Schneider

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

IN RE THE COMPLAINT OF JAMES

SCHNEIDER, AS OWNER OF A 2005 34'

S2 YACHTS MOTOR VESSEL, IILN

SSUH4102G405, USCG OFFICIAL NO.

1267657, IN A CAUSE OF

EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION

OF LIABILITY,

Petitioner.

Case No: 2:21-cv-549-JES-KCD

IN ADMIRALTY

________________________________

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of Allstate

Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Facts, and Supporting

Memorandum of Law (Doc. #94) filed on September 22, 2022.

Petitioner James Schneider filed a Response in Opposition (Doc.

#95) on October 12, 2022, as did third-party defendant Robert Slade

(Doc. #96) on October 13, 2022.

This case involves the collision of two recreational vessels

in heavy fog while they were underway in the Gulf of Mexico off

the coast of Naples, Florida. One of the vessels, a 2005 34’ S2

YACHTS (Pursuit) Motor Vessel, HIN# SSUH4102G405, USCG Official

No. 1267657 – the “the Whiskey Tango Foxtrot” – was owned by

Petitioner James Schneider (Petitioner or Schneider). The second

vessel, a 2019 24’ Boston Whaler, HIN# BWCE1678A919 and Florida

Registration No. FL6069SM – the “Paradox” – was owned by Julie

Leonard (Leonard) and insured by Allstate Property and Casualty

Insurance Company (Allstate). Due to the collision, both vessels

suffered damage (Doc. #1, ¶ 8), and Leonard claims to have suffered

bodily injuries that are either permanent or continuing in nature.

(Doc. #12, ¶ 19.)

On July 20, 2021, Petitioner initiated this action seeking to

exonerate or limit his liability pursuant to Limitation of

Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (the Limitation Act)1. (Doc. #1.)

Leonard filed an Answer and affirmative defenses on August 19,

2021, claiming that Schneider’s negligence caused the collision

between the vessels. (Doc. #12.) Allstate then filed an Answer,

affirmative defenses, and a subrogated claim against Petitioner

for damages to the Leonard vessel resulting from the collision.2

(Doc. #21.) Leonard also filed a third-party complaint against

1 "A shipowner can assert its right to limitation of liability

in one of two ways. First, the shipowner can claim limitation by

pleading it as a defense in an answer to a claim in any court.

Alternatively, the shipowner can file a limitation of liability

proceeding in federal district court." Martinez v. Reynolds, No.

21-11084, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 10035, at *15 (11th Cir. Apr. 14,

2022)(quoting El Paso Prod. GOM, Inc. v. Smith, 406 F. Supp. 2d

671, 675 (E.D. La. 2005)) (citations omitted).

2 Allstate seeks to recover $165,012.20 in property damages.

(Doc. #21, p. 11.)

Robert Slade (Slade), who was allegedly operating Petitioner’s

vessel at the time of the collision, for personal injury damages.

(Doc. #58.) Petitioner and Third-party Defendant Slade3 deny any

liability with respect to the collision.

Allstate moves for partial summary judgment, arguing that the

Limitation Act does not apply because of Schneider’s negligence,

and requests that this Court lift the stay so that Leonard and

Allstate may litigate personal injury and property damage claims

in state court. (Doc. #94, p. 2.) Petitioner and Slade argue there

are material facts in dispute which would preclude an entry of

summary judgment in this matter. (Docs. ##95, 96.) For the reasons

set forth below, the motion is denied.

I.

Motions for summary judgment should only be granted when the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, show “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex

3 Allstate’s motion is not directed against third-party

defendant Slade, however, Allstate argues that Slade was negligent

in the operation of the Petitioner’s vessel and that Petitioner

negligently entrusted the vessel to Slade. (Doc. #94.) Slade

therefore filed a Response to Allstate’s motion, arguing there are

disputed issues of fact as a reasonable fact-finder could find

that Slade was not negligent and the collision was solely due to

Leonard’s negligence. (Doc. #96, p. 3.)

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d

265 (1986). However, “[c]onclusory, uncorroborated allegations by

a plaintiff in an affidavit or deposition will not create an issue

of fact for trial sufficient to defeat a well supported summary

judgment motion.” Solliday v. Fed. Officers, 413 F. App'x 206,

207 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “An issue of fact is

‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Baby Buddies,

Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010).

A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). “A court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether

it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of

law.’” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256,

1260 (11th Cir. 2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views

all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. Tana v. Dantanna's, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir.

2010). "If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising

from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary

judgment." St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken

Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee

Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir.

1983)). "If a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could

draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference

introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should

not grant summary judgment." Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb

Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).

II.

