Adkins v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JEFFREY STEVEN ADKINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:21-cv-718-MAP

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Defendant.

/

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the denial of his claim for disability insurance

benefits (DIB).1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) committed

reversible error by failing to properly consider both his physical and mental subjective

complaints. As the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial evidence and failed

to employ proper legal standards as to Plaintiff’s physical impairments and limitations,

the Commissioner’s decision is reversed and remanded.

I. Background

Plaintiff, who was born in 1961, claimed disability beginning October 1, 2019

(Tr. 240). He was 57 years old on the alleged onset date. Plaintiff obtained less than

a high school education, and his past relevant work experience included work as a

purchasing manager (Tr. 86-88, 303). Plaintiff alleged disability due to back pain, a

1 The parties have consented to my jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

hernia, neck fusion, a rotator cuff issue, sciatic pain, tears in his right knee, scoliosis,

and arthritis in his right hand (Tr. 302).

Given his alleged disability, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB (Tr. 238-46).

The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied Plaintiff’s claims both initially and

upon reconsideration (Tr. 114-48, 155-81). Plaintiff then requested an administrative

hearing (Tr. 182-83). Per Plaintiff’s request, the ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff

appeared and testified (Tr. 41-94). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an

unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and accordingly denied Plaintiff’s

claims for benefits (Tr. 22-40).

In rendering the administrative decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff met

the insured status requirements through December 31, 2024, and had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2019, the alleged onset date (Tr. 28). After

conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of record, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease with

low back pain with muscle spasms and cervicalgia (Tr. 28). Notwithstanding the noted

impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 30). The ALJ then

concluded that Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light

work, except that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10

pounds frequently; stand and/or walk six hours in an eight-hour workday; sit six hours

in an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb ladders, scaffolds, ramps, and stairs;

frequently balance; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; frequently reach in

all directions with his right arm; no grasping or manipulative limitations; and no

mental health limitations (Tr. 30). In formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined that, although the evidence

established the presence of underlying impairments that reasonably could be expected

to produce the symptoms alleged, Plaintiff’s statements as to the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical

evidence and other evidence (Tr. 31).

Considering Plaintiff’s noted impairments and the assessment of a vocational

expert (VE), however, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform his past

relevant work as a purchasing manager (Tr. 34, 86-92). Accordingly, based on

Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the VE, the

ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 34). Given the ALJ’s finding, Plaintiff requested

review from the Appeals Council, which the Appeals Council denied (Tr. 11-16, 232-

37). Plaintiff then timely filed a complaint with this Court (Doc. 1). The case is now

ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Standard of Review

To be entitled to benefits, a claimant must be disabled, meaning the claimant

must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A “physical or mental

impairment” is an “impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities, which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical

and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

To regularize the adjudicative process, the SSA promulgated the detailed

regulations currently in effect. These regulations establish a “sequential evaluation

process” to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an

individual is found disabled at any point in the sequential review, further inquiry is

unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Under this process, the ALJ must determine,

in sequence, the following: whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial

gainful activity; whether the claimant has a severe impairment, i.e., one that

significantly limits the ability to perform work-related functions; whether the severe

impairment meets or equals the medical criteria of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1; and whether the claimant can perform his or her past relevant work. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the claimant cannot perform the tasks required of his or

her prior work, step five of the evaluation requires the ALJ to decide if the claimant

can do other work in the national economy in view of his or her age, education, and

work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). A claimant is entitled to benefits only

if unable to perform other work. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

A determination by the Commissioner that a claimant is not disabled must be

upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable legal

standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the court reviews the

Commissioner’s decision with deference to the factual findings, no such deference is

given to the legal conclusions. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th

Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reweigh the

evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even if it finds that the

evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s decision. Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 771

F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014); Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citations omitted);

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). The Commissioner’s

failure to apply the correct law, or to give the reviewing court sufficient reasoning for

determining that he or she has conducted the proper legal analysis, mandates reversal.

Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (citation omitted). The scope of review is thus limited to

determining whether the findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial

evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints regarding his physical and mental impairments in finding that

Plaintiff retained the ability to perform his past relevant work. At step four of the

sequential evaluation process, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and ability to

perform past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545. To

determine a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ makes an assessment based on all the relevant

evidence of record as to what a claimant can do in a work setting despite any physical

or mental limitations caused by the claimant’s impairments and related symptoms. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In rendering the RFC, therefore, the ALJ must consider the

medical opinions in conjunction with all the other evidence of record and will consider

all the medically determinable impairments, including impairments that are not

severe, and the total limiting effects of each. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(2)

& (e); see Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(“Consideration of all impairments, severe and non-severe, is required when assessing

a claimant’s RFC”); see Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating

that the “ALJ must consider the applicant’s medical condition taken as a whole”). In

doing so, the ALJ considers evidence such as the claimant’s medical history; medical

signs and laboratory findings; medical source statements; daily activities; evidence

from attempts to work; lay evidence; recorded observations; the location, duration,

frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms; the type, dosage,

effectiveness, and side effects of any medication or other treatment the claimant takes

or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; treatment, other than medication,

the claimant receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; any

measures the claimant uses or has used to relieve pain or symptoms; and any other

factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii), 404.1545(a)(3); Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p, 1996 WL

374184 (July 2, 1996); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017).

