English v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOHN WAYNE ENGLISH,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-336-MCR

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

/

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an

administrative decision denying his application for supplemental security

income (“SSI”). Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on November 25, 2014,

alleging disability beginning April 20, 2014. (Tr. 149, 328.) The Agency

denied Plaintiff’s claims both initially and upon consideration. (Tr. 201, 206.)

Upon Plaintiff’s request, Plaintiff testified at a hearing held on July 24, 2017,

before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mallette Richey. (Tr. 37-80.) ALJ

Richey issued an unfavorable decision on October 3, 2017, finding Plaintiff

limited to light work, and determining he was not disabled. (Tr. 182-86.)

1 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States

Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 16.)

Plaintiff requested review of ALJ Richey’s decision, which the Appeals

Council (“AC”) granted on March 7, 2019. (Tr. 194-95.) The AC found that

remand was warranted because the ALJ did not evaluate evidence from

Putnam Community Medical Center. (Tr. 194.) On remand, Plaintiff

appeared telephonically on April 7, 2020, before ALJ Kelley Fitzgerald. (Tr.

15.) On May 6, 2020, ALJ Fitzgerald issued a second unfavorable decision.

(Tr. 15-28.) Plaintiff then timely filed a Complaint with this Court. (Doc. 1.)

Based on a review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, the

Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

I. Standard

The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841

F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner’s findings

are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

390 (1971). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th

Cir. 2004). Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have

reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that

the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v.

Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d

1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a

whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the

decision. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery

v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court must

scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the

Commissioner’s factual findings).

II. Discussion

Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he

ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination is unsupported by

substantial evidence as it fails to complete a function-by-function analysis of

Plaintiff’s ability to stand and walk prior to 2020.” (Doc. 27 at 10.) Plaintiff

asserts that the ALJ “did not explain Plaintiff’s limitations in regards [sic] to

standing and walking prior to April of 2020.” (Id. at 11.) Second, Plaintiff

argues that “[t]he ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is

unsupported by substantial evidence and rooted in legal error.” (Id. at 14.)

As to the first issue, Defendant responds as follows:

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s argument fails because even

if his contentions were unquestioningly accepted, the ALJ used

the testimony of the vocational expert to determine that

Plaintiff’s additional walking limitations were not disabling.

Meaning even if Plaintiff’s limitation to walking for 2 hours in an

8-hour day and only 15 minutes at a time were extended

throughout the entire relevant period, substantial evidence would

still support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform the

duties of an inspector, hand packager, and ticket taker and was

therefore not disabled. Plaintiff does not contend that he had

additional restrictions in walking, nor does he allege the ALJ

made any error in relying on the vocational expert’s testimony.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ did not

comply with SSR 96-8p because she did not make a “function-by-

function inquiry” in assessing his walking ability prior to April

2020 is meritless. The ALJ’s RFC assessment is, in fact, a

“function-by-function” assessment and complies with the proper

legal standards, including SSR 96-8p. Given the definition of

light work in the regulations and rulings and the ALJ’s

discussion of the record evidence, the ALJ was not required to

further discuss Plaintiff’s ability to perform the exertional

demands of light work.

(Doc. 30 at 13-14 (internal citations omitted).)

A. Relevant Evidence of Record

1. Azalea Health Records

From June 13, 2013, through July 25, 2014, Plaintiff treated at Azalea

Health. (Tr. 571-595.) On June 13, 2013, Plaintiff complained of back pain

after his shoe got caught on a gate causing him to fall on a hard surface. (Tr.

592.) Plaintiff also stated that his fibromyalgia worsened after the fall. (Id.)

Upon inspection and palpitation, Dr. Emilio Gonzalez noted that Plaintiff had

muscle spasms throughout his spine and moderate pain with motion. (Tr.

594.) Dr. Gonzalez instructed Plaintiff to avoid heavy lifting, bending, and

heights, and to rest, ice, stretch, and walk for exercise. (Tr. 595.) On July 24,

2013, Plaintiff returned, complaining of worsening back pain and that Lortab

was not helping his pain. (Tr. 589.) Upon inspection, Dr. Gonzalez noted

that Plaintiff had muscle spasm in his thoracic spine and severe pain with

range of motion. (Tr. 590.) Dr. Gonzalez again advised Plaintiff to avoid

heavy lifting, bending, and heights, to rest, ice, stretch, walk for exercise, and

lose weight. (Tr. 591.)

