Black v. Godwin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

EVERETTE L. BLACK, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-260-MMH-JBT

WARDEN GODWIN and

SERGEANT KISER,

Defendants.

___________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Everette L. Black, Jr., an inmate in the custody of the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action on March 9, 2022, by

filing a pro se Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1) with

attachments.1 In his Complaint, Black asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against Defendants Warden Godwin and Sergeant Kiser. He alleges that

Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment when they failed to protect him from another inmate’s

attack at Columbia Correctional Institution (Columbia CI) on October 25,

2021. As relief, Black seeks compensatory and punitive damages. He also asks

1 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

that the Court transfer him to the federal Bureau of Prisons, or alternatively,

to an FDOC Region III corrections facility. This matter is before the Court on

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Motion; Doc. 10). Black filed a response in

opposition to the Motion. See Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (Response; Doc. 16). Defendants’ Motion is ripe for review.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

As to the specific underlying facts supporting his claims, Black avers

that he was in the dormitory dayroom on the morning of October 25, 2021, and

Kiser was assigned as a supervisor in the security station. Complaint at 4. He

states that he saw inmate Allen Cashe (FDOC #E33535) stab inmate Saquin

Scott (FDOC #N19231) with a homemade knife.2 Id. He maintains that the

incident lasted five minutes. Id. According to Black, Cashe left Scott bleeding

on the floor, rushed towards Black, and stabbed Black below the left eye. Id.

He alleges that Cashe chased him around the dayroom and yelled that he “was

going to kill [Black].” Id. Black maintains that Kiser watched and “did

nothing.” Id. He suggests that Kiser should have called for additional security

or deployed chemical agents to stop Cashe’s assaultive behavior instead of

2 Scott also has a pending civil rights action based on the same incident. See

Saquin Scott v. Warden Godwin and Sergeant Kiser, 3:22-cv-349-MMH-PDB (Fla.

M.D.).

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watching the events unfold for twenty minutes “with no action.” Id. He states

that Captain Teems eventually handcuffed Black and escorted him to the

medical clinic. Id.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint

should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further,

the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when

the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

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that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and

quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”

which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine

whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be

liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th

Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto

counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

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sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th

Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359,

1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other

grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

IV. Summary of the Arguments

In Defendants’ Motion, Defendant Godwin asserts that Black’s claims

against him should be dismissed because (1) Black fails to state a plausible

Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against him, and (2) Godwin, as a

supervisory official, is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Motion at 3-6.

Additionally, Defendants Godwin and Kiser argue that they are entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 6-7. In response, Black asserts that he

states plausible Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants and asks that

the Court deny the Motion and set discovery deadlines. See generally

Response.

V. Analysis

A. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect

In the Complaint, Black asserts that Defendant Godwin, as the Warden,

violated his Eighth Amendment right when he failed to protect him from the

stabbing. Complaint at 3. He states that Godwin “allow[ed] [him] to be

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assaulted without a proper and protective response from [Godwin’s]

subordinates.” Id. Additionally, he asserts that Godwin did not fulfill his duties

under the Florida Administrative Code, which provides that officers “are

responsible for the search of inmates and the control of contraband (such as

weapons).” Id. In the Motion, Godwin contends that Black neither alleges the

existence of an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence at the institution,

nor that Godwin was personally involved in the incident. Motion at 5-6. In

response, Black maintains that Godwin’s failure to ensure that the institution

is adequately staffed and that officers regularly search cells for contraband

caused the incident. Response at 2-3.

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994). It is “[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate [that] violates the Eighth

Amendment.” Id. at 828 (citations omitted). The deliberate indifference

standard requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison official “was

subjectively aware” of a risk of harm; mere negligence is insufficient. Id. at 829,

835-36. The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirement of deliberate

indifference to a substantial risk of harm as follows:

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To succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, a

plaintiff must satisfy three elements. First, the

plaintiff must show that [he] was “incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970.[3] Second, the plaintiff must

show that the “prison official [had] a sufficiently

culpable state of mind,” amounting to “deliberate

indifference.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, and finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate

causation—that the constitutional violation caused

[his] injuries. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748

F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). . . .

. . . .

Deliberate indifference exists when a prison official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct.

1970. “Deliberate indifference has two components:

one subjective and one objective.” Mosley v. Zachery,

966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal

quotation marks omitted). A prisoner must establish

“both that [1] the defendant actually (subjectively)

knew that [the prisoner] faced a substantial risk of

serious harm and that [2] the defendant disregarded

that known risk by failing to respond to it in an

(objectively) reasonable manner.” Id. (alterations

adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.

1178 (2022).