As indicated, in addition to the objective evidence of record, the Commissioner

must consider all the claimant’s symptoms,2 including pain, and the extent to which

these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective evidence

and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2.

A claimant’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive

evidence of disability, however. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). Rather, to establish a

disability based on testimony of pain and other symptoms, the claimant must show

evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (1) objective medical evidence

confirming the severity of the alleged symptoms or (2) that the objectively determined

medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged symptoms.

Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225 (citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991));

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Consideration of a claimant’s symptoms thus involves a

two-step process, wherein the SSA first considers whether an underlying medically

determinable physical or mental impairment exists that could reasonably be expected

to produce the claimant’s symptoms, such as pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b); SSR 16-

3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3-9. If the SSA determines that an underlying physical or

mental impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms,

the SSA evaluates the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the

2 The regulations define “symptoms” as a claimant’s own description of his or her physical

or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(i).

extent to which the symptoms limit the claimant’s ability to perform work-related

activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3-9. When the

ALJ discredits the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ must articulate explicit

and adequate reasons for doing so. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225 (citation omitted). A

reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated finding regarding a claimant’s

subjective complaints supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Mitchell, 771

F.3d at 782; Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citation

omitted).

A. Physical

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in considering Plaintiff’s physical

impairments and limitations. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did

not properly consider several factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) or other

factors, such as Plaintiff’s self-reported statements regarding his limitations; the

objective medical evidence; Plaintiff’s treatment, including the type, dosage, side

effects, and effectiveness of medications and other treatment modalities; the duration,

frequency, and intensity of pain and precipitating and aggravating factors; Plaintiff’s

activities of daily living; statements from Plaintiff’s wife as to Plaintiff’s functionality;

and Plaintiff’s excellent work history. While the ALJ need not refer to every treatment

note, the ALJ must demonstrate that he considered Plaintiff’s medical condition as a

whole and provide substantial evidence in support of the decision. See Buckwalter v.

Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1326 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating that the ALJ

need not cite every piece of evidence in the record but must demonstrate he or she

“considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole”); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d

1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding that there is no rigid requirement that

the ALJ specifically address every piece of evidence in the decision so long as the

ALJ’s decision was not a broad rejection). Though the ALJ likewise did not need to

address every factor set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) or otherwise, several of the

ALJ’s findings and omissions call into question whether the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s

medical condition taken as a whole.

At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s lumbar disc disease with low back pain

with muscle spasms and cervicalgia to constitute Plaintiff’s only severe impairments

(Tr. 28). The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not substantiated by the record

based upon Plaintiff’s imaging, findings on examination of 5/5 with normal gait and

strength, treatment history with Plaintiff not undergoing recommended lumbar

surgery, activities of daily living, Dr. Gary Correnti’s statement that Plaintiff could

return to work without restrictions, and Plaintiff’s statement that he used the proceeds

of the work claim settlement to pay off his wife’s car instead of getting medical care

(Tr. 31). Several of the bases the ALJ cited for discounting Plaintiff’s statements

regarding his physical impairments and limitations do not accurately reflect what the

record detailed.

Namely, during the administrative hearing, Plaintiff indicated that he had been

on pain medication for more than 15 years and was currently taking three morphine

pills per day along with oxycodone, meloxicam, and methocarbamol for pain as well

as medical marijuana to try to reduce his narcotic intake (Tr. 53-55). He also stated

that he underwent four surgeries in the prior 15 years for his rotator cuff, a hernia, a

scrotal cyst, and a cervical fusion (Tr. 57-58). According to Plaintiff, he required a

second cervical surgery to address the cervical discs above and below the fusion, but

he could not afford that surgery as he had no income (Tr. 58). Additionally, in April

2019, when Plaintiff was prescribed Oxycontin and believed he was well enough to

work, he suffered a back injury on the job after he briefly attempted to go back to work

following a prior period of disability and for which surgical intervention was needed

(Tr. 55-59). Plaintiff indicated that he had also injured his rotator cuffs again by

working, and, at that point, he had two tears on his left and one tear on his right, for

which he likewise needed surgical intervention (Tr. 58-59, 67-68).

