-1912-PGB-LHP

STEVEN ALLEN ISAACS,

ESTATE OF ALBERT ISAACS

and CARS ASSET GROUP, LLC,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 53 (the “Motion”)), Plaintiff’s response thereto (Doc. 55), the Honorable

United States Magistrate Judge Leslie Hoffman Price’s Report and

Recommendation that the Court grant the motion and dismiss the case without

prejudice but without leave to amend (Doc. 69 (the “Report”)), Plaintiff’s

objection to the Report (Doc. 74 (the “Objection”), and Defendant’s response

(Doc. 75). Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Report is due to be adopted,

the Objection overruled, and the case dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

This case stems from a testamentary and trust dispute regarding a family

business. On November 15, 2021, Plaintiff Robert Louis Isaacs (“Plaintiff”),

appearing pro se, filed the above-styled case on behalf of himself and CARS Asset

Partnership, Ltd., against Defendants Steven Allen Isaacs, the Estate of Albert

Isaacs, and CARS Asset Group, LLC. (Doc. 1). With leave of Court, Plaintiff filed an

Amended Complaint, this time on behalf of himself only and adding CARS Asset

Partnership, Ltd., as a Defendant, along with Steven Allen Isaacs, the Estate of

Albert Isaacs, and CARS Asset Group, LLC. (Doc. 22). On Defendants Cars Asset

Group, LLC and Steven Allen Isaacs’ previous motion, the Court dismissed the

amended complaint as a shotgun pleading, with leave to replead. (Docs. 23, 50).1

On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff timely filed a Second Amended Complaint,

which is now the operative pleading. (Doc. 51). The Second Amended Complaint is

59 pages in length and includes 204 numbered paragraphs. (Id.). Plaintiff also

attached 67 pages of Exhibits, including the Last Will and Testament of Albert

Isaacs, an Amended Trust Agreement by Albert Isaacs, and a “Victim’s

Constitutional Rights” pamphlet from the Casselberry Police Department. (Doc.

52, 54).2 The second amended complaint again centers around facts related to the

1 On May 10, 2022, the Court dismissed without prejudice and terminated as a party Defendant

Cars Asset Partnership, Ltd. (Doc. 44). The Estate of Albert Isaacs has not, to date, answered

or otherwise responded to the amended complaint, nor has the Estate of Albert Isaacs joined

in the presently pending motion to dismiss. Given that it does not appear that the Estate of

Albert Isaacs has been served in this matter, and that the Estate of Albert Isaacs does not

appear to be a proper party in any event, I will recommend dismissal of the Estate of Albert

Isaacs as a Defendant, as more fully discussed below.

2 Recently, Plaintiff has also filed several “notices,” which include copies of a premarital

agreement, Florida Statutes, Federal Rules of Evidence, an Amended Trust Agreement, and

Last Will and Testament of Albert Isaacs, a Petition for Administration, a Certification of

Death, an Oath of Guardian, and several state court documents, some of which are duplicative

of documents previously filed. (See Docs. 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68). However, these

“notices,” even if considered, are “not a substitute for well-pleaded allegations.” See Yeh-Ho

v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 21-81852-CIV, 2021 WL 9568005, at *2 n.1

(S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2021).

conversion of CARS Asset Partnership, Ltd. to CARS Asset Group, LLC, and the

disposition of Albert Isaacs’ Estate, from which Plaintiff was excluded as a

beneficiary due to language in the will which asked for Plaintiff to be considered to

have predeceased Albert Isaacs. (Doc. 51).

As listed in the second amended complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege twelve

separate causes of action: (1) “Count – 1, Albert Isaacs Estate PREDECEASED,

August 24, 2009 – violation by ALBERT ISAACS ESTATE: PREDECEASED

VIOLATION OF STATUTE USE 731.103(3);” (2) “Count – 2, Albert Isaacs Estate

Breach of Contract of Trust delivery pursuant to Florida Statute 736.0813 and no

limitation per fl. st. 736.0604;” (3) “Count – 3, Albert Isaacs 620.8401(1)(a)

Partner’s rights and duties;” (4) “Count – 4, Albert Isaacs 620.8401(2) Partner’s

rights and duties;” (5) Count – 5, Albert Isaacs 620.8404(1)(2)(3) General

standards of partner’s conduct;” (6) “Count – 6, Albert Isaacs 620.8601 Events

causing partner’s dissociation;” (7) “Count – 7, Steven Allen Isaacs 620.8801(5)(c)