On August 30, 2013, Dr. Gonzalez told Plaintiff to forego taking HCTZ

because it caused his gout to flare up. (Tr. 586, 589.) On November 26,

2013, Plaintiff presented with complaints of fibromyalgia, gout, and chronic

back pain, and he also requested a referral to a pain specialist. (Tr. 582.) At

this visit, Dr. Gonzalez advised Plaintiff to exercise at least three times per

week for more than 20 minutes, specifically power walking, and increasing

his aerobic and weight bearing exercise. (Tr. 585.) On December 2, 2014,

Plaintiff complained of gout and pain in the lower leg joint. (Tr. 575.)

Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal notes revealed moderate pain with motion,

moderately reduced range of motion, and swelling and tenderness in his

knees. (Tr. 578-79.) Dr. Gonzalez instructed Plaintiff to use a warm towel

over the painful area and moist heat for 20-30 minutes every two hours while

awake for three days. (Id. at 579.)

2. Robert B. Dehgan, M.D., Jacksonville

Multispecialty Group

Upon referral by Dr. Gonzalez, on January 27, 2014, Plaintiff began

treating with Dr. Robert B. Dehgan, a pain specialist with Jacksonville

Multispecialty Group. (Tr. 629.) Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal exam revealed

no swelling, no tenderness of the axial and peripheral joints, no tenderness to

palpitation with full range of motion in the hands, wrists, elbows, and hips,

but tenderness to palpitation in his knees. (Tr. 629, 630.) On March 24,

2014, Plaintiff’s examination revealed mild to moderate right knee swelling,

tenderness in the medial and lateral joint, normal range of motion in the

knees, and pain in the right foot and ankle. (Tr. 623.) During the July 14,

2014 general examination, Dr. Dehgan noted that Plaintiff had moderate

tenderness on the lumbar paraspinals and buttocks, pain with forward

flexion, difficulty standing because of pain in his ankle and right knee, and

positive straight leg raises bilaterally. (Tr. 610.)

3. Miguel Dejuk, M.D.

From June 14, 2016 through June 5, 2017, Plaintiff treated with Dr.

Miguel Dejuk. (Tr. 688-726.) On June 14, 2016, Plaintiff needed pain

medication refills. (Tr. 724.) Dr. Dejuk noted that Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal

exam was unremarkable, and that Plaintiff was moving all limbs well. (Tr.

725.) Plaintiff stated that he bought a step counter and had been using it to

“push [himself] to walk.” (Tr. 724.) On July 5, 2016, Plaintiff appeared

needing a check-up and Lortabs and Flexeril refills for his back pain. (Tr.

722.) Dr. Dejuk again noted that Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal exam was

unremarkable, and that Plaintiff moved his limbs well. (Tr. 723.) On

September 23, 2016, Plaintiff presented with complaints of gout flare up with

pain in both legs and swelling in his feet. (Tr. 714.)

B. The ALJ’s Decision

At step two of the sequential evaluation process2, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: gout, fibromyalgia, knee

osteoarthritis, and obesity. (Tr. 18.) At step three, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Id.)

Then, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff

had the RFC was as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 416.967(b) except with no more than

occasional climbing [of] ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping,

kneeling, crouching, crawling, and no climbing [of] ladders[,]

ropes[,] and scaffolds. He should avoid concentrated exposure to

cold, wetness, vibrations, and hazards[,] such as moving

machinery and unprotected heights. As of April 2020, the

claimant can walk no more than two hours in an eight hour [sic]

workday for no more than 15 minutes at a time.

(Id.)

In making this determination, the ALJ discussed the evidence of

record. (Tr. 20-26.) She found that while Plaintiff’s medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, his

2 The Commissioner employs a five-step process in determining disability.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those

symptoms were “not entirely supported for the reasons explained in [the]

decision.” (Tr. 19.) Then, after determining that Plaintiff was unable to

perform any past relevant work, at the fifth and final step of the sequential

evaluation process, the ALJ found that there were jobs existing in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform such as

inspector, hand packager, and ticket taker. (Tr. 27.)

C. Standard for Evaluating Subjective Pain Testimony

When a claimant seeks to establish disability through his own

testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms, the Eleventh Circuit’s three-

part “pain standard” applies. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.

1991) (per curiam). “If the ALJ decides not to credit such testimony, he must

articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Id.

