The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
WILLIAM VALENCIA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 8:21-cv-1748-TPB-AAS
HAINES CITY, FLORIDA,
Defendant.
______________________________ /
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on “Defendant Haines City, Florida’s Motion
for Final Summary Judgement and Incorporated Statement of Facts and
Memorandum of Law,” filed on September 9, 2022. (Doc. 21). Plaintiff filed a
response in opposition on October 13, 2022. (Doc. 31). Defendant filed a reply on
October 27, 2022. (Doc. 34). Based on the motion, response, reply, court file, and
record, the Court finds as follows.
Background
Plaintiff William Valencia began working as a firefighter for Defendant
Haines City, Florida, in 2001. He rose through the ranks, and in 2018 became a
Battalion Chief, reporting directly to the Deputy Fire Chief. One of the job duties of
a Battalion Chief is “running calls,” that is, going out to emergencies and
commanding fire scenes. Plaintiff had been required to run calls at various times
since becoming a Lieutenant in 2008. At other times, he had worked primarily on
logistics and administrative matters, although he was required to cover the shifts of
the other Battalion Chiefs whose regular duties including running calls.
Plaintiff suffered from high blood pressure and anxiety. In 2012, he
experienced symptoms suggesting a heart attack and went to the emergency room.
Ultimately, it was determined he did not suffer a heart attack, but medical
providers advised him to try to reduce his job stress in various ways. None advised
him at that time that he should not run calls.
In 2018, Thomas Murphy became interim Fire Chief, and Plaintiff assisted
him in running the department while Plaintiff was on light duty due to an arm
injury. Plaintiff asked Murphy to let him continue working in logistics and be
excused from running calls. Murphy did not require Plaintiff to run calls, although
the evidence is conflicting as to whether Murphy did so as an accommodation for a
disability or simply because Murphy did not think Plaintiff competent to handle the
task.
In February 2019, Jeffrey Davidson became the new Fire Chief. Plaintiff
asked Davidson to excuse him from running calls. Davidson did not agree, and he
asked Plaintiff to provide medical documentation to support the request, which
Plaintiff never did. Plaintiff talked to a workers’ compensation lawyer about going
out on a pension based on his medical issues, and in June 2019 the lawyer sent a
letter to Davidson inquiring about this possibility. The letter from the lawyer upset
Davidson, who asked Plaintiff why he had consulted a lawyer and whether Plaintiff
was suing him.
After that, Davidson counseled and then disciplined Plaintiff based on
various performance issues. Plaintiff describes this as Davidson placing his
performance under a “microscope.” In November 2019, Davidson placed Plaintiff on
a “performance improvement plan” or “PIP,” which required Plaintiff to meet or
show progress on certain goals and projects within 90 days. Following a meeting
with Plaintiff in February 2020 to discuss Plaintiff’s progress, Davidson submitted a
recommendation that Plaintiff be terminated for failing to meet the PIP goals and
other performance issues. On March 26, 2020, City Manager Deric Feacher
conducted a pre-determination hearing attended by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s counsel,
Human Resources Director Auburn Taylor, Chief Davidson, and Defendant’s
counsel. Feacher thereafter sustained Chief Davidson’s recommendation, and
Plaintiff was terminated on April 10, 2020.
On October 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in state court asserting a claim for
retaliation under the workers’ compensation statute. Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint in July 2021 that included federal claims, and Defendant removed the
case to this Court. The operative complaint alleges counts for workers’
compensation retaliation (Count I), disability discrimination in violation of the
Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) (Count II), disability discrimination in violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count III), retaliation in violation of
the FCRA (Count IV), and retaliation in violation of the ADA (Count V). Defendant
has moved for summary judgment on all counts.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A properly supported motion for summary
judgment is not defeated by the existence of a factual dispute. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Only the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact will preclude summary judgment. Id.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004). When the moving party has discharged its burden, the
nonmoving party must then designate specific facts showing the existence of
genuine issues of material fact. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,
593-94 (11th Cir. 1995). If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations or
evidence, the nonmoving party’s evidence is presumed to be true and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of
Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003).
