Rogers v. Centurion of Florida, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOSEPH ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-725-MMH-MCR

CENTURION OF FLORIDA, LLC,

et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Joseph Rogers, a former inmate of the Florida penal system,1

initiated this action on June 30, 2020, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint

(Complaint; Doc. 1)2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rogers is proceeding on a

second amended complaint (SAC; Doc. 27) with exhibits (Doc. 27-1), filed on

February 23, 2022. In his SAC, Rogers names as Defendants: (1) Ricky Dixon,

Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC); (2) Centurion of

1 The Florida Department of Corrections’ website shows Rogers was released

from custody on June 14, 2022. See Offender Search, Florida Department of

Corrections, (last updated June 14, 2022).

2 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

Florida, LLC (Centurion); and (3) Corizon Health, Inc. (Corizon).3 Rogers

alleges Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment when they allegedly

created and implemented a cost-saving policy that sanctioned the delay of

medically necessary treatment for Rogers’ hepatitis c virus (HCV) infection.

Rogers also contends that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) by delaying treatment for his HCV.

As relief, Rogers seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as

declaratory and injunctive relief.

This matter is before the Court on Dixon and Centurion’s Motions to

Dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Florida Department of

Corrections (Dixon Motion; Doc. 48); Defendant Centurion of Florida, LLC’s

Motion to Dismiss (Centurion Motion; Doc. 55) (collectively “Motions”). Dixon

also filed exhibits in support of the Motions. See Docs. 48-1 through 48-3.

Rogers filed a response in opposition to Centurion’s Motion. See Response (Doc.

66). He failed to respond to Dixon’s Motion.4 Defendants’ Motions are ripe for

review.

3 On February 17, 2023, Corizon filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy. See Doc. 70.

4 Dixon filed his Motion on July 15, 2022. See generally Dixon Motion. After

granting Rogers three extensions of time to respond, see Docs. 56, 61, 65, the Court

ordered Rogers to file a response to the Dixon Motion by February 6, 2023, and

cautioned “[i]f Rogers fails to respond by the deadline, the Court will consider Dixon’s

Motion to be ripe, and all briefing will be closed,” Doc. 68 at 1.

2

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations5

In the SAC, Rogers alleges that Defendants Dixon, Corizon, and

Centurion discriminated against inmates with HCV, including Rogers, in

violation of the ADA; discriminated against inmates with HCV, including

Rogers, in violation of the RA; and were deliberately indifferent to a serious

medical need when they each enforced a policy that delayed necessary

treatment for Rogers’ HCV infection in violation of the Eighth Amendment.6

SAC at 8.

As to the specific underlying facts supporting his claims, Rogers asserts

that his HCV infection “was first discovered at the federal penitentiary [in]

Atlanta Ga.” SAC at 5. He states that he received treatment at Grady

Memorial Hospital. Id. According to Rogers, the FDOC became aware of his

HCV when he entered its custody on November 15, 1993. Id. He alleges that

after that date, Defendants only conducted “lab work” and did not treat his

HCV. Id. at 12. Rogers’ HCV progressed to cirrhosis of the liver; however,

5 Because this case is before the Court on Defendants Dixon and Centurion’s

Motions, the Court accepts the allegations in Rogers’ SAC as true and construes them

in the light most favorable to Rogers. Cinotto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 674 F.3d 1285,

1291 (11th Cir. 2012).

6 To the extent Rogers also attempts to bring a claim under Florida Statutes

section 825.102, the Court finds he does not state a claim for relief. That statutory

section criminalizes abuse of the elderly and does not create a civil remedy for Rogers.

3

Defendants never informed him of its severity. Id. at 12-13. He contends that

even when direct-acting antivirals (DAA) was recognized as “life-saving

treatment” for HCV, Defendants never provided him with such treatment due

to a cost-saving policy. Id. at 12. Rogers maintains Defendants created and

implemented a policy of delaying DAA treatments for inmates with HCV based

on the cost of the treatment. Id. at 8. However, he contends Defendants did not

implement a similar policy for inmates with other serious illnesses. Id.

III. Summary of the Arguments

In his Motion, Dixon contends that the Court should dismiss the claims

against him for the following reasons: (1) Rogers failed to properly exhaust his

available administrative remedies; (2) Dixon is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity; (3) Rogers fails to state Eighth Amendment, ADA, and

RA claims upon which relief can be granted; and (4) the statute of limitations

bars Rogers’ claims. Dixon Motion at 4-19.