The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical

condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms

the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3)

that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a

severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the

alleged pain.

Id.

Once a claimant establishes that his pain is disabling through objective

medical evidence from an acceptable medical source that shows a medical

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

symptoms, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a), “all evidence about the

intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of pain or other

symptoms must be considered in addition to the medical signs and laboratory

findings in deciding the issue of disability,” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561. See also

SSR 16-3p3 (stating that after the ALJ finds a medically determinable

impairment exists, the ALJ must analyze “the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms” to determine “the extent to

which an individual’s symptoms limit his or her ability to perform work-

related activities”).

As stated in SSR 16-3p:

In considering the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of

an individual’s symptoms, [the ALJ must] examine the entire

case record, including the objective medical evidence; an

individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information

provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other

relevant evidence in the individual’s case record.

. . .

In evaluating an individual’s symptoms, it is not sufficient for our

adjudicators to make a single, conclusory statement that “the

individual’s statements about his or her symptoms have been

considered” or that “the statements about the individual’s

symptoms are (or are not) supported or consistent.” It is also not

3 SSR 16-3p rescinded and superseded SSR 96-7p, eliminating the use of the

term “credibility,” and clarifying that “subjective symptom evaluation is not an

examination of an individual’s character.” SSR 16-3p.

enough for our adjudicators simply to recite the factors described

in the regulations for evaluating symptoms.4 The determination

or decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to

the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by

the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any

subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated

the individual’s symptoms.

. . .

In evaluating an individual’s symptoms, our adjudicators will not

assess an individual’s overall character or truthfulness in the

manner typically used during an adversarial court litigation. The

focus of the evaluation of an individual’s symptoms should not be

to determine whether he or she is a truthful person. Rather, our

adjudicators will focus on whether the evidence establishes a

medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be

expected to produce the individual’s symptoms and given the

adjudicator’s evaluation of the individual’s symptoms, whether

the intensity and persistence of the symptoms limit the

individual’s ability to perform work-related activities[.]

SSR 16-3p.

“[A]n individual’s attempts to seek medical treatment for symptoms

and to follow treatment once it is prescribed” will also be considered “when

evaluating whether symptom intensity and persistence affect the ability to

4 These factors include: (1) a claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location,

duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms; (3) any

precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side

effects of any medication taken to alleviate the claimant’s pain or other symptoms;

(5) any treatment, other than medication, received by the claimant to relieve the

pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures (other than treatment) used to relieve the

pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20

minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and (7) any other factors concerning

the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other

symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3); SSR 16-3p.

perform work-related activities.” Id. “[I]f the frequency or extent of the

treatment sought by an individual is not comparable with the degree of the

individual’s subjective complaints, or if the individual fails to follow

prescribed treatment that might improve symptoms, [the adjudicator] may

find the alleged intensity and persistence of an individual’s symptoms are

inconsistent with the overall evidence of record.” Id. However, the

adjudicator “will not find an individual’s symptoms inconsistent with the

evidence in the record on this basis without considering possible reasons he

or she may not comply with treatment or seek treatment consistent with the

degree of his or her complaints.” Id. In considering an individual’s treatment

history, the adjudicator may consider, inter alia, one or more of the following:

• That the individual may have structured his or her

activities to minimize symptoms to a tolerable level by

avoiding physical activities or mental stressors that

aggravate his or her symptoms;

• That the individual may receive periodic treatment or

evaluation for refills of medications because his or her

symptoms have reached a plateau;

• That the individual may not agree to take prescription

medications because the side effects are less tolerable than

the symptoms;

• That the individual may not be able to afford treatment

and may not have access to free or low-cost medical

services;

• That a medical source may have advised the individual

that there is no further effective treatment to prescribe or

recommend that would benefit the individual;

• That due to various limitations (such as language or mental

limitations), the individual may not understand the

appropriate treatment for or the need for consistent

treatment.

Id.