Analysis
The Legal Framework
The parties agree that Plaintiff’s retaliation and discrimination claims under
Florida’s workers’ compensation law, the ADA, and the FCRA should be analyzed
under the burden-shifting framework used in Title VII cases pursuant to McDonnell
Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer evidence to present
a prima facia case of discrimination or retaliation. The burden then shifts to the
defendant to offer a non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for its actions. If
it does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered
reasons are pretextual. See, e.g., Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1328
(11th Cir. 2018) (ADA retaliation); Wood v. Calhoun Cty. Fla., 626 F. App’x 954, 956
(11th Cir. 2015) (workers’ compensation retaliation); Toliver v. City of Jacksonville,
No. 3:15-cv-1010-J-34JRK, 2017 WL 1196637, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2017) (ADA
and FCRA disability discrimination).
Prima Facie Case
Although Plaintiff has brought several different claims, the requirements
for a prima facie case for all of them are similar. A prima facie case of retaliation
under the workers’ compensation law requires that Plaintiff demonstrate (1) he
sought workers’ compensation benefits, (2) he suffered an adverse employment
action, and (3) there is a causal connection between his workers’ compensation
claim and the adverse action. See, e.g., Williams v. Record Town, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-
502-T-24-MAP, 2009 WL 960096, at * 3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2009). A prima facie case
of retaliation under the FCRA or the ADA requires that the employee demonstrate
(1) that he engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) that he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) that a causal connection exists between the two.
Batson, 897 F.3d at 1328-29; Monroe v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 793 F. App’x 924, 928
(11th Cir. 2019). A prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA or the FCRA
requires that the plaintiff show: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is a
“qualified individual” such that he could perform the essential functions of his
position with or without accommodation; and (3) that he was discriminated against
because of his disability. Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 934 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th
Cir. 2019). Where, as here, the plaintiff alleges disparate treatment because of a
disability, the plaintiff must prove he or she was treated differently from similarly
situated, non-disabled employees. See Toliver, 2017 WL 1196637, at *5.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case for
purposes of his ADA and FCRA discrimination claims because he cannot establish
he was disabled or regarded as disabled, or that he was a qualified individual.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s ADA and FCRA retaliation claims fail because he
cannot establish he engaged in protected activity. Defendant does not appear to
challenge Plaintiff’s showing of a prima facie case for purposes of workers’
compensation retaliation, but argues as to this claim, and as to the others, that it
has proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that Plaintiff has not shown to be
pretextual.
The Court assumes for purposes of this Order that Plaintiff has presented
evidence to establish a prima facie case under the theories asserted. The question
becomes whether Defendant has offered legitimate non-discriminatory and non-
retaliatory reasons for its conduct, and if so, whether Plaintiff has shown them to be
pretextual.
Legitimate Reason Versus Pretext
The defendant’s burden to provide a legitimate reason for its actions is “a low
bar to hurdle.” Flowers v. Troup Cty, Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir.
2015). The defendant “need not persuade the court that its proffered reasons are
legitimate; the defendant’s burden is merely one of production, not proof.” Vargas v.
Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 8:16-cv-1949-T-33JSS, 2017 WL 2931379, at *14 (M.D.
Fla. July 10, 2017) (quoting Weston-Brown v. Bank of Am. Corp., 167 F. App’x 76, 80
(11th Cir. 2006)).
If the defendant meets that burden, then the plaintiff must present evidence
that the proffered reasons are pretextual, that is, that the reasons offered were not
the true reasons. Burgos-Stefanelli v. Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 410 F
App’x 243, 247 (11th Cir. 2011). A reason is pretextual only if it is false and the
true reason for the decision was discrimination or retaliation. Gogel v. Kia Motors
Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1136 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Burgos-Stefanelli,
410 F. App’x at 247.
Evidence of pretext must be sufficient to “allow a reasonable finder of fact to
conclude that the [employer’s] articulated reasons were not believable.” Callahan v.
City of Jacksonville, Fla., 805 F. App’x 749, 753 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brooks v.
Cty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006)). The plaintiff
must “demonstrate ‘such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the [defendant’s] proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.’”
Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Combs
v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)). As long as the
proffered reasons might motivate a reasonable employer, the employee must rebut
each one. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25, 1029-1030 (11th Cir.
2000); Burgos-Stefanelli, 410 F. App’x at 247.
A plaintiff cannot succeed by quarreling with the wisdom of the employer’s
decision or by showing the decision was based on erroneous facts. Id.; Thatcher v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 8:17-cv-3062-T-AEP, 2020 WL 2838849 (M.D. Fla.