Events causing dissolution and winding up of partnership business;” (8) “Count 8,

Albert Isaacs deceased partner requirement to settle account by backpay to both

Ltd. limited partners. 620.8807 Settlement of accounts and contributions among

partners;” (9) “Count – 9, Albert Isaacs Breach of Partnership Contract by Albert

Isaacs 620.102 Definition;” (10) “Count 10, Steven Isaacs 2012 through 2022;

Defendant Steven Allen Isaacs Failure to perform services due from LLC owed

from Ltd. 608.4211(1)(4) Contributions to capital and liability for contribution;”

(11) “Count – 11, 608.432(1)(a)(b)(2)(a)(b) Assignment of member’s interest;” and

(12) “Count – 12 Steven Isaacs 608.4228 Limitation of liability of managers and

managing members.” (Id. at pp. 37–54). The Second Amended Complaint also

includes a paragraph titled “Cause of Action 3 Asset Partnership, Ltd as CARS

Asset Group, LLC,” but this does not appear to be a separate claim for relief. (See

id. at p. 40).3 Plaintiff appears to seek declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief,

but the claimed damages value is unclear as Plaintiff references both

“$4,000,000.00” and half of “$7,293,823.99” with interest.” (Id. at p. 56–58).

Plaintiff alleges that the Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the claims proceed from “directly a predeceasing of plaintiff

Robert Louis Isaacs living estate and divesting his rights to properties and money

in the Albert Isaacs decedent Estate procedurally persistently upholding an

incorrect Florida state death decree by presumptions and considerations and

illegal procedure of requirements of Florida Statute 731.103” and because this case

turns on an important federal issue. (Id. at 3–4, 8). Plaintiff also briefly mentions

without explanation due process and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See

e.g., id. at pp. 7, 8, 10).

Defendants collectively moved to dismiss the second amended complaint.

(Doc. 53). Defendants contended that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

remains a shotgun pleading, fails to adequately allege a basis for the Court’s

jurisdiction, is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, fails to state any claim,

3 The Court finds that even if it were pled as a separate cause of action, this would not change

the Court’s ultimate conclusions.

and asserts claims barred by the statute of limitations. (Id.). After referral, on

March 20, 2023 Magistrate Judge Hoffman Price recommended that the Court

grant the Motion, dismiss the Second Amended Complaint without further leave

to amend, and sua sponte dismiss the claims against the Defendant Estate of Albert

Isaacs. (Doc. 69). On October 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Report

(Docs. 74) and Defendants responded (Doc. 75) to the Objection such that this

matter is now ripe for review.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s findings, the district court must

“make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court “may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” Id. The district court must consider the record and factual issues

independent of the magistrate judge’s report, as de novo review is essential to the

constitutionality of § 636. Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512–13

(11th Cir. 1990). However, when the parties object to the findings and

recommendations, “[f]rivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be

considered by the district court.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion, overrules Plaintiff’s

objection, adopts the Report, and dismisses the Second Amended Complaint

without prejudice yet without leave to replead.

To start, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Objection mostly rehashes its

previous arguments without properly addressing Magistrate Judge Hoffman

Price’s conclusions. In other words, Plaintiff fails to delineate why Magistrate

Judge Hoffman’s conclusions are in error, or when Plaintiff is construed to have

done so, Plaintiff does so in an entirely conclusory fashion. For this reason alone,

the Report is due to be adopted. Knezevich v. Ptomey, 761 F. App’x. 904, 906 (11th

Cir. 2019) (“objections to a magistrate judge's recommendation and report must

be ‘specific’ and ‘clear enough to permit the district court to effectively review the

magistrate judge's ruling.’”). Certainly, Plaintiff puts forward citations to legal

authority, but he never explains why this authority undercuts Magistrate Judge

Hoffman Price’s specific conclusions. Nevertheless, the Court will independently

explain why the Motion is due to be granted, the Report adopted, and the Objection

overruled.

A. Shotgun Pleading4

4 A pro se complaint should be construed leniently, but a court does not have “license . . . to

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.”

GJR Invs. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). Pro se parties must

comply with the minimum pleading standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and the Local Rules. Nawab v. LVNV Funding LLC, No. 5:12-cv-129-Oc-10PRL, 2012 WL

12918283, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2012).