The material relevant facts (some of which are undisputed)

are as follows:

On February 8, 2021, Leonard was bringing her vessel (the

“Paradox”) back to her residence from Marine Max (the Marina) in

Naples, Florida, where it was being serviced. (Doc. #1, ¶ 10; Doc.

#94-1, pp. 13, 15.) When Leonard left the Marina (around 4:30

p.m.), she did not turn the vessel’s running lights on because it

was “clear and sunny.” (Doc. #94-1, pp. 18-20.) Leonard expected

to reach her home by sunset — around 6:20 p.m. (Id.) During

Leonard’s voyage home, a dense, heavy fog came about — there was

zero visibility, and it was getting darker. (Doc. #85-2, p. 10;

Doc. #80, p. 20; Doc. #94-1, p. 28.)

Schneider and Slade were aboard Schneider’s vessel (the

“Whiskey Tango Foxtrot”); both men were going north to Naples to

fish from a spot Schneider had selected. (Doc. #94-2, pp. 14-15.)

Slade was operating Schneider’s vessel for the first time.4 (Id.,

4 Although this was Slade’s first time operating the Whiskey

Tango Foxtrot, Slade had experience operating several vessels that

p. 15.) Slade had one beer on the vessel before lunch and one

beer at lunch, while Schneider just had one beer several hours

before the accident, which did not occur until between 5:30 p.m.

and 6:30 p.m. (Id., pp. 16, 23; Doc. #85-2, pp. 22-23; Doc. #85-

3, pp. 23-24.)

The remaining facts about what occurred prior to and during

the collision between Leonard and Schneider’s vessels are heavily

disputed. Leonard claims that her average speed on the way home

was under 20 mph, and that she was going 5 to 6 mph at the time of

the collision between her and Schneider’s vessels. (Doc. #94-1,

pp. 20-21, 28.) Due to the fog, Leonard turned on her running

lights, wrapped a bungee cord (safety lanyard) from the motor

around her hand, put on a life jacket, and sounded her vessel’s

horn as much as she could (but not every two minutes).5 (Id., pp.

29-30, 39.)

In contrast, Schneider and Slade allege that Leonard did not

slow her vessel down prior to the collision – GPS data shows that

he owned, including a 22’ Pontoon boat with 110 horsepower and a

19’ Mastercraft with 260 horsepower. (Doc. #85-2, pp. 11-12.)

Schneider and Slade boated together before in the Great Lakes.

(Doc. #80, p. 56.) Slade did not have a Florida boating safety

identification because Florida law does not require it for people

born before January 1, 1988. (Doc. #85-2, p. 5.)

5 Leonard alleges that she was familiar with a “boating

requirement” to sound a vessel’s horn every two minutes when in

fog. (Doc. #94-1, pp. 30-31.)

Leonard’s vessel was traveling at 29 mph at the time of the

collision, and that Leonard’s vessel was moving at that rate of

speed, and up to 35 mph, in the six minutes before the collision.

(Doc. #80, p. 21; Doc. #85-1, pp. 2-3.) Schneider recalled that

the running lights on Leonard’s vessel were not on prior to the

collision, and that Leonard did not wrap the safety lanyard around

her arm because her vessel kept running in circles after the

collision. (Doc. #80, pp. 35, 39, 41.) Leonard also failed to sound

her fog horn when she observed Schneider’s vessel. (Doc. #94-1, p.

73.)

Leonard alleges that she saw Schneider’s vessel about a

hundred feet away; the two vessels were in a direct, head-on

collision course. Leonard saw a man was standing outside the

center console. (Id., pp. 45-46, 49.) Leonard did not have time to

reduce the speed of her vessel before the collision because she

was trying to get out of the way. (Id., p. 50.) Leonard believes

that Schneider’s vessel was going faster than her vessel. (Id., p.

66.) Upon impact of the two vessels, Leonard was knocked

unconscious and does not recall her vessel going in circles or

there being a second impact with Schneider’s vessel. (Id., pp.

51, 56.) Leonard did not recall seeing running lights on

Schneider’s vessel before impact. (Id., p. 63.) Following the

collision, Leonard boarded Schneider’s vessel and alleges that

Schneider and Slade smelled of alcohol. (Doc. #94-1, p. 95.)

Schneider and Slade, on the other hand, state that right

before the collision the two vessels were not headed directly

towards one another – Schneider’s vessel was heading due south

while Leonard’s vessel was heading north to northeasterly. (Doc.

#80, pp. 20, 22.) Schneider’s vessel was traveling less than 10

mph at the time of the collision. Schneider, who was acting as a

“spotter,” saw Leonard’s vessel about three seconds before the

collision. (Doc. #85, pp. 13-14; Doc. #94-2, pp. 16-18, 20.)