Next, Centurion argues that the Court should dismiss the claims against

it for the following reasons: (1) Rogers failed to fully disclose his litigation

history; (2) Rogers failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) Rogers

fails to state an Eighth Amendment, medical malpractice, negligence, or other

claim upon which relief can be granted. Centurion Motion at 2-24. In his

4

Response to Centurion’s Motion, Rogers argues the Court should not dismiss

his claim for the following reasons: (1) he did not willfully omit parts of his

litigation history, and (2) he did not have available administrative remedies.

Response at 4-11.

IV. Analysis

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. PLRA Exhaustion

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held the exhaustion of

administrative remedies by a prisoner is “a threshold matter” to be addressed

before considering the merits of a case. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,

1286 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Myles v. Miami-Dade Cty. Corr. and Rehab.

Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that exhaustion is “a

‘threshold matter’ that must be addressed first”) (citation omitted).7 It is well

settled that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires an inmate

wishing to challenge prison conditions to first exhaust all available

administrative remedies before asserting any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

7 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

5

See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). While the

Eleventh Circuit does not appear to have addressed the applicability of the

PLRA to suits brought under the ADA or the RA, the language of § 1997e(a) is

not limited to § 1983 claims, but also applies to challenges to prison conditions

brought under other “Federal law[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Notably, several

courts that have considered the reach of the PLRA have concluded that its

exhaustion requirement must be satisfied before a prisoner can pursue an ADA

claim, such as the one asserted here by Rogers, in federal court. Green v.

Thomson, No. 1:20-cv-19 (LAG), 2021 WL 7967925, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 9,

2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-cv-19 (LAG) (TQL), 2022

WL 1042915 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2022) (collecting cases).8 Because the reasoning

of these courts applies equally to claims under the RA and the Court finds the

reasoning persuasive, the Court applies the PLRA exhaustion requirement to

all of Rogers’ claims.

A prisoner such as Rogers, however, is not required to plead exhaustion.

See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, the United States

8 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union

Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court

would not be bound to follow any other district court's determination, the decision

would have significant persuasive effects.”).

6

Supreme Court has recognized that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative

defense under the PLRA[.]” Id. Notably, exhaustion of available administrative

remedies is “a precondition to an adjudication on the merits” and is mandatory

under the PLRA. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008). Not

only is there an exhaustion requirement, the PLRA “requires proper

exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal

with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these

parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to

do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full

opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Administrative

law does this by requiring proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies, which “means using all steps

that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so

that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”

Pozo,[9] 286 F.3d, at 1024 (emphasis in original).

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. And, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id.

The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ourts may not

engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one

9 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).

7

baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies

as are ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). For an

administrative remedy to be available, the “remedy must be ‘capable of use for

the accomplishment of [its] purpose.’” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084

(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th

Cir. 2007)).

Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, Defendants bear “the burden of proving that [Rogers] has failed to

exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Id. at 1082. In accordance with

Eleventh Circuit precedent, a court must employ a two-step process when

examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance

procedures, he may file suit under § 1983. In response

to a prisoner suit, defendants may bring a motion to

dismiss and raise as a defense the prisoner’s failure to

exhaust these administrative remedies. See Turner,

541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v. Burnside we

established a two-step process for resolving motions to

dismiss prisoner lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541

F.3d at 1082. First, district courts look to the factual

allegations in the motion to dismiss and those in the

prisoner’s response and accept the prisoner’s view of

the facts as true. The court should dismiss if the facts

as stated by the prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id.

Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s

view of the facts, the court makes specific findings to

resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based

8

on those findings, defendants have shown a failure to

exhaust. Id. at 1082-83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining

that defendants bear the burden of showing a failure

to exhaust).

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).

At step two of the procedure established in Turner, the Court can consider facts

outside the pleadings as long as those facts do not decide the case and the

parties have had sufficient opportunity to develop the record. Bryant, 530 F.3d

at 1376; see also Jenkins v. Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 838-39 (11th Cir. 2020).

2. Florida’s Prison Grievance Procedure

State law “determines what steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche v.

Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 218

(stating that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define

the boundaries of proper exhaustion”). The FDOC provides an internal

grievance procedure for its inmates. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.001

through 33-103.018. Generally, to properly exhaust administrative remedies,

a prisoner must complete a three-step sequential process. First, an inmate

must submit an informal grievance at the institutional level to a designated

staff member responsible for the specific problem. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

103.005. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate must submit a formal grievance

at the institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006. If the matter is

9

not resolved through formal and informal grievances, the inmate must file an

appeal to the Office of the FDOC Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

103.007. However, under certain specified circumstances, an inmate can

bypass the informal-grievance stage and start with a formal grievance at the

institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005(1); 33-103.006(3). Or

an inmate can completely bypass the institutional level and proceed directly to

the Office of the FDOC Secretary by filing a “direct grievance.” See Fla. Admin.