In August 2019, Plaintiff informed Dr. Correnti of his plans to go on a cruise

with his wife and have lumbar surgery following the cruise (Tr. 720). Dr. Correnti

noted that, from a neurological perspective, Plaintiff had no restrictions and could

continue to work full duty until surgery unless it became unbearable, at which point

the surgery would need to be scheduled sooner (Tr. 720). The ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s

statement regarding taking a cruise with his wife as indicative of Plaintiff’s limitations

not being as severe as alleged (Tr. 32, 720). During the administrative hearing,

however, Plaintiff stated that he and his wife canceled the cruise because Plaintiff was

physically unable to go (Tr. 64-65). Plaintiff also explained Dr. Correnti’s statement

regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform work with no restrictions until the surgery (Tr.

31, 65, 720). Given Plaintiff’s injuries at the time, including injuries to his back and

rotator cuffs, Plaintiff believed there was no further damage that could occur (Tr. 65).

Consequently, he asked Dr. Correnti to remove any work restrictions because his

employer would not let him work in any capacity, including a limited capacity with

such restrictions, and he was trying to keep his job (Tr. 65). In the end, Plaintiff tried

to continue to work but was unable to do so because of his injuries (Tr. 65).

The ALJ also cited to Plaintiff’s decision to use money that he received through

worker’s compensation for a needed surgery to pay off his wife’s car instead of for

medical care as evidence of the fact that Plaintiff was not as limited as alleged (Tr. 31).

As Plaintiff made clear during the hearing, he did so because issues arose with the

worker’s compensation claim,3 the cost of surgery exceeded the worker’s

compensation payment provided, he needed several surgeries that he could not afford

without an income, and, most importantly, he was trying to avoid bankruptcy, stating:

I paid my wife’s car off. I figured I’d still have the $20,000 in my IRA if

I’d have to use that for surgery, but I did that because I had no income,

and I was trying to eliminate a bill so I could, you know, we didn’t go

bankrupt. But I – I haven’t had any income since October of last year. I

haven’t had any income at all.

(Tr. 58-59, 65-68).

Beyond the mischaracterization of the evidence, the ALJ also omitted any

meaningful discussion of Plaintiff’s use of potent narcotics to treat his constant and

severe pain (Tr. 25-34). To reiterate, Plaintiff took three morphine pills per day with

3 Dr. Correnti’s contemporaneous treatment notes seem to support Plaintiff’s statements,

indicating that Plaintiff had been scheduled for surgery but because Dr. Correnti determined

that Plaintiff’s “pre-existing condition was 80% of the problem and the major contributing

cause,” worker’s compensation canceled his surgery (Tr. 717).

oxycodone, meloxicam, and methocarbamol as well as medical marijuana to try to

treat his pain (Tr. 670, 687, 770, 790, 792, 798, 841). The ALJ’s failure to address the

use of those narcotics to relieve his pain, with mixed notes regarding the efficacy of

such treatment, leaves a gap in the ALJ’s analysis that warrants reconsideration.

Given these deficiencies, the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.

Accordingly, remand is warranted to reconsider Plaintiff’s physical impairments in

light of the evidence of record, and the decision on remand should include discussion

of Plaintiff’s medication regimen and any side effects affecting Plaintiff’s ability to

perform work-related activities.

B. Mental

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider his mental

impairments and limitations. At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s unspecified

depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressive mood,

uncomplicated bereavement, and alcohol use disorder in sustained remission,

considered singly and in combination, did not cause more than minimal limitation in

Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic mental work activities and therefore concluded those

impairments were non-severe (Tr. 28-29). In considering the effects of Plaintiff’s

mental impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff experienced no limitation in

his ability to understand, remember, or apply information; no limitation in his ability

to interact with others; mild limitation in his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain

pace; and mild limitation in his ability to adapt or manage himself (Tr. 29). Such

findings properly led to the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were

not severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1).

Going further, the ALJ provided a more detailed assessment of Plaintiff’s

mental impairments at step four in setting forth the RFC finding (Tr. 32-33). See

Schink, 935 F.3d at 1269 (acknowledging that the RFC determination requires a “more

detailed assessment” of a claimant’s mental functioning). Specifically, the ALJ stated:

Mentally, the claimant’s debilitating allegations are inconsistent with the

objective medical record evidence. The evidence strongly supports no

severe mental impairments with no more than mild limitations. On

neurosurgical examination, Dr. Correnti found the claimant pleasant,

conversant, alert, and oriented. On consultative physical examination,

the claimant reported being under a lot of stress[,] and Dr. Kibria found

the claimant anxious and depressed, but fully oriented and cognitively

intact. The claimant underwent a consultative psychological

examination in March 2020 with Cheryl Kasprzak, Psy.D., with the

claimant denying treatment with a psychiatrist or psychotherapist, but

reporting being overwhelmed due to family losses with frustration and

memory problems. Dr. Kasprzak found the claimant with normal mood,

flat affect, cooperative, normal thought content and thought process,

clear speech, relevant content, oriented, estimated average intellectual

ability, normal immediate memory, below average recent memory,

average remote memory, normal attention and concentration, and

adequate insight and judgment. The claimant was assessed with

unspecified depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety

and depressed mood, uncomplicated bereavement, and alcohol use

disorder in sustained remission.