D. Analysis

As to the first issue, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination

is supported by substantial evidence. A claimant’s RFC is the most a

claimant can still do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.645(a)(1). The

assessment of a claimant’s RFC must be based on all the relevant medical

and other evidence in the record. Id. An ALJ’s decision must state his RFC

determination and provide the supporting rationale for it. In determining a

claimant’s RFC, Social Security Ruling 96-8p requires the ALJ to perform a

function-by-function analysis. The ruling states that the “RFC assessment

must . . . assess [the individual’s] work-related abilities on a function-by-

function basis.” Id. Moreover, while SSR 96-8p requires consideration of all

evidence, it does not require that the ALJ expressly address each functional

ability in her decision. See Freeman v. Barnhart, 220 Fed. Appx. 957 (11th

Cir. 2007) (explaining that complying with SSR 96-8p's function-by

function requirement does not require the ALJ to be specific or explicit in his

findings for the RFC assessment so long as he considers all of the evidence

and whether it supports the level of disability claimed); see also Allen v.

Astrue, No. 09-00496-B, 2010 WL 1658811, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 21, 2010);

Gully v. Astrue, No. 1:08cv245-WC, 2009 WL 1580416, at *4 (M.D. Ala. June

3, 2009) (“[W]here the ALJ has considered all available relevant evidence

pertaining to the claimant's functional limitations, the failure to specifically

and explicitly discuss the ALJ's assessment of the claimant's work-related

abilities on a function-by-function basis does not require reversal.”) (internal

quotations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “did not explain Plaintiff’s

limitations in regards [sic] to standing and walking prior to April of 2020.”

(Doc. 27 at 11.) However, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument

that the ALJ failed to describe Plaintiff’s functional capacity for the six years

prior to March 2020. Although the ALJ stated “[a]s of April 2020, the

claimant can walk no more than two hours in an eight-hour workday for no

more than 15 minutes at a time,” (Tr. 18), the ALJ carefully considered the

entire medical record, beginning with the alleged onset date and beyond.

(See Tr. 20-26.) Additionally, the ALJ began her decision by referencing the

correct alleged onset date—April 20, 2014. (Tr. 16, 17.) As such, it appears

that the ALJ’s reference to “as of April 2020,” in Plaintiff’s RFC was perhaps

a harmless typo at best.

The ALJ’s RFC determination is further supported by the state agency

medical consultant’s opinion, which included a function-by-function

assessment of Plaintiff’s exertional limitations. (Tr. 26, 169-173.) As of

March 18, 2015, Dr. Suzanne Johnson opined that Plaintiff could stand

and/or walk for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday and sit for

approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 169.) The ALJ’s RFC

determination is also supported by medical records from Plaintiff’s treating

physicians. (See Tr. 623, 629, 630 (listing Dr. Dehgan’s examination notes

from January 27, 2014 to July 14, 2014, noting Plaintiff’s swelling and pain

ranging from mild to moderate); Tr. 688-726 (listing Dr. Dejuk’s examination

notes from June 14, 2016 to June 5, 2017, noting Plaintiff’s unremarkable

musculoskeletal exam and Plaintiff’s ability to move his limbs well).)

Moreover, the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony constitutes

substantial evidence because the ALJ’s hypothetical questioning during the

hearing included all of Plaintiff’s impairments. “In order for a vocational

expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence the ALJ must pose a

hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant's impairments.”

See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir.2002). Here, the ALJ

posed hypothetical questions that encompassed Plaintiff’s impairments and

limitations, and the VE testified that the hand packager and inspector jobs

would remain available. (Tr. 113-14.) Thus, in light of the state agency

medical consultant’s functional opinion, Plaintiff’s treating physicians’ notes,

and the VE’s testimony, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC

determination.

As to the second issue, the Court finds that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The ALJ

made specific findings as to Plaintiff’s credibility and concluded that his

“complaints [were not] completely dismissed, but rather, [were] included in

the [RFC] to the extent that they [were] consistent with the evidence as a

whole.” (Tr. 26.) Additionally, the Court finds that the ALJ’s statement that

Plaintiff’s allegations are not supported by any treating provider (Tr. 19) was

harmless error at most. Plaintiff points to two treating physicians’ notes that

purportedly contradict this statement. First, Plaintiff cites to Dr. Dejuk’s

undated letter, which states that “[Plaintiff’s] medical condition has made it

unable [sic] for him to work permanently.” (Tr. 650.) However, the ALJ

considered this letter, but gave it no weight reasoning that it was on an issue

reserved for the Commissioner and that Dr. Dejuk’s opinion dramatically

contrasted with his treatment notes showing normal examinations during the

entire treatment period. (Tr. 26.) Thus, the ALJ was entitled to discount Dr.