Code R. 33-103.007(3). Emergency grievances and grievances of reprisal are

types of “direct grievances” that may be filed with the Office of the FDOC

Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007(3)(a).

Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.011 provides time frames for

the submission of grievances. Informal grievances must be received within

twenty days from the date on which the grieved incident or action occurred.

See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(a). Formal grievances must be received

no later than fifteen days from the date of the response to the informal

grievance. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(b). Similarly, grievance

appeals to the Office of the FDOC Secretary must be received within fifteen

days from the date that the response to the formal grievance is returned to the

inmate. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(c). According to Rule 33-

10

103.014, an informal grievance, formal grievance, direct grievance, or

grievance appeal “may be returned to the inmate without further processing if,

following a review of the grievance, one or more . . . conditions are found to

exist.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1). The rule provides an enumerated

list as “the only reasons for returning a grievance without a response on the

merits.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1). A grievance can be returned

without action if it: is untimely; “addresses more than one issue or complaint;”

is “so broad, general or vague in nature that it cannot be clearly investigated,

evaluated, and responded to;” is “not written legibly and cannot be clearly

understood;” is a supplement to a previously-submitted grievance that has

been accepted for review; does not “provide a valid reason for by-passing the

previous levels of review as required or the reason provided is not acceptable;”

or does not include the required attachments. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

103.014(1)(a)-(y).

3. Rogers’ Exhaustion Efforts

With the Dixon Motion, Dixon provides records of Rogers’ exhaustion

efforts. Docs. 48-1; 48-2. The records show Rogers submitted a grievance to the

Office of the FDOC Secretary on April 11, 2016. Doc. 48-1 at 4. His grievance

stated:

11

I along with numerous other inmates incarcerated

within the Florida Department of Corrections have

been diagnose[d] with a potentially fatal liver disease

known as Hepatitis C. This disease causes ongoing

damage to live cells, cells that die and get replaced by

scar tissue leading to another enhancement of the

HVC [sic] disease. The cells that die and get replaced

by scar tissue leading to cirrhosis of the liver have an

additional factor to add to the potentially fatal

outcome of HVC[,] cells that grow back after some are

d[e]stroyed may with a great possibility lead to

another fatal liver disease of cancer. Both cirrhosis

and cancer add to the fatality factor of the HVC vir[us]

which will often spread in blood to other body organs.

Curing Hepatitis C is now possible with new

groundbreaking medical advancements. With these

new medications and treatments the response rate [is]

now greater than 90% in many cases, with a possibility

of a re[lapse] probably less than one in 10,000.

Harvoni (ledispasuir/sofosbuvir) a non-interferon

treatment is one tablet per day for 12 weeks.

Viekira Pak (ombitasvir/paritaprevir/ritonavir/dasabuvir)

4 tablets a day for 12 to 24 weeks have been approved

by the FDA and are available for treatment of HVC.

Medical contractor Corizon is cutting corners on this

life saving treatment to those of us who have this high

potential[ly] fatal Hepatitis C disease. Therefore

financial[l]y benefit[t]ing from [] the deliberate

indifference of their professional integrity,

responsibility, trustworthiness and accountability in

their claims of “good business sense and good medical

sense to the excellent preventive care — intervening

early to prevent and[/]or treat conditions before they

become serious and cause disease-related

12

complications,” as quoted by Martha Harbin,

spokeswoman for Corizon.

Due to the treatment price tag between $ 75 to 80,000

Corizon[’s] refusal to approve this life saving

treatment to the majority of inmates with HVC clearly

shows they placed profits over their so called “good

business sense and good medical sense of excellent

preventive care.” Leaving myself and others with the

more likely scenario of HVC related complications that

will lead to the fatal liver disease of cancer.

A treatment that could save the State of Florida the

cost of a more extensive treatment later on that may

or may not extend the life, and a treatment now that

would avoid an excruciating life later on due to the acts

of deliberate indifference by medical contractor

Corizon for financial benefits by failure to treat a

treatable life threatening disease.