June 1, 2020). Nor may an employee “recast an employer's proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute his business judgment for that of the
employer.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. The court is not a “super-personnel
department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” Id. (quoting Elrod v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.1991)).
The employer may be high-handed or mistaken, and may terminate an
employee for a good reason or a bad reason, as long as the reason is non-
discriminatory and non-retaliatory. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. “[T]he
question is not whether the employee actually engaged in the conduct, but instead
whether the employer in good faith believed that the employee had done so.” Gogel,
967 F.3d at 1148. As the en banc Eleventh Circuit emphasized in Gogel:
[t]he inquiry ... centers on the employer's beliefs, not the employee's
beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside of the
decision maker's head. ... The question is whether [the] employers were
dissatisfied with [the employee] for these or other non-discriminatory
reasons, even if mistakenly or unfairly so, or instead merely used those
[reasons] as cover for discriminating against her. ... [emphasis added]
Id. at 1148 (quoting Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F. 3d 1253, 1266
(11th Cir. 2010)); Cusick v. Yellowbook, Inc., 607 F. App’x at 955 (“The inquiry into
pretext is concerned with the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s perceptions of
his performance.”).
Defendant has offered legitimate non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory
reasons for Plaintiff’s discipline and termination, identifying numerous specific
incidents and problems with Plaintiff’s performance as Battalion Chief in 2019.
Chief Davidson supported his recommendation that Plaintiff be terminated by
citing the following issues, among others: multiple instances of improper use of a
department purchasing card for supplies without using a tax exemption as required
by department policy, failure to turn in an assignment in time for Davidson to use
at a meeting, failure to send part of another assignment until reminded to do so by
Davidson, turning in a report that was due in October on November 1, 2019, failing
to attend a training class as directed, failing to prepare a draft purchasing
procedure as directed, and coming to a meeting without a list of specific job
responsibilities as directed.
Plaintiff was placed on a performance improvement plan or PIP on November
25, 2019. The PIP required Plaintiff to demonstrate progress on various issues and
projects within 90 days and to provide interim status reports. The PIP advised that
failure to comply with the PIP’s goals could result in discipline, including
termination. On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff reported to Chief Davidson that he was
working on the various items for the PIP. He specifically represented in an email
that he was “continuing to work[] on [his] presentation” for one of the projects and
that he was “presently putting a power point together which will be incorporated
into the presentation.”
In mid-February 2020, Chief Davidson directed Plaintiff to cover another
Battalion Chief’s shift the next day. Because this might involve going out on fire
calls, Plaintiff became extremely anxious and had to go to the emergency room with
high blood pressure, followed by a two-week leave from work to recuperate.
Plaintiff returned to work and met with Chief Davidson on February 26, 2020, to
discuss his progress on the PIP over the past 90 days. Plaintiff testified that he
reported on the work he had done on the various goals and projects; it is disputed
whether he had any written work product to present at the meeting.
Plaintiff admits, however, that despite his specific representation in early
February that he was “presently” working on a PowerPoint, as of the time of the
meeting three weeks later, he still had not done “any” of the PowerPoint. Plaintiff
testified that as soon as Chief Davidson heard this, he started raising his voice and
“kept asking me about a PowerPoint.”
Plaintiff does not dispute that these and other instances of arguably deficient
performance occurred in some fashion. Some of them he does not specifically recall.
For some of them, he points to extenuating circumstances such as other job
demands or being out on medical leave. For others, he blames Davidson for
communication problems or downplays the significance of the issues. He accuses
Davidson of lying about specific aspects of several incidents, but he points to no
evidence of deliberate falsehood as opposed to differences in memory and
perception.
In short, Defendant has pointed to legitimate reasons that would motivate a
reasonable employer to take the actions it did, and Plaintiff has not shown that the
reasons were pretextual under the standards set forth above. Defendant may have
been high-handed, unfair, or wrong, but Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that its
stated reasons were not the real reasons. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is granted.
It is therefore
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) “Defendant Haines City, Florida’s Motion for Final Summary
Judgement and Incorporated Statement of Facts and Memorandum of
Law” (Doc. 21) is GRANTED.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Haines
City, Florida, and against Plaintiff William Valencia.
(3) Following the entry of judgment, the Clerk is directed to terminate any
pending motions and deadlines and thereafter close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 14th day of
February, 2023.
a 5 N 7
— h by
-TOMBARBER (assis
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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