Opinion

Netherland v. Williams

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Oct 14, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.9%

“It is axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior.”

How later courts described this case

  • “It is axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior.”
  • affirming entry of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s due process claims because state law and forfeiture proceedings “provided alternate postdeprivation avenues for recovery of [the property]”
  • recognizing Florida’s civil cause of action for conversion provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy when law enforcement officers allegedly seize or retain personal property

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JONATHON BURNS NETHERLAND,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-983-BJD-PDB

MIKE WILLIAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff, Jonathon Burns Netherland, an inmate of the Florida penal

system, initiated this action pro se by filing a complaint for the violation of civil

rights (Doc. 1). He is proceeding in forma pauperis. See Order (Doc. 4). As

Defendants, Plaintiff names former Sheriff Mike Williams, State Attorney

Melissa Nelson, and three officers with the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO).

Doc. 1 at 1, 3-4.

Plaintiff alleges Officer Taylor negligently and carelessly pursued him

through a residential neighborhood on February 25, 2022, causing him to crash

his motorcycle and sustain physical injuries. See generally Docs. 1-2, 1-3. He

alleges Officers Taylor and Cowan illegally searched his backpack and satchel

and seized his motorcycle, and Officer Shouse unlawfully authorized the

seizure of his motorcycle. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Mike Williams and

Melissa Nelson are “responsible for taking [his] . . . motorcycle and keeping it

without any due process of law.” Doc. 1-3 at 2. As relief, he seeks to be released

from prison, the return of his motorcycle, and damages. Doc. 1-4.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district court to

dismiss a complaint or any portion of a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1). Since the PLRA’s “failure-to-state-a-claim”

language mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, courts apply the same standard. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,

1490 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th

Cir. 2008).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked

assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Moreover,

a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all

the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal

theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.

2

2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit

A Sept. 8, 1981)). In reviewing a complaint, a court must accept the plaintiff’s

allegations as true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se,

but need not accept as true legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Without referencing a specific constitutional amendment, Plaintiff

identifies his claims broadly as (1) “negligent pursuit,” (2) “illegal search,” and

(3) “due process violation.” See generally Doc. 1-2. Liberally construing his

allegations, Plaintiff suggests violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Even under a liberal interpretation, however, Plaintiff fails to

state a plausible claim for relief against Mike Williams and Melissa Nelson.

Plaintiff alleges that Mike Williams and Melissa Nelson took and kept

his motorcycle without due process of law. Doc. 1-3 at 1-2. A negligent or

intentional deprivation of personal property does not constitute a Fourteenth

Amendment due process violation “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for

the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Plaintiff

alleges forfeiture proceedings were initiated. See Doc. 1-3 at 1-2. Regardless,

however, in Florida, a person whose property has been wrongfully taken or

retained may pursue a state-law claim for theft or conversion against the

offending party. See Fla. Stat. § 772.11(1). Because Plaintiff has meaningful

postdeprivation remedies available for the alleged unlawful retention of his

3

motorcycle, his due process claim is due to be dismissed. See Case v. Eslinger,

555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing Florida’s civil cause of action

for conversion provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy when law

enforcement officers allegedly seize or retain personal property); see also

Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming entry of

summary judgment on the plaintiff’s due process claims because state law and

forfeiture proceedings “provided alternate postdeprivation avenues for

recovery of [the property]”).

Additionally, the claim against Melissa Nelson is due to be dismissed

because prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in

their official capacities. See Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir.

2004). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff names former Sheriff Mike Williams as a

Defendant merely because of the supervisory role he enjoyed at the time of the

alleged violation, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983. See Cottone v.

Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds

by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). See also Brown v. Crawford,

906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that

liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat

superior.”).

4

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Williams and Nelson are

DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate these

Defendants as parties to the action.

2. The Court will direct service of process on the remaining

Defendants by separate order.!

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 14th day of

October 2022.

4 ry

fo /itan— | £ Agra

BRIAN/J . DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

C:

Jonathon Burns Netherland

1 In determining that the complaint can be served on the officer-Defendants,

the Court makes no findings as to the likelihood of success of any of the claims

Plaintiff asserts or purports to assert against those Defendants. Moreover,

Plaintiff is advised that he may not seek release from prison through a civil

rights action. Generally, a prisoner who seeks to attack the validity of his

conviction must pursue relief through a habeas corpus action. See Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1978).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.