Schneider yelled “boat, boat, boat,” but Slade did not have time

to turn the vessel and avoid the collision because Leonard was

“going too fast” and there was “zero visibility.”6 (Doc. #80, pp.

20, 29; Doc. #94-2, p. 20; Doc. #95-2, pp. 12-13.) Schneider claims

that his vessel’s navigational lights were turned on at the time

of the collision because he had set up all the lights while Slade

was operating the vessel. (Doc. #80, p. 20; Doc. #85-2, p. 11.)

Schneider and Slade deny that there is any evidence showing they

were intoxicated at the time of the collision. According to both

men, Leonard asked them not to call 911, and she did not call the

police. (Doc. #94-1, p. 100.)

6 Slade testified that he was familiar with the navigational

rule which applies when two vessels are approaching each other in

close proximity, and requires turning the vessel “starboard.”

(Doc. #85-2, p. 13.)

III.

A. The Limitation Act

The Limitation Act (the Act) "limits a vessel owner's

liability for any damages arising from a maritime accident to the

value of the vessel and its freight, provided that the accident

occurred without such owner's 'privity or knowledge.'"7 Beiswenger

Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1996);

In re Phillips, No. 2:19-CV-14070, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109130,

at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2020). Specifically, the Act provides

that the shipowner's liability "shall not exceed the value of the

vessel and pending freight," at least for certain claims. 46 U.S.C.

§ 30505(a); see also Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. Carroll, 918

F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021). Qualifying claims are "those

arising from any embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any

property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board the vessel,

any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act, matter, or

thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred,

without the privity or knowledge of the owner." Id. § 30505(b).

7 Federal courts are vested with exclusive admiralty

jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner may have limited

liability under the Limitation Act. Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1036.

See also Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Shubert, 86 F.3d 1060,

1063 (11th Cir. 1996)("A vessel owner's claim to limited liability

must be adjudicated exclusively in the admiralty court, which sits

without a jury.").

“[T]he Act functions by ‘limiting the physically remote

shipowner's vicarious liability for the negligence of his or her

water-borne servants.’" Freedom Unlimited v. Taylor Lane Yacht &

Ship, LLC, No. 20-11102, 2021 WL 3629904, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS

24524, at *7-8 (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2021) (quoting Suzuki of Orange

Park, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1064).

In a proceeding under the Limitation Act, maritime torts are

reviewed under a two-step analysis. First, the court "determine[s]

what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused

the accident." Martinez v. Reynolds, 2022 WL 1113001, 2022 U.S.

App. LEXIS 10035, at *16 (quoting Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United

States, 273 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotations

omitted)). Liability is established only where the vessel owner's

negligent acts were "a contributory and proximate cause of the

accident." Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Fla., 768

F.2d 1558, 1566 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs of the

Port of New Orleans v. M/V Farmsum, 574 F.2d 289, 297 (5th

Cir.1978)). If the shipowner is free from any contributory fault,

he is exonerated from all liability. See Am. Dredging Co. v.

Lambert, 81 F.3d 127, 129 (11th Cir. 1996).

If negligence was at least partly what produced the accident,

the court proceeds to the second step and determines whether the

vessel owner had knowledge of or was in privity with the acts of

negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness. Martinez, 2022 U.S.

App. LEXIS 10035, at *16 (citing Tug Allie-B, Inc., 273 F.3d at

944). "The damage claimants bear the initial burden of establishing

liability (i.e., negligence or unseaworthiness), and the shipowner

then bears the burden of establishing the lack of privity or

knowledge." In re Phillips, 2020 WL 3315994, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

109130, at *10 (quoting Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Shubert, 86

F.3d 1060, 1062-63 (11th Cir. 1996)). If there is liability, but

the vessel owner is entitled to limitation of liability, the "court

oversees the distribution of the limitation fund among the damage

claimants." Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1063.

IV.

A. Negligence or Unseaworthiness

As the Court previously mentioned, “[t]he first step in

determining a shipowner's entitlement to limitation of liability

is to establish what acts of negligence or conditions of

unseaworthiness caused the accident.” Hercules Carriers, Inc., 768

F.2d at 1565. Allstate bears the initial burden of proving such

negligence or unseaworthiness. Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86

F.3d at 1063.

"Establishing negligence under either maritime or common law

requires proving the same elements." In re Royal Caribbean Cruises

Ltd., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1182 (S.D. Fla. 2013). "To prevail in

a negligence action, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the

defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff; (2)

that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that the breach was the

proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff; and (4) that the

plaintiff suffered damages." Hasenfus v. Secord, 962 F.2d 1556,

1559-60 (11th Cir. 1992).