The claimant reported activities of daily living of performing personal

care, driving, paying bills, managing banking accounts, watching

television, and washing dishes. The claimant reported to Dr. Correnti

that he was scheduled to go on a cruise in October 2019.

(Tr. 32-33) (internal citations omitted). In concluding the RFC analysis, the ALJ

reiterated that the findings related to Plaintiff’s mental impairments were supported by

the opinions of the state agency psychologists, who opined that Plaintiff had no severe

mental impairments with no more than mild limitations, and that those opinions were

supported by findings on examination, Plaintiff’s lack of mental health treatment, and

Plaintiff’s daily activities (Tr. 34).

As the ALJ articulated, the evidence did not support a finding that Plaintiff’s

mental impairments were severe. As an initial matter, the record includes no mental

health treatment notes. Indeed, during the administrative hearing, Plaintiff confirmed

that he had not received any mental health treatment, although he also noted that he

had been told he needed to seek such treatment but had not received word from the

Veterans Administration regarding receiving such mental health treatment (Tr. 75).

Additionally, most of the treatment notes addressing Plaintiff’s mental capabilities

indicated unremarkable findings, including presenting as pleasant, conversant, alert,

oriented, in no acute distress, cognitively intact, and denying anxiety, a depressed

mood, or any psychiatric condition while showing normal thought content and

process, clear speech, average intellect, cooperative attitude, normal immediate

memory, no memory loss, average remote memory, normal attention, normal

concentration, adequate insight, and adequate judgment (Tr. 32-33, 724, 771, 777,

786, 791, 794, 797, 800, 841, 844, 847, 850, 853, 856, 859). Even on the occasions

when Plaintiff appeared anxious and overtly depressed, he presented as fully oriented

and cognitively intact (Tr. 771, 777).4

4 Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s purported failure to discuss evidence for and against a

finding of disability and the ALJ’s selective view of the evidence. The ALJ’s discussion of

Plaintiff’s mental impairments and limitations includes evidence for and against a finding of

disability and notably omits reference to an unfavorable finding. Namely, even though the

Going further, as the ALJ stated, the state agency medical consultants each

found Plaintiff’s mental impairments non-severe and causing only mild limitations, as

the evidence of record did not support greater limitations (Tr. 33, 122-24, 139-41).

State agency medical consultants are considered highly qualified experts in the Social

Security disability evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(1). Although the ALJ

did not need to afford their opinions any special deference, the ALJ properly found

the opinions of the state agency medical consultants persuasive since the opinions were

supported by findings on examination, treatment history, and activities of daily living

(Tr. 33).

To that end, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s ability to perform personal care,

drive, pay bills, manage bank accounts, watch television, and wash dishes as indicative

of his ability to mentally function at a greater level than alleged. Indeed, in evaluating

a claimant’s complaints, the ALJ may consider the claimant’s daily activities. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). As the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned, however, everyday

tasks are hardly indicative of a claimant’s ability to function in a work

environment. Schink, 935 F.3d at 1266. In this instance, Plaintiff’s ability to perform

such activities of daily living provided just one factor supporting the ALJ’s finding that

Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not as severe as alleged. Based on the foregoing,

ALJ chose not to reference the portion of Dr. Cheryl Kasprzak’s disability evaluation report

regarding malingering, it should be noted that Dr. Kasprzak indicated that Plaintiff’s score on

the test for malingering fell above the recommended cutoff score for identification of

suspected malingering (Tr. 787). She elaborated that Plaintiff endorsed a high frequency of

symptoms that were highly atypical in patients with genuine psychiatric or cognitive

disorders, which raised the suspicion of malingering (Tr. 787).

the ALJ provided substantial evidence in support of his finding that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments were not severe.

Notwithstanding, it does not appear that the ALJ properly factored in whether

Plaintiff’s pain and potent medication regimen would cause mental or cognitive

limitations. Again, Plaintiff indicated that he took three morphine pills per day,

oxycodone, meloxicam, and methocarbamol and used medical marijuana, which

caused him difficulty with staying focused and with his memory (Tr. 315).

Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ should address Plaintiff’s mental impairments,

including any mental limitations relating to Plaintiff’s pain and any cognitive

limitations related to Plaintiff’s medications and how such limitations affect Plaintiff’s

ability to work.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards,

and the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. After consideration,

it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and the matter is

REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Commissioner

for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Plaintiff and close

the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on this 27th day of March, 2023.

MARK A. PIZZO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: Counsel of Record

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