Roberson v. Crawford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER ROBERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-1037-MMH-PDB

VIKAS CRAWFORD,

Defendant.

________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Christopher Roberson, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action on September 16, 2022, by filing a pro se Civil Rights

Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1-1) with exhibits (Docs. 1-2 through 1-3).1 In the

Complaint, Roberson names Dr. Vikas Crawford as the Defendant. Roberson

asserts that Dr. Crawford acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the

Eighth Amendment when he “maliciously and sadistically” prescribed

Meloxicam to Roberson on March 25, 2021, and renewed the prescription on

June 23, 2021. Complaint at 3. According to Roberson, he went to a”[m]edical

call out” on March 25, 2021, but arrived late. Id. at 4. He alleges that Dr.

Crawford chastised him, and stated, “All you inmates cry about minor

1 In referencing documents filed in this case, the Court will cite the document

page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.

problems when they aren’t as big as you say they are. You’re a bunch of cry

babies.” Id. Dr. Crawford then said, “I got some good medication for you, so you

can get out of my office.” Id. Dr. Crawford prescribed Meloxicam to Roberson,

telling him that the medication would treat his arthritis and “change [his] life.”

Id. at 5. Roberson avers he experienced pain in his body “weeks later.” Id. Dr.

Crawford ordered blood tests on July 19, 2021, and the results showed

Roberson had high creatinine levels. Dr. Crawford ordered additional blood

tests on August 14, 2021. Id. After reviewing the results, Dr. Crawford told

Roberson that the Meloxicam had destroyed his kidneys. Id. He allegedly

stated, “Since the medication has destroyed your kidneys, I think the meds [are

not] working like I expected it to.” Id. Roberson contends he now has anemia

due to kidney failure. Id. at 6. As relief, he requests a declaratory judgment,

$3,000,000 in compensatory damages, $3,000,000 in punitive damages, and

fees and costs. Id. at 7.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.2 See 28

2 Roberson requests to proceed as a pauper. See Doc. 2.

2

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.3 Mitchell v.

3 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in

a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection

between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation

omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-

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63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not

necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the

. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not

required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and

quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”

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which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional

deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of

action against the defendant.

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim,

a plaintiff must show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate

indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the

plaintiff's injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir.

2009). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

“To show that a prison official acted with deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must

satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.”

Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).

To meet the first prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate

an “objectively serious medical need”—i.e., “one that

has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating

treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor's attention,” and, in either instance, “one that,

if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Id. (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted).

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To satisfy the second, subjective prong, the plaintiff

must prove that the prison officials “acted with

deliberate indifference to [his serious medical] need.”

Harper v. Lawrence Cty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th

Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). “To establish deliberate

indifference,” a plaintiff must demonstrate that the

prison officials “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk

of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3)

acted with more than gross negligence.” Id. (quotation

omitted).[4] An inmate-plaintiff bears the burden to

establish both prongs. Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d

1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).

Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020)

(footnote omitted; emphasis added). For medical treatment to rise to the level

of a constitutional violation, the care must be “‘so grossly incompetent,

inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to

fundamental fairness.’” Id. at 1271 (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,

1505 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th

Cir. 1989) (stating “[g]rossly incompetent or inadequate care can constitute

4 The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “a tension within [its] precedent

regarding the minimum standard for culpability under the deliberate-indifference

standard.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 n.2 (11th Cir.

2020). The court stated that the “competing articulations –‘gross’ vs. ‘mere’

negligence”– may be “a distinction without a difference” because “no matter how

serious the negligence, conduct that can’t fairly be characterized as reckless won’t

meet the Supreme Court's standard.” Id.; Patel v. Lanier Cnty. Ga., 969 F.3d 1173,

1188 n.10 (11th Cir. 2020).

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deliberate indifference . . . , as can a doctor’s decision to take an easier and less

efficacious course of treatment” or fail to respond to a known medical problem).

However, the law is well settled that the Constitution is not implicated

by the negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348

(1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause,

whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care

by prison officials.”). A complaint that a physician has been negligent “in

diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham, 654 F.3d at

1176 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit

has noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a constitutional

deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to subordinate his own

professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well

established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does not constitute

deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the question of whether

governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or

forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and

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therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth

Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted). In sum, the Eleventh Circuit has stated:

A prisoner bringing a deliberate-indifference claim has

a steep hill to climb. We have held, for instance, that

the Constitution doesn’t require that the medical care

provided to prisoners be “perfect, the best obtainable,

or even very good.” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1510 (quotation

omitted).[5] Rather, “[m]edical treatment violates the

[E]ighth [A]mendment only when it is so grossly

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the

conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental

fairness.” Id. at 1505 (quotation omitted). We have also

emphasized—as have our sister circuits—that “a

simple difference in medical opinion between the

prison’s medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s

diagnosis or course of treatment [fails to] support a

claim of cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.; accord,

e.g., Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir.

2018) (“We have consistently held that prison officials

do not act with deliberate indifference when they

provide medical treatment even if it is subpar or

different from what the inmate wants.”); Kosilek v.

Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc)

(“[The Eighth Amendment] does not impose upon

prison administrators a duty to provide care that is

ideal, or of the prisoner's choosing.”).

Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1266.

5 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).

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Here, Roberson fails to allege facts permitting the reasonable inference

that Dr. Crawford actually knew Roberson faced a substantial risk of serious

harm but disregarded that risk. While Roberson makes the conclusory

allegation that Dr. Crawford “maliciously” prescribed Meloxicam to harm him,

see Complaint at 3, he presents no factual allegations plausibly supporting

such a conclusion. To the extent Roberson arrives at such a conclusion based

on Dr. Crawford’s March 25th statements chastising Roberson for his tardiness

and describing inmates as “cry babies,” the statements, at most, demonstrate

a poor “bedside manner” and do not support “an inference of deliberate

indifference.” Bismark, 213 F. App’x at 897.

Roberson’s allegations also do not support a claim that he received

medical care “so grossly incompetent . . . as to shock the conscience.” Hoffer,

973 F.3d at 1271. As exhibits to the Complaint, Roberson provides a grievance

and response related to the kidney disease that he allegedly sustained as a

result of the Meloxicam prescription. In the grievance, Roberson contends that

Dr. Crawford stated, after he reviewed the results of blood tests, he knew

“something wasn’t right” because Roberson previously had “stab[]le” test

results. Doc. 1-2 at 4. According to Roberson, Dr. Crawford allegedly admitted

the Meloxicam had not worked as he expected it to work. Complaint at 5.

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Taking Roberson’s allegations as true, as the Court must, Dr. Crawford

discontinued Meloxicam and ordered a blood test when he became aware that

the Meloxicam did not benefit Roberson as Dr. Crawford had hoped that it

would. His assertions sound in negligence, if at all, which “does not state a

valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106. As such, Roberson has failed to plead facts sufficient to nudge

his claim of deliberate indifference “across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. In light of the foregoing, this case is due

to be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 3rd day of

November, 2022.

United States District Judge

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Jax-9 10/24

C: Christopher Roberson #R20924

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