In their Answer, Allstate asserts that Schneider breached the

duties owed in the operation of his vessel by (1) failing to

maintain a proper lookout; (2) failing to proceed at a safe speed

in reduced visibility caused by dense fog; (3) failing to sound

his vessel’s horn every two minutes (4) turning his vessel Port

(right) rather than starboard; (5) failing to take action to avoid

the collision; (5) failing to supervise and guide Slade’s actions;

and (6) failing to sound the danger signal (five short whistle

blasts) upon observing Leonard’s vessel. (Doc. #21, pp. 10-11.)

Allstate argues that as a direct and proximate result of

Schneider’s negligence, the collision between the two vessels

occurred and Leonard (and Allstate, as subrogee) suffered property

damages. (Id., p. 11.)

While the Court agrees that the aforementioned facts may serve

as a basis for Schneider’s negligence and the proximate cause of

the collision and damages, there are numerous material facts in

dispute as to vessel speed, lighting, and pre-collision maneuvers

that preclude such a finding as a matter of law. There is also

ample contradictory evidence demonstrating that Leonard’s actions

– the speed at which she was traveling, whether her vessels’ lights

were on, the lack of use of a foghorn, and the direction of her

vessel – may have been negligent, and thus, the proximate cause

for the collision between the vessels. Viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to Petitioner, the Court finds that the record

shows that a genuine dispute of fact exists over whether Schneider

was negligent and whether he was the proximate cause of the

collision between the vessels.

B. Lack of Privity or Knowledge

The Eleventh Circuit explained that "consistent with the

statutory purpose to protect innocent investors, 'privity or

knowledge' generally refers to the vessel owner's personal

participation in, or actual knowledge of, the specific acts of

negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness which caused or

contributed to the accident." Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86 F.3d

at 1064. "The shipowner's privity or knowledge is not measured

against every fact or act regarding the accident; rather, privity

or knowledge is measured against the specific negligent acts or

unseaworthy conditions that actually caused or contributed to the

accident." Id. "[K]nowledge is not only what the shipowner knows

but what he is charged with discovering in order to apprise himself

of conditions likely to produce or contribute to a loss." Hercules

Carriers, Inc., 768 F.2d at 1564.

Allstate argues that the record clearly shows Schneider had

knowledge and privity of the negligent operation of his vessel

because Schneider not only negligently entrusted the operation of

his vessel to Slade, he participated in the negligent operation of

his vessel as well.8 (Doc. #94, p. 19.)

“There can be no ‘privity or knowledge’ unless the claimant

can establish negligence.” ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. v. ROYAL

CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1372 (S.D. Fla.

1999)(citing Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th

8 To the extent Allstate is arguing pursuant to Fecht v.

Makowski, 406 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1969), that limitation of

liability cannot be granted because it is otherwise impossible

under any circumstances for Schneider to demonstrate the absence

of privity or knowledge since Schneider was on his vessel at the

time of the collision (Doc. #94, pp. 11-13, 20), the Court does

not agree. The Eleventh Circuit cautioned district courts from

applying Fecht’s reasoning too strictly and stated that “[t]he

owner's presence [on a vessel] is not necessarily fatal to his

right to limit if the evidence suggests that his conduct was in

all respects prudent.'" Petition of M/V Sunshine, II, 808 F.2d

762, 763 (11th Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit went on to conclude

that:

In short, in most circumstances negligence in operation

will be sufficiently connected to the owner on board his

own small vessel and operating it that he will be found

to have privity or knowledge, but this common sense

recognition of how the facts will usually work out is

not an ineluctable doctrine to be applied at the pleading

stage, on conclusory and disputed allegations, as a

substitute for the knowledge necessary to lead a court

to rational decision. The "owner at the helm" doctrine

is a useful tool directed toward proper decision and not

a talisman.

Id. (emphasis added). In this case, there are many disputed

material facts that preclude the Court from concluding that

Schneider’s presence on the vessel at the time of collision makes

it impossible for Schneider to demonstrate the absence of privity

or knowledge.

Cir. 1976)). Because a genuine dispute of fact exists over whether

Schneider was negligent in operating his vessel and whether his

negligence was the proximate cause of the vessel collision, the

Court is unable to reach a determination of whether Schneider

personally participated in or had actual knowledge of negligence.

See Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1064. Thus, the Court

cannot conclude as a matter of law that “it is impossible under

any set of circumstances for [Petitioner] to establish his lack of

privity or knowledge” which would necessitate the limitation

action be dismissed, and that Leonard and Allstate should be

allowed to try liability and damages issues in state court. Id.

The Court therefore denies Allstate’s motion on this basis.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED :

Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Facts, and

Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. #94) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 22nd day of

November, 2022.

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JGHN E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: Parties of record