Dejuk’s conclusory letter to the contrary. Next, Plaintiff points to Dr. Baird’s

December 2018 notation that Plaintiff had “functional disability from his left

knee joint” to contradict the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints.5 However, “[a] claimant's residual functional capacity is a matter

5 Dr. Dejuk’s letter and Dr. Baird’s remark appear to be conclusions on an

issue reserved for the Commissioner.

reserved for the ALJ's determination, and while a physician's opinion on the

matter will be considered, it is not dispositive.” Beegle v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

Com'r, 482 F. App'x 483, 486 (11th Cir. 2012). Thus, this single remark by

Dr. Baird does not outweigh the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s

determination that Plaintiff’s impairments were not as limiting as he

claimed.

Particularly regarding Plaintiff’s ability to walk, the ALJ’s decision to

discredit Plaintiff’s testimony is further supported by Plaintiff’s physical

examinations repeatedly revealing no edema, negative bilateral straight leg

raises, and a stiff gait with normal balance. (See Tr. 679, 667, 661, 656.)

Additionally, Dr. Alea6 with Azalea Health declined to refill Plaintiff’s

hydrocodone and morphine because he “[did] not see a need,” and “strongly

recommend[ed] pain clinics for evaluation and therapy.” (Tr. 670.) Dr. Alea

also noted that Plaintiff was still overweight, and his eating habits were not

helpful. (Id.)

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the

ALJ’s findings regarding his fibromyalgia. The Court disagrees. Contrary to

Plaintiff’s arguments, it appears the absence of objective findings was not the

6 The ALJ and Defendant both incorrectly state that Dr. Gonzalez declined to

refill Plaintiff’s medications, but the record shows that Dr. Michael Alea was the

medical provider during Plaintiff’s June 15, 2015 visit. (Tr. 673.)

basis for the ALJ’s negative credibility determination. Instead, the ALJ

based his findings on the overwhelming evidence that revealed unremarkable

physical examinations as well as Plaintiff’s inconsistencies between his

descriptions of daily activities and his claims of infirmity. Specifically,

throughout the decision, the ALJ highlighted three occasions where (after his

fibromyalgia diagnosis), Plaintiff sought medical treatment after physical

exertion surpassing his alleged capabilities. (See, e.g., Tr. 20-21 (ALJ

discussing December 2015 Putnam Community Medical Center visit where

Plaintiff presented with neck and back pain after lifting a heavy object); Tr.

21 (ALJ discussing March 2016 Putnam Community Medical Center visit

where Plaintiff presented with upper back pain after working out in the

heat); Tr. 24 (ALJ discussing October 2019 Putnam Community Medical

Center visit where Plaintiff presented with back pain after moving a

mattress).) Plaintiff himself even testified that his gout was the “bigger

problem” relative to his alleged inability to work.7

7 Plaintiff’s April 7, 2020 hearing testimony was in relevant part as

follows:

Q. [Y]ou have gout, sir? So, gout was the primary reason why

you were unable to work starting in April of 2014?

A. [M]a’am, it was the gout as well as the fibromyalgia. This is

what I was having with my back.

Q. Okay. Well, which one would you say is the –

A. It’s bad.

Q. Which one is the bigger problem?

In light of the ALJ’s discussion of fibromyalgia, the Court rejects

Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ “disregarded the nuances associated with

fibromyalgia completely.” (Doc. 27 at 22-23.) The ALJ implicitly credited

some of Plaintiff’s alleged pain due to fibromyalgia by concluding that his

fibromyalgia constituted a severe impairment. See Laurey v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 632 F. App'x 978, 988 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that “[t]he mere fact that

the ALJ determined that Laurey's fibromyalgia was a “severe impairment,”

however, does not mean that the ALJ was required to attribute severe pain to

her fibromyalgia.”).) Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

credibility determination as it relates to Plaintiff’s subjective pain

allegations.

III. Conclusion

The Court does not make independent factual determinations, re-weigh

the evidence, or substitute its decision for that of the ALJ. Thus, the

question is not whether the Court would have arrived at the same decision on

de novo review; rather, the Court’s review is limited to determining whether

the ALJ’s findings are based on correct legal standards and supported by

substantial evidence. Based on this standard of review, the ALJ’s decision

A. The gout was the one that cause me to be immobilized that I

couldn’t go out because it would keep me from walking for days. . . .

(Tr. 102.)

that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act

for the time period in question should be affirmed.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly,

terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on September 7,

2022.

: MONTE C. RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

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