Price v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

TIMOTHY DUANE PRICE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:21-cv-1345-EJK

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

ORDER1

This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative

decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), alleging

August 21, 2017, as the disability onset date. (Doc. 26 at 1.) In a decision dated March

9, 2021, the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) found that Plaintiff was not

disabled. (Tr. 23.) Plaintiff has exhausted the available administrative remedies and

the case is properly before this Court. The undersigned has reviewed the record, the

Joint Memorandum (Doc. 26), and the applicable law. Upon consideration, the Court

determines that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be reversed.

1 On October 20, 2021, both parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a

magistrate judge in this case. (Doc. 17.) Accordingly, the case was referred to the

undersigned by an Order of Reference on January 20, 2022. (Doc. 14.)

I. ISSUE ON APPEAL

The sole issue on appeal is whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards

of supportability and consistency in evaluating Dr. Calla’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) questionnaire and whether the ALJ’s ultimate RFC determination is

supported by substantial evidence.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

In Social Security appeals, we must determine whether the

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence

and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is

more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. We may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the

evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the

[Commissioner].

Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and

quotations omitted). “With respect to the Commissioner’s legal conclusions, however,

our review is de novo.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that a comprehensive review of the record does not support

the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Calla’s2 opinion is “unpersuasive” (Doc. 26 at 17)

and that the ALJ’s findings are therefore “not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.

at 25.) The Commissioner argues that “[t]he ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Calla’s

2 Dr. Calla has treated Plaintiff since August 2016 as his primary care physician. (Doc.

26 at 4.)

medical opinion, and substantial evidence supports her conclusion that the opinion is

unpersuasive.” (Id. at 25.)

Under the revised Social Security Administration regulations, the

Commissioner no longer “defer[s] or give[s] any specific evidentiary weight, including

controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical

finding(s), including those from [] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a),

416.920c(a). Rather, the Commissioner must “consider” the “persuasiveness” of all

medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings. Id. To that end, the

Commissioner considers five factors: 1) supportability; 2) consistency; 3) relationship

with the claimant;3 4) specialization and 5) other factors “that tend to support or

contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding.” Id. §§

404.1520c(c); 416.920c(c).

The most important of these factors are supportability and consistency, and the

ALJ must explain the consideration of those two factors. Id. §§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(2);

416.920c(a), (b)(2). The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how he or she

considered the other factors (i.e., relationship with claimant, specialization, and “other

factors”). Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2); 416.920c(b)(2). In assessing the supportability and

consistency of a medical opinion, the regulations provide that the ALJ need only

explain the consideration of these factors on a source-by-source basis—the regulations

3 This factor combines consideration of the following issues: length of the treatment

relationship, frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment relationship, extent

of the treatment relationship, and examining relationship. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(c)(3)(i)–(v); 416.920c(c)(3)(i)–(v).

themselves do not require the ALJ to explain the consideration of each opinion from

the same source. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(1); 416.920c(b)(1). The regulations state:

[W]hen a medical source provides multiple medical

opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), we

will articulate how we considered the medical opinions or

prior administrative medical findings from the medical

source together in a single analysis using the factors listed

in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as

appropriate. We are not required to articulate how we

considered each medical opinion or prior administrative

finding from one medical source individually.

Id. In sum, the ALJ’s analysis is directed to whether the medical source’s opinion is

supported by the source’s own records and consistent with the other evidence of

record.

In August 2020, Dr. Calla opined that Plaintiff could not lift or carry more than

10 pounds, could not sit for more than two hours during the course of a workday, and

for no more than one hour at a time, and that Plaintiff would need to miss more than

four workdays per month. (Tr. 393–97.) The ALJ found Dr. Calla’s medical opinions

to be inconsistent with the record as a whole, ultimately concluding:

The record has documented improvement in the claimant’s

functioning. For example, a December 4, 2020, entry noted

the claimant’s gait was wide-based, but that he was able to

ambulate with a cane, and maintained intact sensation and

normal deep tendon reflexes. A monofilament test was

intact (Ex. 10F, page 4). November 13, 2020, entry noted

that claimant maintained active dorsi- and plantar-flexion,

as well as inversion and eversion. The claimant’s gait was

antalgic, similar to earlier entries, but he was ambulatory

(Ex. 11F, page 1). A November 4, 2020, entry noted normal

curvature in the claimant’s back, and that he retained

normal muscle tone and strength, with normal movement

in his extremities, without evidence of edema or cyanosis,

which is iconsistent [sic] with Dr. Calla’s conclusions

concerning the claimant’s ability to life and carry. Again,

the claimant was able to ambulate with a cane. . . . A July

7, 2020, examination noted that claimant’s left foot

tenderness and limited range of motion, but also that

claimant was able to ambulate with a cane. The claimant’s

sensation remained intact, and he had normal motor

strength and muscle tone, along with full range of motion

in his neck and normal curvature in his back (Ex. B7F, page

8; and B10F, page 15).

(Tr. 21.)

The ALJ’s analysis does not sufficiently explain how Dr. Calla’s opinions as to

Plaintiff’s ability to lift weight and sit while at work contradict the record as a whole.

More importantly, even if the undersigned were to find the ALJ’s analysis to be

sufficient as to the consistency factor, the ALJ wholly failed to articulate how his

reasoning is related to the supportability factor, or otherwise explain his consideration

of the factor. Hanna v. Astrue, 395 F. App’x 634, 636 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ must

state the grounds for his decision with clarity to enable us to conduct meaningful

review.”); Flentroy-Tennant v. Astrue, No. 3:07-cv-101-J-TEM, 2008 WL 876961, at *8

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2008) (“An ALJ is required to build an accurate and logical bridge

from the evidence to his or her conclusion.”).

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s conclusion was in line with a

supportability and consistency analysis (Doc. 26 at 30); however, the Court may not

decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of

the Commissioner. Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).

Because the ALJ did not fully explain her consideration of consistency and failed to

address supportability in relation to Dr. Calla’s opinion, the undersigned is unable to

say the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. Brown v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-cv-840-Orl-GJK, 2021 WL 2917562, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2021)

(noting that when evaluating medical opinions under the new regulations, the ALJ

must “explain his decision, particularly with respect to supportability and consistency”)

(emphasis in original). Additionally, although the Commissioner has examined the

record and attempts to provide support for the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Calla’s

opinions, such post-hoc rationalizations do not provide the basis for judicial review of

an administrative decision. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983); Baker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 384 Fed. Appx. 893, 896

(11th Cir. 2010).

Since the Court finds reversal is warranted based on the ALJ’s error, the

undersigned need not consider Plaintiff’s remaining arguments at this time. See

McClurkin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 625 F. App’x 960, 963 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that

the claimant’s other assignments of error will not be discussed since the court already

found grounds for reversal).

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that:

1. The Commissioner’s final decision in this case is REVERSED AND

REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff

and CLOSE the file.

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on September 22, 2022.

gM KIDD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE