“It is axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior.”
How later courts described this case
- “It is axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior.”
- affirming entry of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s due process claims because state law and forfeiture proceedings “provided alternate postdeprivation avenues for recovery of [the property]”
- recognizing Florida’s civil cause of action for conversion provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy when law enforcement officers allegedly seize or retain personal property
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JONATHON BURNS NETHERLAND,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:22-cv-983-BJD-PDB
MIKE WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________
ORDER
Plaintiff, Jonathon Burns Netherland, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, initiated this action pro se by filing a complaint for the violation of civil
rights (Doc. 1). He is proceeding in forma pauperis. See Order (Doc. 4). As
Defendants, Plaintiff names former Sheriff Mike Williams, State Attorney
Melissa Nelson, and three officers with the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO).
Doc. 1 at 1, 3-4.
Plaintiff alleges Officer Taylor negligently and carelessly pursued him
through a residential neighborhood on February 25, 2022, causing him to crash
his motorcycle and sustain physical injuries. See generally Docs. 1-2, 1-3. He
alleges Officers Taylor and Cowan illegally searched his backpack and satchel
and seized his motorcycle, and Officer Shouse unlawfully authorized the
seizure of his motorcycle. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Mike Williams and
Melissa Nelson are “responsible for taking [his] . . . motorcycle and keeping it
without any due process of law.” Doc. 1-3 at 2. As relief, he seeks to be released
from prison, the return of his motorcycle, and damages. Doc. 1-4.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district court to
dismiss a complaint or any portion of a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1). Since the PLRA’s “failure-to-state-a-claim”
language mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, courts apply the same standard. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2008).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked
assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Moreover,
a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.
2
2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit
A Sept. 8, 1981)). In reviewing a complaint, a court must accept the plaintiff’s
allegations as true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se,
but need not accept as true legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Without referencing a specific constitutional amendment, Plaintiff
identifies his claims broadly as (1) “negligent pursuit,” (2) “illegal search,” and
(3) “due process violation.” See generally Doc. 1-2. Liberally construing his
allegations, Plaintiff suggests violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Even under a liberal interpretation, however, Plaintiff fails to
state a plausible claim for relief against Mike Williams and Melissa Nelson.
Plaintiff alleges that Mike Williams and Melissa Nelson took and kept
his motorcycle without due process of law. Doc. 1-3 at 1-2. A negligent or
intentional deprivation of personal property does not constitute a Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for
the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Plaintiff
alleges forfeiture proceedings were initiated. See Doc. 1-3 at 1-2. Regardless,
however, in Florida, a person whose property has been wrongfully taken or
retained may pursue a state-law claim for theft or conversion against the
offending party. See Fla. Stat. § 772.11(1). Because Plaintiff has meaningful
postdeprivation remedies available for the alleged unlawful retention of his
3
motorcycle, his due process claim is due to be dismissed. See Case v. Eslinger,
555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing Florida’s civil cause of action
for conversion provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy when law
enforcement officers allegedly seize or retain personal property); see also
Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming entry of
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s due process claims because state law and
forfeiture proceedings “provided alternate postdeprivation avenues for
recovery of [the property]”).
Additionally, the claim against Melissa Nelson is due to be dismissed
because prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in
their official capacities. See Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir.
2004). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff names former Sheriff Mike Williams as a
Defendant merely because of the supervisory role he enjoyed at the time of the
alleged violation, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983. See Cottone v.
Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds
by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). See also Brown v. Crawford,
906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that
liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat
superior.”).
4
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Williams and Nelson are
DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate these
Defendants as parties to the action.
2. The Court will direct service of process on the remaining
Defendants by separate order.!
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 14th day of
October 2022.
4 ry
fo /itan— | £ Agra
BRIAN/J . DAVIS
United States District Judge
Jax-6
C:
Jonathon Burns Netherland
1 In determining that the complaint can be served on the officer-Defendants,
the Court makes no findings as to the likelihood of success of any of the claims
Plaintiff asserts or purports to assert against those Defendants. Moreover,
Plaintiff is advised that he may not seek release from prison through a civil
rights action. Generally, a prisoner who seeks to attack the validity of his
conviction must pursue relief through a habeas corpus action. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1978).