3 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

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Here, Black does not allege facts sufficient to permit the Court to draw

the reasonable inference that Warden Godwin knew Black faced a substantial

risk of serious harm and failed to protect him from it. In the Complaint, Black

describes the incident as “sudden violence.” Complaint at 4. According to Black,

Cashe told Black that he stabbed him and Scott because they were the only

inmates awake that morning, and therefore “chose” them as his exit “ticket”

from Columbia CI. Id. Black does not assert that inmate-on-inmate attacks

frequently occurred at Columbia CI, nor does he contend that Cashe previously

threatened him, so that Warden Godwin would have had notice that a risk of

harm existed. Although Black argues in his Response that Columbia CI has “a

pervasive history and culture of stabbings and assaults,” Response at 3, he may

not amend his Complaint in a response to a motion to dismiss, see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 7(b); Huls v. Llabona, 437 F. App’x 830, 832 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that

a plaintiff cannot raise new arguments in a response to a motion to dismiss

and instead must seek leave to amend his complaint).4 Upon review, the Court

concludes that Black has not alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible Eighth

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

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Amendment claim for relief against Warden Godwin. As such, Defendants’

Motion is due to be granted as to Black’s Eighth Amendment claim against

him.

B. Supervisory Liability

Defendant Godwin contends that Black has failed to allege he personally

participated in the underlying constitutional violation, and therefore Black has

not pled facts sufficient to establish supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Motion at 3-4. In response, Black argues that he specifically alleged in

the Complaint that Godwin’s failure to ensure that his subordinates searched

inmates’ cells resulted in Cashe’s possession of the knife he used in the attack.

Response at 3. Insofar as Black raises a supervisory claim against Godwin, the

Eleventh Circuit has stated:

“Supervisory officials are not liable under

section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability.” Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30

F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). “The standard by which

a supervisor is held liable in her individual capacity

for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.”

Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).[5] “Supervisory liability occurs

either when the supervisor personally participates in

the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a

causal connection between actions of the supervising

5 Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).

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official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).

“The necessary causal connection can be

established ‘when a history of widespread abuse puts

the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to

correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.’”

Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (citation omitted).[6] “The

deprivations that constitute widespread abuse

sufficient to notify the supervising official must be

obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration,

rather than isolated occurrences.” Brown, 906 F.2d at

671. A plaintiff can also establish the necessary causal

connection by showing “facts which support an

inference that the supervisor directed the

subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the

subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop

them from doing so,” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235, or

that a supervisor's “custom or policy . . . resulted in

deliberate indifference to constitutional rights,” Rivas

v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).

Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled on other

grounds by Randall, 610 F.3d at 709; see Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d

1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014). In sum,

To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the

plaintiff must allege (1) the supervisor’s personal

involvement in the violation of his constitutional

rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy that

resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's

constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference

that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or

knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a history of

6 Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003).

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widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of

an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct.

See id. at 1328-29 (listing factors in context of

summary judgment).[7] A supervisor cannot be held

liable under § 1983 for mere negligence in the training

or supervision of his employees. Greason v. Kemp, 891

F.2d 829, 836-37 (11th Cir. 1990).

Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App’x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Here, any supervisory claim against Warden Godwin fails because Black

has not alleged sufficient facts to show that Godwin was personally involved

in, or otherwise causally connected to, the alleged violation of his Eighth

Amendment right. Black instead makes conclusory assertions that Warden

Godwin failed to fulfill his duties pursuant to the Florida Administrative Code.

Complaint at 3. As pled, his allegations amount to no “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, the Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted as to Black’s

supervisory claim against Warden Godwin.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Next, Defendants Godwin and Kiser contend that, to the extent Black

sues them in their official capacities for monetary damages, they are entitled

to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Motion at 6-7. The Eleventh Amendment

7 West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2007).

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provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed

to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of

the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of

any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. It is well-settled that, in the

absence of consent, “a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or

departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh

Amendment.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (quotation omitted).

The Eleventh Amendment also prohibits suits against state officials where the

state is the real party in interest, such that a plaintiff could not sue to have a

state officer pay funds directly from the state treasury for the wrongful acts of

the state. Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir.

1999).

In Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam),

the Eleventh Circuit noted:

It is clear that Congress did not intend to

abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity in

section 1983 damage suits. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.

332, 340-45, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1144-45, 59 L.Ed.2d 358

(1979). Furthermore, after reviewing specific

provisions of the Florida statutes, we recently

concluded that Florida's limited waiver of sovereign

immunity was not intended to encompass section 1983

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suits for damages. See Gamble,[8] 779 F.2d at 1513-20.

Accordingly, in Zatler, the court found that the Secretary of the Florida

Department of Corrections was immune from suit in his official capacity. Id.

Here, the Court need not consider whether Defendant Godwin is entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity because Black does not

provide facts sufficient to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against

him. To the extent Black seeks monetary damages from Defendant Kiser in

her official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit. Accordingly, the

Motion is due to be granted insofar as Black requests monetary damages from

Defendant Kiser in her official capacity.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is GRANTED as to

Black’s (1) Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Godwin; (2)

supervisory claim against Defendant Godwin; and (3) claim for monetary

damages against Defendant Kiser in her official capacity.

8 Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Serv., 779 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir. 1986).

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2. Black’s claims against Defendant Godwin are DISMISSED

without prejudice. The Court directs the Clerk to terminate Warden

Godwin as a Defendant in the case.

3. Defendant Kiser shall respond to the Complaint (Doc. 1) no later

than January 25, 2023. Upon the filing of Defendant’s answer, the Court, by

separate Order, will set deadlines for discovery and the filing of dispositive

motions.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 15th day of

December, 2022.

United States District Judge

Jax-1 12/14

Everette L. Black, Jr., #364497

Counsel of Record

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