“A complaint that fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 may be classified as a

‘shotgun pleading.’” Luft v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Realty Corp., 620 F. App’x 702,

704 (11th Cir. 2015). Shotgun pleadings generally present in one of four ways: (1) a

complaint “containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of

all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before

and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) a complaint

“replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to

any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint that fails to separate “into a

different count each cause of action or claim for relief”; and (4) complaints

containing “multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which

of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the

defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s

Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015). Each of these types of pleadings

fails “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the

grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.

Magistrate Judge Hoffman Price recommends a finding that the Second

Amended Complaint is still the second type of shotgun pleading. (Doc. 69, pp. 8–

10). The only objection that even remotely addresses this conclusion is Plaintiff’s

assertion that he utilized the “US District Court pro se complaint form structure”

and that “counts were kept as basic as possible not to charge two people with the

same offense” in crafting his Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 74, pp. 2–3).

Plaintiff’s supposed reliance on the form pleading provided for pro se litigants and

his attempt to avoid a different form of shotgun pleading violation do not excuse

Plaintiff’s form of pleading which, at bottom, fails to adequately give Defendants

adequate notice of the claims against them due to its voluminous, disorganized,

and stream-of-consciousness style. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Make no

mistake—detail is not the problem; instead, Plaintiff does not connect the

pleadings’ many varied assertions to any specific cognizable causes of action that

the Court can discern. As the Court already gave leave for Plaintiff to cure, the

Court agrees dismissal without leave to refile is warranted. (Doc. 69, p. 16).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court further agrees that Plaintiff fails to allege an adequate basis for

the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over all of the claims before it. A

district court may at any time, upon motion or a sua sponte review of the file,

address the potential lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a case. Herskowitz v.

Reid, 187 F. App’x 911, 912–13 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Howard v. Lemmons, 547

F.2d 290, 290 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977)). “[I]t is incumbent upon federal courts trial and

appellate to constantly examine the basis of jurisdiction, doing so on our own

motion if necessary.” Save the Bay, Inc. v. U.S. Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102 (5th

Cir. 1981);5 United States v. Meyer, 50 F.4th 23, 31 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[A] federal

5 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh

Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

court cannot address the merits of a dispute unless it satisfies itself that subject-

matter jurisdiction exists.”).

The Court agrees that, even charitably interpreted, it has neither federal

question nor diversity jurisdiction over this case. Federal question jurisdiction

exists when the case arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction exists only when there is

complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. See Owen Equip. & Erection

Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). In order to achieve “complete diversity,”

no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants. Id.

The Second Amended Complaint does not plead a federal question. (See

Doc. 51). Despite passing reference to the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or

Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiff does not explain in even a rudimentary fashion

why his allegations qualify as cognizable constitutional claims. O’Neal v. Allstate

Indem. Ins. Co. Inc., No. 20-14712, 2021 WL 4852222, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 19,

2021) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he mere reference to federal

law is insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction—the implicated federal

issue must be substantial. District courts may dismiss a federal question claim for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction when (1) the alleged claim under the

Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely

for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction; or (2) such a claim is wholly insubstantial

and frivolous.”). Moreover, Plaintiff entirely fails to address federal jurisdiction in

his Objection. (See Doc. 74).

Plaintiff finally fails to allege complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Indeed, the only allegations potentially related to citizenship tend to demonstrate

all parties in this case are Florida citizens. (See Doc. 51, pp. 1–2). In any event, the

claims regarding the disposition of the Estate of Albert Isaacs would appear to be

barred by the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Holt v. Holt,

No. 6:21-cv-1115, 2022 WL 1224075, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2305988 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2022). Yet

again, the Plaintiff fails to address these jurisdictional defects in the Objection.

(See Doc. 74). Consequently, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over this case,

so dismissal must be without prejudice. Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l

Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, the

Court will not provide leave to replead as the Court has already provided

opportunities for Plaintiff to fix these pleading deficiencies. Jackson v. Bank of

Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356–59 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of

amended complaint after the plaintiffs were given an opportunity to replead yet

failed to cure).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. United States Magistrate Judge Leslie Hoffman Price’s Report and

Recommendation, filed on March 20, 2023 (Doc. 69), is ADOPTED

and CONFIRMED and made a part of this Order;

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED (Doc. 53);

3. Plaintiff's Objection (Doc. 74) is OVERRULED;

4A. The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 51) is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE yet without leave to replead; and

5. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on April 24, 2023.

<.

PAUL G.

UNITED STATES*DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties