The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
MARCUS ALLEN, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 2:18-cv-69-FtM-99NPM
FIRST UNUM LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, PROVIDENT LIFE AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
and UNUM GROUP,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiff’s
Renewed Motion For Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. #286) filed
on March 1, 2023. Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition
(Doc. #290) on March 14, 2023.
I.
On March 22, 2022, a jury trial began on plaintiff Dr. Marcus
Allen’s (Plaintiff or Dr. Allen) breach of contract claim set forth
in Count I of the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. #87.) In this
Count, Plaintiff alleged that defendants Provident Life and
Casualty Insurance Company (Provident) and Unum Group (Unum)
(collectively Defendants) breached their obligations under four
individual disability income insurance contracts (the Individual
Policies) when they determined Dr. Allen was no longer totally
disabled from his occupation as a diagnostic radiologist and
terminated his disability income benefits effective August 22,
2015. (Id., p. 29.)
The jury rendered its verdict on March 28, 2022, finding that
Defendants had proven that Dr. Allen was no longer totally disabled
under the Individual Policies as of August 22, 2015. (Doc. #243.)
On February 9, 2023, Judgment was entered in favor of Defendants
as to Count I and Plaintiff took nothing. (Doc. #282.)
Plaintiff made oral and/or written motions for judgment as a
matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) at the appropriate
times during trial. (Docs. ##237-239.) Plaintiff argued that
Defendants did not meet their burden in showing that he was no
longer totally disabled (after August 22, 2015) as defined under
each individual disability insurance policy. The Court denied
Plaintiff’s motions, stating that under the “liberal [motion for
judgment as a matter of law] standard”, a reasonable jury could
render a verdict in Defendants’ favor. (Doc. #241; Doc. #259, pp.
150-51.)
Plaintiff now renews his motion for judgment as a matter of
law as to Count I, arguing that a reasonable jury did not have a
legally sufficient basis to find in favor of Defendants, and
therefore the Court should enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff
notwithstanding the verdict. (Doc. #286, pp. 1-3.) Defendants
respond that Plaintiff’s renewed motion should be denied because
Plaintiff has failed to overcome Rule 50(b)’s onerous requirements
for overturning a jury’s verdict. (Doc. #290, p. 1.) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendants and
denies Plaintiff’s motion.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) allows a party to renew
a motion for judgment as a matter of law made pursuant to Rule
50(a) following entry of a jury verdict. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
Rule 50(b) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as
a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is
considered to have submitted the action to the jury
subject to the court's later deciding the legal
questions raised by the motion. . . . In ruling on the
renewed motion, the court may:
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned
a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry
of judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
A renewed motion under Rule 50(b) must be based on the same
grounds as the earlier Rule 50(a) motion. Connelly v. Metro.
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 764 F.3d 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 2014).
When considering a Rule 50(b) motion, the Court determines whether
the record — viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party — points so overwhelmingly in favor of the opposing side
that the jury's verdict cannot stand. Yates v. Pinellas Hematology
& Oncology, P.A., 21 F.4th 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2021). “Stated
differently, the verdict will be set aside only if no reasonable
jury could have arrived at it.” Id. Where there is substantial
evidence in the trial record that would allow reasonable minds to
reach different conclusions, judgment as a matter of law is not
appropriate. Mee Indus. v. Dow Chem. Co., 608 F.3d 1202, 1211
(11th Cir. 2010). The Court does not weigh the evidence or make
credibility determinations in determining such a renewed motion.
Brown v. Ala. Dept. of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1173 (11th Cir.
2010).
In the renewed Motion, Plaintiff argues that the jury was
instructed as a matter of law “that Dr. Allen adequately performed
his obligations under the terms of the four Individual Policies
through August 22, 2015” and because Dr. Allen was “totally
disabled”1 under each of the Individual Policies, he received
disability benefits prior to and through August 22, 2015. (Doc.
#286, p. 3.) Plaintiff asserts, however, that Defendants failed
to present any evidence showing that after August 22, 2015 he was
no longer suffering from the same “sickness”, i.e., glare and
1 The jury was instructed that Policies 1, 2, and 3 define
“Total Disability” as when “due to “Injuries or Sickness: you are
not able to perform the substantial and material duties of your
occupation; and you are under the care and attendance of a
Physician.” (Doc. #235, p. 8.) As to Policy 4, the jury was
instructed that the definition of “Total Disability” is “Injuries
or Sickness: you are not able to perform the substantial and
material duties of your occupation; and you are receiving care by
a Physician which is appropriate for the condition causing the
disability.” (Id., pp. 8-9.)
floaters in both of his eyes that obstructed his vision, which
rendered him totally disabled as a matter of law prior to August
22, 2015. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the testimonial evidence
offered by both sides confirmed Dr. Allen continued to suffer from
the same “sickness” that rendered him unable to perform the
substantial and material duties of his occupation as a radiologist.
(Id., pp. 3-8.) Plaintiff also argues that the evidence presented
regarding the possible effects of vitrectomy surgery on his eyes
was insufficient to demonstrate he was no longer totally disabled.
(Id., pp. 8-9.) Plaintiff therefore concludes that because a
reasonable jury did not have a legally sufficient basis to find
for Defendants, the Court should enter judgment in his favor
notwithstanding the verdict. (Id., p. 3.)
Defendants respond that the ultimate question presented at
trial was one of credibility – i.e., did Dr. Allen’s eye condition
(floaters) prevent him from performing his occupation as a
radiologist? – which the jury determined was not the case. (Doc.
#290, p. 2.) Defendants point to various record evidence which
showed Dr. Allen’s floaters existed many years prior to his
disability claim, that his own treating physicians found Dr.
Allen’s complaints to be inexplicable or exaggerated, and that Dr.
Allen elected not to undergo a vitrectomy to correct his vision.
(Id., pp. 3-5.) According to Defendants, the jury weighed the
evidence and chose not to believe that Dr. Allen continued to be
disabled from the floaters such that he could not perform his
former occupation. Because the jury’s verdict was well-supported,
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied.
As typical in a jury trial, contradictory evidence was
presented to the jury and required the jury to make factual
determinations to resolve the conflicting evidence. Indeed, the
jury was presented evidence from Drs. Kay, Hoepner, and DiLoreto
about the ongoing existence of floaters in Dr. Allen’s eyes. On
the other hand, the jury also considered evidence from Drs. Andrew
and Schwartz that implied Dr. Allen’s subjective complaints about
the severity of his symptoms were “out of proportion” and
inexplicable. While Plaintiff argues that no evidence showed that
he was no longer suffering from the same sickness that rendered
him totally disabled, the jury had sufficient evidence to
reasonably conclude otherwise. Viewing the evidence and inferences
in a light most favorable to Defendants in accordance with Rule
50(b), the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion For Judgment as a Matter of Law
(Doc. #286) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 20th day of
March, 2023.
Z tivo
JGH E. STEELE
5 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Counsel of record