Relief sought. That Corizon be required to pay for this

treatment before the contract the[y] entered into with

the Department of Corrections is ended. I seek

treatment at the expense from profitable funds that

Corizon squandered from it[s] intentional, calculated

and scheming practices of financial benefits over its

contract accountability to afford incarcerated persons

within the Florida Department of Corrections with life

saving treatment that is within their own “good

business sense and good medical sense” guidelines of

preventive care and treatment before conditions

become serious and cause disease related

complications.

Id. at 4-6. On April 29, 2016, the Office of the FDOC Secretary provided the

following response:

13

Your request for Administrative Remedy or Appeal

has not been filed in compliance with Chapter 33-

103.006, Inmate Grievance Procedure. You did not

provide this office with a copy of the formal grievance

filed at the institutional level as required by rule or

the reason you provided for by-passing that level of the

grievance procedure is not acceptable.

If you feel you need medical attention, contact the

institutional medical department via the sick

call/emergency process.

Upon receipt of this response, if you are within the

allowable time frames for processing a grievance, you

may resubmit your grievance at your current location

in compliance with Chapter 33-103, Inmate Grievance

Procedure.

Based on the foregoing, your appeal is returned

without action.

Id. at 3. Rogers did not submit any other grievances concerning treatment for

his HCV until after October 2021, when he filed three informal grievances.

Doc. 14-2 at 10-12. Suwannee Correctional Institution denied the grievances,

and Rogers did not file a formal grievance or pursue an appeal. Docs. 14-1 at

1-2; 14-2 at 10-12.

4. Turner Step One

Under the first step of the Turner analysis, the Court must review the

allegations in the Motions and Response and accept as true Rogers’ allegations.

See Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1209. If Rogers’ allegations in the Response show a

14

failure to exhaust, then dismissal would be appropriate. See id. In an

abundance of caution and because Dixon and Centurion make similar

arguments concerning exhaustion, the Court will consider Rogers’ view of the

facts in his Response as directed to Dixon.

The Court now turns to the allegations in the Motions and Response

concerning Rogers’ exhaustion efforts. The parties seemingly agree that Rogers

filed a direct grievance about treatment for his HCV in 2016. Dixon Motion at

10; Centurion Motion at 7-8; see generally Response. The Office of the FDOC

Secretary returned the grievance without action for failure to comply with

procedural requirements. Id. Rogers never resubmitted the grievance at the

institutional level. Id. In 2021, he also filed a series of informal grievances

about treatment for his HCV. Id.

Dixon and Centurion argue that Rogers did not properly exhaust

administrative remedies in 2016 because he failed to comply with the FDOC’s

grievance procedure. Dixon Motion at 10; Centurion Motion at 8. They further

contend that the 2021 grievances do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement

because he submitted them after he filed the Complaint in this case. Dixon

Motion at 10; Centurion Motion at 8. Rogers argues that he did not have

administrative remedies available to him because of deficiencies in the

15

grievance process, including the untimely return of grievances to inmates and

the failure to respond to grievances. Response at 5-6, 9-10. Accepting Rogers’

view of the facts as true, the Court cannot dismiss his claims at the first step

of the Turner analysis and will proceed to step two.

5. Turner Step Two

As dismissal would not be appropriate based on the allegations in the

Motions and Response, the Court next turns to the second prong of the Turner

analysis. Here, the Court finds Rogers had available administrative remedies

that he failed to properly exhaust before filing the Complaint. Rogers grieved

the denial of HCV treatment in 2016; however, the Office of the FDOC

Secretary returned his grievance without action because he did not include his

formal grievance as required nor did he provide a valid reason for bypassing

previous levels of review. Doc. 48-1 at 3; see Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

103.014(1)(f)-(g). Rogers did not file any other grievances concerning the denial

of HCV treatment before filing this lawsuit.10 “Proper exhaustion demands

10 While Rogers filed multiple grievances concerning the denial of HCV

treatment after he filed the Complaint in June 2020, see Doc. 48-2 at 10-12, “an

inmate alleging harm suffered from prison conditions must file a grievance and

exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before pursuing a § 1983

lawsuit.” Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, those grievances are not pertinent to the Court’s determination of

whether Rogers satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See Smith v. Terry,

491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012).

16

compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.”

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Therefore, Rogers did not properly exhaust his

administrative remedies where his grievance failed to comply with FDOC

procedural requirements.

While Rogers alleges that FDOC officials would not respond to

grievances in a timely manner or would not render a decision, a failure to

respond does not render the grievance process unavailable. FDOC’s grievance

procedure provided that “he could have ‘proceed[ed] to the next step of the

grievance process’ – administrative appeal – after the expiration of the 20

days.” Pavao v. Sims, 679 F. App’x 819, 825-26 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fla.

Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(3), (4)). “Because [Plaintiff] could have proceeded

by filing an administrative appeal, the PLRA still requires him to file an appeal

notwithstanding the prison’s lack of response.” Id. at 826 (citing Turner, 541

F.3d at 1084).

Rogers also refers to a “cell trashing” incident when prison officials

destroyed his legal documents. If he contends the event constituted retaliation

and rendered his administrative remedies unavailable, his argument is not

persuasive. The incident presumably occurred after Rogers filed the Complaint

because he alleges officials destroyed his legal documents from the instant case

17

“and all his grievances that were filed in [this] case were also confiscated by

staff.” Response at 7. Indeed, because the event occurred after he filed the

Complaint, it could not have hindered his ability to properly exhaust

administrative remedies before filing suit. Moreover, the grievance procedure

was available to Rogers before June 2020 since he filed numerous grievances

in January 2016, May 2018, October 2018, and February 2019. Doc. 48-2 at 1-

4, 14. As such, the Court finds the above-described incident did not prevent

Rogers from exhausting his administrative remedies before he filed this

lawsuit.

To the extent Rogers requests an evidentiary hearing, the Court will not

conduct a hearing. Here, Dixon submitted Rogers’ grievance records as an

exhibit to the Dixon Motion. See Docs. 48-1; 48-2. Rogers does not dispute the

accuracy of these records. Nevertheless, he requests a “pretrial hearing . . . to

gain the documents he will need from other inmates that will clearly show the

violations of the Defendants of the grievance process.” Response at 5, 9.

Because the Court need not resolve a material question of fact, an evidentiary

hearing is not warranted. See Bryant, 530 F.3d 1368, 1377 n.16 (noting that

“in the absence of a timely request for an evidentiary hearing and where the

resulting order is to be a dismissal without prejudice, a district court may

18

resolve material questions of fact on submitted papers”) (emphasis added).

Rogers neither alleges that he attached his formal grievance to the 2016

administrative appeal nor that before June 2020, he refiled a grievance at the

institutional level concerning the denial of HCV treatment. Similarly, he does

not allege any specific threats or actions of reprisal that occurred before he

filed suit. His general request for a pretrial hearing is not of the sort

contemplated by Bryant. See McIlwain v. Burnside, 830 F. App’x 606, 611 (11th

Cir. 2020) (finding that the district court did not give McIlwain an opportunity

to develop the record where he “requested an evidentiary hearing to compare

the tear marks on his receipt with those on the original grievance form so that

he could rebut the defendants’ allegation of forgery”). Accordingly, the Court

finds Rogers had available administrative remedies, and he failed to properly

exhaust the claims against Dixon and Centurion. Based on the above, Dixon

and Centurion’s Motions are due to be granted on that basis.

B. Dixon and Centurion’s Remaining Arguments

Because all of Rogers’ claims are due to be dismissed for failure to satisfy

the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the Court declines to address Dixon and

Centurion’s remaining arguments. Therefore, as to these issues, the Motions

are due to be denied without prejudice.

19

C. Corizon’s Suggestion of Bankruptcy

On February 17, 2023, Corizon filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy (Doc.

70), notifying the Court that Tehum Care Services, Inc., formerly known as

Corizon, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Texas. The filing of a bankruptcy petition

operates as a stay of “the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial,

administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or

could have been commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy]

case . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). The stay is generally limited to debtors and

does not extend to non-bankrupt co-defendants. See Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard

Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983); Am. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Hoich, 560

F.3d 780, 789 (8th Cir. 2009). Here, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the

Court will stay the case as to Corizon.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants Dixon and Centurion’s Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 48,

55) are GRANTED to the extent Defendants seek dismissal for Rogers’ failure

to exhaust his administrative remedies. In all other respects, the Motions are

denied without prejudice.

20

2. Plaintiff Joseph Rogers’ claims against Dixon and Centurion are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court directs the Clerk to

terminate Dixon and Centurion as Defendants in the case.

3. The Court will stay and administratively close the case pursuant

to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Corizon shall file a status report with the Court on June

21, 2023, and every 120 days thereafter, reflecting the status of Corizon’s

bankruptcy proceedings. The Court directs the Clerk to administratively

close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 1st day of

March, 2023.

United States District Judge

Jax-9 2/13

C: Joseph Rogers

Counsel of record

21